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Abstract
m
Tliis thesis starts fiom the point of departure of asking why Aesthetic Theory is difficult to 
read. In answering this question it is argued that the difficulty of the work is a function of the 
unusual claims Adorno makes about the relation between art and philosophy, and that the 
presentation of these arguments exemphfies these claims. This complimentary relation 
between form and content has implications for the way Adorno can be understood as 
engaging the idea of mimesis. Aesthetic Theory should be understood as a theory of mimesis 
in modern art and as a mimetic work itself. Given this idea, the question of the readability of 
the work emerges as inseparable from the explicit claims Adorno makes for mimesis. If the 
work ultimately cannot be understood because Adorno does not define his concepts, or it is 
unexplainable for any other reason, then mimesis will be shown to be untenable.
The issue of the readabihty of Aesthetic Theory is explored in the Introduction through a 
discussion of issues arising from the recent histoiy of Adorno’s reception. Particular attention 
is paid to the differences between critics who have emphasised the significance of the 
particular claims Adorno makes against those who emphasise his method. Chapter I rejects 
this distinction while it argues that the character of Adorno’s wiiting is uneven. I hat is to 
say, Aesthetic Theory cannot usefully he read in a uniform way. Chapter I considers dilièrent 
aspects of this lack of uniformity and argues that the identity of Aesthetic Theory as 
‘philosophy’ is often tenuous as it moves in and out of other modes of argument.
Chapters 2 and 3 look at different aspects of the identity of Aesthetic Theory as 
pliilosophy. Chapter 2 ext)lains the strategic significance of the work as a continuation of a 
tradition of philosophy from Hegel onwards. This tradition, it is argued, has explicitly 
understood the problem of philosophy as recognising itself as experience while it attempts to 
describe exjjerience. Chapter 3 extends this theme into a consideration of philosophical f orm. 
If philosophy is understood as a mode of experience then its form as well as its content is 
significant. Through a consideration of Heidegger and Derrida, Chapter 3 examines (he 
uniqueness of the philosophical fonu of Aesthetic Theory. Having made this distinction. 
Chapter 4 reads Aesthetic Theory as philosophical form, describing aspects of it as mimetic. 
Chapters 5 and 6 then give detailed readings of parts of Aesthetic Theory which are 
particularly relevant for an understanding of Adonio’s theoiy of the mimetic potential of 
modern art. The concluding chapter argues that the internal consistency of Aesthetic Theory 
in its practice and definition of the crisis of mimesis in modernism has significant implications 
for the practice of art history and criticism of twentieth-century art.
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Introduction 
ADORNO’S RECENT RECEPTION
In the Introduction to No. 56 of New German Critique and in a srnnlai discussion in 
his book Prismatic Thought, Peter Hohendahl takes a usefully synoptic view of recent 
criticism of Adorno. Broadly speaking, he describes the recent reception of Adorno as kind 
of extended debate about how to read his work. ^  The problem of reception has always been 
an issue, because Adorno the writer is preoccupied with the idea of making his reader aware 
of what is going on in the reception of his arguments. This is a facet of his production which 
derives from a closeness to Hegel. Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit does not simply describe 
experience, but organises its arguments in a way which seeks to exemplify the process it 
describes. It is the insight that Adorno’s wiiting, like Hegel’s, is not simply ‘saying’ what it 
means, but ‘showing’ what it means, that generates commentaiy such as Gihian Rose’s: “It is 
impossible to understand Adorno's ideas without understanding the ways in which he 
presents them...”^
What Hohendahl is saying, however, is shghtly different. He situates his remarks in 
the context of a discussion of the recent American reception of Adorno’s work, of a “retxmt 
to Adomo after years of relative neglect”, and the diagnosis of something of a crisis in his 
reception: “a growing awareness now that Adomo criticism cannot continue in its traditional 
foim”. Without going into the specifics of his argument, Hohendahl claims there is a new 
awareness of “the interface between readmg and appropriation” of Adorno’s work.
 ^Peter Hohendahl, “Adorno Criticism Today”, New German Critique 56 (Spring-Summer 1992), pp. 3-16.
 ^Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: An Inh'oduction to the Thought o f  Theodor W. Adomo, (London:
Macmillan, 1978) p. 11.
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If Hohendahl’s diagnosis of a renewed emphasis on Adomo’s importance for the 
present represents anything hke a new phase in his reception, it is in marked contrast to the 
general tone and dhection of the work through which Adorno’s posthumous reputation 
developed. Various well known figures have produced poweidul arguments to the effect that 
central aspects of Adorno’s position have made his work obsolete. Indeed, despite the many 
different facets of Adorno’s reception, the idea of Ins obsolescence is a remarkably persistent 
theme. For example, Habermas’ critique of Adomo as a Nietzschean mationalist, is often 
thought of as a move in the developing histoiy of Critical Tlieoiy.^ If Critical Theoiy is thus 
represented as a developing whole, embracing the work of both Adorno and Habermas, 
among others, then Critical Theory provides the context where Habermas’ argument can be 
read as superseding Adomo. Habermas’ argument supersedes Adorno because of its specific 
criticisms of Adomo, but also by virtue of Habermas’ identity as a member of the ‘second 
generation’ of Critical Theorists.
More widespread diagnoses of Adorno’s obsolescence are arguments which 
emphasise the extent to which his work is perceived to be inextricable fiom the particular 
cultur al, social, and pohtical conditions of its emergence. These arguments claim, in various 
ways, that the objects of Adorno’s critique have changed to the extent that his work is no 
longer relevant. For example. Axel Honneth expresses a common view of Adomo when he 
argues that the co-ordinates of Adorno’s thought were established in the 1930’s with the 
critique of Nazi Germany. The issues which seemed pressing at the time are no longer- 
relevant as premises of the critique of more recent, complex, and diverse manifestations of 
Western capitalism.^ A similar principle motivates Peter Burger’s critique of Adorno’s
 ^Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 
1987), pp. 106-130.
Honneth argues
From the perspective of a philosophical-historical inteipretation of fascism, the critical 
theoiy of Adorno's post war writings surveys the Germany restored by capitalism. The
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aesthetics. Burger argues that Adorno did not imderstand art as an institution. Adorno’s 
oversight is compounded by history because, according to Burger, the institutional dimension 
of art has become determining since Adomo was writing.^ Adomo’s obsolescence has also 
been reinforced by the impact of poststructurahsm. While sometimes admhnig Adorno’s 
critique of the idea of subjectivity, more sophisticated poststructmahst readings of him 
imder stand his critique of the possibihty of the idea of subjectivity to be “half-hearted”, by 
comparison with its own, ostensibly more radical claims.^
Above and beyond these critiques of aspects of Adomo’s position, certam, apparently 
definitive, problems with his thought have emerged, particularly with regard to his views on 
art. These criticisms coalesce ar ound the idea of Adomo as a high modernist, emphasising his 
ehtism, particularly as it is e^qrressed in his claims for the significance of ‘autonomous’ art as 
distinct fiom mass culture. Taken with the widespread perception of Adorno’s pohtical 
quietism, in the period before his death in the late 1960’s while Aesthetic Theory was being 
written, and the subsequent emergence of postmodernism as an idea of culture, it would 
appear that there are ample reasons for understanding Adorno’s work as having httle more 
than historical interest.
Some of these criticisms are justifiable, some are less so, but if, as Hohendahl 
suggests, there is new interest in Adorno, not as a historical figure not because of his 
historical interest, but because of the immediate relevance of his theory, then the multiple
theory is in a paradoxical situation; it is equipped with the conceptual tools for an analysis 
of totalitarian domination, although these are not obviously useful for an investigation of 
the nonnal form of capitalist domination.
Axel Honneth, The Critique o f Power: Reflective stages in a Critical Theory, trans. Kenneth 
Baynes,(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1991) p. 58.
 ^See, for example, Peter Bürger, “Aporias of Modern Aesthetics”, New Left Review 184 (Nov/Dec 1990), pp. 
47-58.
 ^See Jean-François Lyotard, “Adorno as the Devil”, trans. Robert Hurley, Telos 19 (Spring 1974), pp. 127- 
137. Wellmer uses the term “half-hearted” to describe Adorno’s reception by poststructuralists in Albrecht 
Welmer “On the Dialectic of Modernism and Postmodernism”, trans. David Roberts, Praxis International 
(Jan 1985), p. 339.
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obsolescences of his reputation need to be confronted. It is in divergences between different 
attempts to disprove Adorno’s obsolescence, that the question of the “intersection between 
reading and appropriation”, develops a particular uigency. Hohendahl identifies various 
defences of Adomo, but the mutually coiTosive positions of HuUot-Kentor and Fredric - 
Jameson are particularly interesting because, despite then differences, both counter the idea 
of Adorno’s obsolescence with the exphcit claim that, as Hohendahl puts it; “the tiue Adorno 
has yet to be discovered...”  ^ As such, they can be said to represent two extremes of a 
spectrum of arguments which attempt to defend Adomo, and then comparison highhghts the 
major issues and difficulties of any attempt to define Adomo’s contemporaiy relevance.
HuUot-Kentor reading Adorno
Hohendahl cites Robert HuUot-Kentor as exemplifying a strategy which: “describes or 
evaluates criticism of Adomo as intentional or unintentional misreadhigs caused by the 
particular biases of Adomo’s critics”, which comes with an “insistence on the absolute truth 
value of Adomo’s theory”.^  It is not difficult to understand how Hohendahl anived at this 
analysis of HuUot-Kentor’s position. One of HuUot-Kentor’s papers, “Back to Adomo”, 
begms “The only legitimate ‘back to’ is one that caUs for a retum to what was never reached 
in the first place, which is the case with Adomo’s work”.^  HuUot-Kentor cites 
deconstmction, bad translation, and Habeimas, as being the major obstacles to the proper 
understanding of, in this instance. Dialectic o f Enlightenment. HuUot-Kentor’s method uses 
various devices to unearth what Adomo reaUy meant to say, involving the detaUed refutation 
of aU those eiTors which he identifies as standing in the way of tme understanding. For 
example, in chaUenging Habeimas’ misreading of Dialectic o f Enlightenment, he gets
’ Peter Hohendalil, “Adorno Criticism Today”, p. 10.
® Peter Hohendahl, “Adorno Criticism Today”, p. 10.
 ^Robert Huliot-Kentor, “Back to Adorno”, Telos 81 (Fail 1989), pp. 5-29.
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involved with an argument about which parts of that jointly wiitten work are attributable to 
Horkheimer and which to Adorno. He criticises the conclusions of the editor of Horkheimer’s 
collected works for his “positivistic philology” in paying the wrong kind of attention to 
handwiiting on the typescripts of Dialectic o f Enlightenment, and thereby misunderstanding 
the importance of “collective dictation and intense discussion” in producing the final text.
The authority of this kind of detail derives fiom the accumulation of emphical 
evidence to explain a misreadhig of Adomo, followed up with emphatic claims for the coii ect 
reading of certain important passages or concepts. This, in tum, generates wider claims 
which seive to remfbrce HuUot-Kentor’s premise that the true Adomo has rarely, if ever been 
accessed. Thus, the final sentence of “Back to Adomo” reads “mistranslations must be sorted 
out before any real discussion of this pivotal text of Critical Theoiy can proceed in the 
EngUsh-speakhig world”.
What are the impUcations of takhig HuUot-Kentor’s arguments seriously? His 
procedure impUes the removal of Adomo out of the history of his reception, as it has thus far 
developed, and into the histoiy of phUosophy. That is to say, it is to move Adomo out of the 
exigencies of a Uving context where he can be used, appropriated, or misread, and into a 
phUosophical context where a firmly estabUshed series of truth claims can be conectly and 
objectively identified. Once this ‘translation’ has heen effected, Adomo’s thought acliieves 
the cmiency of the great phUosophy, against which he can be measm ed, and his real status 
emerge. On the teims withhi which he operates, HuUot-Kentor’s arguments are hard to 
refute, but what makes reading him on Adomo so odd, is that he clearly grasps a lot of what 
Adomo has to say, but there is no indication that the manner of his argument is in any way
Robert Huliot-Kentor, “Back to Adorno”, p. 29.
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infected by the imphcations of Adorno’s argument. This is quite proper. Huliot-Kentor is an 
exemplary academic reader of Adomo; he remams objective and sticks to the facts.
These claims about the imphcations of HuUot-Kentor’s method can be fiuther 
explained thiough their contrast with Jameson’s Late Marxism: Adorno or the Persistence o f 
the Dialectic. The parameters of Jameson’s defence of Adomo derive fi om an argument that 
can be thought of as the inversion of Honneth’s critique, described above. That is to say, 
Jameson argues that capitaUst society has changed, not to make Adomo melevant, but to 
make him relevant again. We saw with HuUot-Kentor that the key to the tme meaning of 
Adomo is in the hands of the objective critic/translator. For Jameson, with liis particular 
brand of historical materialism, the meaning of a text is a fimction of changes in the 
materially defined conditions of its reception.
If this definitively separates their respective understandings of the ‘location’ of 
meaning, and therefore then methods of readmg, there is another, more important difference. 
For HuUot-Kentor, the problem is about being conect in imderstandmg what Adomo said. 
This is detached fiom the consideration of what it might mean for such an idea of 
correctness, if what Adomo says about ‘tmth’ is taken seriously. It is pomtless to ask the 
second question, on HuUot-Kentor’s teims, because we do not yet have the necessaiy raw 
material qua the conect text, to answer it. Taking Adomo seriously.both antecedes and 
succeeds HuUot-Kentor’s critique. It antecedes critique, because otheiwise there would be no 
motivation for bothering to work out what Adomo reaUy meant. It succeeds critique, because 
only after HuUot-Kentor’s revelation of conect meaning are we given the equipment to giasp 
Adomo as tme. hi neither instance does he give us reasons for taking Adomo seriously, 
beyond claims like the assertion that the Dialectic o f Enlightenment is a “pivotal text of 
Critical Theory”. For Jameson, by contrast, the conditions for reading Adomo as ‘true’ are
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different and, more important, in place. Jameson’s piimaiy concern is deploying Adorno’s 
Marxism to explain the present state of experience under capitahsm. Although flawed, 
Jameson’s reading provides a basis on which to appreciate Adorno’s potential strategic 
significance. In so doing, Jameson treats Adorno’s work as ‘five’ in the sense that it is 
treated, not an object to be dissected, but as an accumulation of ideas and arguments which 
engage his own position dhectly. What comphcates Jameson’s relation to Adomo, however, 
is that having taken up this attitude towards reading, he misrepresents Adomo.
Jameson appropriating Adorno
In the Introduction to Late Marxism, “Adomo in the Stream of Time”, Jameson 
makes the claim: ‘Tt now seems to me possible, then, that Adomo’s Marxism, which was no 
great help in the previous periods, may tum out to be just what we need today”. How does 
Jameson justify his confidence? Fust, he establishes his relation to Adomo’s work by 
attempthig to make Adomo answerable to Oifiiodox, or Scientific Mamsm. This, as 
Hohendahl radicates, is a controversial way of locating Adomo’s work, because his Marxism 
is thoroughly mediated by other preoccupations.
At any rate, Jameson’s strategy is to present Adomo’s project as a response to a 
famihar problem for Orthodox Maixism. As Jameson puts it, ‘“To be a M amst’ necessaiily 
includes the behef that Mamsm is somehow a science: that is to say an axiomatic, an 
organon, a body of distinctive knowledges and procedures’’.^  ^ How can such a claim be 
protected fiom the sceptical assertion that any claim to tmth ultimately disappears mto 
provinciahsms of one sort or another? Jameson initially bases his defence of Mamsm on the 
obseivation that many different sometimes contradictory, versions of its claims have arisen.
Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adomo, or the Persistence o f  the Dialectic, (London: Verso, 1990), p.5.
Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adomo, or the Persistence o f  the Dialectic,p.5.
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This is a situation, according to Jameson, which testifies that there is no abstract Marxist
“Tmth” which claims universal scientific vahdity. Rather, the varieties of Marxism each
express local “tmth”. In his words:
The various Mamsms - for there are many of them, and famously 
incompatible with one another - are just that: the local ideologies of Mamst 
science in history and in concrete historical situations, which set not merely 
their priorities but also their limits. To say, then, that the Marxism of Lenin, or 
of Che, or of Althusser, or of Brecht (or indeed of Perry Anderson or of 
Eagleton, not to speak of myself) is that each one is situation specific to the 
point of encompassing the class deteiminations and cultural and national 
hoiTzons of its proponents.
Critically speaking, this looks like another exjiression of the old Orthodox argument 
that material reahty deteimines thought, hi its present guise, it fiees any of the above fiom 
responsibihty for the tmth claims of then own arguments beyond then various local 
limitations. If Jameson is to sustain this position, he needs to have a rigorously defined 
explanation of what precisely constitutes the limits to the local truth of each thinker. This 
would then predict at what point each moves fiom science to ideology. Jameson does not do 
this. His pmpose, however, is not to defend this argument directly, but to allow space for his 
characterisation of Adorno’s significance in two ways. It allows him to claim that Adorno’s 
particular brand of Mamsm “fits” with the present in the “local” manner he has just 
described. Additionally, however, Jameson acknowledges that the significance of Adomo is 
not just that he “fits” the present; he claims Adomo does somethhig more, sometlung very 
unorthodox - he “shows perplexity”. Jameson thus characterises Adomo in the terms he has 
used above, which is to say that Adomo makes tmth claims about the world as a Mamst but, 
hi “showing peiplexity”, he somehow pre-empts sceptical critique by undercutting his own 
position without sliding hito absolute scepticism. Jameson does not put it as baldly as this.
Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or the Persistence o f  the Dialectic, p. 6.
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but this fonnulation does describe quite neatly a way of thinking about an aspect of Adorno’s
own understanding of the immediate problem facing him.
The device thiough which Jameson says Adomo short-chcuits scepticism is the idea
that the possibihty of tmth resides not in the signifying capacity of a text, a tmth claim, or an
artwork, but as a condition of its structure. If we accept this claim, then a real problem
emerges where Jameson reads Adomo as supplying a method that can be more or less
universally apphed in countering scepticism. That is, Jameson holds that what he identifies as
the “structure” of Adomo’s argument can be apphed to the crisis of “Science” in the face of
its critique as “ideology” in all the various foims with which Jameson is concemed: the crisis
of Marxism, the crisis of the subject, the possibihty of Mamst hterary criticism in the face of
its critique of poststmcturahsm, aesthetic modernism in the face of postmodemism, and more
besides. Thus Jameson writes
Adomo’s prophesieds of the ‘total system’ finaUy came tme m whoUy 
unexpected foims ...late capitahsm has aU but succeeded m ehnhnating the 
final loopholes of nature and the unconscious, of subversion and aesthetic, of 
individual and coUective praxis alike...
Jameson the Mamst claims it is the transfoimation of experience by “late capitahsm” 
which is the root cause of ah the varieties of contemporaiy scepticism. Chiistopher Nonis 
defines the grounds for scepticism in Jameson’s position dififerently. For Norris, the 
scepticism generated by deconstmction infects Jameson’s practice as hteraiy critic and as a 
Mamst “Deconstmction is inimical to Mamst thought at the point where it questions the 
vahdity of any science or method set up in rigid separation Jfrom the play of textual 
meaning”. From the perspective of Jameson’s strategy, which comes fibrst, late capitahsm or 
deconstmction, matters only in an abstract sense. Both are apparently ah consuming and, 
once characterised thus, demand ah consuming critique. On his own terms, Jameson the
Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or the Persistence o f the Dialectic, p.5. 
Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, (London; Methuen, 1992), p. 83.
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Marxist and Jameson the Hteraiy critic, face structurally identical problems. It is only as
stmctiires that society and hteratme can be tmly known. In other words, for Jameson, the
critique of deconstmction becomes the critique of late capitalism and vice versa. As a
consequence, and as Nonis has argued:
Jameson pins his theoiy to a faith that method can retain some absolute 
validity even when histoiy and meaning have been reduced to a constantly 
shifting interplay of tropes. He... seeks to preseive ‘stmcture’ as a mode of 
inteUigibihty immune to the assaults of sceptical doubt.
Notwithstandhig the problems inherent in Jameson’s reduction of all skepticisms to a
common structure, his ehsion of the different chcumstances of scepticism does not take place
in an abstract or neutral manner. Rather, certain claims or tendencies in Jameson’s
comprehension of “stmcture” accompany his argument, moving from one circumstance to
another. For example, in talking about Adorno’s philosophical wiiting, he identifies its
“stmctme” quite specifically as “Hnguistic experiment, as Darstellung, and the invention of
form”. It is because Adomo is so aware of this aspect of wiiting, according to Jameson, “that
it becomes interesting and appropriate to look at his own work hi the same way”. It is one
thing to identify Adorno’s interest in the structure of philosophical argument, it is quite
another to claim that the structure of his, or indeed any philosophical text, resides m its
quahty as “linguistic expeiiment”. Jameson acknowledges this, continuing.
But then I need to con ect this foimulation of the matter in tuiu, and to insist 
that although Adomo certainly does have a ‘style’... and although I sometimes 
talk about it as such, I doubt if the reading I propose can be thought of as a 
Hteraiy one in the restricted or triviahsed sense.
Recognising that the “stmcture” of Adomo’s work cannot be read purely in teims of 
its style, Jameson does not attempt to do so in a unifoim way. Elsewhere, he seems to
Christopher Norris, Deconstmction: Theory and Practice, p. 79.
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contradict himself by saying that it is Adomo’s dialectic, not style, which is the all important
“structure” of his work:
So the deeper message of my book, at the level at which Adomo himself in his 
particularity becomes indistinguishable from the dialectic, has to do with the 
celebration of the dialectic as such.
The problem, then, is that having placed such emphasis on “stmcture”, Jameson 
cannot dehver a consistent picture of it because he does not have a theorised understanding 
of how he might, or how Adomo does, make the distinction between orders of “stmcture” in 
the different chcumstances of philosophy and hteratme. Jameson’s problem can be put 
another way, by saying that he has too abstract an understanding of the importance of 
“structure’ in Adomo, in the sense that he thinks that such “stmcture’ can be extracted from 
the specific interest of Adomo’s discussion at any given moment. Having made this 
extraction, which is enoneous in teims of understanding Adomo’s position, he then reads 
“stmctme” in a confused way. A symptom of this confusion in Late Marxism is the way 
Jameson’s critical orientation towards Adomo’s texts shifts between philosopher and hteraiy 
critic, but in an apparently random, even evasive way, so it becomes difficult at times to 
know which he is being.
This absence of a strategy for developing a proper understanding of the potential 
relations between philosophical tmth claim and hteraiy/plulosophical “stmctme”, has an 
important function within Jameson’s defence of Adomo’s immediate relevance. It aUows him 
to distance himself in two ways fiom aspects of Adomo’s argument with wliich he feels 
imcomfortable. Fnst, as we have seen, he is able, more or less at wift, to characterise the 
value of any part of Adomo’s argument as either piimarily “stmctme” or “truth claim”. He 
can concentrate on one or the other, depending on the relevance of a particular passage to his
Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or the Persistence o f  the Dialectic, p. 11.
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argument. Thus, Peter Osbome has identified the “displacement of philosophical by rhetorical 
analysis” as one of the two major methodological devices of Jameson’s book.*^ Interestingly, 
Eva Geulen sees Jameson’s problem slightly differently, concentrating her criticisms on 
Jameson’s emphasis on the difference he attempts to estabhsh between “the dialectic” as 
distinct fiom the particular claims Adomo makes. What, for Orsbome, is a spht between the 
hterary and the philosophical, is configured by Geulen as a spht between dialectical 
“structure” and the secondary significance Jameson gives particular claims. This, as Geulen 
pomts out, enables Jameson to argue that
...the most precarious opinions Adomo held vis-à-vis pohticaUy committed 
art or his refusal to see any critical potential in popular culture are minor 
obstacles, easily overcome by this dialectical tour de force. Jameson argues 
that “...these positions of Adomo - so easily reducible to ‘ehtist’ opinions...- 
are probably better dramatised as moves against a variety of other imaginaiy 
or ideal-typical protagonists. .. The various positions become characters and 
then abstract ballet tums out to be transferable to areas veiy different fiom 
ait” (Geulen’s emphasis).
hi other words, the idea of Adomo’s obsolescence, tied to his views about popular 
cultme and his ehtism, are constmed by Jameson not as tmth claims in a philosophical sense, 
but as ihustrations in a mode of dialectical argument whose “stmctme” is what is important. 
In this way the ‘true Adomo” remains unsuhied by the various unpalatable (for Jameson) 
specifics of his position. What should be becoming evident, then, is that Jameson is not just 
confusing about the relation between tmth claims and stmcture, he is confused about the 
nature of that “stmcture”. At different moments he identifies it as ‘linguist expeiiment” and 
at others as “the dialectic”. This lack of clarity aUows different characterisations of Jameson’s 
strategy so, although Osbome and Geulen agree on the dynamic behind Jameson’s problem.
Peter Osborne, “A Marxism for the Postmodern? Jameson’s Adorno”, New German Critique 56 (Spring- 
Summer 1992), p. 173.
Eva Geulen, “A matter of Tradition”, Telos 89 (Fall 1991), p. 155.
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they disagree on precisely what he is extracting from Adomo at the cost of a neglect for
Adomo’s specific claims.
If this gives us some idea of Jameson’s problems with Adomo, it certainly raises a
variety of issues about the intersection between reading and appropriation. As a reader, in the
sense that HuUot-Kentor is a reader, Jameson is wi ong about a lot of things, as the almost
uniformly hostile reviews of his book make plain. Notwithstanding Jameson’s factual eiiors,
it can be argued that the inqiact of his argument is both similar to and veiy different foim
HuUot-Kentor’s. Both defences of Adomo attempt to remove his thought fr om those of its
aspects which might imply obsolescence. I have argued that the impact of HuUot-Kentor’s
argument is to abstract Adomo’s thought into a series of phUosophicaUy digestible truth
claims. Geulen emphasises a simUar tendency towards abstraction in Jameson’s argument,
only Jameson abstracts what he sees as the “structure” of Adomo’s thought. A helpfrd way
to frame the similarity and difference between HuUot-Kentor and Jameson, and to tease out
some of the imphcations of this comparison, is to consider it in the hght of a related spht that
emerged in the early reception of Hegel.
Disagreement over which was the “tme” Hegel was the occasion for a division
between the so caUed “Old” and “Young” Hegehans. hr a short Preface to an anthology of
the writings of the Yoimg Hegehans, Lawrence Stepelevich describes the major elements in
the dispute, and links it with what he caUs a recent “Hegel-renaissance. He begins,
A distinction must be made between being a Hegehan philosopher and a 
student of Hegehan phUosophy, for the practice of this phUosophy extends 
weU beyond the mere scholarly recoUection of that thought. To phUosophise, 
as a Hegehan, is to take up, develop, and apply the dialectical methodology of 
Hegel to a point that would extend beyond the limits found in Hegel himself.
Lawrence Stepelevich, (ed.), The Young Hegelians: An Anthology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), p. ix.
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It is this attitude towards Hegel which characterises the Young Hegehans, in contrast
to the Old Hegehans, who, Stepelevich quotes Lowith as saying: “jrreseived Hegel’s
philosophy hterahy”.^ * Having made this distinction, Stepelevich goes on to describe a more
recent “so-cahed ‘Hegel-Renaissance’”, an aspect of which was the estabhshment of the
‘Hegel-Ai'chiv’ in 1958. The function of this archive wiU be the pubhcation of a complete
critical edition of Hegel’s writings. Stepelevich notes that this project is not expected to be
completed before the first quarter of the next century. “But”, he continues,
.... any ‘renaissance’ deserving of the name - just as did the original Itahan - 
expand beyond a merely reverential cohection of past tmths and go on to 
generate its own world. If it does not it is not a true renaissance, but an ever­
more empty formal exercise devoted to a dead system, which in this case 
would become nothing else than a noxious autopsy upon the Hegehan corpus.
Young Hegehanism, which drew its sphit dhectly fiom Hegel... is far fiom 
resting content with such autopsies.^^
Now, it is too simphstic to ahgn the kind of position represented by HuUot-Kentor 
with the Old Hegehans and Jameson with the Young Hegehans. In the hght of Stepelevich’s 
commentary, however, there is enough of a similarity at least to question the assertion that 
HuUot-Kentor is the “reader” and Jameson the “appropriator”. Jameson’s reading of Adomo 
is symptomatic of a problem mherent in the reception of any Hegehan phUosophy. That is, 
any phUosophy which claims to both ‘say’ what it means and ‘show’ what it means, is 
vulnerable to having one or other of these emphasised at the expense of the other. As we 
have seen the question of the separabihty of Hegel’s dialectic fi om his specific truth claims is 
a fundamental issue in the history of the reception of Hegel. IronicaUy Michael Rosen has 
criticised Adoruo’s reading of Hegel on these very gr ounds. He accuses Adoruo of wr ongly 
presumhrg Hegel’s dialectic can be extracted fiom Hegel’s claim to have achieved “Absolute 
Knowledge”.C ertairU y Jameson is no disciple of Adomo. He quite shamelessly makes
Lawrence Stepelevich, (ed). The Young Hegelians: An Anthology, p. x.
Lawrence Stepelevich, (ed). The Young Hegelians: An Anthology, p. x.
^ Michael Rosen, Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
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Adomo out to be things which he is not, but in the way he does this, Jameson demonstrates 
that he and Adomo have related ends. They are both preoccupied with aspects of the 
problem of modem scepticism, and how it might be avoided. Moreover, both understand this 
in a way that parallels what Stepelevich identifies as the Young HegeHàn attitude to Hegel, 
which is “...as much a mode of philosophical apprehension as a form of philosophy to be 
apprehended, and as much a methodology as a passing event”.J a m e s o n ’s ‘mode of 
apprehension’ is veiy different fiom Adorno’s, and he misrepresents Adomo as a 
consequence. At the same time, it is because he understands Adomo’s argument as ‘a mode 
of apprehension’ in the JSist place, that he attains a degree of proximity to Adomo, quite 
absent fiom the kind of readings of Adomo presented by HuUot-Kentor.
Readmg Jameson appropriating Adorno
Another aspect of the critique of Jameson’s Late Marxism emphasises a shghtly
different theme, concentrating on Jameson’s mode of hterary critical behavioui. For Peter
Osbome, it is not just a case of Jameson’s emphasis on the hterary stmctme of Adomo’s
work. He suggests Jameson’s book can be read “as a case study in the problematic
relationship of “hteraiy” to “phUosophical” theoiy more generaUy”^^  and that it is
characterised methodologicaUy by
...the displacement of phUosophical by rhetorical analysis and an associated 
pragmatic reduction of judgement to the parameters of a conjunctmahst 
conception of hegemonic hiteivention into cun ent theoretical debates.
I have ah eady discussed some of the imphcations of the first point Osbome makes.
The second, however, is shghtly different. It is also interesting because it reappears forcefuUy
in HuUot-Kentor’s scabrous review of Late Marxism. Osbome’s argument is that Jameson
^ Lawrence Stepelevich, (ed.). The Young Hegelians: An Anthology, p. x.
Peter Osborne, “A Marxism for the Postmodern? Jameson’s Adorno”, p. 173. 
Peter Osborne, “A Marxism for the Postmodern? Jameson’s Adorno”, p. 173.
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tends to see parallels between Adorno’s position and contemporary debates in literaiy tbeoiy.
Using Osborne’s word, Jameson then “translates” Adorno into the teims of that debate, at
the expense of making judgements about the philosophical import of Adorno’s argument. For
Osborne this “reveals itself as an evasion of theory, or more precisely, of judgem enr^  It is a
case of assimilating Adorno to the terms of the “institutional hegemony of Hterary theory hr
the United States”, rather than generating illuminating insights into Adorno own claim s.For
Huhot-Kentor, Jameson’s comparisons of Adorno with other recent or contemporary
thinkers tends to be slap-dash, rmexjrlained, and functions as a way of superficially
famiharising Adorno:
Like bis Enghsh alter-ego, Teny Eagleton, Jameson is a conventional thinker 
whose will to occupy the fiont seat on the flying wedge of hterary criticism, 
combined with an omnivorous intellectual metabohsm, led him to genuinely 
anti-conventional work, which he regularly scrambles. This does not bother 
his readership: anxious to share his velocity, they take the incoherence as a 
mark of authenticity on ideas that they are content to let hover overhead, 
reserving their attention for tracking the pulse of idées reçues just below the 
surface.^^
This, and Osborne’s problems with Jameson, are quite legithnate ways of 
characterising aspects of bis infuriating way of arguing. At the same time, there is a very 
indistinct boundary between that order of criticism which is specifically dhected at 
demonstrable short comings in what Jameson has to say, and more general grumblings about 
Iris “careerism”, the “institutional dominance of hterary theory in the United States” and 
questions of Jameson’s competence as a critic of Adorno per se. Such criticisms imply, on 
the part of Jameson’s critics, some fahiy clear notion of the kind of thinker Adorno is. 
Indeed, the question of the critical competence of a particular reading of his work is 
inseparable fiom the institutional conventions of whichever discipline within which Adorno’s
Peter Osborne, “A Marxism for the Postmodern? Jameson’s Adorno”, p. 180.
Peter Osborne, “A Marxism for the Postmodern? Jameson’s Adorno”, p. 192.
Robert Hullot-Kentor, “Suggested Reading: Jameson on Adorno”, Telos 89 (Fall 1991), p. 172.
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work is located. When Jameson is accused of lacking judgement he is being criticized for not
understanding that you must be a philosopher to read Adorno properly. The issue of critical
“etiquette”, and Jameson’s lack of it, comes across particularly strongly in the opening of
Hullot-Kentor’s review of Late Marxism:.
Frediic Jameson is one of the great tattooed men of our times. Every inch of 
flesh is covered: that web of cats cradles coiling up the right calf are Gr eimas 
and Lévi-Strauss; dripping over the right shoulder, under the sign of the 
Cimabue Christ - the inverted crucrGxion - hangs Derrida; and hardly 
recognisable in those many overlapping splotches of colour is just about 
everybody else...
Hullot-Kentor admits he is mocking here, but it is hard not to see in this parody a real 
anxiety at the rU-disciplined and non-philosophical allusion-making of Jameson’s 
“omnivorous intellectual metabohsm”, by contrast with his own tightly defined and 
empirically driven research.
It is not that Jameson’s position is any less tightly defined than Hullot-Kentor’s, but 
the disciplinary boundaries between hterature and philosophy become especiahy problematic 
when they are simultaneously adhered to and used to supersede each other. Philosophy has 
traditionaUy defined itself, to use a phrase of Danto’s, as “wanting necessity”,Philosophy 
wants to make truth claims apphcable to aU possible situations; its method seeks to address 
all situations. This apphes especially to the relation between the philosophical reader and 
Adoruo’s philosophy. From this perspective, what Jameson should do, with due hiunility, is 
say “I will read Adorno’s work m terms of its hterary structure and see what interesting 
insights this might produce”. Instead, Jameson wants necessity for his idea of “structure”, 
which is to say he wants to displace not only philosophy’s claim to necessity, but
Robert Hullot-Kentor, “Suggested Reading: Jameson on Adorno”, p. 177.
Arthur Danto, “Philosophy as/and/of Literature”, in A. Cascardi, (ed.), Literature and the Question o f
Philosophy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1987), p. 17.
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philosophy’s method of reading, and replace it with his method of rhetorical reading, allusion 
making etc., which is held to he equally apphcable to aU situations, including reading Adorno.
The “wanting necessity”, imphcit in the methods of both Hullot-Kentor arrd Jameson, 
is closely related to then strong claims for Adorno’s significance as hnving, or potentiaUy 
having, truth value. These claims for Adorno are also associated with the tendency not to 
differentiate between Adorno’s different works. As Geulen points out, Jameson repeatedly 
makes claims for the “whole” Adorno. It is clear from his “Back to Adorno” that Huhot- 
Kentor thinks it is not just Dialectic o f Enlightenment which has been variously 
misrepresented and mistranslated, but ah of Adorno’s work. This is not to say Jameson and 
Huhot-Kentor are not interested in detah, far fiom it, but that every detah is hkely to be 
measured by the same necessary critical standard and the same corrvention of reading. 
Together, these presuppositions form the working assumption that Adorno’s identity as a 
writer remains consistent through ah his work, that ah Adorno’s work is about the same tiling 
- “the truth,” - and that “truth” can be extracted using a imiquely suitable method for doing 
so.
Reading, ‘mimesis’ and Aesthetic Theory
The issues emerging out of the recent reception of Adorno are interesthig in 
themselves, but the dhection the argument has taken has a particular relevance for any 
attempt to describe “mimesis” in Adorno’s thought in general, and Aesthetic Theoiy m 
particular. The reason for this is relatively simple.
The recent reception of Adorno does indeed raise the question of the relationship 
between “reading” and “appropriation,” but this is not a straight forward distinction between 
modes of critical behavior. It is as much a debate about the kind of thinker Adorno is.
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Jameson is not claiming that his is simply a better critical method, he is saying that Adorno’s 
writing is a kind of thing that needs to be read in a way that is not strictly philosophical. 
Thus Jameson’s “appropriation” is not just saying things about Adorno that other readers 
disagree with, it is about appropriating Adorno for the “hterary” as against the 
“philosophical”. At its most far-reaching the controversy siuTounding Jameson’s book is 
about the identity of Adorno’s work as “phüo sophical” or “hterary”.
A premise of this reading of Aesthetic Theory is that Adorno’s identity as a thinker is 
not usehdly addressed when thought of as a function of his whole oeuvre. Rather, it will be 
argued Adorno’s identity changes significantly within Aesthetic Theory. Among other things, 
this means adopting a critical attitude towards reading the work which does not adhere to the 
notion that a unique convention for doing so will suffice. So, although the scope of the 
argrunent about reading Adorno as a whole is perhaps spurious, the axis ar ormd which the 
debate has orientated itself is not. The question of the relation between the “jrliilosophical”, 
“the hterary” and the “arts” is one of the defining problematics Adorno addresses in 
Aesthetic Theory. The deploymerrt of “mimesis” is pivotal within that problematic.
For Adorno, art is different fiom philosophy for all sorts of reasons. At the same time, 
both art and philosophy can be minimally construed as having “mimetic moments”. More 
strongly, it is trne to say that art and philosophy can only have truth value in so far as they 
exist in a “mimetic” relation to then objects. We therefore need to understand Adorno as 
theorising about art’s mimetic relation to the world. At the same time, this ‘theorising 
about,” is taking place within the parameters of an idea of how Aesthetic Theory qua 
philosophy might exist in a mimetic relation to its object, which is art.
In other words, there are at least two different orders of mimetic activity involved in 
Aesthetic Theory. One is the mimetic relation of philosophical argument to its object. The
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other, a theory of how modern art can be seen to be mimetic of the world. These different 
manifestations of “mimesis” are definitively inseparable hr Aesthetic Theory, and this is not 
just because we understand Adomo as “showing” as well as “saying” what he means. The 
reasons for this inseparability can be explained as follows.
An aspect of the definition of a “mimetic” act is that it imphes some kmd of imitatiorr 
of its object. It follows that to recognise philosophical mimesis, it carmot be anticipated as an 
abstract condition; it orrly reveals itself in the imitation of something. One therefore has to 
grasp what is behig imitated, in Aesthetic Theory, which is art. Equally, to understand art as 
“mimetic”, one has to mrderstand how it is “mimetic” of the world. Within this fi amework, 
the identities of “philosophy”, “art”, and “the world” are far fiom obvious; indeed they are 
obscure. This means that although there is are going to be cormections between pMosophy, 
art, and the world, they will not always be evident: sometimes they are “said”, sometimes 
they are “showrr”. On a pmely pragmatic basis, it woirld seem obvious that if we are 
interested in say, Adoruo’s theory of how modern art is “mimetic” of the world, we should 
pay attention to the way that art is “mimicked” through Adorno’s philosophical argumerrt. 
Indeed this is the case, but more fundamentally and controversially, in Aesthetic Theory 
philosophical “mimesis” and “mimesis” m art are mutually dependent. Put another way, 
neither can be successful without the other. Put another way, the “mimetic” potential of an 
art work cannot be released except through philosophical reflection. Moreover the 
philosophical reflection on a work of art has itself, m some way, to be mimetic of the art 
work. Now, without becoming bogged down at this stage in trynig to define “philosophical 
mimesis” in Aesthetic Theory, we can be quite clear that it does not take the shape of the 
isolated philosophical judgement. This being the case, when trymg to discuss “mimesis” in 
Aesthetic Theory, it is simply not useful to make the kind of separation between philosophical
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content and form that seems to be emerging in some of the recent reception of Adomo. The 
identification of “mimesis” in Aesthetic Theoty demands an attitude towards the work which 
does not force a distinction between philosophical form and content tluougb a 
methodological predisposition. To do so, is not just to adhere to a standard of critical 
probity, but to be a bad reader, because it will misconstme “mimesis” in Aesthetic Theory.
The structure of “mimesis” in Aesthetic Theory
Within the idea of an openness to form and content, we need some abstract idea of 
how “mimesis” manifests itself in all contexts of its appearance in Aesthetic Theory. It goes 
without saying that this order of analysis will be incomplete, but it is necessary as a means of 
beginning to map what is at stake in the idea of “mimesis”.
“Mimesis” must be understood with reference to Adomo’s engagement with two 
other concepts: “mediation” and “autonomy”. Every act of “mimesis” must be under stood as 
“mediated”, which means it carmot be understood as an isolated phenomenon; it is shaped by 
the “context” of its articulation. As a consequence, Adorno’s evaluation and definition of 
“mimesis” changes according to the context of its appearance in Aesthetic Theoiy. Such 
potentially infinite fluidity can be modified somewhat when we rmderstand that although the 
conditions that govern refinement of a particular “mimetic” act are obviously not uniform, 
otherwise abstract definitions would suffice. It is not therefore necessary to abandon the 
possibihty of identifying broadly different contexts of the deployment of “mimesis” in 
Aesthetic Theory. This is an indication of the idea that every act of “mimesis” is not 
sufficiently defined by its “mediations”. It also has a degree of “autonomy” and camrot be 
explained pm ely as a fimction of its context.
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It lias already been suggested that “mimesis” is operative in philosophy and art, and 
this can be extended to include all representations. “Representation” here designates anything 
fiom the “representation of experience to consciousness,” to a work of art, or a philosophical 
argument, hi this general sense, “representation” is the sole preoccupation of Aesthetic 
Theoiy. Adoruo’s discussion is contained, however, because he “organizes” it around the 
consideration of the way “society”, “philosophy” and “art” functions as systems of 
representation in mediating hidividual representations. The potential clar ity of this fi amework 
is jeopardized when we begin to rmderstand that neither “society”, “trhilosophy” nor “art” in 
isolation provides the basis for any sufficient definition of an individual representation. It is 
precisely the insufficiency of these thr ee systems of representation which gives all individual 
representations their indeterminacy. Adomo somewhat coyly admits that the premise that 
there is no “groimd” for his definition of the individual representation generates “dialectical 
tmbulence”.
What gives this potential morass any order is that Adomo is equally adamant that 
although “society”, “jrhilosophy” and “art” are mediating systems of representation, they are 
also “autonomous”. None of them can be reduced to the terms of the others. Works of 
philosophy and art are not definable as purely social phenomena, but then neither can art or 
philosophy sufficiently represent society. The same prohibitiorr against one-sided definitions 
pertams to every conceivable relation within the matrix of concerns addressed in Aesthetic 
Theoiy.
Within this pervasive emphasis on the principle that everything is “mediated” by its 
relation to everythmg else, the possibihty of “mimesis” only exists because the principle of 
“autonomy” holds that everythuig has some kmd of potentially discrete identity. This 
triangular relation between “mediation,” “autonomy,” and “mimesis” can by no means be
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taken for granted, and can be cbaracteiized as the asphation of Aesthetic Theory. That 
asphation is rarely, if ever fidfilled. The way to read Aesthetic Theory is to understand it as 
explaining the conditions which might make such a relationship possible and why it is such an 
elusive state.
The complexity of this context for the discussion of “mimesis” within Aesthetic 
Theory aside, Adorno’s arguments about the significance of “mimesis” relate to other 
arguments at various levels. Although it can be productive to compare Adorno’s theory of 
“mimesis” to other such theories, these comparisons serve orrly to identify “mimesis” as an 
order of representation. They do not give credit to the strategic importance of “mimesis” 
within his argument. It is by thinking about “mimesis” in terms of its strategic significance, 
that Adorno’s position can begin to be given some kind of identity in terms of its relation to 
those other thirrkers.
Reading the strategic significance of “Mimesis” and Aesthetic Theory
One way to situate Adorno’s project is to thirrk of it as developing within the 
imphcations of two orders of recent scepticism. One posits the claim that language is the 
condition of experience (Heidegger), the other that experience has been so thoroughly 
transformed by capitahsm that it is incapable of any “real” relationship with the world 
(Lukacs). Heidegger and Lukacs can both be read as offering ways out of the scepticism they 
generate, but Adorno is unconvinced and more interested in then arguments as reasons to be 
sceptical than the means they develop of coimtering it. From this perspective on Heidegger 
and Lukacs, the possibihty of meaning in general and “mimesis” in particular, is radicaUy 
curtailed, if not prohibited. Adorno takes this problem particularly seriously, hideed, he can 
properly be said to have played an important role in developing and emphasising the sceptical
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implications of Heidegger’s and Lukacs’ thought, against any claim to produce or identify 
any definitively adequate representation of the world. What does this mean for how we 
should understand the strategic significance of “mimesis” in Aesthetic Theoryl “Mimesis” has 
been variously construed as implying one or more of the follovring: “an act of imitating,” or a 
“copy,” a “representation,” a “superficial resemblance”. Each of these aspects of its definition 
is compromised by skepticisms wliich claim that neither language, nor experience under 
capitahsm, can perform the necessary stepping out of themselves to ahow such re­
presentation.
It is against this backgroimd that we need to understand Adoruo’s engagement with 
“mimesis” and, as a general rule, we need to think of it first and foremost as an unstable 
mode of representation. If such instabrhty can be thought of as an objective char acteristic of 
“mimesis” in Aesthetic Theory, then its deployment is additionahy problematic because, as we 
have seen, it becomes operative in Adoruo’s thought in a range of different guises. “Mimesis” 
is engaged in Aesthetic Theoiy as a mode of art and a mode of doing philosophy. It is also 
clear that, although in Aesthetic Theory mimesis in art and mimesis hr philosophy are 
different, they are mutuaUy dependent modes of ex^rerience. That is to say, neither is possible 
without the other. The issues this mutual dependence generates are far reaching for 
understanding Aesthetic Theory. For the moment, however, we need to think about what it 
might mean to read Aesthetic Theory as a “mimetic” text, and this means thinkhrg of it as an 
act of representation.
This demand creates problems in itself because it is by no means clear what it might 
mean to describe a philosophical work as “r epresentational”. Until Hegel, philosophy had not 
been accustomed to thinking of itself as representational beyond the obvious idea of a 
conespondence between a philosophical concept and its object. Philosophy remains generally
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poorly equipped to understand itself as representation, and this is part of the context which 
makes Adorno’s reception so tortuous. Indeed, one of the reasons Jameson gets into such 
difficulties is that he apphes conventions for the analysis of hterary representation too rigidly 
to a philosophical text.
If Jameson’s critical impulses are corr ect m diagnosing the problem of representation 
in Adomo, then this means that the representational identity of Adomo’s arguments need to 
be re-thought. As a preliminary suggestion of what this might involve, it is worth considering 
one of the most famrhar theories of representation, as it is developed by Gombrich in his 
paper “Meditations on a Hobby Horse”. It might seem unnecessarily tendentious to refer to 
Gombrich here, as doing so invites the charges of melevance and appropriation levehed at 
Jameson. AU the same, the risk is worth taking, because orre of Gombrich’s arguments about 
the possibihty of representation is chrectly relevant to explaining the particirlar problems 
arisittg fi om trying to read Aesthetic Theory as a representational work.
hi the paper ‘Meditations on a Hobby Horse”, Gombrich argues that, to be taken for 
a representation, something must be taken for a substitute for what it represents. For 
substitution to occur, two criteria according to Gombrich, must be fulfilled. There must be 
resemblance, but there must also be relevance. To explain himself, Gombrich uses the 
example of a chUd who takes a stick for a hobby horse. “It needed two conditions, then, to 
turn our stick into oiu hobby horse: first, that its form made it just possible to ride on it; 
secondly - and perhaps decisively - that riding mattered”. In other words, for a resemblance 
to be taken as a representation, there has to be some reason for doing so.
Now, obviously Gombrich was thinking about visual representation, but his argument 
is apphcable to reading Aesthetic Theory because of the suggestion that its success as 
representation is contingent on a configur ation of resemblance and relevance. That is to say.
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to see Aesthetic Theoiy as a representational work means it must have some resemblance to
something, and, it needs to matter that it should. As previously suggested, the latter condition
is aheady problematic because of the apparent implausibihty of reading any philosophical text
as representational. Allowing that possibility means looking to Hegel’s example.
Understanding Aesthetic Theory as a representational work is impossible without
understanding Hegel. Consider the following description of Hegel’s philosophy;
Hegel, as both Hegehans and anti-Hegehans argue, has offered the greatest 
solution to, or at least formulation of, the problem of representation. 
According to Hegel’s unification of logic and ontology, the “world,” “reahty,”
“the absolute,” can be represented truthfully because the representation and 
the tlfing represented are not separate entities linked arbitrarily by a 
philosopher’s subjectivity; rather, things and thought are engaged in a 
common movement toward self representation.^^
Hegel made claims for his philosophy of as a perfect identity between itself and what 
it represents. Paraphrasing Gombrich, “It needed two conditions, then, to turn Hegel’s 
philosophy into the world: fir st, that its form made it just possible to understand it; secorrdly - 
and perhaps decisively - that absolute truth mattered”. Now, concentrating on the second 
claim, Hegel tells us clearly why his philosophy is relevant: it matters because Kant had left 
open the problem of scepticism, and this needs to be discounted as a legitimate philosophical 
disposition.^^ The claim to resemblance derives fiom Hegel’s attempt to demonstrate that, as 
the above quotation puts it, “things and thought are engaged in a common movement toward 
self representation”.
From the point of view of reading Aesthetic Theory? as a representational work, the 
most important things about Hegel is the possibihty of some order of plrilosophical 
resemblance to the world which is not restricted to the simple idea of a conespondence
John H. Smith, The Spirit and Its Letter: Traces of Rhetoric in Hegel’s Philosophy of Bildung, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) p. x.
See for example, G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology o f Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1977) p. 47.
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between a concept and its object. One sense in which Aesthetic Theory can be understood as 
representational, therefore, is that Adomo, like Hegel, seeks to exploit the idea that a 
philosophical argument represents the world in the way it “moves”.
I will be arguing that Adomo understands this movement as inextricable from the 
truth claims made along the way, but the appearance of a possible distinction makes his 
position vulnerable to misrepresentation as, either a series of “obsolete” tmth claims or a 
“dialectic”. As we saw in the argument between the Old and Young Hegehans, they spht on 
whether the truth of Hegel was in his claim to have achieved absolute knowledge, or in his 
method, hi other words, is Hegel better thought of as having represented the world in the 
claim for absolute knowledge, or is that claim inseparable from “the movement towards it”? 
The same quandaiy reappears in the reception of Adomo, and alerts us to tlie general 
problem of reception peitaioing to any representational philosophy. The paraUel with Hegel’s 
reception, however, only estabhshes a problem within the possibihty of philosophy as 
representation in general. This is not the end of comphcations pertaining to reading Aesthetic 
Theory.
hi addition to the risk of a false spht between particular truth claims and the 
movement of the argument as a whole. Aesthetic Theory takes place within the presumption 
of scepticism, which is quite ahen to Hegel. Adonro repeatedly situates his project as an 
attempt to work through the imphcations of Hegel’s failure. A consequence of Adomo’s 
skepticism about the adequacy of philosophy is that the paraUel between the reception of 
Hegel and Adomo needs to be quahfied. Returning to the language of Gombrich’s 
argument, Adorno’s skepticism dhectly raises the question of whether philosophy “matters” 
any more. This raises again the problem of reading Aesthetic Theory as representational, 
beyond the unfamiharity of doing so in the fir st place.
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To recapitulate, the unexpectedness of the idea of philosophy as representation 
apphes equahy to Hegel and Aesthetic Theory. On Gombrich’s terms, philosophy must be 
made to “matter” as representatioir or its representational quahty wiU be missed. As has been 
suggested, one minimal way of doing this might imply being open to the notion of the work 
having multiple identities. Once we have alerted ourselves to the necessity of this mode of 
critical behavior, however, the skeptical tenor of Adonro’s thinking questions the possibihty 
of philosophy per se, and this apphes to traditional philosophy and the representational model 
imphed by Hegel’s argument, hr other words, having got past the problematic idea of 
thinking and reading philosophy as representation, when reading Aesthetic Theoiy we have to 
understand that that mode of philosophizing is itself radicaUy tenuous. It is here that 
“mimesis” has its significance. “Mimesis” is orrly ever a “superficial resemblance” that does 
not conform to secure ideas of tmth. For Adorno, even though we know concepts are 
inadequate, we have to deploy them as if they were, if we are to generate an argument whose 
movement can indhectly relate to the object of philosophical attention. It is here that 
Adorno’s attitude to reason carr be identified as radicaUy different fiom Heidegger and 
Lukacs. Adorno’s relation to these thinkers wiU be discussed in due course, but what needs 
to be emphasised here, is tlrat the tmth value of “mimesis” carmot be separated fiom its 
tenuous state.
hr reading Adorno, therefore, one should be less interested in the question of whether 
Adorno’s phUosophy “matters”, than with the imphcations of that question for tlrirrking of it 
as representatiorr. It is precisely at this level that the criteria of truthfulness invoked by a 
critical reading become entangled with the tmth claims of the argirment it claims to represent. 
There is a very real sense in which the claim for the truth value of what Adorno say wUl make 
representation “matter” too much. Inespective of the critical identity of the reader, the pre-
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emptive desire to define Adomo as tme or false will tend to force a distinction between 
particular tmtb claims and the movement of his argument. It is orrly thus separated that they 
can be invoked as having some stable truth value, but it is precisely this stability which 
neutrahses the possibihty of reading the ephemeral nature of “mimetic” truth. To put it 
bluntly, to be certain of Adorno’s tmth or falsity is to be certain to miss the mimetic aspect of 
his arguments.
The problems generated by recognising the “dehcacy” of mimesis in Aesthetic Theoiy 
might, to some extent, be mitigated by considering the fohowing strategies.
Fust, not being too preoccupied with whether and how what Adorno says might be of 
immediate interest to the present. This is not to abandon judgement of the truth value of 
Adorno’s work. Rather, it is to try to avoid predetermining the shape that truth nright take. 
Ahowing for this possibihty, we may be able to avoid going through corrtortions to attempt 
to salvage, or explain away, those aspects of Adorno which do not mesh with a preconceived 
global idea of how and why what Adorno says has tmth value, hr part this means engaging 
with Adorno’s works in a way that pays as much attention to the differences between them as 
then similarities. Although other works will be refened to, they whl be used to explain 
Aesthetic Theoiy and the claims made about Aesthetic Theory do not extend to his other 
work.
Second, if we abandon strong claims for the truth value of Adorno’s work, we can 
avoid the problem of definitively disproving his obsolescence. This is not to admit Adorno’s 
obsolescence, but to allow the historical element in Adorno’s thought its place. One of 
Hegel’s ideas was that philosophy was in some way restricted to the historical conditions of 
its emergence. If we take the same to apply to Adorno, then there are three possibihties: 
a)Adorno is obsolete b)Adorno is conect c) Adorno’s idea of tmth might include the idea of
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its own obsolescence. If we admit the possibility of c), then a) and b) look like partial 
understandings. To claim that Adorno is obsolete because his idea of society is out of date, 
might be rather like saying that the impact of the Black Death on Europe’s population would 
have been minimal had there been a programme of mass vaccirration. This is of course true, 
but it involves using the power of hindsight in a spmious way. If we take assertiorrs of 
Adorno’s obsolesceirce in the same sphit, then the problem of showing how he might be 
right, is no longer a matter of distilling the trnth of Adorno’s thought fi om the historical, but 
of understanding that Adorno worked with the idea that truth and history are mutually 
defining. As I understand him, Albrecht WeUmer gives support to this idea iir suggestirrg the 
importance of avoiding the comp aitmentahsation of Adorno’s thought. Writing about various 
critiques o ïAesthetic Theoty claims
That all the above-mentioned critics are at least partially corTect seems to me 
to be indisputable. At the same time then critiques leave one with the feeling 
of a disproportion between the results of critique and its object: as though the 
real substance of Adorno’s aesthetics had escaped the critics. '^*
Orr the face of it, WeUmer puts himself in the same camp as HuUot-Kerrtor and
Jameson. Like them he imphes that ‘the trne Adorno has yet to be discovered”. What
differentiates him fiom them, however, is that he is restricting the claim to a part of Adorno’s
thought, namely his Aesthetic Theoty and, he is ahowirrg for the fact that the criticisms of that
work are “partiaUy conect”. He goes onto say, rather crypticaUy, that: “The latter [Adorno’s
aesthetics] is in danger of ah partial critiques i.e., those which ultimately remain detached
fiom then object”. I read WeUmer here as implying the need for a kind of pre-emptive
coUapse of critical distance in order to prevent a single dominant idea or method fiom driving
our understanding of Adorno. Aesthetic Theory does not obviously fit irrto existing
Albrecht WeUmer, ‘Tmth, Semblance, Reconciliation: Adorno’s Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity”, 
trans. M. Cooke, Telos 62 (Winter 1984-85), p. 90.
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disciplinary definitions and conventions. One can be a supremely competent philosopher, or 
hterary theorist, and not maintain that standard of competence when it comes to doing justice 
to Aesthetic Theory. Avoiding this problem means having a far less developed critical identity 
than either Huhot-Kentor or Jameson. More tangibly, it becomes important to provide some 
kind of argument about what the kind of thing Aesthetic Theory is, in order to be able to 
respond to it in a way that is not whoUy determined by pre-estabhshed procediues.
hr Chapter 1 I describe some different explanations for the difihculty of Aesthetic 
Theoty. Whhe I emphasise the importance of ahowing ah of them a measure of control on 
how the work is read, the chapter concludes with the discussion of Aesthetic Theory as a 
thoroughly “mediated” text, and discusses what this means m terms of defirring the work.
Chapter 2 traces a vhtual history of plihosophy in developmg an increasingly complex 
idea of “mediation”. As ideas of “mediation” develop complexity, so phhosophy’s 
understanding of its “mediated” relation to its object becomes mcreasingly complex. Tliis 
process is described through Hegel’s critique of Kant, Marx’s critique of Hegel, Lukacs’ 
critique of Marx, and Adorno’s critique of Lukacs. This is rrot meant as a Iristory of 
“mediation”, or to summarise the impact of other thinkers on Adorno. Rather, the aim is to 
address a theme which, I wih argue, repeats itself in each of the above critiques. Hegel claims 
that the conditions for the sceptical imphcations of Kant’s philosophy are aheady estabhshed 
in the way Kant conceived of the task of philosophy, and orientated himself in doing it. For 
Hegel, this imphes the necessity for a fimdamental reorientation and redefinition of 
philosophising, involving an assimilation into its mode of argument an imderstanding of its 
own “situatedness” in relation to its object. Each subsequent thinker addressed in Chapter 2 
is presented as corrfionting the previous one, in a way which emphasises that his faihngs 
derive fiom an improper or incomplete understanding of the extent to which his arguments
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are defined by a wr ong conception of the “situatedness” of Ms thinking. For Marx, for 
example, Hegel misunderstands the impact of material reality on Ms thinking. Lukacs 
criticises Marx’s “inversion” of Hegel, but fiom Adorno’s perspective, does not go far- 
enough in emphasising the significance of reason. Both Marx and Lukacs ulthnately imply the 
impossibihty of philosophy and the inadequacy of critical thinking hr general, and while their 
suspicion of philosophy is pervasive in Adorno’s thought, he understands that to continue 
doing philosophy also means giving reason systematic relevance. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of how Adomo adopts Lukacs’ basic insight that the power of capitahsm derives 
fiom its capacity to represent the world. TMs idea informs Adorno’s understanding of Ms 
own situatedness in writing Aesthetic Theory, an understanding wMch is partially res^ronsible 
for the shape Aesthetic Theory takes. For reading “mimesis” in Aesthetic Theory, tMs means 
we must understand “mimesis” as mediated by capitahsm, but potentially at least, capable of 
tr anscending it.
As HohendaM has noted, the different kinds of exjrertise a reader brings to Adomo 
will tend to predispose the dhection that critique whl take, and the aspects of Adoruo’s 
oeuvre wMch appear as most significant.^^ If Chapter 2 tends to emphasise the significance of 
Marx and Lukacs, and the extent to wMch Adoruo understands pMlosophy as socially 
mediated. Chapter 3, looks at the background for understarrding the relation between art and 
pbhosophy in Aesthetic Theory?. From tMs perspective, Heidegger is far more important than 
Marx and Lukacs. Heidegger’s significance is multifaceted. Like Adomo, for Heidegger 
pMlosophy verges on an impossibihty and, at various moments Heidegger, like Adomo, 
appears completely preoccupied by the problem of pMlosopMcal presentation. Despite many
See Peter Hohendahl, P. Prismatic Thought: Theodor W. Adorno, (Lincoln: Nebraska University 
Press, 1995), pp. 7-8. The author em phasizes the significance of Adorno’s  critique of Heidegger In 
the first part of Negative Dialectics for poststrucurallst readings of Adorno. In contrast, he says  
“Intellectual historians such as Martin Jay and Eugene Lunn em phasized the Hegelian tradition in 
the work of the Frankfurt School”, p. 8.
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basic similarities, Adomo and Heidegger are very different, especially in then appreciation of 
the nature and significance of plulosopbical form. Here Heidegger’s impact on Aesthetic 
Theory is both dnect and indirect. It is direct m that one of Adomo’s most extended 
discussions of philosophical form is his critique of Heidegger in the fir st part of Negative 
Dialectics. The arguments Adomo develops here are very useful as a basis for exirlahrhrg 
how Adoruo differentiates philosophical form fiom the form of art. Heidegger’s indhect 
impact derives fiom bis influence on deconstruction, especially Derrida. Deconstruction 
might be said to be exclusively preoccupied with philosophical form. It has largely estabhshed 
the terms on which philosophical form can be understood as, m very general terms, “hterary”. 
Heidegger and Deriida both develop ideas of “mimesis” which often seem so close to Adomo 
as to be indistinguishable, but while the critical ambience Heidegger and Deriida operate 
within, is very suggestive for reading Aesthetic Theoty, it is also intensely misleading. The 
form Aesthetic Theory takes is predicated orr the distinctness of philosophical and hterary 
form. For Heidegger and Deriida, however, any discussion of mimesis emerges fiom the 
premise that philosophical and hterary form are indistinguishable. It is only as philosophical 
form that Aesthetic Theoty can be understood as a “mimetic” work.
Having estabhshed the grounds for doing so in Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 considers 
the extent to which Aesthetic Theory can be thought of as a work of philosophical mimesis. It 
looks at the cah for the transformation of aesthetics hr the Draft Introduction, and compares 
Aesthetic Theory with aspects of Hegel’s Aesthetics, particularly Hegel’s idea of “the 
concrete” as the context for the production and reception of art. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of what it means to understand Aesthetic Theory as arguing for, and 
exemplifying, the mutual dependence of mimetic philosophy and mimetic art.
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It is then possible to read “mimesis” at the different levels of its appearance in parts of 
Aesthetic Theory. Chapter 5 looks at the beginning of Chapter 10 of Aesthetic Theory to 
consider “mimesis” as it emerges in his discussion of the “artefactuaHty” of art. Chapter 6 
looks at chapters 4, 5, and 6 o f Aesthetic Theory in some detail, explaining Adorno’s theory 
of mimesis in art and the relation of art’s “mimetic” capacity to the beautiful in nature and to 
philosophy.
Chapter 7 considers these arguments fir st in relation to Gombrich’s Art and Illusion. 
The systematic urrity of Gombrich’s work is revealed and explained as inseparable fiom his 
analysis of representational art. Aesthetic Theory can be read is an equally integrated 
exposition of “mimesis” in non-representational art. The comparison of Art and Illusion with 
Aesthetic Theoty serves to emphasise the mutually incompatible ideas of art developed in 
each work. At the same time, Gombrich’s imderstanding of the significance of the moment 
of production of art and the tension within the individual representational act between 
conventions of representation and the object represented, remain pivotal for Aesthetic 
Theory?, hr a sense, Aesthetic Theory? can be read as a thoroughgoing “inversion” of AtT and 
Illusion. This happens when the philosophical premises of AtT and Illusion and its object, qua 
representational art, are imdernrined.
Other similarities between Aesthetic Theory and art history are considered in the 
second half of Chapter 7. The imphcations for reading Aesthetic Theory as art history are 
explored in the fight of the transformation of aesthetics demanded in the Drafl; Introduction 
to Aesthetic Theory, and put into practise in subsequent chapters. It is argued that aspects of 
Aesthetic Theory are better read as part of an art historical debate about modernism and 
postmodernism, than as part of a tradition of philosophical aesthetics. WhUe this is a useful 
re-contextualization of Aesthetic Theory, Adorno’s position within the debate about
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modernism is nnfamUiar. An indication of the difficulty is that theories of modernism are, 
almost without exception, justifications of ait in the hght of its rejection of “mimesis”. 
Although he is certainly a defender of modernism, Adorno’s constant emphasis on 
modernism as representing an absolute crisis for art (which is its significance), is quite at odds 
with ideas of modem art which emphasise its continuities with the past.
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Chapter I
VLEADmG/APmOPmATJNGAESTHETIC THEORY
Degrees of difficulty
The most pressing problem with reading and writing about Aesthetic Theory is how 
to begin; the most concrete experience of preliminary attempts to understand its arguments is 
the impression of the work's impenetrabihty. To a degree, this is a fimction of the difficulty of 
the text itself, equally; the particular background and expectations of the reader wifi have a 
role in determining how it is understood. On both counts, when we attempt to go further than 
a superficial acquaintance with the work, the need to develop a more directed strategy for 
reading becomes urgent. A prerequisite for this strategy would be to propose parameters for 
estabfishing how the responsibilities for the meaning of the work devolve. How far can or 
should the reader go in assimilating himself to Adorno's way of thinking? How far should this 
possibihty be resisted in the name of critical distance?
These are familiar problems for any critical reading. What gives them more than 
abstract importance here is that Adorno's writing in general, and Aesthetic Theory in 
particular, is put together in a way that raises the reader's consciousness of the various 
mechanisms that generate meaning in the production and reception of the work. Aesthetic 
Theory is pervaded by an intrusive authorial presence, manifesting itself through a polemical 
turn of phrase, repetitiorr, or the disjointed structure of an argument. The effect of these 
interruptions is to make a straight-forward concentration on content, necessary in reading 
more traditional philosophy, problematic. As a consequence, what we would traditionally 
think of as the content of the argument is sometimes obscured or withheld, with the effect 
that the meaning of certain passages comes to be perceived by the reader as indeterminate, hr
Reading/appropriating Theory 37
this situation, the act of reading, which is always an act of ‘making sense’, is made conscious 
of itself as such; meaning is experienced as hemg generated, rather than completed by 
reading.
It is one consequence of Adorno's obvious preoccupation with the production and 
reception of meaning - as it pertains to his own work as well as a focus of interest within it - 
that critiques of his work rarely fail to acknowledge the problem of reading at some level. In 
their “Editor's Epilogue” to Aesthetic Theory Gretel Adomo and Rolf Tiedmann admit “The 
foim of presentation of Aesthetic Theory will no doubt stand in the way of its 
appropriation”.^  Added to problems of the text, despite and because of its presentation, is the 
incompletion of the work at the author's death. The editors describe it as a “torso” - not an 
entirely apt metaphor, smce they also quote one of Adorno's letters, written shortly before his 
death, as saying that Aesthetic Theory was “all there” and any changes would be 
“organisational rather than substantive”?
Given such comphcations, any reading of Aesthetic Theory which made absolute 
claims for its tmth value would have to explain the difficulty of its argument in such a way 
that that difficulty did not emerge as an obstacle to grasping the meaning of Aesthetic 
Theory. This approach would have to present the difficulty of Adorno’s argument as 
something to be transcended, either through rigorous reading/translation, or by describing it 
as having some specific purpose as form or structure. I argued in the Introduction that this 
kind of single-minded attitude towards definmg the tmth of Adorno’s argument may well be 
predetermined to misrepresent it. hr this chapter I contend that the difficulty of Aesthetic 
Theory is not reducible to a single factor; it cannot therefore be thought of as a uniform 
phenomenon which might be susceptible to a uniform way of reading. Accordingly, the
 ^Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedmann “Editors' Epilogue”, in T.W. kdomo. Aesthetic Theory, Xrans. 
C.Lenliardt, (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1984), p. 496.
" Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedmann “Editors' Epilogue”, in Aesthetic Theory, p. 493.
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chapter is divided into sections, each of which gives a different explanation for the difficulty 
of Aesthetic Theory. In the last part, I suggest ways of reading the work that allow for the 
possibihty that its argument might not be reducible to a consistent order of explanation.
Inherited difficulty
Some of the problems associated with reading Aesthetic Theory are inherited from the 
innate obscurity of the tradition of German philosophy of which it is a part. Furthermore, the 
aesthetic writings of this tradition, specifically Kant's Critique o f Judgement and Hegel's 
Aesthetics (the two philosophical works Adomo most self-consciously confr onts in Aesthetic 
Theory), are themselves as legendary for their ambiguities as for what they say with clarity. 
As Patrick Gardiner puts it, "...both [Kant's Critique o f Judgement and Hegel's 
Aesthetics\..MQ structurally complex, frequently obscure, and notoriously susceptible to 
wide varieties of interpretation".^ Significantly, both identify the aesthetic itself as a radically 
problematic object for philosophy; its ambiguity is a necessary, even defining condition.
Above and beyond the complexities arising from such a comphcated inheritance, 
Aesthetic Theoiy remains obscure, even by the standards of its great predecessors. Part of the 
problem here is simply a matter of context. Irrespective of the merits of the aesthetic writings 
of Kant and Hegel, the status of these two giants in the history of philosophy ensures that 
their contributions to that history, even if disputed, are widely summarised. Robert Pippin has 
described Hegel as being "hr the impossible position of being both extraordinarily influential
 ^Patrick Gardiner, “Kant and Hegel on Aesthetics”, in Stephen Priest (ed.), Hegel's Critique of Kant, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 162.
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and almost completely inaccessible"? Adomo himself, making a similar point, writes of 
Hegel:
In the realm of great philosophy Hegel is no doubt the only one with whom at 
times one hteraUy does not know and cannot conclusively determine what is 
being talked about, and with whom there is no guarantee that such a 
judgement is even possible?
Despite Hegel's complexity, the history of his reception has digested aspects of his 
argument. Likewise, the cornerstones of Kant's position are widely known. The reader of 
Aesthetic Theory, by contrast, is far less hkely to have any such prior knowledge of Adorno's 
position. Certaioly the recentness of Adomo's contribution to philosophy has somethhig to do 
with this; Aesthetic Theory was first pubhshed hr 1969 and only translated into Enghsh in 
1984. More reahstically, however, Adomo is simply not as generally an important thinker as 
Kant and Hegel; his philosophy wUl never have the same strategic importance. These very 
obvious facts have some bearing on why Aesthetic Theory seems arcane.
‘Genetic’ difficulty
Beyond the historical and strategic disparity between Adomo and his great 
predecessors, is a more subtle diflference. Kant and Hegel both place enormous emphasis on 
achievmg the greatest possible clarity in defining the begiiming of theh philosopliical projects. 
Kant's whole enterprise is sometimes described as an attempt to define a beghming for 
philosophy; the status of the transcendental argument in his project is an indication of this 
central preoccupation. Hegel is obsessed with the same problem The Science o f Logic opens 
with the sentence:
 ^Robert Pippin, Hegel's Idealism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 3.
’ Theodor Adorno, “Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel” in T.W. Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, trans. Slrierry
Weber Nicholson, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1993), p. 89.
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It is only in recent times that thinkers have become aware of the difficulty of 
finding a beginning in philosophy, and the reason for this difficulty and also 
the possibihty of resolving it has been much discussed?
For Kant and Hegel, the emphasis on a clear beginning derives from the self­
consciously asserted demand, and methodological prerequisite, that they base then 
philosophical projects on some kind of foundational truth. As a dnect result, both 
philosophers spend a great deal of time explaining their points of departure. Having 
mtroduced their projects, the works which follow generally hold together and complement 
each other so that, for example, it has been argued that Kant's three critiques form a unity in 
the direction of their argument. Likewise, Hegel conceives of his project as a system of 
component parts, and even specifies that the Phenomenology should be read as an 
introduction to the system.
Adomo's oeuvre is quite different. There is no obvious point of entry mto his thought, 
and he never gives a clear account of his basic assumptions. Even his status as a philosopher 
can be questioned. The foim and content of liis writings are varied, ranging from the 
aphorisms of Minima Moralia, to the essays of Prisms and Notes to Literature, to the more 
si3eciahsed works on musical theory and criticism. Adomo's most obviously philosophical 
works are Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory. However, his progr ammatic hostihty to 
the idea of attempting to estabhsh secure assumptions on which to construct his position 
means even these works do not have obvious beginnings, and therefore do not read logically.
Such ‘non-philosophical’ characteristics of his writing are obviously not unique to 
Adomo. Much of post-Nietzschean Contiaental philosophy shares a common preoccupation 
with the problem of how to present itself. This dilemma is a direct result of its perception of 
the impossibility of defining a starting point for its own activity. The question mevitably arises 
of how it might be possible to start a philosophical argument in the absence of the idea of a
G.W.F.Hegel, Science o f Logic, trans. A.V. Miller, (New York: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 67.
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begiimiiig? Without a begiiming, how is it possible to think of a middle and an end? The
crisis in confidence, which precipitates the unravelling of traditionally unproblematic
philosophical foim, is reflected in the crisis of philosophy as a discipline. If it no longer feels
able to confront its traditionally conceived function of defining the most general piinciples
and causes of things, then what is its role? The situation has prompted one contemporaiy
Continental ‘philosopher’ to ask: "...how could it be other than derisory today to clahn still to
be engaging in philosophy or - worse - to proclaim oneself a philosopher?"'' As part of this
broad reaction against the problems and form of traditional philosophy, it is not surprising to
find Adorno wilting o f Aesthetic Theory in the following terms:
My theorem that there is no philosophical "fir st thing" is coming back to haunt 
me. Much as I might be tempted, I cannot now proceed to construct a
universe in the usual orderly fashion. Instead I have to put together a whole
firom a series of partial complexes which are concentrically arranged and have 
the same weight and relevance.®
To amplify the imphcations of this point it is useful to contrast the fabric of Hegel's 
and Adorno's writing. The ‘structure’ of then respective arguments reflect then author's 
different motives and conceptions of what doing philosophy involves.
An identifying characteristic of Hegel's argument is its teleological and cumulative 
stmctuie. This is to say, to grasp his strategy it is necessary to follow a developing train of 
thought. If Hegel makes a statement which assumes a degree of foreknowledge, that 
knowledge will have been provided at an earher stage in the argument. Put another way, 
Hegel's claims often seem to have two levels of meaning: a sentence in Hegel has both an 
immediate meaning which is tied to the description of a specific situation, such as, for 
example, his famous discussion of the French Revolution in the Phenomenology. At the same 
time, the discussion is additionally meaningful as a result of its special function within the
’ Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction o f the Political, trans. Chris Turner, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 1.
^Aesthetic Theory, p. 496.
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context of Hegel's strategy as a whole. This seems an obvious claim to make for any text, but 
what is important, and unique about Hegel's argument, is the claim that both levels of 
meaning are mutually defining. Such unity is achieved because, according to Hegel, the logic 
of the grand dialectical process of history is identical with movements of minute and 
exhaustive detail which drive it. fir Hegel, everything is meaningfid because it exists within a 
unified and coherent universe.
Adorno's mode of argument is similarly loaded but, unlike Hegel, Adorno does not 
argue in such a way as to give derivations explaining the genesis and development of a 
thought. This essential difference between Hegel and Adorno can perhaps be summarised by 
a trite but telling analogy. If Hegel's argument is compared to an onion, then each particular 
claim can be likened to a layer of flesh, which both envelops the previous claim and depends 
on it for its structural stability, hr the Preface to The Phenomenology he writes: “[philosophy] 
is the process which begets and transcends its own moments”; every claim is made 
meaningful by its fimction withhr the system.^ Adorno's argument, by contrast, carmot be 
likened to a concrete object. Although it has a similar depth and rigoiu', that rigour is less 
evident since it cannot be traced to a stable centre or closed system, because, and this is 
where Adorno differs fundamentally firom Hegel, for him there isn't one.
What this comparison with Hegel seeks to underline, is that the diflSculty of Aesthetic 
Theory might be thought of as generated by the problems Adorno encounter s in trying to do 
philosophy, having rejected the possibility of grounding that argument. The difficulty of 
Aesthetic Theory then, I contend, is different firom that generated in the aestheticisation of 
philosophical discourse, often associated with Nietzsche, or the late Heidegger. I will return 
hr greater detail to Adorno’s critique of Heidegger hr Chapter 3, but some indication of the 
issues at stake can be signalled in advance. For example, hr Heidegger’s The Origin o f the
G.W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology o f Spirit, trans. A.V.Miller, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 27.
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Work o f Art, the hterary or poetic style is conceived of as philosophically meaningfid in itself, 
insofar as Heidegger considers the presumption of a potentially adequate correspondence 
between concept and object imphcit in the traditional philosophical judgement to be the 
obstacle to its success. By trying to eliminate philosophical reflection, Heidegger aims to by­
pass what, for him, is the self-defeating distance of rational thinking fi*om its object. For 
Heidegger, such reflection is problematic because it is a force which breaks up the very unity 
presupposed by traditional philosophical activity as its end. Adorno's well-known antipathy 
towards Heidegger derives in no small measure fi om the closeness of their arguments at this 
level. He shares Heidegger’s hostility to the idea of the sufficiency of reason, but unhke 
Heidegger, he does not abandon reason. For Adorno, this would imply the impossibihty of 
any foim of critical judgement: philosophical, aesthetic, moral or ethical. Rather, the problem 
Adorno engages in his work can be fi'amed as a continuing attempt to answer/demonstrate 
what it might mean to do philosophy in the understanding that philosophy is insufficiently 
equipped to resolve the problems which define it. Habermas has spoken of the “grandeur of 
Adorno’s consistency” in the pursuit of this “philosophical impulse”. Habeimas made this 
comment in a critical discussion of Dialectic o f Enlightenment, but, and it might seem odd to 
claim this, in an abstract, and therefore potentially misleading sense, the word “consistent” is 
apt in describing Aesthetic Theory. It can be read as an attempt to answer or demonstrate 
what it might be to write critically and rationally on ait and aesthetic experience, while 
understanding the impossibihty of doing so in a satisfactoiy way. This is to alter sHghtly the 
terms of the discussion o f Aesthetic Theory as ‘groundless’, in the sense that this description 
apphes to an idea Adorno had about all his work. It specially emphasises the particular 
problem, self-consciously grounded or not, which philosophy has when trying to describe art
Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, trans. F.Lawrence, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 
1987), p. 120.
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and aesthetic experience. Indeed, the historical difficulty or insolubility of the problems of
aesthetics is a large part of what makes aesthetics so important to Adorno in the Hght of his
general position about the necessity for a groundless philosophy. In Aesthetic Theory the
difficult problem and the difficult way of confionting it ‘complement’ one another. As Gietel
Adorno and Rolf Tiedeman say in their Editors Epilogue to Aesthetic Theory:
Adorno...knew that aesthetics demands a solution to a problem which cannot 
be delivered in the medium of theory. What vahdity aesthetic theory has is 
predicated on the philosopher’s dogged determination not to give up in the 
face of an insoluble dilemma. This paradox might be a good model for the 
appropriation of this work, too. hr the last analysis the obstacles to any kind 
of direct approach (poros) to the text o f Aesthetic Theory are objective. They 
would not have been entirely eliminated, no matter how conscientiously 
Adorno revised the existing text.“
hr other words, Habermas is right about the consistency of Adorno’s philosophical 
purpose, but this does not produce consistent philosophical results. One of the imphcations of 
not grounding a philosophical argument is that your method can no longer be a consistent 
organishig force within it. hr Aesthetic Theory Adorno’s method ‘mutates’ in response to the 
different kinds of question being confronted.
Having said this, it would be wrong to read Aesthetic Theory purely as though its 
difficulty were a consequence of the way Adorno confronts an insoluble problem. This 
woidd be to imply that Aesthetic Theory is an ‘organic’ work, whose genetic imprint defirres 
the way its argument evolved. The difficulty o f Aesthetic Theory is not purely a consequence 
of spontaneous generation; we need to understand it, at least to some degree, as a 
dehberately manufactured afterthought. This attitude to Adorno’s argument is highhghted 
particularly clearly in Popper’s approach toward reading him.
Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedeman, “Editors’ epilogue” in Aesthetic Theory, p. 497.
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12Difficulty as ‘afterthought’ or, Popper reading Adorno
Popper, one of Adorno's least sympathetic critics, did more than most to propagate 
Adorno's image as a gratuitously difficult author. As Jay has remarked. Popper accused him 
of "talking tiiviahties in high sounding language".To make the point. Popper analyzed a 
section of the text of Adorno's argument. Taking it through a series of progressively 
shnplifymg stages. Popper performed what might be described as a filtering process. Using 
thr ee columns, he juxtaposed Adorno's original German, a paraphrase into simple German of 
what seemed to have been asserted, and a translation of that paraphrase into Enghsh.^“ There 
is something to be said for the rigor of Popper's method, but its dissecting close focus, even 
were it not motivated by an overt hostility towards Adorno's work, makes certain 
assumptions about the nature of philosophical expression that are incompatible with Adorno's 
broad theoretical aspnations.
Imphcit in Popper's close textual analysis is the assumption that his and Adorno's 
work take place withhr an all-encompassing continuity of meaning. Furthermore, this is a 
continuity that overrides any diflcerences between them, hi other words, Popper assumes he 
and Adorno are playing the same game. With this imphcit assumptiorr, the premises of 
Popper's interpretative enterprise are cahbrated against a universal standard of clarity, whose 
authority he takes to be so obvious as to be unquestionable. That standard is the apparently 
reasonable demand that an author state his thoughts "simply, clearly and modestly, rather 
than impressively."^^ As a consequence, there is no possibihty in Popper's interpretation that 
the meaning of Adorno's text is anything other than defined by its author's use of language,
For an analysis of the relation between Popper and Adorno emphasisizing their similarities, see Robert 
D’Amico,“Popper and the Frankfurt School”, Telos 86 (Winter 1990-91), pp. 33-49.
Martin Jay,^£/omo, (London: Fontana, 1984), p. 12.
Karl Popper, "Reason or Revolution" in T. W. Adorno and others. The Positivist Dispute in German 
Sociology, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby, (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 296-97.
^^ T.W. Adorno and others. The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, p. 297.
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grammar and syntax. The meaning of Adorno's argument is Adorno's responsibihty. His 
difficult style of wilting represents, for Popper, a giatuitous refusal to engage directly with 
matters of substance. With this conclusion in mind. Popper sees it as the function of his 
critical reading to discern what Adorno ‘really’ wanted to say. He can then proceed to 
reshape what is actually wiitten, in teims that make more obvious sense. Accordingly, 
Popper proceeds with his distillation of Adorno's wiiting; coming to terms with the text by 
seeking to eliminate its difficulty.
Adorno's perspective on the matter is, needless to say, quite different. During his 
long-mtming dispute with Popper he suggests that:
...the cognitive ideal of the consistent, preferably simple, mathematically 
elegant explanation falls down where reaUty itself, society, is neither consistent, nor simple, nor neutrally left to the discretion of the categorical fonnulation.
In the hght of this statement, and others like it thr oughout Adorno's oeuvre. Popper's 
mandatory clarity is actively resisted by Adorno. Without considering the rights or wrongs of 
either position, it is fairly obvious that Popper and Adorno have incompatible understandings 
of the significance of the difficulty of Adorno's work. This incompatibrhty registers where 
Popper's interpretative method meets Adorno's text, fiiespectrve of particular interpretative 
decisions Popper makes about Adorno's work, the mechanism of Popper's inteqrretative 
method, and his expectations for it, already define the parameters within which he can 
understand the meaning of Adorno's work to take place. For Popper, the difficulty of 
Adorno’s argument is an obstacle that needs to be overcome. For Adomo, it is part of the 
meaning of his work qua an obstacle to clear understanding.
“^T.W. Adorno, "On the Logic of the Social Sciences" in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, p. 106.
Reading/appropriating Aesthetic Theory 47
It seems that this idea of dehberately thwarting easy reception was important to
Adomo as he was working on Aesthetic Theory. One of the letters he wrote wliile working
on it says that the work was written in two drafts, each of which was quite different:
...The second draft for me is always the decisive one, whereas the jfirst merely serves to assemble raw materials...The first draft is always an organised self- deception; in the second I manoeuvre nwself into the position of critic of my own work. This I find most productive. ’
This account of the genesis of the work, together with pronouncements on the natm e 
of philosophical argument in Negative Dialectics and “The Essay as Form”, suggest that the 
"self-deception" of the first draft was precisely that it was too "clear". The second phase of 
writing is therefore a critique and necessary "abstraction" of the first. The word "abstraction" 
is important in this context, hr philosophy it denotes the distance which exists between a 
philosophical concept and the object it describes. Equally, in this context it also denotes the 
re-emphasis of this distance and an attempt to thematise it against any attempt or temptation 
by the writer or reader to forget its inevitability. From this perspective of its difficidty, 
Aesthetic Theory is doubly abstract first, as a philosophical text, and second, as text which 
seeks to emphasise the inevitable distance of a philosophical argument from the possibility of 
estabhshing a secme truth.
The difficulty of Aesthetic Theoryr, from this perspective, is precisely to counter the 
putative transparency of traditional philosophical argument. It aims to cloud that 
transparency to make the reader aware of the contingencies involved in making sense of the 
text, hi “The Essay as Form” Adorno argues that the essay is a particularly suitable medium 
for the presentation of thought since its ephemeral form emphasises the contingency of its
Aesthetic Theory, p. 495.
®^Tliis way of thinking Aesthetic Theory is further born out by the draft version of the “Introduction” 
which escaped the second phase of composition and was to have been rejected by the author from the final 
edition. The draft Introduction is a lucid account of the aims of the work as they relate to the tradition of 
phiiosopliical aesthetics, and is therefore useful for c o n t e x t u a l i s i n g Theory vis-a-vis that tradition.
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content. Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory however, are both over four hundred 
pages long and, according to Adomo, represent "the quintessence of my thought".They 
are, in contrast to his essays, substantial works. What has not changed for the author, 
however, is their contingent relation to what they describe. Adomo must therefore develop 
some way of maintaining an awareness of such contingency in this context. From this 
perspective then, the difficulty o f Aesthetic Theory is fimdamentally reflexive, aiming to draw 
attention to the contingency of its tmth claims, but it is still making tmth claims and expects 
and demands rigorous critique and evaluation. Put another way, the opacity of Aesthetic 
Theory is defined by the possibility of clear meaning; we only experience the work's opacity 
as a contrast to the possibility of transparently clear meaning and vice-versa.
Returning briefly to the concrete act of reading Aesthetic Theory, how should we now 
think of our experience of the work? To define its difficulty as purely ‘inherited’, ‘genetic’, or 
dehberately dismptive would be misguided. One strategy of reading which suggests itself is 
to do the opposite of Popper, accept the difficulty of Aesthetic Theory as a fa it accompli, and 
understand the obscurity as testimony to the radical indeteiminacy of the issues he tries to 
discuss, hi practice, m moments of indulgence towards Adomo (and ouiselves as readers), 
this may be the best, even the only, pohcy. In this sense we can understand the difficulty of 
Aesthetic Theory as Adomo’s insurance pohcy against the possibihty of a definitive reading 
of a work which seeks to give expression to the radical indeteiminacy of the object of its 
interest, rather than simply describe it as such. There are two problems with this attitude. 
Fh’st, as Adomo makes very clear in his critique of Heidegger in Part 1 of Negative 
Dialectics, the indeteiminacy of Heidegger’s thinking is the focus of much of his hostihty to 
Heidegger. In other words, to read the difficulty o f Aesthetic Theory as indeterminacy which
See T.W. Adorno, Notes to Literature Vol 7, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), pp. 3-24.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 493.
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testifies to the indeterminacy of its objects, is to see Adomo in the hght of what he sees most 
wrong with Heidegger. So, while ‘reading’ Aesthetic Theory hke this may, at times, be no 
bad thing, we need to keep in mind that indeteiminacy in philosophical argument is something 
which Adomo actively resists and considers to be a symptom of the failure of philosophical 
thinking. The second problem with identifying the difficulty of Aesthetic Theory with 
indeteiminacy is that, while it may give credit to the idea of the significance of difficulty in 
itself, rather than simply as an obstacle to clarity, it makes no commitment to estabhshing a 
critically infoimed understanding of that difficulty in teims other than of its contrast with 
what is clearly understood.
The followhig section, therefore, looks at the difficulty of Aesthetic Theory as a 
function of the idea of “ideology critique” which, like the earher discussion of difficulty as 
‘genetic’, places emphasis on understanding why Aesthetic Theory is hard to read because of 
what Adomo is trying to do, rather than as a negative image of clarity. The discussion of 
‘genetic’ difficulty concentrated on the way the refusal to estabhsh a beginning for 
philosophical argument impacted on its organization. The difficulty generated by “ideology 
critique” is related, but concentrates more on the detail of Adomo’s argument and the 
tendency not to define particular concepts.
Difficulty and “ideology critique”
One of the most potentiahy dangerous, but appealing, possibihties is to look to 
Adomo as a reader for clues about how to read his own work. We might be able to use 
Adomo against himself to judge how his argument lives up to his own aspirations for it. Or, 
by looking at his critiques of other theorists, we might gain some idea of how he demarcates 
his own practice in relation to theirs. Having said this, Adomo's oeuvre addresses the
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problem of reading at different levels. It is therefore impossible to develop a uniform strategy 
to confront all its constituent elements. Nonetheless, different parts of his oeuvre potentiahy 
ihuminate one another. Aesthetic Theory clearly demands a different kind of attention than, 
say, the letter in which Adomo criticizes aspects of the draft version of Benjamin's Arcades 
Project. At the same time, Adomo’s critique of Benjamin is potentiahy hlumdnathig of 
Adomo’s own way of working in an unexpected way. This is because Habermas, among 
others has argued that one of the flaws in Adomo's reading of Benjamin is that he tends to 
see Benjamin as trying and failing to address precisely the same problems which exercise him: 
“Adomo never noticeably hesitated to attribute to Benjamin the precise intention of Ideology 
critique that he fohowed in his own work, and in this he was wrong”.^ ^
At this point the interest is not hi the rights and wrongs of the notorious editorial 
dispute between Benjamin and Adomo over Benjamin’s Arcades Project. Rather, what is of 
interest is the way Adomo’s critique of Benjamin reflects back onto how his own procedures 
of constmcting an argument might be constmed as attempting to get round the problems he 
finds hi Benjamin. I will concentrate on Adomo’s critique of Benjamin’s essay ‘Paris - 
Capital of the nineteenth-centuryBenjamin’s essay is divided into six titled and numbered 
sections. Adomo singles out for special attention a motto which divides the first section: 
'^'Chaque époque reve la suivante [Every Epoch Dreams its Successor]” and Benjamin's 
ensuing exposition of what it means.
Immediately following the motto, Benjamin claims there are “correspondences” 
between nineteenth-centuiy means of production and “images in the collective
See particularly Jurgen Habermas “Consciousness Raising or Rescuing Critique” in Gary Smith (ed.). On I
Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections, (Cambridge, Mass.: MTT, 1991), p. 115. |
^ see W. Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era o f High Capitalism, trans. H.Zorn, J
(London: Verso, 1983), p. 157-60. 1
^ For Adomo’s critique of Benjamin see T.W. Adorno “Letter to Walter Benjamin, 2 August, 1935” in j
R Taylor {qû ..). Aesthetics and Politics, (London: Verso, 1980), pp. 110-120. Î
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consciousness”. This correspondence takes the form of a theme shared by both: a “mingling
of the old and the new”. The ‘shape’ the economic half of this conespondence takes is that
new means of production are stdl dominated by old means of production, because these have
not yet been completely transformed by capitalism. In the collective consciousness, the
mingling of old and new expresses itself in the aspiration to transcend its own social
deficiencies. Such desire for a better society emerges, according to Benjamin, as the
“vigorous aspiration to break with what is out-dated - which means, however, with the most
recent past.” He continues.
These tendencies [in the collective consciousness] turn the fantasy, which gains its initial stimulus fiom the new, back upon the primal past, hi the dream in which eveiy epoch sees in images the epoch winch is to succeed it, the latter appears coupled with elements of prehistory - that is to say of a classless society.
So, the deshe for a better present comes to be a dieam for a better future, which is
itself associated with the idea of a prelapsarian classless society. Benjamin then goes on to
say that the pattern of this asphation in the collective consciousness leaves material traces in
“in a thousand configurations of life, Jfrom peimanent buddings to ephemeral fashions. This
last claim reflects back on the first part of the section, before the motto, where Benjamin
discussed the emergence of the arcades, using the same khid of argument:
The beginnings of construction in iron constituted the second condition for the appearance of the arcades. The Empire had seen in this technique a contribution to the renewal of architecture in the sense of ancient Gieece. The architectuial theorist Botticher expressed the general conviction when he said that ‘with regard to the art-forms of the new system, the formal principle of the HeUenic mode’ must come into force.
In other words, the architectural construction of the arcades themselves expresses the 
same “dialectical image” of the new and the old. Here the “dialectical image” takes the shape
W. Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era o f High Capitalism, p. 159.
W. Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era o f High Capitalism, p. 159.
W. Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era o f High Capitalism, p. 158.
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of a coalescence of the design principles of the architecture of ancient Greece with the new 
material of iron.
There is an elegant simphcity to Benjamin’s argument. He takes the idea of the 
commodity as fetish and, extends this “dialectical image” to the structure of collective 
consciousness, and the products of early nineteenth-century Paris. Adomo begins with three 
specific criticisms. He faults Benjamin’s
... conception of the dialectical image as the content of consciousness, all be it 
a collective one; its direct - 1 would almost say: developmental -relatedness to the future as Utopia; and the notion of the ‘epoch’ as proper, and self 
contained subject.^
Although Adomo seems to be concentrating on detail, his procedure is to demonstrate 
systematically that the central ideas of Benjarnin’s argument are far more complex than 
Benjamin acknowledges. The result of Adomo’s critique is to nullify the simphcity of 
Benjamin’s argument, both at the level of the concepts it rehes on and its organization. 
Adomo’s fiist target is what he sees as Benjamin’s claim that “the dialectical hnage is the 
content of consciousness”. This would be to hnply that the collective consciousness of the 
nineteenth-century, of which Benjamin speaks, has a reahstic rephcation of a latent tension 
between the old and the new, hnphcit hi the commodity fetish. Against this Adomo argues,
The fetish character of the commodity is not a fact of consciousness; rather, it is dialectical, in the eminent sense that it produces consciousness: This means, however, that consciousness or unconsciousness cannot simply depict it as a dream, but responds to it hi equal measure with desire and fear. But it is precisely this dialectical power that is lost in the rephca reahsm in your present immanent version of the dialectical image.
Here Adomo is deploying against Benjamin an argument first forwarded by Lukacs hi 
the essay ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat.” In an argument which will 
be developed in more detail in Chapter 2, Lukacs argues that the commodity form 
quahtatively changes the way we experience the world, not just what we think about. Adomo
T.W. Adorno “Letter to Walter Benjamin, 2 August, 1935”, p. 111. 
T.W.Adorno, “Letter to Walter Benjamin. 2 August, 1935”, p. 111.
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is similarly highly critical of the implication that the commodity fetish seems to be tied to the 
idea of utopia. According to Adomo’s critique, in Benjamin’s argument there is an erroneous 
translation of the dialectical image of the commodity fetish onto the collective consciousness 
because the utopia promised by the commodity fetish is not the same as a social utopia; “We 
receive the promise of immortahty in commodities and not for people”.
One way to situate Adomo’s critique of Benjamin is to consider it in the hght of 
Habeimas’ description of the central importance of the idea of “ideology critique” to 
Adomo’s theoretical identity. Habermas definition of it as a method of critical procedure is 
particularly ihunhnating when apphed to Adomo’s reading of Benjamin:
Critique becomes ideology critique when it attempts to show that the vahdity of a theoiy has not been adequately dissociated fi*om the context fi:om which it emerged; that behind the back of the theoiy there hes an inadmissible mixture o f power and validity, and that it owes its reputation to this. Ideology critique wants to show how, on the level for which this painstaking distinction between contexts of meaning and contexts of reahty is constitutive, precisely these intemal and extemal relationships are confused - and they .are confused because vahdity claims are confused because of relationships of power. Ideology critique itself is not a theory competing with some other theoiy; it 
simply makes use of certain theoretical assumptions. Thus equipped, it disputes the tj^th of a suspicious theory by exposing its untruthfulness. It 
advances the process of enhghtenment by showing that a theory presupposing a demythologized understanding of the world is sthl ensnared by myth, by pointing out a putatively overcome category mistake.
It is what he sees as the inadequacy of Benjamin’s strategic position ‘behind’ the text, 
and the dependence of the detail on that position, of which Adomo is critical. In simple 
teims, Adomo considers Benjamin's position too obviously divided into a set of theoretical 
assumptions, on the one hand, and a series of statements derived fi*om them, on the other. In 
Benjamin's case, this consists of seeing reahty as explainable through various extrapolations 
of the dialectical image of the commodity fetish. Benjamin derives fi*om the ‘truth’ of the 
commodity fetish, certain ‘facts’. For Benjamin, the dialectical hnage recurs as a variety of 
concrete manifestations. For Adomo, dialectical images are “objective constellations m which
^ T.W.Adorno, “Letter to Walter Benjamin. 2 August, 1935”,p. 114. 
Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity,-p. 116.
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the ‘social’ situation represents itself. Consequently, no ideological or social 
‘accomplishment’ can ever be expected of a dialectical i m a g e . I n  other words, for Adomo, 
a “dialectical image” is something which is consciously a critical motif that recognizes and 
exposes symptoms of the social situation. It is not some stractural rule which, as Benjamin 
seems to imply, functions to organize and unify the relations between the commodity form, 
collective consciousness, and the design of the arcades.
As Habermas says, ideology critique is not a competing theory. Adomo does not 
have a different understanding of the Parisian arcades, rather, his critique of Benjamin 
focuses almost entirely on the erroneous assumptions Benjaimn makes as revealed by his 
mode of argument. Benjamin does not understand that the economic motif of the commodity 
fetish cannot be simply uplifted into a social context without its own transformation. Equally, 
Benjamin’s theoiy relies on the meaningful existence of a contained period of time hnphed by 
the word “epoch”, without questioning whether the concept has any concrete existence.
Adomo is criticizing Benjamin whenever he sees the latter as relying on some ‘truth’, 
be it Marxism, or the presumption of the adequacy of a particular concept. Nothing is 
allowed to be taken for granted. On the face of it, this displaces Benjamin’s argument away 
from its ostensible concems of understanding Paris in terms of the dynamic of nineteenth- 
centmy capitahsm, to problems of method. In a different context, Rainer Nagele has 
described what is going on here: “...Adomo unhinges that point on which all stories depend: 
the beginning whose arbitrariness is covered up by the fiction of a necessary and natural 
origin. Benjamin’s presumption of the tmth of Marxism and the adequacy of the concepts 
he is using are both appeals to the idea of “necessaiy and natural origin” and although such
T.W.Adomo, 'Letter to Walter Benjamin. 2 August, 1935', pp. 115-116.
RainerNagele, “The Scene of the Other: Theodor W. Adorno’s Negative Dialectic in the context of 
Poststmcturalism,” Two 11 (1983), p. 66.
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presumptions pennit a clear and convincing argument, this clarity occludes the appeal to 
fictional origins.
What might Adomo’s critique of Benjamin imply for our understanding of the 
difficulty of Aesthetic Theoryl Fust, we have seen that at its most basic, Adomo’s ideology 
critique reveals the apparently simple to be infinitely compHcated. Thus Habeimas writes: 
“Ideology critique wants to show how, on the level for which this painstaking distinction 
between contexts of meaning and contexts of reahty is constitutive, precisely these intemal 
and extemal relations are confused.” Adomo conceives of his task as making, and keeping 
clear, the painstaking distinction between the constitutive relation of the intemal and 
extemal. hi other words, to expect Adomo to give hard definitions of “beauty”, “ait”, or 
“mimesis” is to overemphasize the constitutive power of the intemal definition, and therefore 
misunderstand his central idea that it is the relation between the intemal definition of a 
concept, and the ch cumstances of its deployment, that constitutes its meaning, hi the practice 
of reading Aesthetic Theory, this means that Adomo has never said the last word about any 
particular concept; there is always something more to say. In the Introduction to Against 
Epistemology Adomo gives a clear indication of why this has to be so: “The doctrine that 
everything is mediated, even supporting immediacy, is irreconcilable with the urge to 
‘reduction’ and is stigmatized as logical nonsense. In this sense the difficulty of deriving 
hard definitions of concepts in Aesthetic Theory can be explained as reflecting a high degree 
of consistency between what Adomo beheves philosophical argument can achieve, and what 
he actually does; to say that a concept is mediated means that it is infinitely definable. In one 
of the most pessimistic moments in Aesthetic Theory, Adomo reaches a point of such 
detailed and minute complexity of mediations that he simply writes
Adorno, T.W. Against Epistemology: A Metacritique. Studies in Husserl and the Phenomenological 
Antinomies, trans. Willis Domingo, (Cambridge, Mass.: MTT, 1983), pp. 4-5.
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Finally what becomes engulfed by this dialectical turbulence is the notion of 
meaning. Since a negative judgment must be passed on history, the unity of process and result is unattainable, increasingly, the individual moments refuse to accommodate themselves within a preconceived totahty, opening a cleavage that destroys meaning.
WhUe this moment of failure can be read as signifying Adomo’s honesty in admitting 
his inability to think any further in a particular train of thought, it might equally imply a 
devious evasiveness. Roger Taylor, the Editor/Translator of the collection of papers and 
correspondence in which the translation of Adomo’s letter to Benjamin appears, takes the 
latter view, suggesting that this accounts for one of the most important differences between 
Benjamin and Adomo:
If Benjamin in Paris was a too credulous behever in the thaumaturgical virtue of ‘calling things by their names,’ his colleagues in New York certandy did not suffer from any trusting hterahsm: they were becoming too adept practitioners of the diplomatic art of euphemism and periphrasis, that knowingly does not call things by their name.^^
This is to read Adomo as thoroughly evasive because he wants to make ideology 
critique impossible by simply not making tmth claims. This is actually quite wrong, as was 
suggested hi an earher discussion of Adomo’s attitude to philosophical indeteiminacy. All the 
same, the suggestion that Adomo practices, or tries to practice ideology critique on himself 
widens the terms of how we should be prepared to read the difficulty of Aesthetic Theory. 
The ‘re-writing’ of his arguments must not be just thought of as dehberate attempt to make 
arguments less transparent, but as Adomo arguing against, even contradicting himself as a 
dehberate strategy. If this were the case, it would be imperative to attempt to criticahy 
differentiate between dehberate contradictions in Adomo’s thought, and those contradictions 
which, as those Adomo sees in Benjamin, genuinely undermine an argument.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 256.
Ronald Taylor (ed.). Aesthetics and Politics, p. 106.
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Difficulty as “mediated” argument
This kind of attitude towards developing a critical, but methodologically sensitive,
reading of Adomo is suggested by Jay. In the short introductory work Adorno, he directly
engages with the problem of trying to deal with Adomo in a way sympathetic to his own
terms. In tune with the idea that Adomo exphcitly energizes a dynamic relation between the
difficulty of his argument and his wider theoretical aims. Jay writes in an often quoted
sentence, "Adomo would have had a principled objection to render his thought painlessly
accessible to a wide audience".This statement certainly contests the adequacy of Popper's
order of interpretative myopia, but Jay later dramatically reinforces the idea of the difficulty
of Adomo by likening his writing to high modernist ait:
Like the music of Arthur Schoenbui g, which, so Adomo approvingly claimed, demanded of the listener “not mere contemplation but praxis”, his own witting was dehberately designed to thwart an effortless reception by passive readers.
On the face of it, the emphasis here on the impossibihty of "effortless reception" 
echoes Popper's critique. Despite very different attitudes to Adomo, both critics 
acknowledge the necessity for a particulaiJy determined attitude to reading him At the same 
time, then* attention is dhected differently, because their understanding of the potential 
significance of the difficulty of Adomo's work is different.
Ignoring the substance of Jay's claim for the moment, I want to concentrate on what it 
tells us about his critical approach, and how it differs fi*om Popper's. Jay suggests a level of 
meaning beyond that which is possible within Popper's paradigm of clarity. One effect is to 
reveal the limitations of Popper's expectations for Adomo, and therefore attest to the 
inevitable inadequacy of his conclusions about Adomo's work. More significantly, Jay's 
suggestion arises out of a different order of critical behavior. To hkqn Adomo's texts to
Martin Jay, Adomo, p. 11. 
Martin Adomo, p. 11.
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Schoenberg's music is by no means a reflexive critical act. That is to say. Jay's analogy is not 
something he could have brought to his reading of the work in the way Popper brought with 
him the demand for clarity. Instead of unreflectively applying given standards to Adomo's 
work, as Popper does. Jay imphes a disposition towards the work wherein the reader first 
needs to make decisions about what those standards should be. This effectively adds a new 
dimension to the process of reading, throwing doubt on the principle that Popper, or anyone 
else, can make unreflective assumptions about the kind of thing Adomo's work is. With this 
in mind, it is worthwhile briefly reconsideiing the question of what it means to be critical of 
Adomo's work.
hi response to an understanding of the significance of Adomo’s work as ideology 
critique, it was suggested that we need to be both critical and sympathetic towards the 
difficulty of Aesthetic Theory. This is a piincipal that sounds plausible, but remains 
asphational, rather than a concrete way of reading which could be put into practice. 
Furthemore, fiom Popper's perspective it looks like a compromise, an uncritical softening of 
critical standards, to compensate for Adomo's idiosyncrasies. The response to this charge is 
twofold. First, Popper's argument is itself based on the imcritical assumption that the 
premises of his own position are absolute. Second, by opening these premises up for 
negotiation, the hoiizons of critical decision making are expanded, not removed. Unhke 
Popper, it is incumbent on us to make critical judgments about our expectations for Adomo's 
work. The judgments we make will define the limits of our reading, and therefore the range 
within which inteipretative questions are asked of it. Without the certainties deriving fiom 
the anchored coordinates of Popper's interpretative universe, the relevance of these critical 
categories can only ever be provisional. They evolve fiom a negotiation with the text, rather 
than being blindly apphed, or randomly plucked out of the air. To take a metaphor Panofsky
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used to describe something hke this kind of attitude, as it apphed to his own interpretative 
enterprise: in order to derive productive contexts within which to understand Adomo's 
argument we need to "marinate" ourselves in his thought. Through time we can develop ideas 
of what to expect from Aesthetic Theory. These expectations are the contexts in which a 
detailed reading can take place.
Responding to the interpretative challenge something hke this idea of Adomo's work 
presents, Jay identifies two themes from Adomo's critical vocabulary: the "force-field" and 
the "constellation" as signaling the hybrid nature of Adomo's wiiting. hi a general sense, 
these ideas are expressive of principals reflecting Adomo's commitment to the notion that the 
analysis of any phenomenon must approach it simultaneously from different perspectives. 
Another way of putting this is to say that the ideas of the "force-field" and "constellation" 
register the importance of the principle of "mediation" for Adomo's project.
Within this model of Adomo's work. Jay signals five intersecting categories to guide 
his general reading. They are respectively: Western Marxism, aesthetic modernism, cultural 
conservatism, a "Jewish impulse", and deconstmction. He emphasizes these are not fixed 
categories, and, "...it would be possible to discern still subtler contesting impulses that would 
help us to get Adomo into better focus".Notwithstanding this warning, the frames of 
reference he identifies are in fact relatively well-estabhshed as defining the major themes of 
Adomo's thought. This has the benefit of making them relatively uncontroversial, but they 
can also have the effect of limiting the reception of his work within those traditions. Equally 
important, the themes we identify as significant for understanding Adomo are necessary to 
help clarify his wiiting, but they can also fimction in reverse, integrating his work into 
particular traditions of debate whose agendas are not necessarily sympathetic to the 
promiscuous overlapping of Adomo's interests. Various critiques of Adomo’s thought
38 Martin jay, Adomo, p. 11.
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described in the Introduction diagnosed his obsolescence as deriving from a particular 
weakness which, it was then asserted, undermined the whole of his project. The problem with 
this type of critique is not so much a question of its correctness, or otherwise, but of the 
tendency towards a compartmentalized reception of Adomo which neglects the integration of 
his thinking.
The significance of Jay’s approach is the extent to which it understands Adomo’s 
thought as a constellation of different interests. Jay himself is taking a global view of 
Adomo’s thought, and recognizes that the mediating interests he identifies may be refined. I 
have suggested that this process of refining is partly about being open in one’s expectations 
for Adomo’s work. At the same time, the idea of refining our expectations fiom the general 
themes Jay diagnoses is also about understanding that the moments in the constellation of 
interests defining Aesthetic Theory are also mutually defining. Taking Jay’s examples, this 
means that Westem Marxism, deconstmction, etc. are not just influences on Adomo’s 
thinking, but each is defined by the others; cultural conseivatism is deconstmcted, 
deconstmction is criticized from the perspective of Westem Mamsm, and so on. Irrespective 
of the outcomes of these confr ontations within Adomo’s work, their mutual modification 
signals one of the biggest problems in reading Adomo, which is the extent to which Ms work 
confuses disciplinaiy boundaries. An obvious frame of reference witMn wMch to read 
Aesthetic Theory, for example, is to see it as part of a tradition of philosopMcal aesthetics. 
Indeed it is, but it is also a strident articulation and defense of a way of thinking about 
modemism, an analysis of the cultural impact of capitahsm, and a theory of representation. At 
times these agendas mutually reinforce each other within the work; at thnes they are in 
obvious, and unconcealed, contradiction.
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Difficulty as the ‘absence’ of discipline
For a start, the argument Adomo uses in discussing the various subjects he engages is 
often driven by critical conventions which he extends beyond the traditions wherein they 
were originally developed. As a consequence, his writing is often a hybrid mixture of different 
kinds of "competence", apphed over normally distinct fields. These include, for example, 
hterary criticism, philosophy, Marxism, sociology, and aesthetics. Once we have identified 
various themes as significant within the work, the critical procediues we adopt to explore 
them are not neutral, they fimction in methodologically specific ways. For example, we have 
seen that Jay makes an analogy between the difficulty of Adomo's style of writing and the 
difficulty of modem art. Notwithstanding Adomo’s hostihty to the aestheticisation of 
philosophy, this is a particularly relevant observation when it comes to thinking about 
Aesthetic Theory. Ift however, we read Aesthetic Theoiy seeking to explain its difficulty 
within the context of related problems arising out of a confrontation with modem art, then 
om discussion wih inevitably cany with it something of the traditions of criticism and art 
historical debate. We might place emphasis on questions that are often asked of works of art, 
such as, how the principle ideas of the work came to be generated; what was its original 
audience; how it relates to other similar works, etc. The answers to these questions may well 
be usefid for understanding Aesthetic Theory as a historical document, but it will not 
necessarily help us to evaluate its claims about the world. If, on the other hand, we assume 
Aesthetic Theoiy is philosophical hr a more traditional sense, then conventions of reading
Paul Crowther gives an example of how critics with different backgrounds treat the same text differently. In 
a review article of M. IvexsQViS Alois Riegl: Art History and Theory, (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT, 1993). He 
writes
Like many art historians, Iversen's tendency is to approach theory as if it were a work of art.
By tins I mean that considerable emphasis is placed on how a theory came to be generated; 
who it was originally addressed to, etc. Now, as has already been noted, this is of some 
value in understanding Riegl's work as a historical product, but it severely restricts Iversen's 
capacity to negotiate the work's status as a body of truth claims.
P. Crowther, "More Than Ornament: The Significance ofRie^", Art History, 1994. p.493.
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philosophy wih, in turn, focus on testing the vahdity of particular substantive claims in 
isolation from considerations of then historical context. To comphcate things even more, 
Adomo is committed to undernhning the kind of division of labor imphed by the separation 
of these different modes of critical practice. This is not to say that Adomo treats ah texts and 
traditions of argument in the same way. He is too close to Hegel, with the latter's emphasis 
on the differences between ait and phhosophy, to do that. Rather, art and phhosophy aie 
centers of gravity whose concems intersect and overlap, as do the modes of criticism 
associated with them.
The imphcations of this proposition for reading Adomo can be grasped when we
observe that his critical discussion of other authors rarely takes any text at face value. A
work we would noimahy think of as phhosophy, for instance, might be read in an unfamihar
way. For example, Adomo describes how he was influenced by Kiacauer's imoithodox
approach to reading Kant:
As he presented it to me, Kant's critical phhosophy was not simply a system of transcendental ideahsm. Rather, he showed me how the objective-ontological and subjective-ideahst moments warred within it, how the more eloquent passages in the work are wounds this conflict has left in the theory."*®
hi other words, through Kiacauer, Adomo became attuned to a conflict between the
objective phhosophical problems Kant is addressing and the particular constraints imposed on
the way he confr onts these problems. In this description of how he read Kant, Adomo then
extrapolates to the general notion of a tension between "objective" and "expressive" moments
in philosophy:
...thiough Kiacauer I perceived for the first time the expressive moment m philosophy: putting hito words the thoughts that came into one's head. The opposite moment, the moment of rigor, of compelling objectivity in thought, took second place to it. For quite a while after I first encoimtered it in the 
practice of philosophy at the university it seemed academic to me, until I 
found out that among the tensions that are the lifeblood of philosophy the tension between expressiveness and rigor is perhaps the most central.'**
T.W. Adorno, "The Curious Realist: On Siegfried Kracauer", in T. W. Adorno, Notes to Literature Vol 2, 
trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 59.
T.W. Adorno, "The Curious Realist: On Siegfried Kracauer", p. 59.
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Reading the "expressiveness" of philosophy, as Adomo describes his reading of Kant,
is surprising and unorthodox. It is also exemplary of the way Adomo extends critical
conventions beyond the traditions wherein they were originally developed and apphed. With
his own work, the titles of his books give us clues as to their subjects: Hegel: Three Studies,
Notes to Literature, Aesthetic Theory, In Search o f Wagner, etc. Although these titles define
a particular area of emphasis, the arguments deployed, and the allusions made, do not
necessarily confine themselves to the fi*amework of disciplinaiy conventions the titles suggest
we might expect. The arguments of different philosophers, polemic, histoiy, criticism,
Maixism, are dehberately worked together to produce wiiting that might uncharitably be
described as always tiying to say too much.
The ‘absence of discipline’ in the title of this section can therefore be taken as having
two meanings. Fust, it signifies Adomo’s lack of respect for traditional disciplinaiy
boundaries. Second, it reflects Adomo’s refusal or inabihty to conclude arguments, ahuded to
earher in the comparison with Hegel. So, although we need frames of reference to make any
sense of Adomo, once they become entrenched or rigidly demarcated, they can be
debilitating because they necessarily concentrate on one aspect of a text which does not
conclude and has multiple identities. It is a notion of this kind of complexity which I take
Albrecht Wellmer to be thinking about when he writes,
Adomo's texts on aesthetics have something of the work of art about them, and to this extent can neither be exhausted nor suqiassed by interpretation and critique. However interpretation and critique might well take on, with respect to these texts, the function of a magnifying glass. If one reads the text with the 
help of a magnijfying glass, it is possible that layers of meaning which to the naked eye blend into each other will now separate and gain an independence from each other. The image of a stereoscope would be better still: it would here be a question of producing a three-dimensional picture that would reveal the latent depth of the texts. Through this kind of "stereoscopic" reading of 
Adomo one wih discover that his incomparable capacity for penetrating experience philosophicahy has permitted him - even in the limited
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representational medium of a philosophical subject-ohject dialectic - to give expression to much that in fact resists representation in this medium.'*^
In the Hght of these observations, what is really difficult about Adomo, I suggest, is
that the principle of mediation - the idea that everything is mutually defining - is not
something he identifies as a philosophical model to be abstractly applied as a method of
understanding the world, but a modus operandi. Aesthetic Theory does more than impinge on
the territories of traditionally distinct disciplines, it assumes their different modes of
argument, methodologies, and expectations in a partial fusion which reveals as much about
the incompatibdity of history and aesthetic judgement as the necessity of understanding their
inextricable unity in the representation of the concrete particular. One way of explaining what
this means for understanding the character of Aesthetic Theory is to consider it in the Hght of
a disciiption BaudriUard uses in the Introduction to The System o f Objects. BaudriHard is
concerned here with finding an appropriate language to describe objects as they are defined
by the process of their technological formation. He makes a distinction between this kind of
understanding of an object and one which is based on reading the object I terms of the way it
fidfiUs social or psychological needs after it has been made. BaudriHard quotes at length from
Gilbert Simondon’s accoruit of the petrol engine.
In todays engines each important part is so closely associated with the others by reciprocal exchange of energy that it carmot imdergo any essential variation whatsoever.... The form of the cylinder head, the metal of which it is manufactured, works in combination with aU the other elements of the cycle to produce a particular temperature in the electrodes of the sparking plug; this 
temperature in turn affects the characteristics of the ignition and of the cycle as a whole.Modern engines are concrete, whereas earher ones were abstract. In 
the older version, each component intervened at a specific stage of the cycle and was then supposed to have no further impact on the others; motor parts were rather Hke people, each doing their job without ever getting acquainted with their co-workers....The technical object may thus be said to have a primitive form, an abstract form, in which each theoretical and material unit is treated as an absolute needing to be set up as a closed system if it is to function properly. Such a situation presents a set of problems of integration 
that have to be resolved....This is the point at which specific structures emerge which specific structures emerge which, relative to each component, one
A. Wellmer, ‘Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation: Adorno's Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity*, trans. 
M.Cooke, Telos 62 (Winter 1984-85), p. 115.
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might call defense mechanisms: for instance, the cylinder head of the intemal- combustion heat engine starts to bristle with cooling fins. These were at first simply an extraneous element, as it were, added to the cylinder and cylinder head for the sole purpose of cooling. In more recent engines, however, these 
fins have come to play a mechanical role as weU as providing a ribbing that serves to inhibit the distortion of the cylinder head imder the pressure of 
gasses....Now the two fimctions are no longer distinguishable; a miique structure has thus evolved, one which is not a compromise but a concomitance, a convergence. The ribbed cylinder head may now be made thirmer , which allows for faster cooling. The bivalent fin/rib structure therefore fiilfills the two formerly separate fonctions by means of a synthesys - and the result is far more satisfactory in both cases : it integrates the two 
fimctions and transcends them....We may say, then, that the new structure is more concrete than the old and that it represents a genuine advance for the technical object, for the true technological problem is the need for a convergence of fimctions within a single structural feature, not the need for a compromise between confictmg requirements. Ultimately, this progression from abstract to concrete means that the technical object will tend towards the state of a system that is completely internally consistent and completely
There aie several ways this extremely mterestmg passage can be understood as 
relevant to Aesthetic Theory, fii this chapter I have given various different explanations for 
the difficulty of Aesthetic Theory and Simondon’s analysis of recent engines provides an 
example of a way of how to think these different kinds of difficulty as a concomitance, a 
convergence which fulfills distinct fimctions by means of synthesis. From a more distant 
perspective, the same argument can be apphed to the multidisciphnarity 6f Aesthetic Theory.
G. Simondon, Du mode d ’existence des objects techniques, (Paris: Aubier, 1958), pp. 25-6 in J. 
BaudriHard, The System o f Objects, trans. James Benedict, (London: Verso, 1996), p. 5.
Chapter H 
MEDIATION AND REIFICATION
Until Lukacs’ History and Class Consciousness of 1923, Marxism concentrated on 
the politics and economics of capitalism as the absolute targets for revolutionary 
transfonnation. Marxists held that if the economic and political organization of society was 
transfoimed, then emancipation in every sphere of life would follow. In History and Class 
Consciousness Lukacs acknowledges capitalism has objective symptoms in the political and 
economic spheres. His original insist, however, is that it also has a subjective symptom. 
Capitalism transforms experience of the world per se  ^ well beyond economics and politics. 
The mechanism of capitalism’s capacity to do this is the “reification” of experience wliich it 
precipitates. Simply put, “reification” is the extreme simplification of experience; the actual 
Gonthigencies and complexities of experience become obscured and are overlooked. Lukacs’ 
argument is significant, not just for Adorno, but for Western Marxism in general. For the fii st 
time, the impact of capitahsm is seen to derive fi om its power as a system of representing the 
world.
The power of capitalism, thus redefined, radically alters the potential for, and means 
oJ^  revolution. Where the power of capitahsm was identified with the ownership of means of 
production, the capacity to resist it was invested in the proletariat qua ahenated labour. For 
Lukacs, the proletariat remahis the key. In the new scenario, however, he ascribes to it the 
unique potential to experience the world in a manner that is not completely reified. Adorno 
does not share Lukacs’ confidence in the proletariat, and this fundamental departure from 
Lukacs’ position will be discussed in due course.
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As well as Lukacs’ obvious preoccupation with re-aligning Marxism, we need to 
recognize the philosophical significance of his argument for Adorno. Inseparable fiom the 
Marxist moment in his thought, Adorno remains preoccupied by philosophical problems, 
specifically Kant’s question of how we can be sure of the existence of a mind-independent 
reahty. Following Hegel, however, Adorno believes that any attempt to answer the question 
as Kant did, in universal, ahistorical terms, will simply fail. For Hegel and Adomo, experience 
cannot be separated fiom thought to be thought about. Any definition of experience which 
supposes that experience can be thus thought about, ignores sometlfing. As a definition, it 
ignores the impact on the explanation of experience it derives of mechanisms brought into 
play hi the attempt to think about experience. From Hegel’s perspective, Kant does not see 
this. Not so much because Kant makes an active decision to avoid the issue, but because his 
method prohibits him fiom recognizing its significance. This, for Hegel, predisposes Kant’s 
argument towards skepticism. Hegel’s antidote to Kant’s difficulties is to argue that 
philosophy must concern itself, not just with whether it is possible to know about the world, 
but with knowing what it might be to know. This involves Hegel in the almost infinite 
complexity of having to explain how various forms of knowledge of the world have come to 
be how they are. He explains that the various representations of the world oflfered thr ough 
art, religion, and philosophy of the past, including Kant’s, are not necessarily ‘wrong’. 
Rather, they are restricted by the order of experience available at a particular historical 
moment, and the medium through which that experience is represented. Thus, for example, 
the representation of the world offered through an art work, will be circumscribed by the 
paiticulai' historical configuration of experience at the time of its production. As well as being 
thus historically mediated, the ait work is also constrained as a medium through which it 
experiences and represents. For Hegel, the medium of ait is the “imagination,” as opposed to
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philosophy, whose medimn is “reason”. It follows that art and philosophy of the same historic 
moment wdl, nevertheless, experience and represent the world differently.
From the perspective of Hegel’s response to the methodological basis for Kant’s 
skepticism, Lukacs’ idea of reification has a particular significance. The idea of the reification 
extends Hegel’s understanding that experience is subject to historical transfoimation to the 
present. 11^ as Hegel argues, experience cannot be sufficiently thought as a universal, then the 
most general significance of reification, for Adomo, is precisely that it is not a universal 
definition of experience. Potentially, reification is a historical mode of experiencing the world 
in which philosophizing takes place. Adomo never misses the opportunity to emphasize the 
peivasiveness of reification. Wlule this is certainly grounds for skepticism, reification also 
functions as an antidote to the temptation of repeating Kant’s error of taking experience to be 
something which might be stepped out of for analysis. Put another way, how might it be 
possible for the philosopher to conceive of a way of experiencing the world that is beyond the 
historical horizon of that philosopher’s experience?
We need to understand that Adomo conceives of his project as taking place within 
the blanket reification of experience. Reification functions in Adomo’s argument in two 
different senses. Fhst, it is operative as a Marxist tmth claim that all ex[)erience is socially 
conditioned. Reification thereby provides a framework for understanding every 
representation as socially mediated. Second, as we have seen, reification is operative in a 
Hegelian sense in so far as it ftuictions as a historically specific mutation of experience. 
Within the reification of consciousness, a philosophical account of experience has to ask what 
it might be to know something in an un-reified way. It must do this before considering the 
question of how it might be possible to transcend reification.
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In Hegel, the sufficiency of reason and the teleology of his system allow the 
supercession of one historical mutation of experience hy the next. In Hegel, it is philosophical 
reflection, as the most advanced mode of experience of a historical moment, that precipitates 
the transition into a new mode of experiencing the world. Hegel, we will recall, had argued 
that ait and religion have been superseded by philosophy as modes of ex^ieriencmg and 
representing the world. This is because they were unable to experience or represent the world 
as fully rational, a task philosophy is equipped to do. Lukacs deploys the same teleological 
piinciple to argue that philosophy has become obsolete: “classical philosophy is able to think 
the deepest and most fundamental problems of the development of bourgeois society thr ough 
to the very end - on the plane of philosophy”.^  Now, under reification, it is the consciousness 
of the proletariat, in its potential immunity fiom reification, which possesses the capacity to 
represent and experience the world properly. Contrary to Hegel, for Adomo reason is neither 
sufficient, nor is rational thought the most advanced mode of experiencing the world, nor 
does Adomo think teleologicaUy. Neither, as has been suggested, does Adomo share Lukacs’ 
confidence in the proletariat. How then, might reified experience be transcended without the 
sufficiency of reason or the revolutionary potential of the proletariat? This is what Adomo 
sets out to investigate and explain in Aesthetic Theory.
An incomplete explanation of Adomo’s position in Aesthetic Theory will be presented 
here to situate it in relation to the above argument. What wiU be given now is a summaiy of 
how reification might be transcended. What will not be given here is an explanation of how 
Adomo explains why it is possible to identify experience as reified at all,, if it is impossible to 
take a position outside it.
 ^ Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. R. Livingstone, (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p. 
121 .
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Although the reification of experience is ubiquitous, it is not necessarily the absolute 
condition of all experience under capitalism. How does Adomo defend the latter proposition? 
He never defends it directly. Rather the indirect importance of “mediation” and “mimesis” 
emerge as significant. As we saw in the previous chapter, especially through Adorno’s 
critique of Benjamin, the principle of mediation, as Adomo practices it, represents experience 
as infinitely complex. As such, mediation fimctions as “ideology critique” of the false 
simplicity of reified experience. From this angle, we could legitimately expect Adomo to be 
hostile to the idea of mimesis traditionally associated with ideas of reahsm. Any idea of 
realism in representation implies an immediate, or potentially immediate, relationship to the 
object represented. If this order of representation is not ah eady reified, it would seem, at the 
veiy least, to be comp licit with the radical simplicity of reified experience. Indeed it is but, as 
we have seen, the idea of mimesis has always been intensely ambiguous and manipulable. For 
Adomo, an act of mimesis is not necessaiily adequately understood as a fimction of 
experience. To use the critique of reification to discount a realistic mimetic act would be to 
imply that a mimetic act is sufficiently described by its identity as a mode of experience. No 
act of representing the world can be defined purely with reference to its status as either 
experience, medium, context, or the object it represents. This principle of the irreducibihty of 
a representation to a single, necessary, aspect of its definition is mediation being put into 
practice by Adomo in his analysis of representation. That is to say, because every 
representation is a complex unity of representations, it cannot be fully accounted for with 
reference to one of its mediations. The same principle, applied to the analysis of every act of 
representation, allows that an individual act of representation can, potentially, be identified as 
having a degree of autonomy. The achievement of this autonomy is not however guaranteed 
for every representation, nor is it assured by a reading which takes account of all possible
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mediations. Autonomy is also a function of the way the representation is configured, hi other 
words, to be autonomous, which is not to be determined by any one of the necessaiy 
mediations which define it, a representation has to be read as mediated, but it also, has to 
configure itself in a special way. Put simply, the status of autonomy is a function of reception 
and representation. The complexities generated by this mutual dependence of a 
representation and its reception can be signaled as indicating something of what it means to 
claim the mutual dependence of philosophy and art hi Aesthetic Theory. The capacity to 
achieve autonomy, and so elude reification, is not ‘given’ to philosophy and art, nor is its 
achievement guaranteed. Rather, the possibility of transcending reification resides hi the 
manifestation of their potential mimetic capacities. Aesthetic Theory can be thought of as an 
extended consideration of whether and how this might be possible.
The detailed hmphcations of this claim wdl emerge in subsequent chapters. For the 
moment, however, we need to step back fiom the direction of Adorno’s argument to 
consider a particularly problematic moment in it. We need to emphasize Adorno’s continued 
commitment to the critical deployment of rational thought, and to consider what this says 
about his attitude to the relation between phdosophy and capitalist society. Hegel, we wdl 
recall, believed in the sufficiency of reason, so it was quite logical for hhn to posit rational 
thought as the guarantee of knowing. In the Introduction to his Lectures on the History o f  
Philosophy, he wiites, “in the case of thought no question can be raised about meaning 
because it is meaning itself. There is nothing behind it, ...for thought is the last thing, the 
deepest, and behind it there is nothing else; it is enthely itself’.^  For Adomo, thought is not 
thus guaranteed; it is thoroughly mediated, and for one thing, this means it is always already 
reified. On the tenus of this assertion alone, the possibility of critical rational thought already
' G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, trans. T.M. Knox and A.V.Miller, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 89.
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looks compromised. Orthodox Mamsts have always been suspicions, if not hostile, to 
Adorno’s apparent valorization of ‘thought’ over revolutionary ‘activity’. Quite apart fiom 
the Orthodox Mamst suspicion of his position, a major strand of nineteenth and twentieth- 
centmy thought has understood the negative impact of modem society as deriving fiom its 
increasing rationalization of hfe. This attitude has fiequently emphasized the culpabihty of 
any order of rational behavior, emphasizing the global significance of the ‘mational’ as an 
antidote to ahenation. Aesthetic Theoiy does not obviously fit within this schema. For the 
proponents of the ‘hrational’ as the emancipatory antidote to rationalization, Adomo’s 
continuing commitment to the critical capacity of reason appears thoroughly compromised. 
Adomo’s defense in the hght of this criticism and his critique of the ‘irrationalist’ tradition 
fiom which it originates, can be signaled by refeiihig to something Merleau-Ponty said of 
Hegel: “it was he who started the attempt to explore the irrational and integrate mto an 
expanded reason...”  ^ Hegel is bemg described by Merleau-Ponty as attempting to make 
rational thought inclusive of the “mational”. Now, this is an obviously paradoxical enteiprise. 
So paradoxical, that for ‘inationahst’ critics of Hegel, his failure is the failure of reason. 
More to the point, Hegel’s enteiprise, and any attempt at its prolongation, seem to be 
precisely that blind, all consuming, reason which the apologists for the “mational” see as the 
problem. For the ‘hxationalist’, reason and the “uTational” are de facto  incompatible.
As has aheady been emphasized repeatedly, Adomo shares the belief that Hegel 
failed. This does not, however, prohibit for him Hegel’s asphation. Merleau-Ponty completes 
the sentence quoted above, saying that what Hegel asphed to do “remains the task of our 
centuiy.” Adomo is by no means alone in his attitude to Hegel. The question is, what shape 
does “an expanded reason” take hi Aesthetic Theoryl How does reason configure itself hi
 ^ M. Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-sense, trans. H.L. Dreyfus, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976), p.26. Quoted in Mark C. Taylor (ed.), Deconstriiction in Context: Literature and Philosophy, 
(Cliicago: University of Cliicago Press, 1986), p. 2.
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relation to the “inational” or, to use Adorno’s importantly different vocabulary, how can 
reason maintain its critical identity and account for the “nonidentical”?
The significance of Hegel’s critique of Kant for understanding what this might involve 
is pivotal. As has been suggested, Hegel’s critique of BCant can be read as implying a 
wholesale transformation of how the activity of doing philosophy should be construed. 
Adomo himself is clear that one way of defining Hegel’s enteiprise is as an extension, or 
fiilfiUhig of Kant. Adomo says “Hegel helped Kant’s critical philosophy come into its own”  ^
and speaks of Hegel’s philosophy as “extending the transcendental philosophy of the Critique 
o f Pure Reason! f  At one level, and this is the level of Adomo’s interest in Hegel’s critique 
of Kant, Hegel is the first philosopher to understand and deploy the implications of the idea 
that what a philosopher says and does in saying, cannot be understood as separable. What a 
philosopher theoiizes, and what he practices in articulating his theories, are mediated, and 
need to be completely consistent with each other. ^
Beginning with Hegel’s critique of Kant, this chapter traces a schematic development 
of the imphcations of understanding rational thinking as mediated for Hegel, Mai*x, Lukacs, 
and Adomo. Each of these thinkers criticized his predecessor’s self-understanding of the 
‘situatedness’ of his thought m relation to his method. In each case, this critique becomes 
pait of a reformulation of the task of thinking, which is subsequently pursued on a different 
trajectoiy and in a different form. In establishing the idea of a tradition of pMosophical self- 
transfoimation, the aim is to situate the formal oddity of Aesthetic Theory within a tradition
T.W. Adorno, "Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy", in T.W. Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, trans. Shierry Weber 
Nicholson, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1993), p. 8.
 ^ T.W. Adorno, "Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy", p. 30.
 ^ A broadly similar strategy which has served to emphasise Hegel's debt to Kant's Transcendental Deduction 
has been suggested by Robert Pippin. See Robert Pippin, Hegel's Idealism, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). Particularly the section “Kantian and Hegelian Idealism”, pp. 16-41. See also Sally 
Sedgwick, “Hegel's Treatment of Transcendental Apperception in Kant”, The Owl o f Minerva: Biannual 
Journal o f the Hegel Society o f America 23 (Spring 1992), pp. 151-163. and Sally Sedgwick, “Hegel on 
Kant's Antinomies and Distinction Between General Logic and Transcendental Logic', The Monist 74 (July 
1991), p. 403.
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of mutating philosophy a tradition which has seen the transformation of the scope and 
significance of philosophical thought as inseparable fiom new thought, and new ways of 
thinking the “nonidentical”.
There are two kinds of impact this way of situating Aesthetic Theory> should be 
understood as aiming at. First, it seeks to make some of the arguments of Aesthetic Theory 
more mtelligible, specifically through a claiification of Adorno’s simultaneous commitment 
to philosophy and to Marxism. These are often thought of as mutually incompatible modes 
of representing the world. Describing Marxism as part of a philosophical tradition helps to 
explain Adorno’s attitude to them. Second, this chapter situates Aesthetic Theory in relation 
to an alignment of Hegel’s critique of Kant, Marx’s critique of Hegel, and Lukacs critique of 
Mai^ x. The aka of so doing is to imply that although Aesthetic Theory is most obviously 
thought of as a work of aesthetics, its strategic significance, or rather its strategic aspkations, 
can be understood differently. The claim is that Aesthetic Theory can be thought of as part of 
a histoiy of attempts to explain the possibility of experience. A histoiy fiom Kant’s 
Transcendental philosophy, Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit, Marx’s Ger^man Ideology and 
Lukacs’ History and Class Consciousness.
Kant
Before Kant, philosophers aigued variations of the idea that the world as we 
experience it is ah eady organized in such a way that we can make sense of it. hi this scenario, 
experience is characteiized as the essentially passive reception of preairanged items. Against 
this hypothesis, Kant claimed we do not find the world to be so organized, but that we 
peifbrtu the organization ourselves.
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The way Kant establishes this claim is, primarily, through the Transcendental 
Deduction m the first Critique. There is a huge hteratme on this which cannot be discussed in 
the present context. However, Kant’s basic strategy might be summarized as follows.^ The 
objective stracture of the phenomenal world and the unity of self-consciousness are 
reciprocally correlated - one cannot have one without the other. At the heart of this bonding 
is the application of “the pure concepts of the understanding,” or, as they are more familiarly 
known, the “categories”. For Kant any item which is to become an object of cognition must 
be given hi space and/or time (those so called “forms of intuition” which are also part of the 
human subjects cognitive apparatus). This “manifold of intuitions” must also be organized by 
the categories and, in applying these, the human subject also organizes its own powers of 
imaginative projection and recall, thus creating the objective unity of self-consciousness, as 
well as that of the external phenomenal world.
This Ihie of argument is one that emphasizes the active natiue of exjierience. How the 
phenomenal world and self appear to knowledge is a function of the imderstandhigs own 
‘synthetic’ or organizational activity. Whatever the merits of this approach, however, it 
leaves the nature of the world and the ultimate nature of the world and the ultimate nature of 
the self as they are in themselves (i.e. qua noumenal) as necessaiy but unknowable 
remainders.
For Hegel, the active structure of experience, and the imknowable status of noumena, 
are both critically pertinent.
^Tliis account of the Transcendental Deduction is derived from Paul Crowther’s paper “Judgement, Self- 
Consciousness and Imagination; Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and Beyond”, in H. Parret (ed.) Kants 
Aesthetic Theory, (Berlin; Gruyter Verlag, 1997).
Mediation and reification 77
Hegel’s critique of Kant
Hegel’s critique of Kant appears at various moments in bis pMosophy, but its broad 
strategy does not change significantly. The argument needs to be seen against bis broad 
characteiTzation of the inherent problems in Kant’s approach outlined m the introduction to 
the Phenomenology (1807). Hegel’s critique of Kant here is veiy much loaded towards 
defining his own position. A more traditional reading of Kant is developed in the, much later, 
thiid volume of his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy (1825-1826).^
We might expect Hegel’s critique of Kant to focus specifically on Kant’s necessaiy, 
but extremely problematic, positing of a noumenal self and noumenal world. Indeed it does, 
but Hegel approaches the issue indirectly. Hegel’s critique of Kant’s distinction between the 
phenomenal and noumenal is inseparable fiom his critique of Kant’s implicit claim to be a 
detached observer of experience. Hegel, by contrast, calls for the philosopher to conceive of 
himself as an active participant in the processes he is describing. It is therefore important to 
recognize that, while Hegel is interested in the particular claims Kant makes, his is a 
metacritical reading of Kant, because he does not attempt to address Kant’s problems on 
then own teims. Rather, he explains Kant’s difficulties as arising out of an incomplete 
understanding of what it means to think. Hegel’s argument is a significant theoretical basis 
for understanding Adomo for two reasons. First, as an exemplary manifestation of 
metacritical of reading, second in the way Hegel canies through the implications of his 
critique of Kant to his own project.
According to Hegel, Kant “takes for granted certain ideas about cognition as an 
instrument as medium, and assumes that there is a difference between ourselves and this
® see G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History o f  Philosophy: The Lectures o f 1825-1826: Volume HI: Medieval 
and Modern Philosophy, (ed.) Robert.F. Brown, trans. Robert.F. Brown, J..M. Stewart and H.S.Harris, 
(Berkeley; University of California Press, 1990), pp. 217-246.
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cognitiorl^? If we take this criticism as relevant to the matter at hand, then, Hegel seems to
imply that the imity of self and world shown by the Transcendental Deduction is much more
than a correlation. Indeed, for Hegel the categories are not separate firom that which they
give fom  to. Thought is ultimately constitutive of its objects. There is no noumenal
remainder. Hence, whilst Kant makes a distinction between noumenal self and phenomenal
world, which he must then attempt to bridge, this is, for Hegel, a false construal of the
problem of philosophy. Rather, the task of philosophy must be to demonstrate their mutually
constitutive sameness.
hi the critique of Kant in the Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, Hegel considers
the problem Kant creates for himself by dividhig up experience into the categories, on the one
hand, and the manifold of sensible intuitions on the other. Kant argues that categories must
be deployed by the understanding hi every experience, or there would be no possibihty of
synthesizing the manifold of intuitions. Hegel wiites.
This bonding of the categories with the stuff of perception is what Kant 
understands by “experience.” And that is quite correct. There is perceiving in 
experience, there is stuff in it that belongs to feehng, to intuition. But this stuff 
is not apprehended merely according to its singularity or immediacy. To the 
contraiy, it is posited hi the veiy bonding with those categories (such as cause 
and effect) or, hi short, with what we call natural laws, universal 
determinations or genera. The latter are not immediate perceptions.
hi other words, the subject, the world, the categories, the intuition, and the
understanding are all simultaneously operative in experience which is then unity. The
problem for Kant and with Kant - and this is Hegel’s fundamental hisight - is that he “adopted
the thought deteimhiations, the categories empirically, just as they have been worked out in
[traditional] l o g i c . T h u s ,  Kant broke experience apart in an analytical fashion and then
showed that it could not be rebuilt out of its constituent parts. This means that the gap
 ^G.W.F.Hegel, Phenomenology o f Spirit, trans. A.V.Miller, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 47. 
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History o f  Philosophy, p. 227.
11 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the H istoiy o f  Philosophy, p. 229.
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between “appearances” and “things in themselves,” which peipetually dogged Kant, is a 
function of the unrecognized lack of correspondence between Kant’s logical representation 
of experience and experience itself He treated experience as though it was an object before 
him. Hegel says “This procedure is empirical and philosophically unjustified.”^^  It reproduces, 
throughout Kant’s argument a “batteiy of dichotomies”, which stand in the way of 
comprehending philosophy, reason, and experience as an inseparable dynamic unity. Wliere 
Kant sees the understanding and the data of the senses as logically separate, Hegel argues we 
need to see them as an indivisible unity. What for Kant were the passive sensibility, which 
receives sensation, and the active imderstandhig, which synthesizes this data, for Hegel, are 
one and the same thing.
In making his criticism of Kant’s definition of the categories as an a priori of 
consciousness, Hegel invokes Fichte. “Fichte went beyond this, and that is his great merit. He 
called for and sought to complete, the derivation or constmction of the categories of thought 
fiom the I, and he did in part carry out this p r o je c t .T h a t  is to say, Fichte is construed as 
directly responding to Kant’s representation of experience. Fichte partially conects Kant’s 
eiTors by making the unified “I” of consciousness a priori, rather than the categories. “The I 
is active, it is determining, it produces its déterminations .The particularities of Fichte’s 
argument are part of his importance for Hegel. Of equal significance, however, is the way 
Hegel extrapolates the implications of what Fichte does for what it might mean to do
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Histoiy o f Philosophy, p. 229.
David Lamb uses the phrase “battery of dichotomies” in ‘Teleology; Kant and Hegel” in Stephen Priest 
(ed.), Hegel's Critique o f Kant, p. 174.
One commentator suggests that Hegel argues precisely tliis point in the early work Faith and Knowledge: 
“Hegel's view was that the "true" meaning of the Transcendental Deduction is that intellect (Verstand) and 
intuition (Anschuung) caimot be kept apart as separate faculties at all. They are, contrary to Kant's 
understanding, “one and the same synthetic unity””.
see Sedgwick, Sally. “Hegel's Treatment of Transcendental Apperception in Kant”, The Owl of Minerva: 
Biannual Journal o f the Hegel Society o f America, Vol 23, No 2, (Spring 1992), p. 155.
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, pp. 229-230 
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, p. 230.
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philosophy. It might be thought that one way to get round Kant’s problem would be to say 
that he misunderstood tlie sensuous unity of experience. With an understanding of this unity 
of experience in mind, subsequent philosophy should base its analysis of exirerience on the 
understanding of it as a sensuous unity, rather than distinct moments.
From Hegel’s perspective, this is all very well, but it does not address the cause of
Kant’s mistake, i.e., his allowing a partial distinction between thought and object. As an
eiToneous idea of the ultimate problem facing philosophy, Kant’s positing of the noumenal
defines the internal dynamic of his argument, and replicates itself in its content. In the
following quotation fiom his reading of Fichte, Hegel fiâmes his attitude to philosophizing in
experience by making a distinction between an “ordinary” consciousness and another form of
“philosophical” consciousness. The former grasps relations within the object of its
experience, the latter grasps the assumptions which enable the former to take place:
When we philosophize about being, cause, effect, and so forth, therr we make 
being, cause and effect into oiu consciousness. When I say “the paper is 
white,” I maintain thereby that the paper is white [ordinary consciousness 
grasps the relation “white” and “paper,” but does not grasp the “it is”]. But 
when I maintain that it is, then I make being - a pirre category - into my 
consciousness, and so make my consciousness into consciousness and in this 
way I stand behind my ordinary consciousness. I am always in the state of 
knowing, and in this instance I make that knowing into my object. To the 
extent that we know our knowing there is no difficulty about it. It was Fichte 
who first brought the knowing of knowing to consciousness. What is more, by 
doing that, Fichte also posited philosophical consciousness or the aim of 
philosophy as the knowing of knowing.
This is extremely dense, but Hegel is saying that behind the assertiorr that something 
is the case, is the unity of the ‘something’ and the maker of the ‘assertion,’ because both 
simply are. To make the assertion that something has being is also to assert that. I, the 
originator of the assertion, also have being. This understanding has the effect of making “my 
consciousness into consciousness.” In other words, my “ordinary” consciousness of the
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History o f  Philosophy, p. 231.
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object, becomes a part of my consciousness. This consciousness of being conscious of an 
object is possible, for Hegel, because “I am always m a state of knowing”. Hegel, we will 
recall, says “...thought is the last thing, the deepest, and behind it there is nothing else...” ®^
hi the light of this argument, there appears to be a common emphasis in Kant’s 
noumenal subject and Hegel’s philosophical “knowing of knowing” . Both imply some kind 
of stepping out, or stepping back fiom experience. We have already seen, however, that 
Hegel’s argument is in a position to, or claims it is in a position to, explain this distinctness of 
self-consciousness in experiential terms.
This helps to explain one of the most obvious and far-reaching methodological 
differences between Kant and Hegel. The former conceives himself as dealing with 
experience as a universal and derives “causal laws of Human perception,” which, 
nevertheless, only apply to the phenomenal world. The latter understands the former’s 
asph ation for such abstract universality as a fimction of his historical situatedness. For Hegel, 
to know knowing, is not to know experience as a universal, but to know that the truth of 
experience is “as historical becoming.” With this idea of experience in Hegel, experience is a 
thoroughly mediated and historically unique. To know experience thus conceived, is to know 
how it came to be thus, and this is a function of history, art, religion, and philosophy. Thus, 
in Hegel, each moment in Kant’s argument is modified. The noumenal self becomes 
consciousness, spontaneously generating its sense of self in the world through history. Hr ere 
is “reciprocity” between the self and the “laws governing human perceptions,” but these laws 
only have the appearance of universality in Hegel. Such laws are actually the limitations 
placed on experience by the historical moment in the simultaneous development of world and 
consciousness. Hegel admits he could not have done his philosophy without Kant. Within the
G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Lectures on the History o f  Philosophy, trans. T.M. Knox and
A.V.Miller, (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 89.
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context of Lis pMosophy as a whole, Hegel’s critique of Kant is not, according to Hegef 
ultimately a disagreement between two different modes of argument, but between pMosophy 
at different moments in time, each restricted by then historical moment. Thus, Hegel says of 
pMosophy,
no more is to be demanded or expected of it than what it has done. We are 
not to look in it for a satisfaction which can be provided only by further 
developed knowledge. Every pMosophy, precisely because it is the exposition 
of one particular stage of development, belongs to its own time and is caught 
in that time’s restriction. The individual is the son of his people, of his world.
He may give himself ans as he hkes but he does not transcend his time since 
he belongs to the one universal sphit which is his substance and essence; how 
can he escape from this?^^
This is a rhetorical question, because it is pMosophy, in its capacity to know its own
condition which holds the germ of progress. Owing to its fbim, qua the critical deployment
of reason, pMosophy can transfoim the historically limited conception of experience at that
time, moving experience to a more sophisticated self-understanding. Hegel explains:
If pMosophy does not stand above its time in content, it does so in foim, 
because as the thought and knowledge of that which is the substantial sphit of 
its time, it makes that sphit its object. In as far as pMosophy is in the sphit of 
its time, the latter is its determined content hi the world although as 
knowledge, pMosophy is above it since it places it in the relation of 
object...thus the formal difference is also the real and actual difference.
Where, for Kant, the problem of pMosophy is how a universal subject can be sure of
the objective stmctme of reality. Hegel’s starting point might be described as the rhetorical
question of how he himself, a particular consciousness, came to be experiencing the world in
the way he does. How is Hegel thinking the thoughts he is thinking at a particular time and
place about the world as it is at that time and place? Kojève puts this biilliantly in a
hypothetical reconstruction of Hegel’s state of mind as he sits down in his study to start
writing The Phenomenology:
G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, pp. 49-50. 
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures in the History o f Philosophy, pp. 54-55.
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“I am not only a thinking being, I am also - and above all - Hegel. What then 
is this Hegel?”
To begin with, he is a man of flesh and blood, who knows that he is 
such. Next, this man does not float in empty space. He is seated in a chair, at a 
table, writing with a pen on paper. And he knows that all these objects did not 
fall from the sky; he knows that those things are products of something called 
human work...hG hears sounds from afar. But he does not here mere sounds.
He knows in addition that these sounds are cannon shots...He knows he is 
hearing shots from Napoleon’s cannons at the battle of Jena.
Now, if Hegel actually achieved what he set out to do, then his critique of Kant 
would be definitive. The problem is that he did not, and this leaves two broad alternatives. 
Either, as Schopenhauer did, you conceive of Hegel’s whole enterprise as so much hot air, 
and return to Kant, and more specifically, re-establish the broad terms of Kant’s relationship 
between philosophy and experience as the proper paradigm for philosophical inquhy. Or, you 
accept the trajectoiy of Hegel’s critique of Kant, and consider the implications for the re­
orientation of philosophy in the hght of Hegel’s failuie. The following discussion of Mai*x, 
Lukacs, and Adomo understands them as taking the second route. Before continuing to look 
at Mai-x’s critique of Hegel, it is worth briefly re-emphasizing the asphation of this ‘second 
route,’ by recalling what Merleau-Ponty was quoted earher as saying of Hegel. Hegel 
“started the attempt to explore the irrational and integrate it into an expanded reason” One of 
the apparent paradoxes of Hegel’s critique of Kant is that throughout Kant is criticized for 
not being fully rational. He makes philosophically unjustifiable assumptions. If we take 
Hegel’s argument seriously, then he is not saying that Kant is not being rational within what 
he does, far fiom it. Lideed, the hitemal consistency of Kant’s argument, even when it leads 
him to make implausible claims about, for example, the noumenal self, is precisely what 
makes him such a profoundly impressive philosopher. Hegel’s point is that Kant was not 
being fully rational in his deployment of reason. He did not think through the full implications
A. Kojève, Inti'oduction to the reading o f Hegel, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 34
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of what he was doing for what he was saying. In being more fully rational than Kant, and it is 
Hegel’s clahn that he is, the logic of Hegel’s critique of Kant drives him far beyond the 
bounds of philosophy, as Kant understood it. This is because, for Hegel, the knowing of 
knowing, is the knowhig of knowing in all its mediations at a particular moment of history. 
Hegel becomes a world historian, an art historian, a theologian, a natmalist, etc. For Kant, 
and neo-Kantians like Schopenhauer, the “irr ational” is signified as that wliich is definitively 
beyond philosophy - the noumenal world. For Hegel, and post-Hegelians, the “irrational” is 
not to be pursued as a distinct realm, but the mediations of the particular experience.
From a different perspective, Kant is said to have isolated and defined what is imique 
and significant to philosophy as a distinct mode of knowledge. This division of labour allows 
that such discretely defined modes of knowledge can be understood and pursued with great 
efficiency As should be clear fiom the above characterization of Hegel’s critique of Kant, 
this division of labom* is corrosive of any attempt to understand the truth of experience, qua 
the unity of its mediating moments at a given moment in time. One thing which Hegel is not, 
is an efficient thinker. He is inefficient in terms of the length of time he takes to say things. 
He is also inefficient, fiom Marx’s point of view, in the sense that he never gets the job done 
properly. Despite his claims for systematic completeness, his philosophy misses a mediation 
in the analysis of the particular experience. The problem with Hegel’s “expanded” reason, as 
read by Mar-x, is that it comes up against an unacknowledged limit that, qua reason, it caimot 
get beyond.
Paul Crowther, Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. vii.
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Marx’s and Engels’ Critique of Hegel
One aspect of Hegel’s argument has proven particularly problematic and productive 
in its challenge to subsequent tlunkers. It is the perception of an imbalance in the relation 
between the knowing miud and changing world, as Hegel practices it in his philosophy. That 
is to say, although Hegel maintains their mutual dependence, he always gives knowing the 
final say. Maine’s critique and development of Hegel centers on the perception of this 
imbalance.
Discussions of Marx’s debt to Hegel almost invariably include the following quotation
fi om Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts:
The outstanding achievement of Hegel’s Phenomenology and of its final 
outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is 
thus first that Hegel conceives the self creation of man as a pro cess...
Mai*x, in other words, appreciates the significance of the Hegehan emphasis on the
idea of experience as an activity that changes through histoiy, but Marx ascribes to this
mechanism a very different motivation. Put simply, as far as Marx is concerned, despite
Hegel’s claim for experience as the dynamic unity of ‘mind’ and ‘world’, such unity is only
achieved through Hegel’s working assumption that the world is ultimately knowable.
Consequently, regardless of Hegel’s emphasis on experience as the mutual modification of
‘man’ and ‘nature’ through history, such ‘activity’ only ever takes place on the assumption
that ‘nature’ is susceptible to sufficient knowing by the mind. For Mai-x, this definition of
philosophy is precisely the kind of ‘subjective’ imposition by philosophy on its object which
Hegel sought to avoid. According to Marx, Hegel makes everything he talks about
“abstract”. Nature, for example, is never considered for what it might be in itself, but as
though it were knowable by mind. As a consequence, although Hegel discusses the material
Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 
140.
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world, even considers himself immersed in, and determined by it, his insights never get
beyond a consideration of that aspect of phenomena which he and his system is sensitized
towards. As Marx sees it, in Hegel’s argument,
...wealth, state power, etc., are understood by Hegel as entities estranged 
fiom the human being, this only happens in their form as thoughts...They are 
thought entities, and therefore merely an estrangement of pure, i.e., abstract 
philosophical thinking.
The failure of Hegel’s project, then rests in its very success as a purely rational 
solution to what it posits as a rational problem. The internal consistency of Hegel’s project 
cannot be questioned, but that rational consistency separates it from the material world 
where, for Marx, real problems have then origins. Thus, despite Hegel’s emphasis on the 
necessaiily mediated nature of philosophy in the world, his own philosophy never achieves a 
complete integiation with the world it describes because the world is already presupposed as 
rational.
The Marxist ‘correction’ of Hegel
With this radical critique of Hegel in mind, the problem for Marxism is to maintain the 
idea of experience as a process of the dynamic integration of mind and world, to remove 
Hegel’s predeteimination of the world as “rational”, hi this process, however, philosophy 
itself win necessarily be transfoimed, because once Hegel’s “abstract theorizing” is tmly 
engaged by material reahty, its own rational structures will cease to be the deterrnining factor 
in the architecture of his argument. As Lukacs puts it:
... we are forced to concede that actuahty, content, matter reaches right into 
the form, the structures of the form and their interrelations and thus into the 
structure o f the system itself In that case the system must be abandoned as 
system. For then it will then be no more of a register, an account, as well
Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts o f J844, p. 138.
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ordered as possible, of facts which are no longer linked rationally and so can 
no longer be made systematic even though the forms of their components are 
themselves rational.
This theme of the implosion of Hegel’s system, once contaminated by the mationahty
it fails to compensate for, will be returned to fiequently in discussing Lukacs and Adomo.
For the moment, it is useful to consider that this implosion is configured differently by Maix,
Lukacs, and Adomo. The different implications of their critiques of Hegel have different
permutations for the order of anti-systematicity they develop.
Marx’s critique of the imbalance in Hegel is based on the idea that Hegel’s argument
might be “inverted”. What Marx is usually understood to have done here is to give “material
reahty” the dominant role in defining the process of experience. Hegel, by contrast, writes in
the Introduction to his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy:
Man is distinguished fiom animals in vhtue of his thinking. Feelings, instincts, 
etc., are common to man and beast, but particular feelings, e.g. rehgious, 
righteous, moral feelings, belong to man alone. Feelings as such, in themselves 
are neither estimable or tme; what is tme in them, e.g. that a feeling has a 
rehgious character, is derived fiom thinking alone.
Thus Maix and Engels write, in what looks hke a paraphrase, or an answering back at Hegel,
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by rehgion or 
anything else you hke. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from 
animals as soon as they begin to produce the means of their subsistence, a step 
which is conditioned by their actual physical organization. By producing their 
means of subsistence men are indirectly producing then actual material life.^^
So, while maintaining the idea of experience as “activity”, Marx and Engels claim it is
not the “activity of the mind”, but the “activity of labour” which defines experience. It looks
simple, but this inversion of Hegel ultimately sets up the hugely problematic division within
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. R. Livingstone, (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p. 
118.
G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, p. 89.
Karl Marx & Fredrich Engels, The German Ideology, (London: Lawrence and Wisliart, 1938), p. 7.
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the dynamic of Marx’s own theory (which diagnoses a problem) and the action of the 
proletariat (which is its remedy).
We have seen the way Hegel’s critique of the content of Kant’s argument signaled the 
wholesale reorienting and redefinition of the form of philosophy. At the same time, the role 
of the philosopher vis-à-vis his object is also changed. The same kiud of transformation is 
implied by the Marxist critique of Hegel. A symptom of the new emphasis is the ambiguity of 
Maix’s own wiitmgs: are they philosophy, economics or sociology? The uncertainty arises 
because while Marx’s theory owes much of its force to Hegel’s philosophy, Marx is not 
simply a philosopher in the way Hegel is. What distmguishes Marx’s position from the 
tradition of philosophy from which it emerges is the positing of its own success beyond the 
realms of its own competence qua rational argument. This idea can be clarified by 
considering the following quotation from Capital. Here Marx defines his own method in 
contrast to Hegel.
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but it is its direct 
opposite. To Hegel, the hfe-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of 
thinking, which under the name of “the Idea”, he even transforms into an 
independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is 
oirly the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea”. With me, on the contrary, 
the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, 
and translated into forms of thought.
The first sentence offers the Marxist characterization of Marx’s and Hegel’s 
arguments as “opposite”. In the second, Marx gives a summary of his critique of Hegel, 
describing how Hegel’s thought “abstracts” material reahty. hr the third sentence, Marx 
summarizes his own method, in opposition to Hegel, wherein “the ideal is nothing else than 
the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.” What 
is striking here is the way Marx ostensibly suggests a definition of experience which finds its
Karl Marx, Capital, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), p. 420.
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nearest philosophical correlate in the pre-Kantian idea that consciousness passively 
experiences an already organized world. Material reality is taken to be immediately available 
to a passive consciousness deteimined by it. hi other words, despite Marx’s exphcit 
commitment to the notion of experience as process, the methodological impact of his 
emphasis on material reality can be read as implying that experience as process is itself 
incompatible with the notion that it is determined by material reality. Having criticized Hegel 
for making experience passive by thematizing reason in the dialectic of experience, Maix and 
Engels reproduce a similar passivity by placing undue emphasis on material reality in the 
dialectic, hi Orthodox Marxism this is precisely what happens. The rational subject of 
Hegel’s philosophy looses both the dynamic and critical capacities of reason, and the 
‘scientific’ claims of Orthodox Marxism are the result.
It would take too long to tease out all the imphcations of Marx’s attempt to ‘coirect’ 
Hegel. It needs to be emphasized, however, that whatever the shortcomings of Marx’s 
argument, its relationship to Hegel remains essentiahy ambiguous. Traditionahy, this 
ambiguity is seen to be reflected in a distinction between the early “Hegehan” Marx and the 
late “Scientific” Marx. While there are significant gioimds for this thesis, the historical 
reception of Marx’s writings has tended to be more important than particular texts in 
thematizing and polarizing the different tendencies in his argument. In this context, it is 
Lukacs’ reading of Marx which is significant.
Taken at face value, then, Maix’s attempt to conect Hegel has a number of 
imphcations which, if scrutinized with philosophical rigor, throw the whole Mamst project 
into doubt. The most obvious is the self-declared “scientific” status of Marxism regarding its 
own claims for its knowledge of society and the associated critique of subjectivity. It is
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against these two premises of Orthodox Marxism that Lukacs wrote History and Class 
Consciousness in 1923.^^
Lukacs critique of Marxism^"
Lukacs’ critique of Orthodox Mamsm begins by accepting Marx’s and Engels’ 
objection to Hegel. As he puts it, Hegel’s Idealism “succumbs to the delusion of confusing 
the intellectual reproduction of reahty with the actual reproduction of reahty itself.”^^  One 
significant consequence of this broad approach to Maix (regardless of its concrete results) is 
the way it categorizes his work within the tradition of philosophy, hi the works of the early 
1920’s, Lukacs sees Maixism piimaiily as an analysis and description of the conditions of 
experience, rather than economic theory. Mamsm is characteiized as continuous with the 
philosophy of Kant and Hegel, and therefore constrained by the same strictures vis-à-vis their 
analysis and description of experience.^^ These themes converge in History and Class 
Consciousness}^ In the 1967 Preface Lukacs sets out the most obvious reason for rejecting 
the Marxist “inversion” of Hegel:
^ Axato and Breines describe the intellectual background to the book.
...Marxist thought virtually as a whole during the latter part of the nineteenth century had 
been dominated by what Korsch called a "Hegel amnesia" and what Lukacs called "vulgar 
Marxism". By these terms they meant to characterise a standpoint in which dialectical and 
revolutionary understanding was displaced by a narrowly materialist and positivist approach 
that had reduced consciousness to an epiphenomenal reflection of economic structures and 
laws. As seen by Lukacs and Korsch, such a Marxism was not and could not have been 
revolutionary; its constitutive premises could not comprehend, and thus not participate in, 
the process through which the proletariat could become the active self-conscious maker of 
history.
see Arato & Breines, The Young Lukacs and the Origins o f Western Marxism, (London: Pluto Press, 1979), p. 
172.
For a summary of the issues involved here see Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin o f Negative Dialectics: 
Theodore W. Adomo, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt School, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1977) pp. 25- 
28.
Georg Lukacs, “What is Orthodox Marxism”, in History and Class Consciousness, p. 9.
Lukacs liimself identifies this strategy of reading Marx's texts as philosophy as significantly different from 
the established patterns of their reception. Wliich is “...the tendency to view Marxism exclusively as a theory 
of society, as social philosophy, and hence to repudiate it as a theory of nature”. See the Preface to the 1967 
edition of Georg Lukacs, Histoiy and Class Consciousness, p. xvi.
Arato and Breines have suggested that the significance of this work is how "...its great achievements and 
its great dilemmas resulted from the preservation of ‘idealist’ elements within the new Marxian fi'amework."
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The most primitive kind of work, such as the quarrying of stones by primeval 
man, implies a correct reflection of the reality he is concerned with. For no 
purposive activity can be earned out m the absence of an image, however 
cmde, of the practical reality involved.
Lukacs point is that the idea of a separation between ‘labour ’ qua ‘physical activity’ 
and ‘thought’ qua the ‘activity of the mind’ is itself a mistake. Thematizing ‘labour’ in this 
false division is to compound the eiTor. Having made this simple, but potentially devastating 
objection to Orthodox Marxism, Lukacs’ strategy is to concentrate his analysis on the form 
of Marx’s argument. Thus, on the first page of the essay ‘What is Orthodox Marxism?’ 
Lukacs wiites.
Orthodox Marxism does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of 
Marx’s investigations. It is not the ‘belief hr this or that thesis, nor the 
exegesis of a ‘sacred’ book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to 
method}^
hi other words, it is not the conclusions of Marx’s and Engels’ arguments that are 
important, but how they were ariived at.^ *^
Lukacs’ own method reveals itself most clearly in “ReMcation and the Consciousness 
of the Proletariat”, where he focuses on the method and structure of Marx’s ‘commodity 
theory’.A rguab ly  the key to Marxism, the theory states that objects are ‘commodified’ 
when we cease to value them for then practical use. Instead, their value comes to be defined 
by the market. The process towards commodification is gradual. As patterns of trade
Arato & Breines, The Young Lukacs and the Origins o f Western Marxism, p. 6. Significant for similar 
reasons are the essay of 1926 "Moses Hess and the Problems of Idealist Dialectics" and Lenin: A Study of the 
Unity o f his Thought of 1924. In so far as these works anticipated the discovery of Marx's 1844 manuscripts, 
they awakened interest in the Hegelian strategies of Marxism and have set the terms of the debate for 
"Western Marxism" ever since. See Martin Jay, 'The Concept of Totality in Lukacs and Adomo' in S. Avineri 
(ed.). Varieties o f Marxism, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 157-58.
See Preface to the 1967 edition of Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness,YYK26Q.Y{?>L9 p. xxv.
Georg Lukacs, “What is Orthodox Marxism?” in History and Class Consciousness, p. 1.
In the 1922 Preface to History and Class Consciousness Lukacs emphasises that he is not concerned with 
Marx's economic theory as such:
There will be no assessment of the economic content of the theory of accumulation, nor of 
Marx's economic theories as such: we shall confine our discussion to their methodological 
premises and implications, 
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develop, the process becomes more and more pervasive until, under Capitalism, it becomes 
completely dominant. Lukacs’ principal interest is in the mechanism by which Mai% describes 
the emergence and development of the “commodity” form through this history.
In pre-capitalist societies the value of products exchanged between people is, at first, 
quite arbitrary. That is, then' value is a fimction of then usefulness. If X and Y both have 
spears, the spears have no value beyond then function in hunting or fighting. If Y looses his 
spear, however, then X’s acquires a new value. This new value, however, only exists as a 
function of the relation between X and Y. hi other words, products have value within the 
context of a social relationship.
As society develops, relationships between people become more stmctured, and the 
arbitramess of the value assigned to objects is conespondingly reduced. This process is not 
initially precipitated by the consumer or producer, but the merchant, as tlie go-between, hi 
order for the merchant to operate, and the market to work, there has to be some system of 
equivalence between products. It is when products become valued, not for then' potential 
usefiilness, but for their place in this system of equivalence, that they become commodified; 
“...they take the form of commodities inasmuch as they are exchangeable, i.e. expressions of 
one and the same third. It is here that Lukacs makes his central claim that under capitahsm, 
where the merchant’s position becomes central to the system of exchange, the “commodity- 
stmcture” begins to transform consciousness and experience.
This is not what Orthodox Mamsm claims. For the Orthodox Mai-xist, the individual 
consciousness is defined by its power and place in the economy. It is a “consumer”, 
“producer”, or “merchant”. The proletariat, with its direct involvement in making, has a 
different relation to the product firom the merchant and consumer who experience it only as a
Marx quoted by Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness^ HX260.H8L9p. 85.
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commodity. For Lukacs, by contrast, it is not the relation to the means of production that
determines consciousness, but the mechanism of commodification. This mechanism
transfoims society, beyond its economic organization, to “aU its aspects” and ultimately, to
experience itself. Thus, Lukacs says, “...the problem of commodities must not be considered
in isolation or even regarded as the central problem in economics, but as the central,
structural problem of capitaHst society in all its a s p e c t s .T h i s  'commodity structure^
Lukacs identifies as the “reification”. The presence of the word in the title of the essay
signals its importance for his argument, and the definition he gives it is as follows:
Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and 
thus acquires a 'phantom objectivity’, an autonomy that seems so strictly 
rational and all embracmg as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: 
the relation between people.'^”
hi “reification”, then, a “relation” is taken for a “thhig”. This transfoimation involves 
two aspects. First, a “relation” is something which exists between two or more people, or a 
person and a thing. Second, it is dynamic, without corporeal substance. In being taken for a 
“thmg”, the “relation” looses both of these characteristics; it comes to be identified as static 
coiporeal substance. Something which is by definition dynamic, is frozen and becomes 
identifiable with a concrete object. With this newly acquired appearance of stabihty, this 
relationship qua concrete object, necessarily gams a new, more tangible presence and 
acquires a “phantom objectivity”. What is important is that something dynamic is taken for 
sometlung static, and simultaneously gams a new, more tangible presence,
A central theme of “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat” emerges as 
a discussion of how capitahsm beghis to remove the possibhity of any real understandmg of 
experience qua process. At every level of consciousness, essentially ‘active’ relations are 
reduced to one of then moments. Through this reduction, the newly found clarity it produces
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousfiess, HX260.H8L9p. 83. 
Georg Lukacs, Histoiy and Class Consciousness, HX260.H8L9p. 83.
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is taken for what is “real”. The structure of every possible relationship is transformed from
being an active mutual modification, into one component of that relation.
If, for a moment, we consider this argument within the wider debate about how to
understand experience as historically changing, then Lukacs’ theoiy is a significant
development. Hegel failed to represent experience, because he makes the error of thematizhig
knowing over material reahty. Marx also fails, but he does so because of his thematization of
material reahty. What Lukacs’ theory does is to continue Hegel’s strategy of historicizing
knowing and shows that under capitahsm it is the veiy insight that knowing itself is
historicaUy limited, that is compromised by the process of reification. Lukacs argues that the
hiabihty of Kant and Hegel to adequately represent experience, stems not so much from
philosophical ‘error’, but from the inabihty to recognize the extent to which the
transfoimation of experience by capitahsm compromises that effbit from within. Thus Lukacs
opens the second section of ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Pioletariat’ with the
sentence: ‘Modem critical philosophy spiings from the reified stmctme of consciousness.”^^
Susan Buck-Morss describes the significance of Lukacs’ argument as foHows:
Instead of reducing bomgeois thought to the economic conditions of its 
production, Lukacs argued that the nature of those conditions could be found 
within the mtehectual phenomena themselves...
...The significance of Lukacs’ analysis was that instead of seeing bourgeois 
theoiy as a mere epiphenomenon, a thin veil for naked class mterests, he 
argued and attempted to demonstrate that even the best bourgeois thinkers, in 
then most honest intellectual efforts, were not able to resolve contradictions 
in their theories, because the latter were based hi a reality which was itself 
contradictoiy.'^^
As we have seen, Lukacs amves at this through his critique of Orthodox Marxism. 
An aspect of Lukacs’ critique of Orthodox Marasm can be thought of as questioning the 
basis for its outright rejection of philosophy, and more specifically, how that tradition of
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, HX260.H8L9p. 110.
Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin o f  Negative Dialectics, p. 26.
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pliilosophy is properly represented. Thus far in this chapter, I have presented an aspect of the 
history of bourgeois philosophy as though it arose out of each thinker criticizing and 
developing his predecessor. For the Orthodox Marxist this idea of the autonomy of the 
history of philosophy is an irrelevance. Smce philosophers have their consciousness defined 
by their position within the pattern of production and consumption, their arguments can only 
ever represent the mterests of their class. Think back to Kojève’s description of Hegel sitting 
in his study, writing The Phenomenology. Hegel asks himself how it is that he comes to think 
the thoughts he is thinking at that particular time and place. His answer, according to Kojève, 
is that he can do so because of what Kant did, and because he is embedded in the particular 
moment in world history. For the Orthodox Marxist, what Hegel neglects in this self­
comprehension is that he is fir st, and fimdamentaUy, of a particular class. No matter what he 
thinks or does, that is the horizon beyond which he carmot see. The only possibihty of seeing 
beyond that horizon is hr the consciousness of the proletariat, and the proletarian revolution.
Lukacs’ resistance to this argument takes different forms. Although History and 
Class Consciousness is central. The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations Between 
Dialectics and Economics of 1938 can be seen as an attempt to pmsue and fulfill certain 
implications of the earher work, hi the Introduction to The Young Hegel, Lukacs argues that 
the rejection of philosophy by Orthodox Mar-xism relies to heavily on a bourgeois view of the 
autonomy of the history of philosophy that was originated, h onicahy, by Hegel himself. That 
is to say, the rejection of bourgeois philosophy by Orthodox Marxism derives from 
confusing philosophy with a bourgeois representation of it as autonomous. This incorrect 
representation of the autonomy of philosophy is given an extreme turn by Schopenhauer and 
the neo-Kantian tradition. Lukacs identifies this as taking hold after 1848 and it signals a 
return to the Kantian, rather than Hegehan, understanding of what philosophy should be
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about/^ Lukacs does not confront Hegel head on, but argues against Marx, that material
reahty does manifest itself in Hegel’s system because his philosophy was a response to reified
experience. Hegel did not understand what reification was, but because of the way Hegel’s
philosophy configures itself in reqionse to reification, the shape of his philosophy testifies to
its unacknowledged presence. Thus, the problems of bourgeois philosophy are symptoms of
trying to understand experience when they do not understand that it is always aheady reified.
Tims Lukacs writes,
...man in capitaUst society confionts ‘reahty’ made by himself (as a class) 
which appears to him to be a natural phenomenon ahen to himself; he is 
whohy at the mercy of its ‘laws’, his activity is confined to the exploitation of 
the inexorable fulfillment of certain individual laws of his own (egotistic) 
interests. But even while ‘acting’ he remains, in the nature of the case, the 
object and not the subject of events. The field of his activity thus becomes 
whohy internalized: it consists on the one hand of the awareness of the laws 
which he uses and, on the other, of his awareness of his inner reactions to the 
comse taken by events.
What we need to appreciate here is the similarity between Lukacs’ metacritique of 
bourgeois philosophy as a whole, and Hegel’s metacritique of Kant. Hegel criticized Kant 
because he did not appreciate the significance of the “knowing of knowing”. This meant that 
no matter how long and hard Kant thought, his activity as a philosopher was only ever reason 
‘idlhig’. Reason was never deployed by Kant m such a way as to understood the meaning of 
its own activity. What Lukacs might be said to be doing is moving the brackets which limited 
Kant, not as Hegel did, to the necessity of “knowing knowing”, but to the necessity of 
“knowing reified knowing.” Since reified experience is a mode of thinking which is man
Lukacs says that
Schopenhauer's approach to philosophy is rooted in his conviction that the efforts of Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel to resolve Kant's contradictions were nothing but aberrations. 
According to Schopenhauer, philosophy should revert to the only correct method, that of 
Kant; anything else was deception, idle talk, a swindle.
Georg Lukacs, The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics, trans. R. 
Livingstone, (London: Merlin, 1975), pp. xv-xvi.
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 135.
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made, it cannot simply be thought beyond, as Hegel understood Kant’s problem could be. 
Rather, reification must be undone at its source, in the process of production thiough the 
revolution of the proletariat.
Problems with Lukacs
hi his development of a more plausible reading of the relevance of bourgeois 
philosophy for Marxism, Lukacs goes some way to resolving the contradictions inherent iu 
his own identity as a Marxist thinker. Marx’s own position as a philosopher is basically 
contradictory hi the sense that his own argument undermines the potential usefulness of 
theoretical activity. Lukacs attempts to remove this contradiction, when he defines the 
consciousness of the proletariat as potentially immune to reification. It is only the bourgeoisie 
who suffer from the reification of consciousness. In this scenario it is the role of the Party to 
act as a bridge between the diagnosis of reification and the proletarian revolution. Lukacs is 
too sophisticated to posit this proletarian immunity to reification as already existing and, as 
Buck-Morss has pointed out, to get around the problem he makes a distinction between the 
“emphical” and “imputed” consciousness of the proletariat. “Empirical” consciousness refers 
to the existing consciousness of the proletariat, but “imputed” consciousness is what the 
proletariat would think, if they had an accurate awareness of their position. Although Lukacs’ 
argument represents an extraordinary refining of Orthodox Marxism, it still retains a strong 
element of Orthodoxy. He remains committed to the Marxist principle that it is only through 
the revolution of the proletariat, and the subsequent transformation of economic relations, 
that the reification of consciousness will be overcome. Lukacs remains committed to the truth 
that the organization of material reahty by capitahsm produces consciousness. As Arato and
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Bremes have argued, this creates a new series of problematic implications for Lukacs’ brand 
of Marxism:
Not finding any elements or traces of possible emancipation in the various 
spheres of the social world, he was not only drastically confined to the 
Marxist answer that the proletarian revolution wUl dissolve the dynamic center 
of reification, the factory based capitaHst economy, but he was also forced 
into a dramatically mythological version of proletarian subjectivity...he could 
not (and, of course, did not want to) squeeze any element of potential 
subjectivity and creativity or even dynamic possibility out of law, science, 
biueaucracy, technology. As a result the theoretical burden on the 
revolutionary proletariat became impossibly great.
Reification and Adorno
Despite its suggestiveness then, there remain serious difficulties with Lukacs theoiy of 
reification. Even so, for Adorno, the significance of the argument is profound. Adorno 
acknowledges that “Lukacs became the first dialectical materiahst to apply the category of 
reification systematically to p h i l o s o p h y . T h e  most obvious contrast between Lukacs and 
Adorno in the deployment of reification is then different understanding of its scope. As 
Buck-Morss has noted, for Lukacs, reification is a specifically bourgeois p rob lem.For  
Adorno, reification is HteraUy all-consuming; the proletariat are not immune. Lukacs cannot 
accept this prognosis because it would be to abandon hope, signalhrg the absolute 
impossibHity for any idea of revolutionary activity. To beghr to explahi how Adomo 
negotiates the crisis impHcit in his skeptical reconfiguration of Lukacs’ position, we need to 
reconsider an alternative critical trajectory impHcit in Lukacs’ critique of Hegel. That all 
previous philosophical attempts to represent experience have failed is, for Lukacs, 
symptomatic of then misrepresentation of the problem of knowing experience as susceptible
Arato & Bremes, The Young Lukacs and the Origins o f Western Marxism, p. 122.
Theodor Adorno, “Reconciliation under Duress” in Ronald Taylor (ed.). Aesthetics and Politics, (London: 
Verso, 1980), p. 151.
Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin o f Negative Dialectics, p. 46.
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to rational rather than social formulation. Reification is a mode of experience of the world
which is made by capitahsm.
The key to recognizing the difference between Lukacs and Adomo is to return again
to Merleau-Ponty’s idea of Hegel’s “expanded reason”, and consider the different ways
Lukacs and Adomo locate the “uTational” in the hght of Hegel’s failure. Certain key passages
in the second part of “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” before Lukacs
makes his commitment to the proletariat, signal an attitude to Hegel from which the different
positions of Lukacs and Adomo can both still emerge.
Lukacs begins the section with a discussion of some of the symptoms of reification in
bourgeois philosophy. His metacritical intentions are quite exphcit:
We wish only to sketch the connection between the fimdamental problems of 
this philosophy and the basis in existence fiom which these problems spiing 
and to which they strive to retum by the road of the understanding. However, 
the character of this existence is revealed at least as clearly by what 
philosophy does not find problematic as by what it does. At any rate it is 
advisable to consider the interaction between these two aspects."^^
For example, Lukacs seeks to reveal how reification, which bomgeois philosophy
does not find problematic, surfaces in the assumptions and stmctures- of that philosophy.
Lukacs sees Kant’s philosophy as grasping the man-made nature of experience, but not fully
understanding that experience is made by capitahsm. Thus “[Kant] refiises to accept the
world as something that has arisen (or e.g. has been created by God) independently of the
knowing subject, and prefers to conceive of it as it instead as its own product. Another
symptom of bourgeois philosophy’s incomplete confi*ontation with reification “is the
equation...of formal, mathematical, rational knowledge both with knowledge in general and
also with ‘our’ knowledge.” Against this totalizing view of reason under reification, Lukacs
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, 112.
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argues that the understanding of the scope and fimction of reason has changed through 
history.
...rationahsm has existed at widely different times and in the most diverse 
forms, in the sense of a formal system whose unity derives from its orientation 
towards that aspect of the phenomena that can be gras^ Ded by the 
understanding, that is created by the understanding and hence also subject to 
the control, the predictions and the calculations of the understandmg. But 
there are fimdamental distinctions to be made, depending on the material on 
which rationalism is brought to bear and on the role assigned to it in the 
comprehensive system of human knowledge and hiunan objectives. What is 
novel about modem rationahsm is its increasingly insistent claim that it has 
discovered the principle which connects up all phenomena wliich in nature 
and society are found to confront mankind. Compared with this, eveiy 
previous type of rationahsm is no more than a partial system.
This is to argue that the insufficiency of reason may be calamitous for Kant’s and
Hegel’s mode of philosophizing which stands or fahs on the sufficiency of reason, but, if
history is anything to go by, reason can stih survive if it is imderstood a “partial system”
where the “ultimate” problems of human existence are understood as persisting “...in an
mationahty incommensurable with human understanding.”^^  Tlius he writes
...it wih not do to regard ‘rationahsm’ as something abstract and foimal and 
so tum it into a supra-historical principle inherent in the nature of human 
thought. We perceive rather that whether the form is to be treated as a 
universal category or merely as a way of delimiting precisely limited partial 
systems is essentiaUy a qualitative problem. Nevertheless even the purely 
formal delimitation of this type throws hght on the necessary correlation of the 
rational and the irrational, i.e. on the inevitabihty with which eveiy rational 
system wih stiike a frontier or barrier of irrationahty.^^
Lukacs now goes on to relate this claim about the exaggerated role of reason
bomgeois philosophy to the different ways the bamer of the “mational” is confronted in Kant
and Hegel. The question is, can the banier of uTationahty, represented by Kant’s “thing-ia-
itseif ’ be further rationahy resolved.
...when the problem of rationahty resolves itself into the impossibihty of 
resolving itself into any datum with the aid of rational concepts or of deriving
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 113. 
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fi’om them such concepts, the question of the thing-in-itself, which at first 
seemed to involve the metaphysical dilemma of the relation between ‘mind’ 
and ‘matter’ now assumes a completely different aspect which is crucial both 
for methodology and for systematic theory. The question then becomes: are 
the emphical facts - (it is immaterial whether they are purely ‘sensuous’ or 
whether that sensuousness is only the ultimate material substratum of their 
‘factual’ essence) - to be taken as ‘given’ or can this ‘givenness’ be dissolved 
further into rational forms, i.e. can it be conceived as the product of ‘our’ 
reason? With this the problem becomes cmcial for the system in general.
Lukacs considers that the Critique o f Judgement and Hegel’s System both respond
to the problem of “thing-in-itself’. The Critique o f Judgement takes it as “given”, Hegel’s
system asserts that it can be “dissolved further into rational forms”. Lukacs notes that Kant
...repeatedly emphasizes that that pme reason is unable to make the last leap 
towards synthesis and the definition of an object and so its principles cannot 
be deduced ‘directly of concepts but only indhectly by relating these concepts 
to something wholly contingent, namely possible experience.’ hi the Critique 
o f Judgement this notion of ‘intelligible contingency’ both of the elements of 
possible experience and of all the laws regulating to it is made the central 
problem of systematization. '^*
That is to say, in Kant, the problem of the “thing-in-itself’ as a barrier to reason 
becomes the question for aesthetics. This is not to see the Critique o f Judgement in a naiTow 
sense as an attempt to delineate the distinctiveness of aesthetic experience. Rather, it is to 
read it as a way of dealing with the ultimate madequacy of pure reason, in its efforts to 
confient the “irrational”. Kant’s aesthetics come to be seen as an exploration of a more 
integrative comprehension of the “irrational” than reason would appear to allow.
Immediately following this explanation of the Critique o f Judgement, Lukacs 
proceeds to discuss Hegel as dealing with exactly the same problem. That is to say, hke the 
Critique o f Judgement, Hegel’s system can be read as attempting to. explain “mtehigible 
contingency” . The fimdamental distinction which separates Hegel’s system from Kant’s 
Critique o f Judgement is that, for Kant, “intelligible contingency” remains possible
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 116.
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experience, where, for Hegel, “intelligible contingency” consists of the mediations pertaining 
to the experience of the particular phenomenon. As such, in Kant, the “thing-in-itself’ 
remains, as Lukacs puts it, “given”. Where, for Hegel, an “expanded reason” dissolves that 
“givenness” “further into rational forms.” At this point, before looking at Lukacs’ critique 
of Hegel, we need to take stock.
The idea of “intelligible contingency” can provisionally be identified with the idea of 
the “irrational” in Merleau-Ponty’s sense. It has been emphasized that one of the most basic 
differences between Kant and Hegel is that the former sees experience as an unchanging 
complex, while the latter sees it as changing through history. For Kant, the irrational is 
everything that is beyond an inflexible, universal reason. For Hegel, the task of philosophy 
was to demonstrate that the irrational was simply the appearance of phenomena, whose 
rational mediations had not been fuUy revealed. It follows that Hegel beheves and shows that 
the “uTational” can be grasped more thoroughly by reason than Kant allows. Put another 
way, Hegel beheved he could think the contingent more thoroughly than Kant, which is to 
say, for Hegel, the irrational is far more permeable to reason than Kant allowed. One obvious 
fimction of this is that for Hegel art and the aesthetic become obsolete in the face of the 
success of reason.
How then does Hegel’s philosophy claim to rationally permeate the “uTational”?
Lukacs says that Hegel’s necessary mode of procedure is to develop a system which wül
account for all the mediations of particular phenomena. So
...the attempt to universalize rationahsm necessarily issues in the demand for a 
system but, at the same time, as soon as one reflects upon the conditions in 
which a universal system is possible, i.e. as soon as the question of the system 
is consciously posed, it is seen to be a demand incapable of fulfillment: For a 
system in the sense given to it by rationahsm - and any other system would be 
self-contradictoiy - can bear no meaning other than that of a co-ordination, or
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rather supra- and subordination of the various partial systems of forms (and 
witlun these, of the mdividual forms).
This imphes that
... the paradox and the tragedy of classical German philosophy he m the fact 
that... while grasping and holding on to the hrational character of the actual 
content of the concepts it strives to go beyond this, to overcome it and to 
erect a system. But from what has already been said it is clear what the 
problem of the actuahy given means for rationahsm: vis. that it cannot be left 
to its own being and existence, for hr that case it would remain ineluctably 
‘contingent.’ Instead it must be whohy absorbed into the rational system of 
the concepts of the understanding.^^
Lukacs’ point is that ft it is assumed, against Kant, that the “grvermess” of the “thing- 
in-itself’ can be “dissolved into further rational forms” then a rational system is the necessary 
consequence. Repeating Marx’s critique of Hegel, such a system wih simply assimilate the 
mational to reason. At this point Lukacs is setting himself for what was described earher as 
his ‘out Hegehng’ Hegel. Lukacs argues that reason has reached its limit, hi the present, to 
know reified knowing, we must attack the basis for reified knowing, wliich is capitahsm, 
because reified knowing has been made by Capitahsm. Lukacs sees the consequence of 
reification as a situation where the capitahst organization of the economy creates a “second” 
reahty which serves to obscure “reahty itself’. For Adorno, reification also sets up a “second” 
reahty, but this does not obscure some post-revolutionary “reahty” behind or beyond it. 
Rather, reification obscures the nonidentical character of particular phenomena. Reification 
creates and feeds the iUusion of a non-contradictory reahty where the dynamic of exjierience 
is transformed mto a simplified positivist understanding of a transparent, and hence 
unproblematic, relationship between consciousness’ representations of the world, and a world 
immediately avahable to it.
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 116-117.
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 117-118.
Mediation and reification 104
This is a subtle but absolutely basic difference between Adomo and Lukacs. Adomo
takes Lukacs argument on board but, for Adomo, the failure of philosophy is not just its
faihue to know itself as reified, but also in the inadequacy of philosophical concepts
themselves. Philosophy is mediated by reification, but it is not completely explained by
reification. To over-emphasize the inability of philosophy to understand itself as a fimction of
reification, would be to do what Lukacs does, and imply the ultimate iiTelevance of
philosophy. On the other hand, to emphasize the madequacy of philosophical concepts as a
vahd explanation for the failure of philosophy would be to imply the absolute autonomy of
philosophy. Each explanation for the failure of philosophy signals the inevitable failure to
know. Neither explanation for the failure of philosophy must come to exclude the other. For
Adomo, neither recognizes that the “irrational” can only be represented by a philosophical
foim which itself is a complex mediation of the philosophical concept and the irrational
within it. Lukacs shows this, but does not develop its imphcations. The symptoms of
reification in Kant and Hegel appear in the form then philosophy takes and, as such,
indirectly represent reification. The irrational persists in the form philosophical argument
takes. This persistence of the irrational in the form of philosophical systematics is the key to
Adorno’s continued commitment to philosophy. For him, the task is the philosophical attempt
to represent the concrete particular in the most succinctly rational way possible, wliich is to
describe it in its complex contingency. This generates philosophical foim which indhectly
represents the world. Once reason is given a partial rather than sufficient role, as it is m
Aesthetic Theory:, is that, in Lukacs words,
...we are forced to concede that actuahty, content, matter reaches right into 
foim, the stmctures of the forms and their interrelations and thus, into the 
structure o f the system itself In that case the system must be abandoned as a 
system. For then it will be no more than a register, an account, as well ordered 
as possible, of facts which are no longer linked rationally and so can no longer
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be made systematic even though the forms of their components are themselves
rational/^
The collapsing system of Aesthetic Theory collapses in giving itself to the particular, 
while acknowledging there wih always also be an unexplained remainder. In this sense 
Aesthetic Theoty can be thought of as engaging this description of the complex relationship 
between Kant’s aesthetics and Hegel’s system Adomo is committed to attempt a relatively 
late resort to the “irrational”. That is to say, in the hght of Hegel’s failure, the problem of the 
“thing-in-itself’ remains a problem, but it can be thought into, while still leaving a remnant. 
The claim I am making for Aesthetic Theory, is that it can be thought of as a kind of 
‘aestheticization’ of Hegel’s system, in its commitment to understanding the mediations of 
the p articulai phenomenon while rejecting the final adequacy of reason. Where the integrative 
comprehension of Kant’s aesthetics remains aloof because of its universafity, the integrative 
comprehension of reason in Aesthetic Theory moves so far towards the particular object that 
it is itself on the point of collapse. The strategic importance of Aesthetic Theory is that it is 
capable of thinking through the “irrational” and contingent, much further than the Kantian 
paradigm allows. This is a big claim for Aesthetic Theory. There are two basically different 
reasons why it is difficult to substantiate.
Fust, there is an objective problem. Is it actually possible to read a collapsing 
philosophical system whose, to use Lukacs words, “facts are no longer linked rationally and 
so can no longer be made systematic?” Second, this task, should it be possible, is infinitely 
comphcated by the fact that philosophical foim is the issue. As was suggested in the 
Introduction, the way philosophical form can be thought has, to a gieat extent, been defined 
by a tradition from Nietzsche, Heidegger and Deconstmction. This tradition has tended to 
emphasize philosophical anti-from as “poetic” or “hteraiy”. Even in the work of Demda, who
57 Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 118.
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operates with an expanded idea of the ‘literary,” the dhection of his argument arises out of a 
radically different context firom Adomo. To make an important generalization, the 
Heidegger/Denida axis is closely related to Lukacs, in as much as it locates the irrational as 
trans-conceptual, beyond rational thinking, the unthought. Adomo, uniquely, is committed to 
thematizmg the nonidentical as a thoroughgoing commitment to reason despite, and because 
of, its acknowledged inadequacy.
There are close parallels between Adomo and the Heidegger/Denida tradition, but as 
I have radicated, these can be intensely misleading for the reception of Aesthetic Theoiy. 
One of the most important differences, which is a persistent, though not dominant theme in 
the following chapter, concems the possibility of reading. Adomo’s commitment to rational 
thought configures the problem of imderstanding Aesthetic Theoiy very differently, from the 
problem of understanding, as it smfaces in the reception of Heidegger and Denida. 
Accordingly the following chapter discusses the problem of philosophical foim, as raised by 
Heidegger and Deconstmction, and considers teims on which it might be possible to read the 
form of Aesthetic Theoiy outwith that tradition.
107
Chapter HI
PHILOSOPHICAL FORM AND LITERARY FORM
When philosophy reflects on its form, one way of doing so has been to think of itself 
as language. Philosophy then compares itself with other ways language is deployed. The most 
obvious non-philosophical languages are ‘poetic’ and every-day language. Thus, philosophy 
which is self-conscious of its foim, has often defined itself in relation to either poetry, or to 
every day language, or to both. The great exception is Hegel. The first attempt to emphasize 
systematically the inseparability of philosophical foim and content, the form Hegel’s 
philosophy takes is a function of his response to previous philosophy, not other modes of 
language. In this sense, Hegel is the point of departur e for any discussion of philosophical 
form that does not explain itself first and foremost as language.
One reason why Hegel is so troubling for philosophy is that he emphasizes the 
sufficiency of reason, while emphasizing the insufficiency of the idea of the isolated 
philosophical judgement. In other words, his prognosis for philosophy is both ultimately 
reassming and extremely worrying. It is reassuring because philosophy can be successful, 
woiiying because it cannot be successful by traditional and obvious means. The “gap” Hegel 
proposes between the idea of the discrete judgement and the sufficiency of reason is here 
occupied by Hegel’s philosophical “form”. Now, just because this form is not thought of by 
Hegel as determined by language, this does not mean it has no relation to poetic or eveiy-day 
language. Hegel wrote extensively on poetry and indeed, the arts m general. Nonetheless, his 
Aesthetics is one part of his system, and his philosophy sustains its identity as form in a way 
which does not obviously owe anything to his theory of art.
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Kant, by contrast, as we have seen, did not self-consciously reflect on the potential 
meaning of the form of his philosophy. At the same time, Kant’s Critique o f Judgement had a 
huge impact, being instrumental in establishing aesthetics as a legitimate branch of 
philosophy. This impact was not puiely a function of what the Critique o f Judgement is in 
itself. There is also the implication that aesthetic experience might somehow compensate for 
the potential inadequacies of reason, as diagnosed in the Critique o f  Pure Reason. In this 
sense, Kant’s philosophy as a whole estabhshed an ambiance which was sympathetic for the 
reception of his aesthetics. This sympathetic ambiance holds for Kant’s aesthetics a 
potentially more significant impact than Hegel’s aesthetics can have within his rationally 
sufficient philosophy.
What works against this prognosis of the relative significance of the “aesthetic” in 
Kant and Hegel is that, although Hegel’s Aesthetics is just one part of his system, art is 
characteiized as essentially continuous with rational thinking. Art and philosophy are both 
understood as foims of experiencing and representing the world. Thus, despite Hegel’s 
emphasis on theft differences, they are ultimately continuous. It is because philosophy and 
art are so thoroughly understood a process of experiencing and representing the world that, 
on Hegel’s terms at least, his philosophical practice is far closer to art than is Kant’s.
It is one consequence of theft systematically different strategies that there are major 
comphcations for any attempt to compare the arguments of Kant and Hegel. Each defines 
“the arts” differently, and configm es itself differently in relation to them. This “configuration” 
is multifaceted, and takes place according to the way each philosopher understands what it is 
about “the aits” that makes them similar to, or different fiom, itself. For Kant, reason and the 
aesthetic are modes of experience. For Hegel, philosophy and ait are modes of experience 
and representation. To compare Kant and Hegel on a specific issue inevitably means erasing
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incompatibilities. This would be either to read Kant on Hegel’s terms (or vice versa), or, as
did Lukacs, to develop a meta-critical position, capable of containing their incompatibilities
within some over-riding common determination of their thought.
So, on Kant’s terms, the Critique o f Judgement is about the analysis and description
of different kinds of experience. From Hegel’s perspective, Kant does not understand the
importance of the different “forms” through which experience represents the world to
consciousness, and therefore neglects to discrirnhiate between them. Adomo, siding with
Hegel in this instance, makes this point hi the following way:
Kant states at the start of the ‘Analytic of the Beautifiil’ that the fiist moment 
of a judgement of taste is disinterested satisfaction, where interest is defined 
as ‘the satisfaction which we combine with the representation of the existence 
of an object.’ Right away there is an ambiguity. It is impossible to teU whether 
Kant means, by representation of the existence of an object, the empirical 
object dealt with in a work of art, hi other words its subject matter or content, 
or whether he means the work of art itself. *
Adorno’s point has nothing to do with a critique of Kant’s idea of “disinterestedness”.
Rather, for Hegel and Adomo, exjierience cannot be understood if thought of as detached,
i.e. “abstracted” fi om the means of its representation, hn this instance, Adomo concludes that
Kant is trying to describe aesthetic experience, without distinguishing between the
experiential relationship between the work of art and the world and the experiential relation
pertaining between the viewer and the work of art. For Hegel and Adomo, the form an
experience takes thoroughly mediates the capacity of that experience to represent. Thus, for
example, when Hegel writes in the Introduction to Aesthetics that art is an incomplete
representation of the world, it is on the basis that
neither in content nor in foim is art the highest and absolute mode of bringing 
to om’ minds the tme interests of the spirit. For precisely on account of its 
foim, art is limited to a specific content. Only one sphere and stage of tmth is 
capable of being represented in the element of art.^
 ^Aesthetic Theory, p. 14.
 ^G.W.F. ViegQl, Aesthetics, vol. 1, trans. T.M. Knox, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) p. 9.
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A fimdamental difference between The Critique o f Judgement and Hegel’s 
Aesthetics, then, is that the former does not pay attention to the medium of representation. 
This difference between Kant and Hegel, and Adorno’s identification with Hegel on the issue, 
is fimdamental to Aesthetic Theoty. It can also suggest why the form Kant’s and Hegel’s 
aesthetics take are so very different. One of the differences is scale. The translation of 
Hegel’s Aesthetics is in two volumes and runs to over 1,000 pages. It describes the history of 
ait fi*om ancient to romantic art. The Critique o f Judgement is mhiute by comparison, thougli 
its claims asphe to universality. Moreover, Kant spends most of the time discussing the 
experience of the beauty of natme, a subject which, Hegel tells us in the Introduction to his 
Aesthetics, he is not going to deal with. As was mentioned earher, the impact of the Critique 
o f Judgement did much to estabhsh the legitimacy of aesthetics as a branch of philosophy, 
while Hegel’s Aesthetics has been almost completely neglected. The impact of Hegel’s 
Aesthetics it to be foimd rather in the discipline of art history, where he has been described 
by Gombrich, for one, as the “father” of the disciphne.
Moreover, it could be argued that Kant’s “oversight”, as diagnosed by Adomo above, 
is indispensable, if he is to maintain the integiity of his identity as a philosopher. To make the 
hard distinction between the representation of experience to consciousness and the 
representation of experience by the work of art, is to make representation, as well as 
experience, an issue for aesthetics. “The arts” so manifestly represent the world in such 
different ways, and each art has represented in different ways through its history, that an 
aesthetics which makes representation an issue must, of necessity, become historically 
orientated towards the arts. Equally, as Adomo argues at the beginning of Chapter 4 of 
Aesthetic Theory, an aesthetics preoccupied by representation will be predisposed to show 
correspondingly little interest in nature vis. Hegel’s Aesthetics.
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Now, despite the enormous range and historical scope of Hegel’s aesthetics, ait 
remains contained by philosophy in his system. The containing “device” is his absolute 
conviction that the way philosophy experiences and represents is more advanced than the 
way the aits experience and represent. For Hegel, the relative inferiority of the arts is that 
they experience the world “imaginatively,” not dialectically, and are thus unable to represent 
the world as such. Philosophy, which does experience the world dialectically, represents it 
accordingly and, for Hegel, this is how the world is.
There are other ways to think of the differences between the aesthetics of Kant and 
Hegel. What needs emphasizing here, if we are better to understand Aesthetic Theory, are 
two things: first, there is the specific criticism of Kant’s failure to differentiate between 
different foims of representation of experience in his aesthetics, and second, there is the 
general claim that the way the problem of aesthetics is framed by philosophy is a fimction of 
how philosophy understands itself. For the moment I will leave the specific criticism of Kant 
aside and concentrate instead on the wider issue of the relation between pMlosopliical self- 
understanding, and philosophical questions.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the revelation of the unconsciously held 
assumptions in a philosopher is the basis for meta-critique. This is a central dynamic m the 
histoiy of philosophy fi om Kant onwai ds. As Lukacs puts it, “classical philosophy [i.e., Kant 
and Hegel] mercilessly tore to shi eds ah the metaphysical illusions of the preceding era, but 
was forced to be as uncritical and as dogmaticaUy metaphysical with regard to some of its 
won premises as its predecessors had been towards then s. Lukacs, in other words, does to 
Kant and Hegel what they did to then predecessors. As we have seen, Lukacs’ critique of 
Hegel is that, despite himself he like Kant, “takes for granted certain ideas.” For Lukacs it is
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 121.
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“...the - dogmatic - assumption that the rational and formahstic mode of cognition is the only 
possible way of apprehending reahty...”'* What Lukacs is not saying is that Kant and Hegel 
did not deal with other modes of apprehending reahty in, for example, the Critique o f 
Judgement or Hegel’s Aesthetics. What he is saying is that the presupposition “that the 
rational and formahstic mode of cognition is the only possible way of apprehending reahty,” 
thoroughly peimeates their attitude towards these non-phhosopliical modes of apprehending 
reahty.
Now, metacritique, deployed as much by Kant and Hegel as by Lukacs, if carried out 
with sufficient insight and rigor, does indeed, “tear to slueds” its target. It is so destructive 
because it takes on a whole system of thought thiough the critique of its premises. Those 
premises are not isolated from the system of thought, but revealed as thoroughly peimeating 
ah its aspects. Indeed one could say that it is precisely because Kant and Hegel were so 
logical, that they were so vulnerable to metacritique.
The importance of Lukacs’ argument is not that it thus ‘saw through’ Kant and 
Hegel. Vhtuahy every subsequent thinker has done so in one way or another. Rather, what is 
key is his claim that the permeation of a phhosophical argument by its premises can be read 
as revealing of the world. As Lukacs writes “the character of existence is revealed at least as 
clearly by what phhosophy does not find problematic as by what it does.”  ^ On Lukacs’ 
teims, however, phhosophy can thus only reveal experience as reified. Moreover, its capacity 
to thus reveal is contingent on its metacritical reading. This metacritical reading is an early 
step in the revolutionary process. On his own terms, however, Lukacs the philosopher cannot 
complete the revolution. This is because, as a means of representing the world, capitahsm is 
not simply a way of thinking, but a material entity which has been made. It cannot be
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 117.
 ^Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 112.
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unthought by philosophical metacritique. Rather, capitalism has to be unmade at the site of its
production, by the proletariat, who are in the position to do so. When this has been done,
then the world can be experienced as it really is. As was argued in the previous chapter,
Adomo here parts company with Lukacs’ argument, after the point where he defines and
diagnoses the significance of the revelatory capacity of philosophical argument.
The significance of Lukacs’ argument for reading Adomo is that in it we have a
prelimhiaiy definition of philosophical form, and a suggestion of its significance as an indirect
means of representing the world. A passage ^om  Negative Dialectics helps tease out some of
the implications of this insight. Adomo is comparing the different function of “questions” m
philosophy and the “special sciences”:
The weight of questions in philosophy differs indeed fiom the. weight they 
have in the special sciences, where the solutions of questions removes them, 
while in philosophical history there rhythm would be more that of duration 
and obhvion.^
Adomo posits that philosophical questions do not simply exist as problems which can 
or cannot be solved. Rather, such questions have a “rhythm...of duration and oblivion.” The 
process of solving a problem, or demonstrating its iiielevance, is dmation. This duration is 
the “rhythm” of that question, as its imphcations permeate ensuing argument, limiting its 
possibihties. With this idea of philosophical rhythm, we can retum to Hegel’s idea of the foim 
of philosophy. Earher it was characterized as the “gap” between the inadequacy of the idea of 
the discrete judgement and the sufficiency of reason. This is most self-evidently identified as 
Hegel’s dialectic: the relentless “thesis”, “antithesis”, “synthesis” of Hegel’s thought. Imphed 
by this step-by-step progress is the principle of comphcity, or deteimination, between the 
different claims Hegel makes, which give his system its intemal coherence. As Lukacs puts 
it, “every given aspect of the system should be capable of being deduced fiom its basic
T.W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973) p. 63,
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piinciple.”  ^ As we saw, a related determinateness can he read into Kant’s arguments. Kant, 
however, according to Hegel “takes for granted certain ideas’’.^  In other words, he is not 
totally explicit, making unphilosophical assumptions. Now, as we have seen, Hegel can 
likewise be read metacritically. The cmcial difference between Kant and Hegel, however, is 
that Hegel seeks to make the integrity of his premises and his specific claims, completely 
exphcit. That is to say, Hegel seeks to make every reading of his argument always aheady a 
metaciitique. Now, as we have seen, Lukacs is not interested in this aspect of Hegel’s 
difference fiom Kant. For Lukacs, Kant and Hegel are just different examples of how the 
failure to recognize reification manifests itself thiough philosophical premises and the 
working out of their imphcations in argument. Adomo, by contrast is interested in the 
difference between Kant and Hegel. This difference is Hegel’s attempt to make exphcit the 
relatedness of his premises to the detailed claims they generate. This makes Hegel’s 
philosophy a paradigm of philosophy which self-consciously understands the representational 
significance of seeking to make that exphcit that which is revealed by metacritical reading.
At one level. Aesthetic Theory: can be thought of as a response to Hegel’s Aesthetics. 
It responds to Hegel’s Aesthetics in the hght of what has been widely recognised as its 
philosophical over-deteimination of art. Hegel’s attempt to demonstrate the sufficiency of 
reason peimeates his Aesthetics. Consider some of the different ways in wliich Hegel’s 
Aesthetics is consistent with its premise: art is dead; philosophy is alive; the medium of art is 
the imagination; the medium of philosophy is reason; art is an incomplete representation of 
the world; philosophy is complete. It is the logical integiity of Hegel’s philosophy of art that 
makes it, on Lukacs’ and Adomo’s terms, an indhect representation of the world. At the
’ Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 117.
® G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology o f  Spirit, trans. A.V.Miller, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 47.
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same time, it is precisely this logical integrity that makes Hegel’s Aesthetics a rationally over­
determined representation of art.
When Adomo rejects the sufficiency of reason in Aesthetic Theory he destroys the 
systematic integrity of Hegel’s Aesthetics. This creates two inseparable problems. First, in 
Aesthetic Theory none of Hegel’s distinctions between art and philosophy hold. As we have 
seen, Adomo is also adamant that the medium thiough which experience is represented to 
consciousness defines it. This means that, despite Adorno’s rejection of the basis for Hegel’s 
distinction between philosophy and ait, he is committed to their distinctness. Second, it is 
exactly the exjilicit systematic unity of Hegel’s philosophy which gives it the capacity 
indhectly to represent the world. In rejecting the sufficiency of reason qua systematic unity, 
Adomo would appear to be destroying the means by wliich philosophy indhectly represents 
the world.
This provides some indication of the problems Aesthetic Theory confionts. hi 
themselves they are daunting, but the reception of Aesthetic Theory is radically comphcated, 
as aheady signaUed in the Introduction and Chapter 1, by the ambience of poststmcturahsm. 
hi this tradition, the whole question of philosophical foim has surfaced not through an 
extrapolation of the imphcations of the intemal collapse of Hegel’s rational philosophical 
foim, but fiom deconstmction’s emphasis on philosophy as, first and foremost, language. As 
we saw in the Introduction, the question of how to read Adomo, as fiamed by Jameson’s 
book and the various responses to it, is peimeated by the question of the relation of the 
philosophical and the hteraiy. Furtheimore, this discussion has tended to estabhsh an 
imhelpful distinction between Adomo’s “philosophical” tmth claims and the “hterary” foim 
of his argument. These tendencies are directly traceable to the way poststmctmahsm has 
configmed the possibihty of thinking about philosophical foim. Heidegger, whose profound
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influence on poststmctm ahsm derives principaUy through Derrida’s reading and 
appropriation of him, produced work which shuns the adequacy of philosophical judgement. 
It should be evident that Adorno’s notion of philosophical form, if in crisis hi Aesthetic 
Theoiy, is predicated on the deployment of the phUosophicahy rigorous judgement. The 
intermpted philosophical rhythm of Aesthetic Theory is, I wih argue, definitively different 
fiom a supeificiahy similar, anti-philosophical tendency identified with Heidegger and 
Deirida. The problem is to define how, and why, this is the case. It is fiom this difference that 
a whole series of incompatibilities between Adomo and the tradition can be defined, and it is 
fiom this that the form of Aesthetic Theory can be understood on its own teims.
The puipose of the rest of this chapter, then, is to estabhsh the grounds on which 
Aesthetic Theoiy is different fiom Deconstmction and the Heideggarian attitude to 
philosophical foim. This wih, by default, do something to suggest the strategic significance of 
Aesthetic Theory within the context of contemporaiy theory. In the next two sections my 
puipose is to estabhsh the limited relevance of various avahable attitudes to reading 
phhosophical foim. I whl consider how the conflict between poststmcturahsm and the 
analytical tradition has defined the parameters within which the relation between phhosophy 
and form can be discussed. To begin with, we must estabhsh the imphcations of the linguistic 
and hteraiy origins of deconstmction. To this end, in the next section I whl briefly 
recapitulate Denida’s critique of Saussme.
Pliilosophical foim and Literary form 1 i 7
Saussure and Derrida
Deconstruction is a way of thinking which has arisen out of hterary criticism. It
explicitly challenges the idea of a significant difference between the literary work of art and
the ostensibly objective critical act. Christopher Norris describes it in the following manner:
Deconstruction is the active antithesis of everything that criticism ought to be 
if one accepts its traditional values and concepts. Beneath the age old conflicts 
of critical method there has always existed a tacit agreement about certain 
conventions or rules of debate, with which (supposedly) no serious thinking 
about literature could be carried out.^
The “method” of deconstruction has been to expose those conventions which
ostensibly lend objectivity to the critical act. These are then revealed as resting on no more
secure a basis than the unashamedly fictional claims of the hterary works criticism explains.
One response to this mode of deconstruction has been to understand it as a means of locating
imphcit structures in hterary works. These can then be thought of as previously submerged
levels of meaning, beyond what has traditionahy been read. According to Nonis, Johnathan
Culler is one such critic. Cuher relocates the meaning of a text fiom its exphcit content to
imphcit structure and, in so doing, assumes that
stmctures of meaning coiTespond to some deep-laid mental ‘set’ or pattern of 
mind which determines the limits of inteUigibihty. Theory, fiom Culler’s point 
of view, woidd be to search for invariant structures or foimal universals which 
reflect the very nature of human intehigence.
Thus, although Cuher makes use of the practice of deconstructive reading, he 
relocates the center of critical objectivity to a new level. Norris identifies this idea of 
criticism as “a ‘meta-language’ set up to articulate the codes and conventions of ah (existing 
or possible) hterary texts”, and identifies it as the central aspiration of Barthes’ early work. 
Against this “stmcturahst” tradition, Derrida signals a shift in several ways. Fhst, he is less
 ^Cliristopher Norris, Decomù^uction: Theory and Pt^actice, (London: Methuen, 1982), p. xii.
Cliristopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, p. 3.
" Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, p. 4.
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concerned with deconstructing the accepted difference between literature and criticism than 
with the supposed difference between hterature and philosophy: ‘T)emda’s attentions are 
therefore divided between ‘literary’ and ‘philosophical’ texts, a distinction which in practice 
he constantly breaks down and shows to be based on a deep but untenable prejudice”; and 
“Derrida refuses to grant philosophy the kind of piivUeged status it has always claimed as the 
sovereign dispenser of r e a s o n . T h e  second aspect of Denida’s difference from 
stmctmahsm is his critique of structuralist claims to diagnose deep patterns of imphcit 
meaning. For Nonis, the focal point of this critique is Saussme’s theoiy of structural 
linguistics, from which “Stmctmahsm in ah its manifold forms and apphcations 
developed...” '^*
Saussure had argued that there is not a guaranteed hnk between words and what they
signify, rather the meaning of words is defined by their differences fr om each other. Saussure
extrapolated two ideas fiom this insight:
He argued, first, that linguistics could be placed on a scientific basis only by 
adopting a ‘synchronic’ approach, one that treated language as a network of 
structural relations existing at a given point in time... Second, Saussure found 
it necessaiy to make a firm distinction between the isolated speech act or 
utterance {parole) and the general system of articulate relations from which it 
derived {la langue)}^
Derrida develops his critique of Saussme in the essay “Linguistics and Grammatology.” ®^ He
diagnoses, and then questions, Saussure’s presumption of “the relative priority of spoken as
opposed to wiitten language, a duahsm Deiiida locates at the heart of the Western
philosophic t rad i t io n .T h e  basis for the distinction Derrida makes is that
In speaking one is able to experience (supposedly) an intimate hnk between 
sound and sense, an inward and immediate realisation of meaning which yields
Cliristopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, p. 21. 
Cliristopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, p. 18. 
Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, p. 25. 
Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, p. 25. 
Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, p. 26. 
Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, p. 26.
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itself up without reserve to perfect, transparent understanding. Writing on the 
contrary, destroys this ideal of self-presence. It obtrudes an alien; 
depersonahsed medium, a deceiving shadow which falls between intent and 
meaning, between utterance and understanding. It occupies a promiscuous 
public realm where authority is sacrificed to the vagaries and whims of textual 
‘dissemination.’ Writing, in short, is a threat to the deeply traditional view that 
associates truth with self presence and the ‘natural’ language wherein it finds 
expression.
Denida’s problem with Saussure is that the latter faüs to distinguish between these 
essentially different impHcations for meaning of spoken and written language. Saussure 
assumes that language as a whole perfoims according to the parameters Derrida equates with 
its spoken form, hi other words, Saussuie’s scientific aspirations for linguistics are based on a 
partial model of language, deriving fiom an extrapolation of the certainties of its spoken foim 
onto writing.
The pattern of metacritique deployed by Deirida against philosophy is obviously part 
of a tradition of metacritique aheady delineated. Where Lukacs, for example, identifies Kant 
and Hegel as having failed to recognize that experience was produced by capitaUsm, Deiiida 
claims that philosophy has never understood itself to be conditioned by the medium of its 
expression, which is not “reason” as it was for Hegel, but wiiting. The meaning of wiiting, 
fiutheimore, in contrast to speech, is fluid. Written meaning is fluid because of its exposure 
to the contingencies of infinitely different receptions of written language. For Denida, 
therefore, philosophy is a congenitally contradictory activity because its means of expression 
prohibit the fidfilling of its aspiration to be truthful.
Now, at this stage, it is important to recognize a strategic similarity between Adorno 
and Deirida. Adorno obseived Kant’s failure in the Critique o f Judgement to discriminate 
between orders of representation. Derrida’s critique of Saussure similarly emphasizes the 
foimer’s failure to discriminate between speech and writing. At the same time, there is a
Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Tireory and Practice, p. 28.
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fundamental difference. Adorno is deploying Hegel against Kant to argue that the medium 
through which experience is represented, cannot be separated from the content of that 
experience. Derrida claims the same thing of Saussure. Where Saussure had based his 
linguistics on thinking language as speech, and thereby emphasized the stability of meaning, 
Denida does the opposite. He then makes wiiting, and thus the fluidity of meaning, the 
condition of experience. Adorno’s point is that experiences cannot be reduced to a single 
necessary aspect of then identity. This is one of Adorno’s premises,, and as we have seen, it 
generates the fluidity of meaning. Thus, from Adorno’s perspective, although Denida is quite 
light about Saussme, he is not right to over-deteimine philosophy as wiiting; it is also other 
things. For Adorno, the fluidity of philosophical truth derives from the particular 
philosophical utterance’s state as a complex mediation of many things. For Derrida, the 
fluidity of philosophy comes from being one thing - writing - and the meaning of wiiting is 
fluid.
This indication of a profound difference between Adorno and Denida is very far fr om 
undermining what Denida does nor, for the moment, is the aim to do so. Denida is not as 
vulnerable to metacritique as Kant and Hegel because he is not as rational as they are. 
Furthermore, like Adorno’s, much of Derrida’s work can be thought of as an attempt to 
relocate meaning, rather than undermine it per se. What this preliminary indication of one 
difference between Adorno and Denida is meant to indicate is that theh premises about why 
philosophical meaning is fluid are fundamentally different, and are going to give then thinking 
radically different rhythms and directions.
With this idea in mind I will now consider, not these differences themselves, but the 
difficulty of doing so. This is because of the way deconstruction constructs the possibilities 
for thinking philosophical form, and its dominance of the discussion of the issue. It should be
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emphasized that this is not a complaint about the power of poststmcturahsm hi general. Its 
power is, in any case, unevenly distributed. Rather, poststructmahsm has raised the issue of 
philosophical foim and, to that extent, contributed to an intellectual climate which should be 
sympathetic to the reception of Aesthetic Theory, That it is not, is because the philosophical 
foim 0 Î Aesthetic Theory is of a different order from that anticipated by poststmctm alism and 
one of its main targets, the analytical tradition of philosophy.
Philosophical content and Literary form: Deconstruction and the Analytical ti adition
It is because of Deirida’s characteiization of the inseparability of “philosophy” and
“literature” that the analytical tradition has been confr onted with the idea of its own foim as
“hteraiy” foim. Those who have responded to this aspect of the deconstructive challenge to
analytical philosophy have come to the issue of philosophical foim thi ough the imphcation of
its potentially “literary” quahties. hitroducmg the first part of his book The Anatomy o f
Philosophical Style, Berel Lang writes.
The premise motivating the discussion... is that philosophy, however it is 
otherwise conceived , is also, perhaps even first, a form of writhig. To the 
extent that this is true, moreover, the critical means that have been found 
relevant to more conventional “literaiy” texts can be - ought to be - also 
apphed to philosophical writhig, up to the point at least that the wiiting itself 
demonstrates its irrelevance.
Smce philosophy and hterature are “first” wiiting, the issue conceinhig Lang is the 
reception of philosophical texts in the fight of their similarity to the “literaiy” qua wiiting. His 
interest is generated by the wide-ranging dispute about the relative merits of ways of reading 
philosophy. This quaiTel emerged from the clash between a philosophical tradition that has
Berel Lang, The Anatomy o f Philosophical Style: Literary Philosophy and the Philosophy o f Literature, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 2.
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been pecuUaiiy nnreflective about the function of language in its procedures (apart from post- 
Wittgensteinian Analytic Philosophy) and a mode of argument which sees nothing beyond the 
“text”. Lang introduces his project as a kind of modification of the way analytical philosophy 
thinks of itself
...in contrast to the NeutraHst model in which the philosophical writer draws 
on an independent and supposedly “style-less” body of prepositional 
assertions that the philosopher first discovers and then arranges or 
reformulates, the writer in this second model, in choosing a form or structure 
for philosophical discourse, is, in that act, also shaping the substance or 
content which the form then - very loosely speaking now - will be “of\^"
This looks promising, if rather depressing. Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit was
pubhshed in 1807, Lang’s book in 1990. When Lang looks at Hegel, and he only ever does in
the form of brief comments, it is by bringing to bear literary ideas. Thus:
Kant, for example, uses metaphors more often than similes, where with Plato 
the proportions are the other way round, and in both cases there is a relation 
between the hterary figure used and the philosophical content - as there is also 
in Hegel, for whom any philosophically historical fragment will eventually 
disclose the whole: so his use of metonymy as a Hterary figure.^^
Moreover,
it seems to me more than merely whimsy to associate the causaHty of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology - what motivates the discourse with a version of what we 
would otherwise recognise as the Bildungsroman in the narration of which the 
novice figure of Geist (spirit) after overcoming a number of serious adversities 
(for which, naturally, Geist itself is responsible) then realises its troie nature 
and destiny. This is, after all, a standard pattern of what in literary history we 
recogirise famihariy as the Romance.
Now these are potentially interesting observations. What needs to be recognized is 
that they are rendered through the identification of philosophical form with hterary form. 
Lang is writing a book called The Anatomy o f Philosophical Style', at the begirming he 
tentatively mentions the possibihty of a relation between philosophical form and content.
Berel Lang, The Anatomy o f Philosophical Style, p. 18. 
Berel Lang, Tire Anatomy o f Philosophical Style, p. 20. 
^ Berel Lang, The Anatomy o f Philosophical Style, p. 21.
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When he mentions the greatest exponent there has ever heen of the idea of the inseparahihty
of philosophical form and content, it is to suggest that we should pay attention to his 
deployment of hterary tropes.
It is essentiaUy the same paradigm which frames the argument exemplified by
Danto’s paper “Philosophy as/and/of Literature”. Danto’s point of departure is a
consideration of the imphcations for analytical philosophy of its deconstructive reading. He
writes of the analytical tradition.
We take a remote satisfaction that some of us Strawson, Ryle, and Quine, let 
alone Santayana, Russeh and James - write distinguished prose...Sthl our 
tendency is to regard style, save to the degree that it enhances perspicuity, as 
adventitious and superfluous to that for the sake of which we finahy address 
these texts: as mere Farbung, to use Frege’s dismissive term. So to rotate
these texts in such a way that the secondary facets catch the hght of
intehectual concern puts what we regard as the primary facets in shadow; and 
to acquiesce in the concept of philosophy-as-literature just now seems tacitly 
to acquiesce to the view that the austere imperatives of philosophy-as-science 
have lost their energy. Considering what has been happening to texts when 
treated in recent times, our carmon seems suddenly fragile, and it pains the 
heart to think of them enduring the frivolous sadism of the deconstructionist.
Like Lang, Danto fr ames his discussion of philosophical form in terms of the contrast
between the philosopliical and the hterary, which is in essence a straight-forward dispute
about the priority of different ways of reading philosophy. As he makes clear, the awareness
of philosophical form in his tradition of practice is understood as supplementary, even
secondary, by contrast with what is finahy addressed by philosophical writing.
Deconstruction is “fiivoloiis” because it disregards the philosopher’s intentions, dehberately
amplifying “style” as an rmacknowledged fluidity at the expense of primary, philosopliical
content. Whhe one can imderstand Danto’s problem, his argument is absolutely compatible
with the parameters of deconstruction. He reinforces the distinctness of philosophical form
Arthur Danto, “Pliilosophy as/and/of Literature”, in Cascardi, (ed) Literature ami the Question of 
Philosophy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 4.
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from content, accepting philosophical form as identical with its metaphoricahty. On this basis, 
he differentiates between traditional philosophical content and hterary form
From Danto’s discussion a whole series of oppositions emerge. The fohowing appear 
in the quotation above: piimaiy facets v, secondary facets, perspicuity v, superfluity, style v, 
what is finahy addressed, phho sophy- as-hterature v, philo sophy- as- science, etc. These 
oppositions are interesting, as is Danto’s argument and the scenario he is engaged hr, but a 
pattern of confr ontation embeds itself and restricts the field of conceivable relations between 
phho sophy and form From the analytical perspective, perspicuity is always the opposite of 
superfluous style; it is perspicuity which enables us to concentrate on what is finahy 
addressed by phho sophy. The disputed relation between phhosophical reading and hterary 
reading is always thought of in terms of the ambient requirement to hold them apart. Analytic 
philosophy and deconstruction share the premise that, at stake in then battle is which mode 
of reading wih ultimately overcome the other. This is true even when Danto suggests an 
altenrative way of thinkhig of phhosophical form: “the form of phhosophical truth and the 
form of phhosophical exjrression are intemahy enough related that we may want to recognize 
that when we turn to other forms we may also be turning to other forms of phhosophical 
truth”, o r ,  further, “that phhosophers with reaUy new thoughts have simply had to invent 
new forms with which to convey them”^^ . These suggestions are not understood as being of 
a potentiahy different order from the paradigmatic split which permeates the argument.
Now, if the reception of deconstruction by analytical phho sophy emphasizes the 
hterary form of philosophy, it is also true to say that much of Derrida’s work has been about 
a radical expansion of the idea of the “hterary”. His own position is certairhy not equivalent 
to the way his perceived imphcations for analytical phhosophy are developed by Lang and
Arthur Danto, “Philosophy as/and/of Literature”, p. 6. 
Arthur Danto, “Philosophy as/and/of Literature”, p. 8.
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Danto. So although the examples of Danto and Lang are important as examples of how the 
permutations of deconstruction channel philosophical consciousness of form, their perception 
of their own relation to language as philosophers is very different from Derrida’s. It is m tliis 
more involved relationship between philosophical form and the ‘literary” that the extreme 
proximity of Adorno and Denida begms to appear. The matiix out of which their proximity 
emerges is theh closeness to Heidegger. Heidegger and Derrida are so shmlar in then 
difference fr om Adomo, that treating aspects of theh positions as indistinguishable will seive 
to simplify the discussion of Adorno. The following analysis of Heidegger and Deirida wih 
concentrate on defining theh basic assumptions and the way these assumptions cany a 
rhythm thiough theh arguments. This rhythm is understood as having ramifications for the 
way they can think of philosophical form and its relation to the hteraiy or poetic in particular, 
and the arts in general. This, in turn, is inseparable fr om the question of their readability, i.e., 
whether it is ultimately possible to “make sense” of them.
Heidegger and Derrida
Heidegger is interested in how it is possible for meaning to take place at all. As 
George Steiner puts it in his discussion of Heidegger, the job of the philosopher is first and 
foremost “to be incessantly astonished at and focused on the fact that things Before
his “turn”, Dasein, the ontological condition of ‘being’ in the world,’ is the context for 
Heidegger’s thinking about the possibihty of thinking how things are. The problem, 
Heidegger argues, is that the basis for proper comprehension of what things are, and what it 
might mean to experience things as they reahy are, is not immediately available to 
consciousness. Rather, experience of the world is always obscmed by estabhshed modes of
26 Georg Steiner, Heidegger, (London: Penguin Modern Masters, 1978), p. 27.
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representing the world, which are actually a ‘forgetting of Being.’ Estabhshed modes of
representation represent the world according to our needs and desires, and therefore do not
represent things as they are, or our relation to them. Once this idea is estabhshed, the task for
Heidegger’s thinking becomes one of transcending technologicaUy modeUed thinkhig. Tins
might seem relatively straight-foiward, until we grasp the scope of the ‘forgetting of Being.’
For Heidegger, this extends far beyond any traditional definitions of instmmental thinking, to
include the whole tradition of Western philosophy and science.
After the “turn”, there is a degiee of consensus that language comes to be understood
by Heidegger as the condition of meaning, i.e., there is no meaning “outside” language
because there is no outside language. Language, in other words, takes on a transcendental
status. Heidegger is obviously close to Denida, and theh closeness on this issue has been
described as foUows:
Denida typicaUy focuses on language as the practice that reveals the most 
about how we are. Heidegger, instead starts with simple (usually rural) 
activity such as a craftsman working on something in his shop. But this 
difference ought not to come to much since Denida says that the deep aspect 
of language - writing - structures any meaningfiil activity and Heidegger 
thinks of language as particularly revealing practice.
Usmg Heidegger’s terminology for the moment, if language is the condition of being, 
it must also be the condition of philosophy. It is the basis of philosophy as language that is 
the premise of Heidegger’s ideas about the relation between art and philosophy. Not 
suiprisingly, of all the arts, Heidegger is most interested in poetry. Smce language is the 
condition of being, the differences between philosophy and poetry are potentially subsumed 
within this overarching unity. Indeed, fiom this perspective, the idea that it might be possible 
to distinguish between aesthetics and art in Heidegger is often to miss the point, both in terms 
of what Heidegger says, and the ways he says it. One of the central problems for Heidegger,
C. Spinosa, ‘Derrida and Heidegger: Iterafaility and Ereignisf in Dreyfiis and Hall (eds.), Heidegger: A 
Critical Reader, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)
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therefore, is how present his thoughts as both poetry and philosophy simultaneously. This is 
the most obvious place where the problem of form is raised in Heidegger’s “philosophy.” 
One of the biggest problems for the reader of Heidegger is how to deal with this necessai-y 
inseparabihty. The difficulty is to do so without either making an extraction which completely 
undermines Heidegger’s most basic conviction, or rephcating Heidegger’s opacity.
The configuration of the inseparabihty of philosophy and poetry peimeates
Heidegger’s ideas about ait which, not suiprisingly, concentrate on poetry. The sum of
poetry and philosophy together is more than either in isolation. Thus, poetiy/philosophy is
potentially the most advanced means of representing the world. At the same time, because
the world is language, as language poetiy/pliilosophy cannot get out of itself to peiibim the
act of revelation. Phüosophy/poetiy is always an act of concealment before it is a revelation.
Timothy Clark explains this dynamic as follows:
Language,...thus participates in a stmctuie of disclosure or appearing that 
may never itself become an object. It is precisely in the disclosure of 
objectivity that the appealing is erased in what becomes apparent. As a mode 
of presencing, language can never be a simple object of representation. It is a 
transcendental horizon. Thus we remain, Heidegger wiites in ‘The Way of 
Language’ ‘committed to and within the being of language, and can never 
look at it fiom somewhere else.^^
Two things need to be noted here. Fhst, there is the transcendental status of 
“language”. For, Heidegger (and Derrida), this makes the possibihty of representation o f any 
kind a potential impossibhity. The second thing to note is how completely consistent 
Heidegger is being in arriving at this impasse. He starts with an ontology: to be is to be in 
language; philosophy and poetry are language; philosophical thought and poetic thought are, 
as language, the same. This is to say that, up to a point, Heidegger is an extremely rational 
thinker, and up to a point, he is thoroughly systematic. This obvious systematicity has
Timothy Clark, Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot: Sources o f Derrida's notion and practice o f literature, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 34.
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generated an industry of systematic Heidegger exposition. This critical attitude considers that
to understand Heidegger, he needs to he thought through. Thus, for example,
Heidegger’s philosophy is in ah respects speculative in the grand manner and 
books purporting to unravel an aspect or aspects of this speculation have been 
and are being produced at a fairly continuous rate. As far as I know, however, 
there is no book length study of Heidegger’s development of poetic language.
The reason for this lack may be based on a view held by Joseph Kockehnans, 
editor of a recent volume entitled Heidegger on Language. Kockehnans is 
explaining the general purpose and scope of the book:
Ah of the papers combined do not give an adequate idea of Heidegger’s 
conception of language, for it is not possible at this point in time to do 
so. Heidegger’s view is stih in the process of development, and many of 
his pubhcations on the subject are not yet avahable. hi view of this 
situation, it seems that this book points many basic problems for which 
Heidegger has tried to find acceptable solution.
Now, if a systematic study of Heidegger and language was and is lacking 
because of incomplete experience with Heidegger’s piinciples on that topic, 
then a work on Heidegger and poetic language could hardly be expected.^^
The author of this passage is clearing the ground for his own systematic study on
Heidegger’s “development of poetic language” and having questioned Kockelman’s hesitancy
on grounds of incomplete assimhation of Heidegger, he goes on to say
perhaps Kockelman’s reservations compel shence on the part of prospective 
commentators, at least until one sufficiently gifted can shed hght where all 
previous students, in mind if not in piint, have discerned only shadows. But it 
does not seem to me that Heidegger’s teachhig on poetic language in 
particular is so oracular that it necessarily confounds aU attempts at 
reconstmction and evaluation. And even if that teaching is generally 
impervious to more prosaic commentaiy, attempts at such commentary must 
be initiated at some time.^^
To be facetious, the response to the last sentence is “why”? The complete systematic 
exposition of Heidegger’s attitude to poetry is systematically demonstrated by Heidegger to 
be an impossibihty. Heidegger develops an integrated speculative fi’amework to demonstrate 
that language, poetry, and reason are definitively inseparable. This effectively prohibits the 
representation of one by the other. To re-present is to present again, and this is precisely
D. White, Heidegger and the Language o f  Poetry, (Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, 1978), p. x.
D. White, Heidegger and the Language o f Poetry, p. xi.
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what the ubiquity of language prohibits; it can never step outside itself. The transcendent 
critique of Heidegger, based on the assumption of a significant difference between the 
language of the critic and Heidegger’s language, is, as a critical disposition towards 
Heidegger, absolutely antithetical to all of Heidegger. As Steiner puts it: “To try to analyse 
Heideggerian “ontology,” the study and theory of the nature of existence, is to speak, or to 
speak of, nonsense - non-sense hr the most drastic connotations of the teim.”^^  hi a trivial 
sense, what this implies is that it is vexy difficult, if not impossible, to do critical justice to 
Heidegger. It raises all the familiar questions about the relation between critic and text that 
have been raised by deconstmction. More important, the behef in the possibihty of a 
complete speculative impacking of Heidegger, expressed by statements like “commentaiy 
must begin sometime”, or that what prohibits understanding is the as yet “incomplete 
assimilation of Heidegger”, is oddly comphcit with Heidegger’s own way of thinking. As 
Adomo says of Heidegger, “One of the invarients of his philosophy (though never caUed 
invarients, of course) is that each substantive deficiency, each absence of cognition, wUl be 
revalued into a sign of profiuidity.”^^  Thus, to think it is possible to wiite about Heidegger, to 
re-present his theories, imphcitly rejects Heidegger’s ontology. At the same time, the attempt 
to do so remains absolutely comphcit with the mge in Heidegger’s thought, which is always 
promismg that the next thought will reveal “Being”.
This is not to say that the speculative unpacking of Heidegger is itself worthless, far 
from it. The process is important and revealing. Where it becomes spurious is where the 
aspiration for critical insight looses sight of itself as the temporary deferral of infinite defen al 
One cannot be completely clear about Heidegger because he Mmself could not be clear'. This 
is not because the tme Heidegger has not yet been properly expoimded, or that Heidegger is
Georg Steiner, Heidegger, p. 4.
Negative Dialectics, p. 76.
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so profoimd that he cannot be paraphrased. Rather, Heidegger himself could not say what he
thought he wanted to say.
If the speculative “reconstruction” of Heidegger represents a distinctive approach to
reading him, another approach concentrates on affirming the impasse his speculative thought
generates. This reading of Heidegger is more interested in his extremely, suggestive attempts
to configure the possibihty that language might become more than language. It is here that
Heidegger’s relevance for Denida becomes clearer. Indeed, it tends to be the hteraiy critical
tendencies of deconstruction which is most attuned to this aspect of Heidegger’s work.
Timothy Clark’s book Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot exemplifies and explains this
relationship. The first chapter discusses Heidegger’s extremely ambiguous term Dichtung as
the context through which to consider Heidegger’s attempts to get beyond language. A
fimction of the ambiguity o f Dichtung is that Clark’s discussion returns to it again and again,
accumulatmg different moments of its definition, while never being definitive, hi the most
general sense Dichtung appears as, “ a mode in which ‘tmth’ happens”. M u c h  later he
suggests Dichtung is ^^mimesis as the appearance of being...though it is not exphcitly named
as such.” '^* Along with these suggestions of what Dichtung might achieve, Clark gives a
definition of what it cannot be:
(1) it would have to be something other than an object in the sense of an 
object of consciousness and hence (2) neither addresses itself to a subject in 
the Post-Cartesian sense nor (3) rise fiom the action of any subject. Needless 
to say, these are heavy demands.
Clark later mtroduces Demda’s neologism littérature which, like Dichtung, seems to 
imply some form of radical language hi language, but is equally undeJSnable. The paradox of 
simultaneous appearance and withdrawal of meaning m language is central to Heidegger’s
Timothy Clark, Derrida. Heidegger, Blanchot, p, 24. 
Timothy Clark, Derrida. Heidegger. Blanchot, p. 112. 
Timothy Clark, Derrida. Heidegger, Blanchot, p. 24.
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and Denida’s ideas of the possibihty of meaning. Attempts to write what this means generate 
repeating motifs in Heidegger’s, Demda’s and Clark’s language, which variously represent 
the simultaneous opening and closing of meaning as doubling, a fo ld  in language,^^ the 
difference between the “B” of “Being” and the “b” of “being”, and Heidegger’s famous 
assertion that language is the “House of Being”.^  ^ All these attempts to explain the 
simultaneous appearance and disappearance of meaning contain the imphcation that 
somehow language has to become something almost materiaUy different fiom itself. This is 
not meant to diagnose some blanket rhetorical tendency hi Heidegger and Denida. Rather, it 
is to signal that in ah their considerations of representation, they anive at the issue fiom the 
presupposition that it is an impossibihty. This impossibility derives fiom the fact that for 
them, there is only one medium of representation: language. How can language represent 
itself? This strainhig towards the physicahty of language can be constmed as the real physical 
sense of the difference between “B” and “b”, but it can also be construed as applying to the 
foim of language.
To give some indication of where this claim is going to lead, we need to recah the 
discussion of the mutuaUy dependent relation between Hegel’s premises, and theh exphcit 
articulation in the fiom of his philosophy. For Hegel, there was an absolutely adequate 
coiTespondence between reason qua reflection, and the sjieculative unity of his philosophy 
and the rational world. For Heidegger, the form of reflection as “a method of thought which 
has to do with something given” is exphcitly rejected. Indeed, it is precisely oui 
preoccupation with particular disclosures of tmth which obscures us fiom a deeper 
relatedness to the world. From a Hegehan perspective this pre-empts philosophy fiom taking 
on its distinctive form Heidegger’s brief conclusion to his reading of Hegel’s
Derrida quoted in Timothy Clark, Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot, p. 33.
Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” in trans. and (ed.) Krell, Heidegger: Basic Writings, (London: 
Routledge & Keegan and Paul, 1978), p.239.
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Phenomenology o f Spirit is most revealing in his rejection of this aspect of Hegel. Heidegger
only deals with only the first two sections of Hegel’s work, reading it so closely as to be
virtually reading out the original. As the translators of Heidegger’s commentaiy say, “This
reading reveals the phenomenology of spirit as a thinking which gathers itself up in a giadual,
always self-assured manner. The emergent unfolding of this gathering of “the phenomenology
of sphit” marks the simphcity of Heidegger’s read ing .D esp i te  Heidegger’s apparent
neutrahty, or rather, complete submission to the terms and language of Hegel’s argument, his
brief conclusion reveals specific, and anti-Hegelian mtentions:
I close by breaking off and foregoing artificial summary. Eveiything should 
remain open. You are not supposed to snatch up a fixed opinion about this 
work, or even a point of view for judging it. On the contraiy, you are 
supposed to leam to understand the task of the confiontation that becomes 
necessaiy here - what it is and what it requhes.^^
That Heidegger stops where he does, and states that “Everything should remain open” gives
away his attitude towards Hegel. For Heidegger, the Phenomenology o f Spirit is a work of
thinking. He breaks off his reading before the work of thinking is demonstrated to be
thoroughly mediated by the conditions of its being thought. That is to say, Heidegger is not
interested in the relation between the particular judgements Hegel makes and the systematic
unity of his thought. Like Lukacs, Heidegger concentrates on Hegel’s failure, asking, “.../j
the absolute reahy actual in the Phenomenology o f SpiritT"'^  ^ It is because it is not that
Heidegger questions the necessity for Hegel’s elaborate attempt to demonstrate the absolute
in the particular. Heidegger asks, is the absolute not always aheady the case? Heidegger
concludes that
the absolute must be actual before the beginning of the work. The legitimacy 
of the beginning cannot be estabhshed by the end, because the end is itself 
only the beginning. Thus the leap into the whole of the absolute is ah that is
Martin Heidegger, Hegel's Phenomenology o f Spirit, trans. P. Emad and K. Maly, (Bloomington: Indiana, 
1988), p. viii.
Martin Heidegger, Hegel's Phenomenology o f Spirit, p. 149.
Martin Heidegger, Hegel's Phenomenology o f Spirit, p. 149.
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left? hi that case, does the problem not become simply the factual issue of 
executing or re-executing the leap?
Certainly. But rightly understood, this issue is itself the question: what 
should man do as an existing being? Where does he stand, that he should or 
should not make the leap and so become something other than man.'^ ^
Hegel’s attempt to think himself out of thought is, for Heidegger, an impossibihty.
There is no before and after to thinking. What must be reflected on in this scenario is what it
might mean to consider the possibihty of doing what Hegel tried to do. The answer might be
simply to “re-execute” Hegel’s leap in conceiving of the possibihty of what Phenomenology
o f Spirit set out to do. This might be a matter of rephcatmg Hegel’s work of thinking
thiough a close re-reading of his work. This, for Heidegger, is the significance of the
Phenomenology o f  Spirit qua a demonstration of thought trying to think against itself
From the Hegehan perspective, making judgements about what is given to
consciousness is the necessary definition of philosophy. It is by making such judgements
about its adequacy in representing the given that philosophy develops a form as the tension
between its premises and its particular judgements about the world. Philosophy can only
think against itself in so far as it experiences contradiction between its particular reflective
judgement about a phenomenon, and discovering that this is not a sufficient representation of
it. Having rejected the reflective judgement about the “given”, on grounds that it only ever
judges appearances, what is left for Heidegger is “abstract speculation” that is, speculation
which constructs its “form” completely on its own terms. Adomo puts Heidegger’s problem
as fohows:
Intentionally or not, every judgement - even an analytical one, as shown by 
Hegel - carries with it the claim to predicate something that is not simply 
identical with the mere concept of the subject. If it ignores this requirement, 
the judgement breaks the contract it has previously signed by its form. But the 
concept of Being as handled by the new ontology cannot help breaking that 
contract. In this ontology. Being must be defined by itself alone because it is 
held to be neither comprehensible in concepts - in other words, neither
41 Martin Heidegger, Hegel's Phenomenology o f  Spirit, p. 149.
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“transmitted” - nor immediately demonstrable after the model of sensory 
ascertainment. In hen of any critical authority of Being we get a reiteration of 
the mere name.'^^
Heidegger’s Being is so abstract that Heidegger is effectively thinking about nothing. 
It is not just Heidegger’s ontology which produces the radical indeterminacy of his thought, 
but Heidegger’s abstract speculation which develops from not thinking about something. 
From a Hegehan perspective, Heidegger’s formless philosophising is thus indeed, first and 
foremost, language, not philosophy. This is the paradox created by framing the abstract 
problem of ti*ying to think out of “being” into “Being”. It is also the paradox that Heidegger 
caimot resolve, not because “Being” is some mysterious condition which we simply do not 
have the power to imagine; but because the way “Being” is framed as a philosophical 
problem prohibits its philosophical resolution. From a different perspective, to think “Bemg,” 
poetry and philosophy have to be thought together, and therefore remam in a formless uirity. 
Philosophy, absolved from its responsibifrty of trying to make reflective judgements, becomes 
indisthrguishable fr om poetry. The ehsion of philosophical and poetic form results is the 
absence of form, both in the sense that they become the same, and because that sameness is 
necessarily detached from the capacity to represent the “giverr”. A formless 
poetry/philosophy rephcates the formless world of the abstract concept of “Being”.
At the begirming of this chapter, the way Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophical premises 
fr amed their attitude to art was discussed. The same mode of critique, apphed to Heidegger, 
has revealed the following. First, that the impossibihty of language representing itself is not 
an absolute problem. Second, tlrat Heidegger’s prognosis for the inseparability of philosophy 
and art is a function of this premise. Moreover, like Hegel, Heidegger is being completely 
consistent in arriving at the various impasses he generates for himself. This is not to say that
Negative Dialectics, p. 71.
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Heidegger does not generate interesting and suggestive insights into philosophy, language, 
and art. Rather, the ambience created by his systematic development of the problem of 
“meaning” as a universal problem develops a situation where representation is always framed 
by its inseparability fr om language, and thereby always predicates its own impossibility. Ait 
and philosophy are the same, before they can be different.
The suggestion that aU aspects of Heidegger’s argument logically generate 
indeteiminacy, and that this derives fr om the claim that language is the condition of bemg. 
needs to be further developed. This can be done with reference to Derrida’s critique of 
HegeL^  ^ Derrida’s metacriticism of Hegel starts from a different perspective than 
Heidegger’s. Its broad trajectory and imphcations, however, are extremely similar to 
Heidegger’s as described above. Again, the aspect of Hegel which Denida most clearly seeks 
to distmguish himself from is what he sees as the production of philosophical meaning in 
Hegel. For both Heidegger and Denida, this aspect of Hegel’s understanding of his 
philosophy is simply the idhng of thought. By invoking Denida here I am not claiming that he 
and Heidegger are the same. Rather, that then common distinctness from Adomo, especially 
in theh attitude to Hegel, resides in theh common distance from the possibility of a distinctly 
philosophical “form” of language.
Derrida on Hegel
Even the title Denida uses, “From Restricted to General Economy A Hegehanism 
Without Reserve”, predicts the explosion of the restricted economy of Hegel’s reason into 
the general economy of language. Using Bataille, Derrida begins by emphasising the
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy A Hegelianism Without Reserve” in Writing and 
Difference, trans. Blass, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 250-277.
Philosophical fonn and Literary form 136
inadequacy of critiques of Hegel which do not understand the unity of his system. He quotes
Bataille, for example, saying of Nietzsche, that he “knew of Hegel only the usual
vulgarisation.” '^^  Derrida’s critique, which is a reading of Bataille’s reading of Hegel, can be
described as identifying moments m Hegel’s argument which are seen to dramatised by his
use of metaphorical language. For Derrida, this gives Hegel’s, wholly rational argument, a
claim to connect with the world. Thus, for example, in the Master/Slave dialectic in the
Phenomenology, Deirida can be read as arguing that the words “life” and “death”, and what
they signify in biological teims, are usmped by Hegel’s reason to become integrated into the
rational economy of his system:
Hegel had clearly proclaimed the necessity of the master’s retaming the life 
that he exposes to risk. Without this economy of life, the “trial by death, 
however, cancels both the tmth which was to result from it, and therefore the 
certainty of self altogether” (Hegel, p.233). To msh headlong hito death pure 
and simple is thus to risk the absolute loss of meaning, in the extent to which 
meaning necessarily traverses the tmth of the master and of self 
consciousness.
Denida is saying that although Hegel says the “master” must “msh headlong into 
death”, he is actually allowing no such thing. Withhi the rational stmctui e of Hegel’s system, 
this death cannot take place: “Through mse of life, that is, of reason, life has thus stayed 
ahve. Another concept of life has been smTeptitiously put in its place, to remain there, never 
to be exceeded, any more than reason is ever exceeded.”'^*’ For consciousness to die would be 
to loose the recognition it aspired to hi risking death. Now, this criticism is immediately 
preceded by Denida writing: “Burst of laughter from Bataille. Through mse of hfe,...etc.” hi 
other words, Denida is asking us to imagine Bataille laughing at Hegel, hi this sense, it is not 
always clear whether Derrida is responding to Hegel or to Bataille. Given the ideas discussed 
earher, those of “doubling” or the “fold in language” and the idea of representation as re-
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” p. 252. 
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” p. 255. 
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” p. 255.
Philosopliical form and Literary form 137
representation, this should not be a smprise. The way Derrida presents his argument is
constantly to emphasise the seamless folding of his, Bataille’s, and HegePs writing.
So, against the rational containment of Hegel’s argument, Derrida juxtaposes
Bataille’s ‘laughter”. Bataille is laughing at Hegel’s incapacity to allow the master to die, to
embrace absolute negativity. Thus,
What is laughable is the submission to the self-evidence of meaning, to the 
force of this imperative: that there must be meaning, that nothing must be 
definitely lost in death, or further, that death should receive the signification of 
“abstract negativity,” that a work must always be possible which, because it 
defers enjoyment, confers meaning, seriousness, and tmth on the “putting at 
stake.
Moreover, Deirida makes a cmcial admission - and this laughter'is the only response 
to the unity of Hegel’s system because “Laughter alone exceeds dialectics and dialectician: it 
bursts out only on the basis of an absolute renunciation of meaning, an absolute risking of 
death, what Hegel calls abstract negativity.
So, what Deirida has done is to acknowledge the absolute consistency of Hegel’s 
system. He has looked at a section of Hegel’s argument, and being critical, refuses to read 
the master/slave dialectic on Hegel’s terms. Derrida argues that although explicitly engaged 
by Hegel, “life” and more specifically, “death”, are assimilated and contained within the 
progress of reason. Hegel’s system simply cannot asshmlate what is meant by “death”, and 
only names it as “abstract negativity”. “Death” can only appear outside the system and 
emerges as Bataille’s laughter at Hegel’s total ""submission to the self-evidence of meaning.” 
Consider what Deirida says about Hegel in the hght of Rodolphe Gasché’s definition 
of deconstmction:
Deconstmction must be understood, we contend, as the attempt to “account,” 
in a certain manner, for a heterogeneous variety or manifold of nonlogical 
contradictions and discursive inequafities of aU sorts that continues to haunt 
and fissure even the successful development of philosophical arguments and
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy” p. 256-57. 
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their systematic exposition. What is this nonhomogeneous manifold for which 
we claim that deconstruction provides, in a certain manner, a unifying 
principle, orighi, or ground? These dissimilarities are to be located, first, in 
concept-foimation; second, on the level of strategies of philosophical 
argumentation; and third, on the level of textual arrangement and disposition 
of the different parts of a philosophical work.
...inconsistencies...which, once agam, do not in the philosopher’s eye, 
put the unity, coherence, wholeness of the philosophical discourse into 
question. Yet these discrepancies are there. In comp heated active and passive 
manner they contribute to what is perceived as the philosophical discoiuse’s 
accomphshed sense unity. Hence, these discrepancies, as well as all the others 
mentioned, need to be accounted for.'^ ^
On the basis of this definition, Derrida is not deconstructhig Hegel. Indeed, he is 
admitting that because Hegel is so completely consistent with himself at eveiy level, he 
prohibits the noimal procedures of deconstmction. The sine qua non of deconstmction is 
that in any philosophical argument “dissimilarities are to be located, fiist, in concept- 
foimation; second, on the level of strategies of philosophical argumentation; and third, on the 
level of textual aiiangement and disposition of the different parts of a philosophical work.” In 
Hegel, and especially in the way Denida represents Hegel, this is just not the case. To laugh 
at the master/slave dialectic is to laugh at the whole of Hegel. This is why Bataille’s laughter 
is the only possible criticism of Hegel, and, to reiterate, this is not deconstmcting Hegel. The 
device of deconstmction is to demonstrate that a philosopher cannot achieve what he/she 
claims to be doing because of internal discrepancies and inconsistencies, hi Hegel, there are 
none.
From bemg unable to undermine Hegel fiom within, Derrida develops a cmcial series 
of claims about the incapacity of philosophy as a whole. These need to be broken down and 
considered in turn. The point fiom which I will start is Derrida writing, “The blind spot of 
Hegehanism, around which can be organised the representation of meaning . . .Th i s  is
Rodolphe Gasché, “Infrastructures and Systematicity” in John Sallis, (ed.), Decomtrvction and 
Philosophy: The Texts o f  Jaques Derrida, (Cliicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 4-5.
50 Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy”, p. 259.
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saying that the only way the “representation of meaning” can take place in Hegel is because
of his “bhnd spot.” The blind spot, on whose condition the representation of meaning in
Hegel can take place, “is the point at which destruction, suppression, death and sacrifice
constitute so iiTeversible expenditure, so radical a negativity - here we would have to say an
expenditure and negativity without reserve - that they can no longer be contained as
negativity in a process or a system” hi other words, the moment of meaning of Hegel is the
moment of his failure to allow that negativity which would bring down Ms system.
Denida then makes a more general claim: “hi discourse (the unity of process and
system), negativity is always the underside and accomphce of positivity. Negativity cannot be
spoken oJ^  nor has it ever been except in tMs fabric of meaning.” In other words, the
negativity to wMch philosophy can give expression is never said directly, but is in “discourse”
as “the unity of process and system”. Deirida continues: “Now the sovereign operation, the
point o f nonreserve, is neither positive nor negative. It cannot be inscribed in discourse.
except by crossing out predicates or by practising a contradictoiy supeiimposition that then
exceeds the logic of philosophy”, i.e. Bataille’s laughter.
Now, if we remember Derrida’s critique of Saussure, we wiU recall that the basis for
the distinction of “speech” and “wiiting” was that, for example.
Writing is HnaugiiraV in so far as it emancipates meaning fiom the 
contingencies of the immediate context and dhects it towards a horizon of 
unforeseen possibihties... Writing, since it is constituted by the suspension of 
immediate reference, is fieed fiom instrumental notions of language...Literaiy 
thought is the thought that is oddly constitutive of nothing.
hi Hegel, none of these claims for writing hold. Bataille and Derrida can point out 
that “death” does not mean “death” in Hegel, but while tMs aspect of Hegel’s language may 
point to “unforeseen possibilities”, it is otherwise so completely integrated into Ms system by
Timothy Clark, Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot”, p. 110.
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other “arch-syntheses and infrastructures” (to use Gasché’s teiminology), that Hegel remains 
thoroughly intact and untroubled by this fragmentary deconstruction.
What Deirida appears to have found in Hegel, then, is wiiting which contradicts 
Deirida’s own definition of its instability, and therefore its meaning. “For meaning, when lost 
to discourse, is absolutely destroyed and consumed. hi other words, it is precisely because 
Hegel’s discourse (the unity of process and system) is so perfect, that it becomes “neutral”. 
Now, this is where we start laughing at Derrida, because what prevents him fiom allowing 
Hegel’s discourse to be thus “neutral” is the ubiquity of language. If as “discourse” Hegel is 
“neutral”, then, as always aheady wiiting, it cannot be. Here Deirida makes an exphcit and 
foundational claim: “There is only one discouise, it is significative, and here one cannot get 
around Hegel. The poetic or the ecstatic is that in every discourse which can open itself up to 
the absolute loss of its sense, to the (non)base of the sacred, of nonmeaning, of un­
knowledge or of play, to the swoon from which it is reawakened by the throw of the dice.” 
So, given that the logic of his position prohibits him fr om allowing the neutrahty of Hegel’s 
argument, Denida must find “the poetic” hi Hegel. He takes a definition of poetry fr om 
Bataihe who says of poetiy that “Tt is unfortunate to possess no more than luins, but this is 
not any longer to posses nothing; it is to keep in one hand what the other gives.’ An 
operation that is stih Hegehan. What makes Hegel poetic for Deirida is that his philosophy 
consists in “stih attributing a meaning, within discourse, to the absence of meaning.
Now, the problem with this argument is that it does not definitively remove Hegel’s 
argument fr om the above definition of its “neutrahty”. The reason why this is so is because to 
distinguish the “jioetic” from “discoiu'se” is, for Derrida, a matter of reading. Fhst, Derrida 
reads Hegel as discourse, generating that discourse as “neutral”, the freezing out of meaning.
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy”, p. 261.
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy”, p. 262.
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Then he re-reads his own argument and says that discourse is “poetic” because, like poetiy,
“discourse” “attributes meaning to the absence of meaning”.
Consider that one of the great criticisms of Hegel’s Aesthetics is that it assimilated ait
to philosophy: art is spirit’s knowledge of itself in sensuous form. Thus, the “imagination”
which, for Hegel, is the medium of poetiy, is dialectical and so ultimately “translatable” into
reason. In the Introduction to Aesthetics Hegel acknowledges that this order of claim appears
unacceptable, if not impossible: “In the face of [ait’s] immeasurable fiiUness of fancy and its
free products, it looks as if thought must loose courage to bring them completely before
itseffi to criticise them, and anange them under its universal foimulae.”^^  But this is what
Hegel sets out to do, and within the terms of his system, does do. As Shapho puts it.
By insisting on the dialectical nature of poetic meaning Hegel makes a 
cognitive defence of poetry which allies it with philosophy. Tlie analogy 
between the two is not in theh shared deviation fr om tautology or emphical 
verifiabihty, as the positivists suggested, but theh possession of a common 
object and mode of thought, each of which is highly articulated.
Equally important to remember, poetry (and art in general) fads, on Hegel’s terms.
not because of some esoteric content, but because of the undialectical representation of spirit
imdialecticaUy experienced. Poetry thus has to be read dialectically to reveal its tmth. This
means reading poetiy against its exphcit meaning, and reading it in the hght of the piinciple
of sufficient reason.
Now, it seems to me that Denida is peifoiming on Hegel something like the reverse 
of what Hegel is accused of doing to poetiy. Deirida bihigs to his reading of Hegel the 
presupposition that Hegel’s argument is “wiiting”. Using “Bataihe’s laughter”, Derrida 
appears to claim that Hegel can only be criticised fr om without, by laughing at the integiity of
G.W.F. BagQ\, Aesthetics, p. 5.
Gary Shapiro, “Hegel on Implicit and Dialectical Meanings of Poetry”, in Steinkraus and Schmitz, (eds) 
Art and Philosophy in Hegel’s Philosophy, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), p.47.
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the system. Now thus far, what Demda argues is convincmg, but to invert what Shapiro said 
about Hegel
By insisting on the “written” nature of philosophical meaning Derrida makes a 
defence of the indeterrninacy of philosophy, which allies it to poetry. The 
analogy between the two is not in their shared deviation from tautology or 
empirical verifiability, as the positivists suggested, but their disposession of a 
common object and mode of thought, each of which is unaiticulated.
The point is that just as there is a logic of determinacy to HegeTs thought, there is a
logic of indeteiminacy to Derrida’s. Just as Hegel wUl always diagnose deteiininate meaning
from poetry, because it is always made accoimtable to reason, so Deiiida wUl always
diagnose indeterminate meaning fr om philosophy because it is always made accoimtable to
'"writing”. As Shapiro remarks, “To the extent that Hegel is committed to the logic of
deteiTuinateness, he sees the metaphorical character of poetry as a necessary defect and the
philosophical appeal to possibility as a failme to achieve wisdom which shiouds itself in
mys t er y .Aga in ,  this can be exactly “inverted” to produce Denida’s favouring of
indetenninateness, the metaphorical character of poetiy against the reflective judgement of
philosophy, and the literaiy appeal to impossibility which shrouds itself in mysteiy as the
antidote to philosophical claims to tmth.
To return the earlier preliminary discussion of Adorno’s critique of Heidegger,
Denida’s argument does not attack the speculative (or what he calls discursive) unity of
Hegel’s system; this remains intact in Denida’s critique. What Derrida does is to sever that
speculative unity from its claim to represent the world. For Derrida, meaning is a frmction of
the relation between “writing” and the infinite possible readings, so he does not consider the
necessaiy unity of reflection and speculation in the production of HegeTs thought. In
Denida, “speech” claims immediate truth because of the inextricability of production and
Gary Shapiro, “Hegel on Implicit and Dialectical Meanings of Poetry”, pp. 52-53.
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reception guarantees immediate reference. In writmg, that unity is severed. Reception
determines reference, and any sense in which production might impinge on meaning becomes
irr elevant. Indeed, “writing” is that severance of meaning from production.
The implications of this fundamental difference between Hegel and Denida become
clearer when the latter tries to formulate what is to be done after the critique of Hegel. We
wiU recall that Derrida had characterised the poetic in Hegel as “still attributing a meanhig,
within discourse, to the absence of meanhrg.”^^ . Denida now calls this “minor play”^^ . Hegel
is “playing” in the sense that he is “attributhrg meanhrg to the absence of meaning”, but this is
only “minor play” because, in order to be seen as such, we need “Bataille’s Lauglrter”. The
problem, as Denida frames it, is to achieve “major play”, which is to hold Bataille’s laughter
and Hegel’s discourse together, without subsuming one within the other. On what terms
then, might “major play” be achieved? Here Denida makes the claim that the philosophical
side of “minor play” is a function of the philosophical “desire for meaning” expressmg itself
as the production, i.e. work, of philosophical argument:
a proposition with which the history of philosophy is confused; a proposition 
that determines work as the meaning of meaning, and techne as the unfolding 
of truth; a proposition powerfully reassembled hr the Hegelian moment, and a 
proposition that Bataille, in the wake of Nietzsche, wanted to bring to the 
point of enunciation, and whose denunciation he wished to wrest from the 
non-basis of inconceivable nonsense, finally placing it within major play.” °^
Here we come to a crrrcial pohrt in Derrida’s argument, where he characterises philosophical
discourse as labom*, which is the opposite of play. The only way philosophy can get beyond
its Ihnitations is to become play, which is the opposite of philosophical discoiuse.
The necessity of logical continuity is the decision or interpretative meheu of 
all Hegehan interpretations. In interpreting negativity as labour, hr betting for 
discourse, meaning, history, etc., Hegel has bet against play, against chance.
He has blinded himself to the possibility of his own bet, on the fact that the 
conscious suspension of play (for example, the passage through the certitude
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy”, p. 262.
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy”, p. 262.
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy”, p. 262.
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of oneself and through lordship as the independence of self-consciousness) 
was itself a phase of play; and the fact of that play includes the work of 
meaning or the meaning of work, and includes them not in terms of 
knowledge^ but in terms of inscription-, meaning is a function of play, is 
inscribed in a certain place in the configuration of a meaning less play/^
What is beginning to emerge out of Denida’s confrontation with Hegel are a series of
oppositions which, if he is to engage “major play,” come to configure Derrida’s position
around some intractable problems. Derrida has to become involved in the production of that
“something” which is aheady predetermined as “writing”, whose meanings are not, on
Derrida’s terms produced, but generated out of the fluidity of its reception, Shapir o notes
that this is not a new criticism of Hegel. “Much of Kierkegaard’s attack on Hegel, repeated
with variations by Sartre and Heidegger, is based on the claim that Hegel supposes an
impossibly determinate relationship, amoimting to identity, between himself and his
readers.”*’^  Derrida repeats this criticism within the paradigmatic opposition between
“speech” and “writing,” and can only criticise HegeTs “neutral” discourse fiom the play
going on outside. There is no play in HegeTs system, but for the “still attributing a meaning,
within discoiu se, to the absence of meaning”,w h ic h  is only revealed, as such, by Bataille’s
laughter. Philosophical discourse is the opposite of play, which is the opposite of labour.
Again, we need to emphasise how logical all this is, and the logic is always pointing towards
indeteiminacy - even the original distinction between Bataille’s Laughter and HegeTs system
only takes place as written - but this just serves to emphasise Derrida’s point.
Denida is practising a mode of argument which, like HegeTs is very difficult to
criticise on Its own terms. The logic, of Derrida’s own argument moves him inexorably
towards silence or play. The fluidity on which the possibihty of meaning depends is not in the
power of the producer of the text to generate; it is a frmction of its various receptions. Thus,
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy”, p. 260.
^  Gary Shapiro, “Hegel on Implicit and Dialectical Meanings of Poetry”, p. 52.
^ Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy”, p. 262.
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the next section of his argument begins with a discussion of the word, “silence”. Derrida’s
playfrihiess is an attempt to get to “major play”, but it is also because there is nothing to do
for the writer, who produces, what is to be done is to be done only by the reader. Derrida’s
writing, like the systematic readers of Heidegger is a deferral of deferral. The systematic
readers of Heidegger believe that if they caixy on long and hard enough they will explain him.
Derrida, on his own terms, should stop writing, but he continues, and in the extremely
suggestive arguments he produces, probably approaches “major play”. As Clark indicates,
however, the questions Derrida is peipetually raising, without answering, give his position a
degree of impending collapse:
how can one practice heteronomyl If to welcome the other is to experience 
the non familial, unforeseen, the incalculable, or that in relation to which any 
concept is inadequate, how can thought or language affirm it except in 
negatives? It is not the concept of the other, or the notion of a language that 
coiielates with the other, a contradiction in terms? It is because the 
heteronomy at issue is so completely illusive that the misreadings of Derrida’s 
work as a form of extreme scepticism or even nihilism are so difficult to avoid.
Yet it is not a question of rejection of the logico-systematic forms of 
reasoning per se, whether in favour of a supposed relativism or paralysing 
epistemological aporias. It is rather a matter of reading writing according to a 
new elusive, heteronomic forms of "coherence’, as binding in their way as the 
more familiar constraints of logic.
As Clark suggests here, and as Gasché has argued elsewhere, the problem for Derrida the
writer of “major play,” is about ^^heteronomic forms of "coherence”’, that is, forms of
coherence which hold language together in a way that is not completely philosophical. As has
aheady been indicated, this is very close to Adorno’s attitude to the significance of
philosophical form What should also be clear, however, is that the way Adorno arrives at the
significance of an anti-systematic philosophical form is fiom a wholly different perspective.
Put simply, Adorno has a far more developed idea of the playful moment in philosophy than
Denida allows in his rejection of philosophy. This in turn is inseparable from Adorno’s
Timothy Clark, Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot, p. 17.
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emphasis on the necessity of the philosophical judgement of the “given.” With this in mind we 
can begin to construct Adorno’s attitude to philosophical form, through his critique of 
Heidegger.
Adorno on Heidegger
Adorno’s critique of Heidegger, which foims the &st part of Negative Dialectics, 
deals with the question of the relation of language and philosophy. Adorno sometimes refers 
to Heidegger by name, sometimes referring to his school of thought as the “new ontology”. 
Importantly, Adorno describes Negative Dialectics as “retrospective,”^^  which is to say it is a 
summaiy of his difference from Heidegger, rather than a working out of his own position.
The terms Adorno describes as orientating his critique of Heidegger are that “rather 
than judged fr om above, this ontology is understood and immanently criticised out of the 
need for it...”^  Adorno shares Heidegger’s conviction that the way we noimally experience 
the world is governed by interests and desires which actually obscure it from us. What 
Adorno is so critical ofr however, is the way Heidegger sets about countering this false 
consciousness. By saying that he will use “immanent criticism” Adorno asserts that he wiH 
look at Heidegger’s thought on its own terms. He will explain what it is about Heidegger’s 
thought which prohibits itself from doing what it sets out to do, which is to understand what 
it might mean to get beyond the appearance of things. Throughout, Adorno frames 
Heidegger’s position hr relation to Hegel, and what emerges is that Adorno represents
Negative Dialectics, p. xix.
Negative Dialectics, p. xx.
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himself as virtually identical to Heidegger in some of then responses to Hegel, and
completely different from others.
Expressing sentiments which almost exactly parallel Derrida’s criticisms of Hegel,
Adorno emphasises his interest in those aspects of experience which Hegel neglected.
The matters of true philosophical interest at this point in history are those 
which Hegel, agreeing with tradition, expressed his disinterest. They are 
nonconceptuality, individuality, and particularity - things which ever since 
Plato used to be dismissed as transitory and insignificant, which Hegel labelled 
“lazy Existenz.” Philosophy’s theme would consist of qualities it down grades 
as contingent, as quantité négligeable. A matter of urgency to the concept 
would be what it fails to cover, what its abstract mechanism eliminates, what 
is not aheady a case of the concept.
The question is, how is this tendency countered? Adorno’s charge against Heidegger, 
as has aheady been suggested, is that what he attempts has a pmely methodological basis. 
What does this mean? Heidegger starts with an ontology and extrapolates logical implications 
of his definition of being for every scenario he touches, including the problem of 
representation. This process diagnoses deficiencies in our mode of ex^rerience at every tiun, 
but, at the same time, each “cognitive deficiency” is a simple echo of “sometliing missing 
which is not to be produced” and so “they are its complimentary i d eo l o g y . h r  other words, 
Heidegger excludes something firom his programme which not only prohibits success, but 
generates indeter-minacy: “The true philosophical task, according to Heidegger, would be to 
conceive Being, yet Being resists any cognitive definition. This makes the appeal to conceive 
it a hollow one.”*^  ^What then, does Heidegger do wrong, or miss out?
Agreeing with Heidegger, Adorno admits that philosophy has no direct access to 
what Hegel calls “lazy Existenz”. Indeed, this is not just an admission on Adorno’s part, it is 
constantly being hammered away through the principle of nonidentity. At the same time, 
Adorno remarks,
Negative Dialectics, p. 8.
Negative Dialectics, p. 98.
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Yet the appearance of identity is inherent in thought itself, in its pure form To 
think is to identify. Conceptual order is content to screen what thinking seeks 
to comprehend. The semblance and truth of thought entwine. The semblance 
cannot be decreed away, as by avowal of a being-in-itself outside the totality 
of concrete definitions. It is a thesis secretly implied by Kant - and mobilised 
against him by Hegel - that the transconceptual "‘in itself’ is void, being wholly 
indefinite. 5
Here we have the first and most basic difference between Adorno, on the one hand, and
Heidegger and Derrida on the other. Both the latter, as did Kant, identify the
""transconceptual” as a ""void” that, as such, is conceived as some ""realm” of ""Being” or
"létterature”, which might be grasped in its negative totality. With such a conception of the
task of philosophy, writes Adorno ""The suspended character of thought is thus raised to the
veiy hiexpressibihty which the thought seeks express. The non-objective is enhanced mto an
outlined object of its own essence and thereby v i o l a t ed . an d  “the inexpressible becomes
explicit and compact with the word ""Being” . O f  Heidegger, he writes ""he talks as if the
contents we wanted to rescue were thus diiectly in om minds. Although the target here is
Heidegger, precisely the same criticism can be made of Derrida who seems to locate the
possibility of meaning in a mode of meaning that is first and foremost different fiom Hegel’s
""discourse”. That is to say, Derrida configures the possibility of ""major play” pmely in tenus
of doing the opposite of what Hegel wrote at every turn. Against this mystification of the
transconceptual, Adorno contends, "‘in philosophy we literally seek to immerse ourselves in
things that are heterogeneous to it, without placing those things in prefabricated
categories... om aim is total self relinquishment.”^^  Furthermore,
if it were delicately understood, the changed philosophy would be infinite in 
the sense of scorning solidification in a body of innumerable theorems. Its 
substance would lie in the diversity of objects that impinge on it and of the
Negative Dialectics, p. 110. 
Negative Dialectics, p. 110. 
Negative Dialectics, p. 98. 
Negative Dialectics, p. 13.
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object it seeks, a diversity not wrought by any schema; to those objects, 
philosophy would truly give itself,
Now, notwithstanding the difference with Denida just emphasised, we can construe
what Adorno is asking of philosophy as remaining close to Demda’s demands. Adorno
speaks of “total self-relinquishment”, of philosophy “giving itself’, and that “philosophy is
more than bustle only where it runs the risk of total fai lure. . .Derrida quotes Bataille, who
himself may be quoting Nietzsche, as saying, “A fundamental principle is expressed as
follows: " communication’ cannot take place from one full intact being to another: it requires
beings who have put the being within themselves at stake, have placed at the hmit of death,
of nothingness.”^^  The difference comes when we begin to work out what this putting at
stake of philosophy implies for Adorno. As a point of depaitme we can take Adorno’s
assertion that “Necessity compels philosophy to operate with concepts, but this necessity
must not be turned into a virtue of their p r io r i ty . . .For  the moment, the “necessity” for
concepts m philosophy needs to be taken as a simple assertion whose implications will
develop. It is worth keeping in mind that the assertion is immediately followed up by a
moment of equivocation. Adorno distinguishes between two types of substance in concepts
that pertain to them when considered ffom different perspectives:
The substance of concepts is to them both immanent, as far as mind is 
concerned, and transcendent as far as being is concerned.
To make sense of this we need Heidegger. Heidegger, we will recall, makes a distinction
between different levels of comprehension of our being in the ' world. One level.
comprehension is governed by a mode of untruth wherein we represent the world to
ourselves on the basis of what is readily available and accessible. The other level is the
Negative Dialectics, p. 13.
Negative Dialectics, p. 19.
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy”, p. 263. 
Negative Dialectics, p. 11.
Negative Dialectics, p. 12.
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potentially impenetrable, or at least very difficult to think, idea that things have a “Being” 
beyond the comprehension we can have of them in the other mode. What Adorno says is that 
fiom the perspective of what is immediately available and accessible to us, the substance of 
concepts is immanent, which is to say that substance can be measmed in terms of the 
adequacy of the correspondence between a judgement and its object. From the latter 
perspective, by contrast, the substance of the concept is “transcendent”. Because the concept 
does not fuUy add up to its object, it leaves a remainder. Now, for Heidegger, these different 
modes of consciousness are hierarchically arranged: “being” and “Being”. For Adomo they 
are both necessary and integiated components of doing philosophy. Now, Adomo levels 
against Heidegger, a criticism which virtually replicates an aspect of Hegel’s critique of Kant. 
We will recall that one of the accusations Hegel levels at Kant is taking the logical analysis of 
experience for the emphical truth of experience. Adomo accuses Heidegger of doing the 
same thing to rational reflection. We wiU recall that Heidegger’s problem with rational 
reflection on the world is that it breaks apart that unity of experience which it is the task of 
rational thinking to demonstrate. Adomo says this is a rationally overdetermined 
representation of rational thought. Heidegger’s rejection of rational reflection is, itseff 
irrational.
To think means to think something. By itselfr the logically abstract foim of 
“something,” something that is meant or judged, does not claim to posit a 
being; and yet, surviving in it - indelible fiom thinking that would delete it - is 
that which is not identical with thinking, which is not thinking at all. The ratio 
becomes hiational when it forgets this, where it runs counter to the meaning 
of thought by hypostatyzing its products, the abstractions.^^
To “hypostatize” means to constme a conceptual entity as a real existent. This is what
Heidegger does to the rational judgement. Now Adomo says, once we. have acknowledged
Negative Dialectics, p. 34.
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that reason is itself never fully rational, we can get away fiom the preoccupation with the
philosophical concept as necessitating the demise of philosophy qua reason, pure and simple.
To be aware of this is to be able to get rid of concept fetishism. Philosophical 
reflection makes sure of the nonconceptual in the concept.
Concept fetishism is any attitude to philosophy, positive or negative, which 
understands the concept fiom the perspective of either “mind” or “being”, as the be-all and 
end-all of philosophy. The second sentence, although suggestive, is more opaque. We can 
provisionally identify “philosophical reflection” as that mode of dialectical thinking which 
holds to both ideas of the substance of the concept described above. What does this imply for 
the practice of philosophy?
Here we come to an absolutely fundamental distinction between Adomo and Denida 
and it centres on the question of philosophical form, and where they locate “play”. Adomo 
writes:
The un-naïve thinker knows how far he remains fiom the object of his 
thinking, and yet he must always think of it as if he had it in its entirety. This 
biings him to the point of clowning. He must not deny his clownish traits, 
least of all since they alone can give him hope for what is denied for him. 
Philosophy is the most serious of things, but then again it is not that serious. A 
thing that aims at what it is not a priori and not authorised to control - such a 
thing according to its own concept, is simultaneously part of a sphere beyond 
control, a sphere tabooed by conceptuality. To represent the mimesis it 
supplanted, the concept has no other way than to adopt something mimetic in 
its own conduct, without abandoning itself
This appears to be exactly what Denida defined, in his words, as “attributing meaning to the
absence of meaning”, as equating philosophy with poetry, and as “minor play”. Is not Adomo
not therefore vulnerable to the criticism Derrida made of Hegel? For Derrida, what Adomo
describes is the poetic moment in philosophy, and we will recall that he asserts “The poetic is
that which in every discourse which can open itself up to the absolute loss of its sense, to the
Negative Dialectics, p. 12.
Negative Dialectics, p. 14.
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(non)base of the sacred, of non-meaning, of im-knowledge or of p l a y . . . W h a t  we need to 
hold on to is that what Adomo defines as the “nonconceptual” remainder in an object is 
represented completely differently by Derrida. For Derrida the “site” of the “non- 
plulosophical” is the “poetic” moment in philosophy. Once defined thus, the “non- 
philosophical” cannot be in discourse, qua the unity of reflective and speculative judgement. 
On the contrary, it is only in Hegel’s metaphorical language. Derrida had located “play” as 
something illicit in philosophy, something revealed by laughing at it fi'om the outside, Jfiom 
reading philosophy as poetic. Adomo sees the “nonconceptual” beyond the philosophical, in 
the labour of philosophical production, in the deployment of the philosophical judgement 
itself. Again, this is the non-philosophical moment in philosophy, which is not therefore 
necessarily poetic. This, in tum, in Adomo maintains the link, broken in Derrida, between 
production and play. Derrida argued that in philosophy, “the desire for identity” had become 
identified with philosophical labour. From his perspective, the antidote to the deshe for 
identity is the opposite of philosophical labour, namely play. For Adomo, the playful in 
philosophy is the moment of its production, which is the production of concepts, despite the 
post-Hegehan acknowledgement of then inadequacy. That is to say, Adomo is being, or 
tiying to be Hegel’s system and Bataille’s laughter. For Denida, this is a question of biinging 
together the philosophical and the poetic. For Adomo, it is a question of deploying the 
philosophical judgement in the knowledge that it is inadequate.
This needs to be qualified, and explained. Philosophy is not just about the production 
of concepts. Neither is the production of concepts, in itselfr playful. We will recall that it was 
argued that in Hegel the idea of philosophical foim qua speculative coherence is 
inconceivable without making specific reflective judgements about specific things. Adomo
Jaques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy”, p. 261.
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holds to this inseparability, but emphasizes how important it is for particular judgements to be
what he calls “stringent”. In philosophy.
Its integral, nonconceptually mimetic moment of expression is objectified only 
by presentation in language...To philosophy expression and stringency are not 
to dichotomous possibilities. They need each other. Expression is relieved of 
its accidental character by thought, on which it toils as thought toils on 
expression. Only an expressed thought is succinct, rendered succinct by its 
presentation in language; what is vaguely put is poorly thought. Expression 
compels stringency in what it expresses.
Stiingency is the need for the concept, as understood fiom the perspective of “mind”
described earlier, to strive for the most adequate possible correspondence between judgement
and object. This specifically philosophical demand for such adequacy obviously does not just
imply doing philosophy as opposed to poetry, it means doing philosophy well. Now, in the
context of Adorno’s project, doing philosophy well means not just making judgements about
the adequacy of concepts in relation to their objects, it also means understanding the concept
to be inadequate. This means that philosophical reflection must always be straining at the
leash in the way it expresses itself. This “expression” is not an intentionally generated
disruption of “discur sive” form on the basis of some global judgement that the realm of the
transconceptual can be only grasped by poetic means. “Intentionally or not, every judgement
- even an analytical one, as shown by Hegel - carries with it the claim to predicate something
that is not simply identical with the mere concept of the subject. Thus, the non-conceptual
m the concept is generated out of the stringent demand to posit truth claims and make
judgements that can be evaluated. Here Adomo makes a very significant series of claims:
Only the truth can really be philosophically understood. Our fulfllhng 
concunence in the judgement in which we understand something is the same 
as a decision about tme and false. If we do not personally judge the stringency 
or nonstringency of a theorem, we do not understand it. The theorem’s claim 
of such stringency is its own content of meaning, the very thing that is to be 
understood.
^  Negative Dialectics, p. 18.
^ Negative Dialectics, p. 71.
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This distinguishes the relation of understanding and judgement fiom 
the usual order of time. The fact that we can no more understand without 
judging or judge without understanding invalidates the schema that the 
solution is the judgement and the problem is only the question based on 
understanding. What is transmitted here is the fibre of the so called 
philosophical demonstration, a mode of proof that contrasts with the 
mathematical model. And yet that model does not simply disappear, for the 
stringency of a philosophical thought requires its mode of proceeding to be 
measured by the forms of inference. Philosophical proof is the effort to give 
statements a binding quality by making them commensurable with the means 
of discursive thiiiking. '^^
Now, this is written in Chapter 1 of Negative Dialectics, and in that context Adorno is
dismantling Heidegger, so this can be read as a critique of Heidegger’s congenital inabihty to
claim anything about Being except in negative terms. For Adorno, Heidegger’s idea of
“Being” is very simple, it is just wrong, deriving, as we have seen, fiom a hypostatized
representation of reason. This is why “Bemg” cannot be grasped. At the same time, the above
quotation is a condensed accormt of Adorno’s understanding of the architecture of the
philosophical judgement. In making a philosophical judgement about the adequacy of the
correspondence between concept and object, we are behaving as though this can be trne. It is
here that we make judgements about the stringency of a judgement. Now, we have seen that
the necessity for making stringent judgements derives fiom the claim that the judgement does
not simply stand hi an isolated relation to its object. Rather the stringent expression of the
judgement is associated with philosophical expression. To grasp what this means we need to
note how the second paragraph in the above quotation, suggests another way of judging the
concept, namely its “binding quality” within discursive thought. We have noted that, for
Derrida, discursive thought is completely resistant to the poetic. It must therefore be rejected
and disrupted by poetic play. Adorno’s discussion of the discursive significance of philosophy
takes a superficially similar direction.
Negative Dialectics, p. 64.
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A great deal of Adorno’s critique of Heidegger takes the form of an extended
consideration of the philosophical system, and this indicates the scope of Adorno’s thinking
about discursive thought. Again he is in a paradoxical position, because although he
repeatedly distances himself fiom Hegel, he also repeatedly emphasises the importance of
some sort of systematic thinking. At one point he quotes d’Alembert as differentiating
between / ’esprit de système and I ’esprit systématique, and indirectly defends the latter saying
“...it does not only satisfy the bureaucrats’ deshe to stuff all things into then categories.
He continues, more strongly, “To comprehend a thing itself, not just to fit and register it hi its
system of reference, is nothing but to perceive the individual moment in its immanent
connection with others.” *^’ So while Adomo seems to be allowing and defending the idea of
systematic thmkhig as representing the “immanent connection of all things”, he remains
dubious and goes on, predictably, to criticise Hegel: “No matter how dynamically a system
may be conceived, if it is in fact a closed system, to tolerate nothing outside its domain, it will
become a positive infinity - in other words, finite and static...Bluntly put, closed systems [vis
Hegel’s] aie bound to be f in i shed .So ,  if closed systems are counter-productive, what is
the alternative for systematic thinking? Adomo writes,
consciousness would have to immerse itself in the phenomena on which it 
takes its stand. This would, of course, effect a qualitative change in dialectics. 
Systematic unity would crumble. The phenomenon would not remain a case of 
its concept, as it does to Hegel, despite all pronouncements to the contrary.
The thought would be burdened with more toil and trouble than Hegel defines 
as such, because the thought he discusses always extracts fi’om its objects only 
that which is thought already. Despite the program of self-yielding, the 
Hegelian thought finds satisfaction in itself; it goes rolling along, how ever 
often it may urge the contrary. If the thought really yielded to the object, if its 
attention were on the object, not on its categoi*y, the very objects would start 
talking under the lingering eye.^^
Negative Dialectics, p. 24. 
^ Negative Dialectics, p. 25. 
^ Negative Dialectics, p. 27. 
Negative Dialectics, p. 27.
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It is at moments like this that Negative Dialectics runs into a wall because it simply 
cannot continue to demonstrate what this anti-systematicity might imply since it is a 
necessarily logically abstract form. To go further, he needs to demonstrate what the collapse 
of philosophical systematicity might imply. Aesthetic Theory, whose writing was iutenupted 
to write Negative Dialectics, can be read as an example of what Adomo is abstractly 
indicating.
The basic difference between Adomo’s and Deirida’s anti-systematicity, and then
notion of mimesis implied therein, can be summarised with reference to the following
description of deconstmction:
a certain mimicry and pretension to systematicity is already requhed if 
deconstmction is to find a foothold in the discourse it seeks to deconstmct. 
Something else than antisystematical thought must, consequently, be at stake 
for deconstmction. Would we say that in a Heideggerian fashion it is bent to 
thinking systematicity in a more originary manner? Although Derrida would 
certainly acknowledge that such an operation is indispensable, deconstmction, 
as its definition suggests, cannot be thought of as a search for essences, 
however originary. Deconstmction is concemed, on the contrary, with 
detennining the limits (the conditions of impossibility) of the possibility of 
systematicity and system formation.
hr other words, the moment of mimesis for Derrida is a fimction of its relation to another
text, a philosophical text, at the boundary of whose systematicity Denida hopes to find what
he is looking for. Against this, for Adomo, the un-thought of by philosophy is not to be
formd by looking at philosophy and identifying a gap where its system prohibits it fiom
thinking further. Rather, it is hr the concrete object, which philosophy fails to represent. It
follows that Adorno’s philosophical mimesis is not just roimetic of other philosophy,
although, like Derrida, Adomo is constantly defining himself against other philosophers.
Rather, his philosophy seeks to be inimetic of the objects it seeks to represent. For Adomo,
the bounds of philosophical systematicity are produced and revealed hr the stringent
Rodolphe Gasché, “Infrastructures and Systematicity”, p. 7.
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deployment of philosophical judgement of the particular phenomenon. Through this 
stringency, the pliilosophical judgement discovers itself to be unable to contain the non- 
philo sophical. This is not a disaster for Adomo; rather, in Aesthetic Theory, philosophy is 
understood as only ever a partial system of representation. Art, which is the object of 
representation in Aesthetic Theory, is not susceptible to sufficient philosophical definition. It 
is mediated by its own history, reification, and its medium. Thus the failure of reason in 
Aesthetic Theory generates an anti-systematicity which may appear playfid, but this 
playfulness is a function of the stringency of rationally deployed reason, which has an 
understanding of its necessity, and its inability to represent properly.
Reading and writing philosophical form: Adorno, Heidegger and Derrida
hi this chapter we have looked at various manifestations of the idea of philosophical 
foim as literary form, and demonstrated that the form of Aesthetic Theory is not usefuUy 
thought of this way. To conclude this chapter I wiU summarize the most important points and 
come back to the problem of reading Aesthetic Theory in the light of what has been argued.
In the conflict between the analytical tradition and deconstmction, at issue is the 
apparent embeddedness of philosophy in the “literaiy”. Within the tradition of criticism of 
post-Hegelian philosophy, it has been widely recognized that, faced with the assertion that 
transcendent critique^^ is an impossibility, two altematives present themselves.Firstly, the 
reader assimilates the terms of the argument in question, criticizing it fi om “within”. In doing 
so, however s/he appears vulnerable to the criticism of lacking critical distance. Secondly, the
This assumes the critic can take a position outside the position criticized, which both Adorno and 
Heidegger proliibit in different ways and to different degrees.
See, for example, the Preface and Introduction to D. White, Heidegger and the Language o f Poetry which 
discusses of the author’s attempts to deal with the problem as it is perceived to impact on his analysis of 
Heidegger’s attitude to poetry.
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critic remains attached to the premise s/he brought to the work, and becomes vulnerable to 
the charge of congenital misrepresentation. Making a related point about the dilemma 
generated by Adorno’s anti-systematicity, Paul Crowther says of any attempt to discuss 
Adomo that “a systematic exposition of his work will be at odds to some degree with 
Adorno’s own most cherished insight. Yet if one is not systematic in exposition and analysis, 
one mns the risk of simply unrnicking the master and remaining at the level of obscurity. 
This kind of dilemma is genuinely inescapable, and we need to acknowledge it as such when 
reading thinkers like Adomo and Heidegger, but its apparent finality can be somewhat 
mitigated.
If instead of trying to face the dilemma head on, we consider the implications of 
accepting or rejecting the unfamiliar standards by which Adomo and Heidegger operate, than 
a different series of possibilities emerge. One way to do this is to acknowledge that in itself, 
Heidegger’s claim that “language is the matrix of thought” is not that difficult to grasp or 
accept. It is only when its ramifications for doing philosophy are thought through that the 
complicated implications of taking it seriously emerge. This thinking through the implications 
of a philosophical premise is closely related to the idea of philosophical “rhythm” introduced 
earlier. Such thinking through identifies the premise of an argument, without necessarily 
accepting it. This thinking through evaluates the extent to which imphcations of a 
philosophical premise are adequately worked out. It is with this idea of reading in mind, 
which is the idea of immanent critique, that we need to proceed.
The possibility of immanent critique rests on the assumption that the argument being 
read is attempting to be intemaUy rationally consistent. Only as such is it possible to trace
^ Paul Crowther, review of ‘Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Ilusion,’ British Journal of j
Aesthetics 33 (Oct 1993), p.397. j
Zuidervaart discusses different methods of philosophical reading in Lambert Zuidervaart, Adorno’s
Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption o f Illusion, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1991), pp. xvii - xxiv. ■
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thr ough the development of a rational train of thought. If it is the case that a philosophical 
text becomes literary or poetic, it wdU not be susceptible to immanent reading because it 
renounces the truthfulness of rational coherence. A different explanation for the impossibility 
of immanent reading would be if a philosophical argument refuses the idea of a beginning. 
With no obvious starting point, or rather, with many different starting points, immanent 
critique cannot derive the meaning of every claim by virtue of that claim’s place within a 
“pristine unity”. Such critique risks loosing the thread, going down blind alleys, or 
misrepresenting a work by giving a partial reading of it. I have argued that Heidegger and 
Derrida are philosophically unreadable for the first reason. The difficulty, of reading Aesthetic 
Theory is, at least partially explainable, by the second. At the same time, it is clear that at 
times Heidegger and Derrida do argue hr very rational ways. To make the difference between 
Heidegger and Derrida, on the one hand, and Adorno on the other, we need to consider how 
the rational and readable and the UTational and unreadable are configured. Consider the 
following description of the contrast between the ideas of thought as “speculation” and 
“reflection”:
Speculation stands opposed to reflection, a method of thought which has to 
do with something given, and appropriates the same by continued analysis and 
syntheses of its elements. If speculative stand thus opposed to reflective 
thinking, it must necessarily belong to the former not to set out fi'om anything 
given as its subject, but from determhrations fiom which thought finds in itself 
as the necessary and primary ground of aU being as of all tlunking. fir this 
sense, all speculative thirrkhrg is of an d priori, and all reflective thinking of an 
à posteriori nature.
The crucial difference here is that “reflection...has to do with something given”, while 
“speculation” has to do with “determinations fiom which thought finds in itsefl”. What 
“speculative thought” is, is as a mode of thought which, m paying attention to its
^ William Fleming, The Vocabulary o f Philosophy, Mental, Moral, and Metaphysical; with Quotations and 
References; For the use o f Students, (Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co, 1860), p. 486. Quotation from 
Julius Müller Christian Doctthne o f Sin, trans. Palesford, (Edinburgli, 1852).
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determinations, constructs itself. What does it mean that speculative thought “constructs 
itself’? I have argued that Heidegger and Derrida are sometimes thoroughly speculative in 
this sense. That is to say, they posit the premise that, for example, “language is the matrix of 
thought” and derive from it an internally consistent series of claims that are mutually 
determining. Both, however, reach a speculative conclusion that speculative thinking is 
inadequate, and thereby start thinking in a non-pMosophical way, wliich both construe as 
some kind of synthesis of philosophical and poetic thinking. This makes them not only 
difficult to read, but also makes judgements about the value of what they are doing, difficult, 
because like Hegel, the speculative unity by which they arrive at and deploy then 
irrationalism is hard to fault.
Although the above definition makes a hard distinction between reflective and 
speculative thought, the great assertion of Hegel’s philosophy is to be valid as reflection and 
speculation. His philosophy makes two inseparable kinds of claim to be right about the 
world. One is the familiar idea that philosophy makes specific claims to tmth which rely on 
coiTespondence between a judgement and its object. The other is that as Hegel makes these 
claims, in the process of his argument they configme themselves into a relationship of 
mutually sustaining determinations through becoming a speculative unity. In this latter sense, 
Hegel claims a speculative tmth which reveals itself in the thinking through of the reflective 
tmth claims of his arguments. A symptom of the inseparability of these two orders of tmth is 
the suggestion, often repeated in arguments about the proper mode of Hegel’s reception, that 
it is impossible to take a piecemeal approach to his thought. One can criticise the specific 
claims Hegel made, for example about the death of art, and say he was demonstrably wrong 
in this. At the same time, to criticise such specifics is to destabilise the dynamic unity formed 
by their mumally supporting relation to other tmth claims he makes. To say Hegel is wiong
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about art is necessarily to say there is a mismatch within the total speculative construction, or
that the whole thing is wrong. Both kinds of claim to truth are mutually dependent, and stand
and collapse simultaneously. The trouble is that it is extraordinarily difficult to trip Hegel up
on grounds of speculative inconsistency. Assessed on the criteria of rationality which
operates to hold together Hegel’s system of determinations, his Aesthetics, for example, is
literally perfect. It is completely rationally consistent with itself and immune to
deconstruction. Hegel’s system is completely readable because every single implication is
completely thought through. This is to say that it is possible to “stay with” Hegel’s argument
all the way through, so the problem of how to read Hegel literally solves itself. Equally, the
correspondence between the speculative structure of Hegel’s system and the world rests on
Hegel’s claim to be speculatively coherent. This coherence then perfectly replicates the world
qua a rationally perfect system. As one reader of Hegel succinctly puts it of Hegel’s system,
Hegel, as both Hegelians and anti-Hegelians argue, has offered the greatest 
solution to, or at least formulation of, the problem of representation. 
According to HegeTs unification of logic and ontology, the “world,” “reality,”
“the absolute,” can be represented truthfidly because the representation and 
the thing represented are not separate entities linked arbitrarily by a 
philosopher’s subjectivity; rather, things and thought are engaged in a 
common movement toward self representation,^^
Hegel manages to present us with a scenario where if we reject any aspect of his
philosophy, even a single truth claim, we are bringing the whole thing down. If we do so, we
must subscribe to the following: concepts are inadequate, philosophy cannot be conqiletely
rationally consistent with itselfr and the world is not subject to rational determination, either
reflectively or speculatively. HegeTs philosophy is so powerfiil that its collapse leaves the
possibility of philosophy in real doubt.
I would claim that HegeTs approach to representation is powerful, and 
limited, precisely because it is the first to think through “reality” in terms of 
the categories of and conditions that underlie Western theories and practices
John. H. Smith, The Spirit and Its Letter: Traces o f Rhetoric in Hegel’s Philosophy ofBildmg, (Ithaca: 
Cornell Universoty Press, 1988), p.x.
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of representation. The power of the argument lies in its circular self- 
reflexivity: Hegel has justified his philosophy by attributing the conditions of 
its representation to the object of representation.^^
Picking up the pieces and continuing to do philosophy having demolished the 
Hegelian system acquires a novel degr ee of tendentiousness. Now, in as much as Adomo 
adheres to the principle of the necessary reflective and speculative unity of philosophy, it 
follows that the way the denial of the sufficiency of reason is played out will be of a different 
order of anti-systematicity than Heidegger’s and Derrida’s. Its condition of readability and 
the possibihty of making judgements about it will be different from Heidegger and Derxida. 
That is to say, where in Aesthetic Theory Adomo does not make phhosoplrical sense, it is 
because he understands that philosophy has gone as far as it can in describing an object. It 
does not then become hxational, his writing does not become poetic. Rather, it seeks to 
complete what reason asphes to do, which is adequately to represent the object. Thus 
Adomo’s anti-philosophical tendencies are moves into modes of describing art which are 
more usuahy associated with art history - art with reference to its own history, to its function 
in society, and to how its medium is different fi'om philosophy. This might seem very prosiac 
by comparison to Heidegger’s attempts to take up residence in the House of Being, and to 
Derrida’s létterature. Indeed, it is, but that is the point. For Adomo, it is possible and 
necessaiy to think much further and harder about the nonidentical than Heidegger or Derrida 
understand, because the nonidentical is the concrete phenomenon, mediated by the 
contingencies of its production and reception.
Jolm. H. Smith, Tie Spirit and Its Letter, p.x.
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Chapter IV
AESTHETIC THEORY AS PHILOSOPHICAL MIMESIS
This chapter discusses Aesthetic Theory as philosophical mimesis. There is an 
important difference between Adorno’s deployment of pliilosophical mimesis and his theory 
of mimesis in ait. This chapter looks at the former, the following chapter the latter.
For Adomo, the grounds on which art and philosophy meet is the concrete. An 
indication of what “the concrete” is can be suggested by saymg that it is the moment when 
philosophically deployed reason encounters its own inadequacy. Adorno’s response to this 
inadequacy is the idea of the “movement of tlie concept”. This can be constmed as a 
movement by philosophy towards something, and a marking of time, i.e., remaining in the 
same place. Together, these two ideas of movement can be construed as a preliminary 
definition of “philosophical mimesis”, hi Aesthetic Theory, philosophically deployed reason is 
responding to its inadequacy in describing art. Aesthetic Theory is mimetic of ait because it is 
a movement towards art, and a marking of time, because that movement is never completed. 
This marking of time figures as a consciously maintained anxiety about the inadequacy of 
Aesthetic Theory qua philosophy and a deliberate mamtenance of the distinction between 
philosophy and art.
As well as being mimetic of art in these terms. Aesthetic Theory is a theory of how art 
relates to the world. This theory of art will be properly explained in subsequent chapters, but 
aspects of it need developing now. This is so, is because, as a mimetic representation of art, 
philosophy takes on aspects of art’s shape. It follows that if we have some idea of the shape 
art takes, we will better be able to understand the philosophy.
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Schematically speaking, for Adomo, art is an orientation towards the “appearance of 
natural beauty.” Art cannot directly or intentionally represent the “appearance of natural 
beauty”. It can only do so obliquely. Indeed, this task is so problematic that it cannot achieve 
an adequate representation of the “appearance of natural beauty.” If ait is to have any 
success, it needs the collaboration of philosophy. Now, the form the collaboration between 
art and philosophy takes involves something like philosophical reflection “retracmg” the 
trajectory of the work of ait in its attempts to assimilate the “appearance of natural beauty”. 
This is necessary because ait has to tiy to make the “appearance of natural beauty” 
“determinate”; to do so, however, is to negate what the “appearance of natural beauty” is i.e.. 
“appearance”. This mutually dependent dynamic of art and philosophy means that the scheme 
adopted here of making a distinction between philosophical mimesis, and mimesis in ait, is 
ultimately going to be misleading. All the same it is a necessaiy distinction to make, and as 
has been suggested, Aesthetic Theory is uneven. So sometimes the relation between 
philosophy and ait is very obviously mextricable, sometimes less so.
In the previous chapter, the way Adorno’s philosophical mimesis was discussed 
mevitably placed heavy emphasis on its being unlike ait and especially unlike the idea of the 
“literaiy”. Having done this we now need to bring back the notion of a very close relationship 
between philosophy, language and art. This should not be surprising, given that the 
something of which philosophy is bemg mimetic, m Aesthetic Theory is art. To re-approach 
Aesthetic Theory in this manner, we need to reconfigure the terms of the argument of the 
previous chapter. As was made plam, the ambiance of deconstruction is of little help in 
reading Aesthetic Theory. To affect this reorientation, I will refer to one of Gadamer’s 
arguments. Gadamer is ultimately very different jfrom Adomo, but as an odd mbcture of
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Hegel and Heidegger, his thinking about the relation between art, language, and philosophy is 
a useful foil against which to develop aspects of Adorno’s argument, hitherto neglected.
Gadamer: Philosophy and Poetry
hi his short paper “Philosophy and Poetry”, Gadamer makes a distinction between
Natural Speech, on the one hand, and Philosophical and Poetic Language on the other. The
important difference between these two categories is that in Natural Speech, the problem of
meaning is not held in question. There are two reasons for this. The first is that natural
speech always exists in a particular living context which gives it meaning. Second, this
context is usually functional, so the adequacy of language is not judged in terms of what it
dir ectly signifies, but in terms of its relation to the language of that functional context. In
Poetry and Philosophy, by contrast, Gadamer sees a quite different relation between language
and what it signifies: “The language of poetiy and philosophy on the other hand can stand by
itseh  ^ bearing its own authority in the detached text that articulates it”.^  Another way of
putting this, is that philosophical and poetic language seem to sustain then meaning in a
condition of autonomy firom their context, not shared by every day language. To illustrate
this capacity of Poetic Language, Gadamer cites Valéry
Valéry contrasted the poetic word with the everyday use of language in a 
striking comparison that alludes to the old days of the gold standard: everyday 
language resembles small change which like our own paper money, does not 
actually possess the value that it symbolizes. The famous gold coins still in use 
before the First World War, on the other hand, actually possessed as metal the 
value that was imprinted upon them. In a similar way, the language of poetry 
is not a mere pointer that refers to something else, but, like a gold coin, is 
what it represents.^
 ^Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance o f the Beautiful, trans. N. Walker, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), p. 133.
~ Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful, p. 133.
Aesthetic Theory as philosophical mimesis 166
Going on to describe the quite different way philosophical language separates itself 
from its context, Gadamer uses the example of the Platonic dialogue. He argues that this 
form does not simply present itself to consciousness, but “involves the reader in the dialogue 
that it portrays”. In other words, the meanmg of language as it appears in the philosophical 
text is made self-sufficient through its thoughtfiil internalization by the reader. In this way, 
the tmth of Philosophical Language does not “stand” as does the Poetic. Rather, 
Philosophical tmth is discursive, always on the move, and depends on being a part of a 
dynamic process between reader and text but, because this is a process, such tmth can never 
be finally grasped.
If their differences from Natural Speech unite Poetry and Philosophy, Gadamer notes 
“then proximity seems in the end to collapse into the extremes of the word that stands, and 
the word that fades into the unsayable”.^  What then is then relation? His principal technique 
is to modify the extreme claims he has made for both Poetic and Philosophical language, 
identifying common feartnes. The first similarity he recognizes is that, considered differently, 
and despite Valery’s extravagant claims. Poetry, like Philosophy, does not become identical 
with contingent reality, but excludes it. In this sense, the Poetic is seen as actually similar to 
philosophy, m so far as it does not literally coincide with reality m the way that Valéry 
suggests. Having made this observation, Gadamer now goes on to argue that, despite the 
apparent failure of the Poetic to “stand”, it can be argued that it generates the kmd of tmth 
associated with Philosophical Language. To make this pohrt Gadamer compares the “extreme 
cases” of lyric poetry and Hegel’s dialectic. He returns to the comparison with Every Day 
Language, distinguishing lyric poetry from it, arguing that then difference resides in the 
extent to which lyric poetry amplifies
Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful, p. 133.
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a tension between the tonal and the significative forces of langage as they 
encounter and change place with one another... There is not a single word in a 
poem that does not intend what it means. Yet at the same time, it sets itself 
back upon itself to prevent it slipping into prose and the rhetoric that 
accompanies it. This is the claim and legitimation of “pure poetiy.”
It is not that lyric poetry is distinguished fiom every day language through its form, but it is
the extent to which it exhibits a tension between “the tonal and significative forces of
language”. Gadamer now goes to his example of philosophical language. Here
The problem is not that everyday prose threatens to infiltrate the language of 
the concept, but that the logic of the proposition takes us in the wrong 
direction. As Hegel expressed the matter, “The proposition in the form of a 
judgement is not suited to express speculative truths.” ^
Philosophy, in other words, defines itself through a different problematic fi om that of poetic
language. Here the issue is not about achieving and maintaining a difference fiom every day
language, but that the means of philosophical language is inadequate to its ends. Gadamer is
quick to emphasize that while he is invoking Hegel’s dialectic, “It is the common
presupposition of all philosophizing that philosophy as such does not posses a language that
is adequate to the task assigned to it.” As in all speech, philosophy cannot avoid the
prepositional form, but the inadequacy of the proposition does not mean that philosophy will
always fad, because the proposition is not the means of expressing philosophical truth.
Rather, quotmg Plato, Gadamer seeks to distance philosophical language fiom this
conception of its inevitably futile deployment of the proposition, by emphasizing its
autonomy:
Philosophy moves exclusively in the medium of the concept: “in Ideas, 
through Ideas, toward Ideas.” The relation that these concepts have to one 
another is not explicated through “external reflection”, which envisages the 
concept fiom without, that is fiom this or that “point of view.” Because of the 
arbitrariness of this way of looking at the matter, where one attribute or
Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful, p. 136.
 ^Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful, p. 137.
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another is predicated of a subject, Hegel describes such “external reflection” 
as precisely the “sophistry of perception.” ^
hi other words, like lyric poetry, philosophical argument is not important for what it signifies
directly through “external reflection”. Rather,
the medium of philosophy is speculation as the mirror-play of the categories 
through which the matter of thought is immanently and dynamically 
articulated. It is immanent because as bemg and as spirit it tends towards the 
concept intended by thought as a concrete totality. ^
These two sentences are extremely important, and somewhat opaque. Gadamer replaces the
significatory capacity of philosophy with an idea of “the mirror-play of the categories”; truth
content of philosophy derives not fiom the truth claims it makes, but fiom the pattern of its
argument which, qua dynamic, internally expresses the matter of thought.
Now, as it turns out, Gadamer’s argument in defining the language of poetiy and
philosophy has taken on a kind of extreme anti-realism which is reminiscent of
deconstruction. Agamst the apparently satisfactory signifying of every day language, poetiy
defines itself, not because it signifies more tmthfuUy, but because it makes explicit the tension
between the tonal and significatory capacity of its language. Likewise, philosophy fails to
signify with the prepositional form, but its truth resides ia the mimetic capacity of its dynamic
argument. Without engaging the terms of deconstruction, it looks as though Gadamer is
making claims about the relative priority of foim over direct signification. Gadamer
acknowledges this problem, and seems to distance himself fiom Hegel and MaUaimé (his
example of a lyric poet), but importantly goes on to errphasize the common significance of
the kmds of tension he has identified in both poetry and philosophy. Of Mallarmé, he writes
he was able to capture in language the encormter with nothingness as well as 
the invocation of the Absolute. Self-bestowal and self-withdrawal - such a
® Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful, p. 137.
' Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful, p. 137.
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dialectic of uncovering and withdrawal seems to hold sway in the mystery of 
language, both for poets and for philosophers, from Plato to Heidegger/
This last sentence is important, because it is here that Gadamer the critical thinker seems to
pull up. The 'frncoveiing and withdrawal” constitutes the “mystery of language”. It is this
contradiction between the significatory and tonal capacity of lyric poetry which Gadamer wiU
not further dissect. The same dynamic of “uncovering and withdrawal” holds for the different
contradiction inherent in the philosophical form. This has far-reaching implications for
Gadamer’s understanding of the possibility of truth in philosophy and poetry.
Thus both the poetical and philosophical types of speech share a common 
feature: they cannot be “false”. For there is no external standard against which 
they might correspond. Yet they are far from arbitrary. They represent a 
unique kind of risk, for they can fail to live up to themselves. In both cases 
this is not because they faü to respond to the facts, but because their words 
prove to be “empty”. In the case of poetry, this occurs when instead of 
soimding right, it merely sounds like other poetry or like the rhetoric of every 
day life, hi the case of philosophy, this occms when philosophical language 
gets caught up in pruely formal argumentation or degenerates into empty 
sophistry.
hr both these inferior forms of language - the poem that is not a poem 
because it does not have its “own” tone, and the empty formulae of a thinking 
that does not touch on the matter of thought - the word breaks. Where the 
word fulfills itself and becomes language, we must take it at its word.
With that, Gadamer concludes. His slipping into a kind of Heidegerrian elusiveness
begins to read like a defenal of critical thought, rather than thought coming up against an
object to which it had no access. Although Gadamer is at pains to emphasize the mystery of
language as inhering in the dialectic of “uncovering and withdrawal”, his concluding
paragraphs give far greater importance to withdrawal. When he claims that philosophy and
poetry “cannot be ‘false’” he radically imderplays the signifying capacities of language, and
this is directly related to his weak claim for the possible truth of art and philosophy.
Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful, p. 139.
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Seeing the connection between Gadamer’s weak claim to truth and the extent to 
which he leaves aspects of his argument unresolved is important. At the same time, an 
argument which makes strong truth claims about language, like deconstruction or analytical 
philosophy as either “the encounter with nothingness” or the “invocation of the Absolute”, 
will be predetermined to privilege one means of articulation (i.e. philosophy or literature) 
over another. In contrast, Gadamer’s argument begins with a degree of opeiuiess about the 
nature of the relation between philosophical and poetic truth, but by the end his argument 
degenerates into obscurity about the difference between the true and the false, which seems 
too high price to pay for his flexible attitude. Adorno is acutely aware of this mediating 
relation between the kinds of truth claim we make and the degree of commitment we have for 
the means of its expression. As we have seen however, “awareness” on its own is probably 
not enough. It is the premises with which an argument begins, which hr a large measure limits 
the range of available hisights into a problem. When discussing Adorno’s idea of 
philosophical truth, we need to remember that it is always hi the context of his strong claim 
for the idea that experience is reified, as described in the previous chapter. At the same time, 
because philosophy is understood as potentially having a degree of “autonomy” fi-om reified 
experience, and fiom art, its truth value is not thinkable as sufficiently described as 
determined by either his theory of experience, or his theory of art. This means that the 
archetectonics of Adorno’s argument, as they impinge on his imderstanding of the possibility 
of philosophical truth, are not epistemologically predetermined to emphasize philosophical 
language as either ‘the encormter with nothingness” or the “invocation of the Absolute”. At 
the same time Adorno makes stronger and more developed truth claims than Gadamer 
allows, and does so without curtadhig the possibility of the truth of art.
.. A
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Philosophical Mimesis
Although he does not name it, Gadamer’s definition of the relation between
philosophical language and truth can be construed as defining philosophy as mimetic:
the medium of philosophy is speculation as the mirror-play of the categories 
through which the matter of thought is immanently and dynamically 
articulated. It is immanent because as being and as spirit it tends towards the 
concept intended by thought as a concrete totality. ^
We will recall that this definition is offered k  the context of Gadamer’s diagnosis of
the failure of philosophical propositions to signify. Indeed, he mvokes Plato and Hegel to
argue that the idea of vertical meankg between philosophical proposition and the world is a
specious understandkg of philosophical truth:
Philosophy moves exclusively k  the medium of the concept: “k  Ideas, 
through Ideas, toward Ideas.” The relation that these concepts have to one 
another is not explicated through “external reflection”, which envisages the 
concept fiom without, that is from this or that “pokt of view.” Because of the 
arbitraikess of this way of lookkg at the matter, where one attribute or 
another is predicated of a subject, Hegel describes such “external reflection” 
as precisely the “sophistiy of perception.”
Gadamer’s argument is very useful k  beginnkg to identify Adorno’s idea of philosophical
mimesis, but, as I have already kdicated, it is crucially different fr om Adorno’s position. Tbds
is because the kkd of philosophical mimesis Gadamer diagnoses is detached from any strong
idea of truth. Inseparable from this, Gadamer’s definition of philosophical mimesis takes
place k  the context of the denial that philosophy can make truth claims k  any traditional
sense: mimesis is thus constmed as an alternative to direct signification. Philosophy becomes
a kkd of parallel existence which, withk the terms of its own mles and conceptual
conventions, imitates the world. This autonomy is not total, however, because philosophy is
both “bekg and spirit”. This is Hegelian teimkology and kdicates that, while philosophy is
 ^Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful, p. 137. I
Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful, p. 137. ■
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understood as a particular form of “being” i.e. experience at a moment in history, it also 
expresses something universal. This is to say that philosophy does have a direct relation to 
the world, beyond its imitative capacity. This is in so far as it has an unintentional relation to 
the historically situated context of its production.
Now, both kinds of relation between philosophy and world hnphcit m Gadamer’s 
definition of philosophical roimesis hold for Adomo, and they need to be properly explained. 
At the same time, there is a thii'd aspect of the relation between philosophy and its object in 
Adorno’s argument which emphasizes the distinction I have already made between Adomo 
and Gadamer. hi Adomo, philosophical mimesis is not just about the parallel imitation of the 
object, but a movement of the concept towards its object. That is to say, because for Adomo 
philosophy stdl has a signifying capacity, it is inadequate to think of philosophical mimesis as 
the horizontal configuiation of a relation between concepts. This horizontal configuration of 
concepts simply parallels the object, whatever that might imply. Rather, the mimetic relation 
also pertains vertically, between concept and object. Now, as we have seen, Gadamer 
understands poetiy and philosophy as operating within precisely this tension. The point is that 
Gadamer then goes on to resolve it, both in the claim that the concepts of philosophy should 
not be subjected to “extemal reflection” and in his claim that neither philosophy nor poetry 
can be “false”, but simply judged in terms of whether they are intemally consistent or “live up 
to themselves”. What distances Adomo from Gadamer is that his engagement with 
philosophy does not allow for this resolution. He goes much further in pursuing the dialectic 
of “uncovering and withdrawal”, which is to say he maintains its energy by giving more 
weight in his thought to “uncovering” (the signifying capacity of poetiy and philosophy), 
within their dialectical constmction. Adomo therefore understands philosophy and poetry as 
making strong and direct tmth claims. This certainly means that philosophy and poetry can be
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“false”, but it also means that they can be “true” beyond the alooJ  ^ parallel truth, of 
Gadamer’s argument.
One place to begin defining what this analysis of Adorno’s position might imply for
his deployment of philosophical mimesis, is early in Negative Dialectics. Here he says that
philosophical thought “must strive, by means of the concept, to get beyond the concept.” As
Wellmer suggests, in an argument which I will return to later “hi Negative Dialectics Adomo
has tried to characterize this self-conquest of the concept as the incorporation of a “mimetic”
moment into conceptual thouglit.”^^ This does not explain any more clearly what
philosophical mimesis might entail, but it does provide a basis for understanding its
significance for Adomo. If we hold together the ideas of the “self-conquest of the concept”
and “mimesis”, we are at least thinking in the right dhection.
hi the previous chapter I suggested that mimesis is not only defined by its medium, in
this case concepts, but also the object of imitation. This is one of the reasons why an abstract
definition of mimesis is impossible, and it is also why it makes so little sense to read that
philosophical thought “must strive, by means of the concept, to get beyond the concept.”
When we think of philosophical mimesis in the context of Aesthetic Theory, we are aheady
containing the problem and making it more concrete because, as we have seen, we can
assume that the objects of philosophical attention will be art. Indeed, Adomo is quite direct in
providing a model for explaining what the philosophical mimesis of art might mvolve:
There is no need for aesthetics to exorcise concepts and thereby put itself 
completely under the spell of its object. On the contrary, it must divest 
concepts of whatever externality they may have m relation to the particular 
work, tiydng to make them more germane. Hegel’s analysis, in the Preface to 
the Phenomenology o f Spirit, of the movement of the concept is more 
apropos in aesthetics than in any other field.
“ Albrecht Wellmer, ‘Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation: Adorno's Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity', 
trans. M.Cooke, Telos 62 (Winter 1984-85), p. 91.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 259,
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Now, this is informative and problematic because it opens up two different issues. First, is the
question of what Adomo does in Aesthetic Theory to “divest concepts of whatever
externality they may have in relation to the particular work, trying to make them more
geimane”. What is the “movement” m the “movement of the concept”? Second, given that he
practices philosophical mimesis as “the movement of the concept”, what are the products of
that movement? What are the specific tmth claims he makes as a consequence?
In the following section, I consider what the “movement of the concept” is in 
Aesthetic Theory.
The “movement of the concept” in Aesthetic Theory
One of the things for which I criticized Gadamer, was the way his argument became
elusive when he spoke of “mysteiy of language” as constituted by the dialectic of
“uncovering and withdrawal”. Now, Adomo is by no means hostile to this abstract idea of
philosophical tmth, but where he differs from Gadamer is that he is much less happy with the
idea of “mysteiy”. For Adomo, critical thought is more powerful than Gadamer seems to
imply, and this means that where Gadamer diagnoses congenital elusrveness, Adomo takes
concrete steps to pursue an issue. This means that philosophical mimesis, as Adomo practices
it, is not an esoteric art, but a rational mode of procedure. The Draft Introduction^^ to
Aesthetic Theory sets out the broad terms for such a procedure m the shape of a metacritique
of traditional aesthetics, and the development of a series of altemative modes of practice for
philosophical aesthetics. The inadequacies of traditional aesthetics are the impetus for this
movement. He begins
Like the idea of a philosophical system or philosophy of morals, the notion of 
a philosophical aesthetics seems awftdly antiquated. This perception is not 
confined to artists and public opinion, both of which are indifferent to
According to the editors this was to be dropped from the final version of Aesthetic Theory. Nonetheless, it 
sets the agenda for the book in uncharacteristically lucid terms and is thus an extremely useful aid to 
understanding the range of issues addresed'm Aesthetic Theory.
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Aesthetic Theory. It is a sentiment one runs into even among university 
scholars.
Now, Adomo is quite clear there are two different kinds of problem here. The 
“mysteiy” for traditional aesthetics, as it is for Adomo, is “the difficulty, if not impossibility, 
of understanding art by the means of a system of philosophical concepts. As we have seen, 
Adomo understands this as an objective problem; traditional aesthetics cannot be blamed. 
Indeed, the problematic reputation of aesthetics derives, to an extent, from the context of its 
practice: “Among scholars, the mistmst of aesthetics has also something to do with the 
academic nature of the discipline. Why the lack of concem for aesthetic questions? Because 
there is a general institutionalised avoidance of uncertainty and controversy among 
academ ics.T his is a recuning theme throughout Adomo’s work; in Negative Dialectics he 
suggests that the constraints of institutional convention militate against, even anticipate and 
pre-empt, posing certain kinds of problem ‘Wliat may or may not be reflected, however 
lu'gent, is regulated by a method blithely modelled after cmrent methods of exact science. 
Approved modes of proceeding, pure means, gain primacy over ends, the goals of 
cognition.
Now, having said this, Adomo is also quite clear that philosophical aesthetics has
problems which are not objective, resulting rather fiom eironeous modes of procedure, which
can be corrected. It is here that we can think of the philosophical mimesis of Aesthetic
Theory as involving a movement of the concepts of traditional aesthetics. What then is the
problem with traditional aesthetics? It is
the long standing dependency of aesthetic statements on epistemological 
positions, such that the problems of epistemology return directly in aesthetics, 
for the question of how the latter is able to interpret its objects depends on the 
kind of concept of objectivity epistemology happens to subscribe to. Now this
Aesthetic Theory, p. 456. (see p. 509.)
Aesthetic Theory, p. 456. (Adorno is quoting from a philosophical dictionary)
Aesthetic Theory, p. 458.
Negative Dialectics, ?
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long established dependency is given by the subject matter of aesthetics itself 
and it is reflected in its very terminology.
This is a section of the extended quotation from a philosophical dictionary definition of
aesthetics, which takes up most of the first page of the Draft Introduction. In effect, it is
arguing that philosophical aesthetics has always been a sub-discipline of epistemology.
Whether we agree with or not, it sets Adomo up to delineate his altemative. It is clear that
the issue is not so much the obvious argiunent that ait cannot be thought of as
epistemologically detemnned. Rather, it is the way philosophical aesthetics inherits
epistemology’s deportment towards to its object, which is not a usefid paradigm of
behaviour for philosophical aesthetics:
The idea of the concrete which is the matrix of eveiy work of ait, indeed of 
every experiential orientation to beauty, makes it impossible When dealing 
with art to remove oneself from specific phenomena, as one is unfortunately 
accustomed to do in epistemology and ethics. A theory of the concrete would 
necessaiily miss its aim which is the concrete object. One reason for the 
obsolescence of aesthetics then is its failme to face this problem squarely.
Instead it has stuck to generalities that are both inadequate to concrete works 
of art and fixated on the value of immortality which it is itself mortal.
What is key here Adorno’s emphasis on “the concrete” as “the matiix of every work
of art” and his assertion that “A theory of the concrete would necessarily miss its aim which
is the concrete object,” Adomo is asking for a relocation of the interest of philosophical
aesthetics, away from a preoccupation with generalities, to “the concrete”. What, then does
Adomo mean by “the concrete”? In part, it is the way Adomo answers this question in
arguments of Aesthetic Theory that makes him vuhierable to all those criticisms of his work
as obsolete; what was “concrete” for Adomo, is no longer so now. At the same time, “the
concrete” is not simply constituted by historically finite ideas; it is also a series of piinciples
Aesthetic Theory, p. 456. (see p. 509.)
Aesthetic Theory, p. 457.
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for doing aesthetics that are less obviously susceptible to obsolescence. To understand what 
these principles of “the concrete” might be, we need to consider Hegel’s Aesthetics,
Hegel describes three phases in the development of art the Symbolic (e.g. the 
pyramids), the Classical (e.g. Gieek sculpture), and the Romantic (e.g. Romantic art), m that 
order. Each is profoundly different from the other, over an above their obvious material and 
formal differences. This is because each art’s understandhig of itself in its relation to the 
Absolute is different, and the experience of what the Absolute is also different for each ait. 
So, for example. Symbolic art has an extremely diSuse and abstract idea of the Absolute. 
Although its foitns, like the Egyptian pyramids, are obviously solid in a material sense, they 
simply indicate or gesture towards spiritual content, rather than manifesting it directly “the 
conespondence of meaning and shape is always defective and must itself remain purely 
abstract.C lassic  ait, by contrast, is the perfect ait: in Classical sculpture the human body 
“becomes the natural shape of the spirit” because “hi classic ait the concrete content is 
implicitly the unity of the divine natm e with the human”, hi other words, the absolute is no 
longer incompletely understood and so is simply gestured toward. As the unity of the divine 
with the human, is directly manifested in the sculptm e of the Gi eeks. The problem is that it is 
precisely this determination of spirit as “particular and human” that necessitates the 
dissolution of the classical art-form, because spirit cannot be properly understood in such 
teims. This leads into Romantic art, which hke Symbolic art, only represents the Absolute in 
a diffuse way. The ciucial difference here, however, is that in world historical teims, the 
absolute is now understood as “not susceptible of an adequate union with the external”. In 
Symbohc art, spirit was alluded to in an abstract way because it was inadequately
G.W.F. Bsgü, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 76-80. 
G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol 1, p. 77.
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comprehended. In Romantic art, spirit is incompletely represented, but this is now because 
spiiit is now understood as not susceptible to complete representation.
The point here is not to become absorbed in a discussion of Hegel’s Aesthetics. 
Rather, I wish to underline how Hegel divides the histoiy of art into discrete phases which 
are not simply formally different, but are so by vhtue of having radically different kinds of 
experience and different understandings of then possible ftmction and value in the world. In 
confronting ait on these terms, Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics (1820-29) were, at one level, a 
direct confrontation with Whickehnann. Winckehnann saw his own History o f Ancient Art 
not just as a histoiy and explanation of the progress and dechne of Gieek art, but as a 
“theoretical treatise, aiming to demonstrate, through the example of Gieek art, what beauty 
was.”^^  Hegel’s aesthetics was the first attempt to describe the entire histoiy of art, and while 
he broadly agieed with the teims of Winckehnann’s argument, for Hegel Classicism was just 
one phase of art, rather than an absolute standard which could be universally extended. As 
we have seen, the way Hegel does this is to define each phase of art hi terms of a) its own 
historically defined understanding of the Absolute and its relation to it, b) the perception of 
its broad purpose in the light of (a), c) the medium by which that purpose was earned out, 
and d)the realised end of that activity,(these should not be construed in hierarchical order 
of importance), hi each of the three phases of art Hegel describes, these factors are different 
and mediated and, as such, they produce radically different results. It is in this sense that we 
can begin to understand what Adomo means when he invokes the idea of “the concrete”: it is 
that mediating constellation of moments which constitute the tmth content of a work of art.
Ernst Gombricli, “Hegel and Art YiisXory", Architectural Design (1981), p.3.
^ Here I am modifying Gary Shapiro's useful analysis of the way Hegel characterises all spiritual activity : 
‘Typically, Hegel analyzes spiritual activities in terms of three aspects: the general idea or purpose, abstractly 
considered; the medium or means in wliich or by which the purpose is carried out; and the concrete or 
realised end of the activity.” see Shapiro, Gary. “Hegel on Implicit and Dialectical Meanings of Poetry,” in 
Steinkraus and Schmitz, (1980), p. 40-41.
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Adomo takes from Hegel a hostility to the idea of a fixed epistemology and likewise 
understands experience to change through history. We have already seen that in place of 
epistemology, Adomo adopts “reification” as a historically limited theory of knowledge, hi 
purely negative terms, this simply means Adomo abandons any aspirations to understand the 
possibility of tmth in general, and of art in particular, beyond a particular set of theoretically 
defined historical limits. On the other hand, it this which enables him to engage reified 
experience as one of the mediating factors defining his “concrete” relation to ait. The 
philosophical mimesis practised by Adomo in Aesthetic Theory, then, is this movement of the 
philosophical concept of experience m its relation to art. It moves away from a universal 
characterisation of the relation between philosophy and art towards a historically changing 
one. We can, therefore, with some hesitation, think of Aesthetic Theory’s with modem ait as 
roughly analogous to one of the three main “episodes” in the history of art, as diagnosed by 
Hegel, in his Aesthetics.
This claim needs immediate qualification, and its implications will continue to be 
developed. In fact, on Hegel’s own terms, only one thing which allows the comparison of the 
thiee orders of art he describes. It is that they are all insufficiently determinate 
representations of the Absolute, by comparison with his own, historically located, philosophy. 
Hegel the philosopher understands the absolute as dialectical; it is philosophy, as the 
supremely dialectical form, which is most adequate to the task of representing the Absolute 
as such.
If, as Adomo, one rejects the possibility of any such absolute perspective, 
philosophical or otherwise, then one will not just concentrate on a historically defined idea of 
art. In addition, there is no possibihty of grasping the tmth content of anything beyond the 
“concrete” conditions of one’s own experience. We can criticise the narrow terms with which
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Aesthetic Theory limits itself to specifically modem art, hut without Hegel’s all-seeing
rational periscope, it is simply not possible to see definitively beyond the concreteness of
one’s own reified experience. The upside of this is that art is not subordinated to philosophy
or vice versa. Neither is one made obsolete by the other and both can be understood as
having its own autonomous, but mediated history.
The unacceptable by-product of Idealist philosophy’s aspiration to produce definitive
tmth, its inevitable abstracting of its object, is shoit-chcuited. In practical teims, the
traditional scope of philosophical aesthetics, the isolation of those characteristics which
unquestionably hold for aesthetic experience for all time, is simply abandoned, thereby
avoiding a common criticism of universalising aesthetics:
in tmth the inelevance of esthetic theory is due to the fact that it has often 
been a response to a particular body of ait and of limited appHcation to 
another order. Plato, Aiistotle, Hume and Kant, powerfiil and systematic 
thinkers aU were giving universal validity to thoughts suited to a very local ait, 
so that in large measme, esthetic theory is a body of criticism concealed as 
such by the unacknowledged provincialisms of its authors.. 24
The idea that an aesthetic theoiy should aim to define a common tmth content of all works 
of art, from cave paintings to the “Mona Lisa” to the “Demoiselles d’Avignon,” is itself 
historicized by Adomo. The desire for art to be universal is “fixated on the value of 
immoitahty which it is itself mortal”;
As a theoiy that attempts to establish the laws of the beautifiil once and for 
all... aesthetics has become as reactionary as the solemn pathos associated 
with a conception of art that elevates it above empirical reality and society 
into the absolute. 25
By dehberately limiting the historical scope of his aesthetics Adomo, necessarily focuses his 
inquiiy onto the specific characteristics of the possibility of the tmth of art within those
Arthur Danto, State o f  The Art, (New York: Prentice Hall, 1987), p. 4
T.W. Adomo, Notes to Literature Vol I, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1991), p. 138.
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limits. When he discusses the “truth content” of works of art, he describes how they are true 
in the context of reification. He does not discuss how art works might be de facto “True.”
Returning then to the idea o f Aesthetic Theory as philosophical mimesis of art, we can 
consider the move from  the universal preoccupations of traditional aesthetics. This is 
simultaneously a move to the concrete experience of ait under reification. This movement is 
one manifestation of the “movement of the concept” as it occurs in Aesthetic Theory. As I 
have aheady indicated, however, this movement of philosophical aesthetics is not simply a 
reorientation of the focus of its attention it implies the transfoimation of philosophical 
aesthetics itself. The necessaiy vulnerability of its own procedures is deiived fiom Adorno’s 
refiisal to take refiige in Hegel’s notion of sufficient reason. Sufficient reason preserves the 
shape of Hegel’s argument, whatever the idiosyncrasies of its object. In an abstract and 
philosophical sense, for Adomo the impetus for the movement and transfoimation of his own 
aesthetics derives from his appreciation of Hegel’s unfulfilled ambition to allow the object to 
speak.
The fulfilling of Hegel’s philosophical imperative, however, is not in the gift of 
philosophy itself but resides in other mediations. It would quite wrong, therefore, to think of 
Aesthetic Theory as the inevitable product of Adomo’s critique of the Ideahst’s 
epistemological over-determination of aesthetics. Indeed, if it were, Adomo’s arguments 
would simply be reproducing a negative image of the tendency in Idealist aesthetics to follow 
in the wake of Idealist epistemology. Adomo’s altemative conception of the substance and 
function of aesthetics means that Aesthetic Theory has a variety of defining iofluences which 
the author exphcitly defines.
Adomo acknowledges he is not working m a vacuum m his conviction that the 
disciphne of philosophical aesthetics needs reconstmction, and cites a number of theorists
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who initiate changes in aesthetics which he is able to build on. The three he mentions first are 
Benedetto Croce, Georg Lukacs and Walter Benjamin, citing in particular Lukacs’ Theory o f 
the Novel, Benjamin’s treatise Goethe’s Elective Affinities and The Origin o f German Tragic 
Drama. According to Adomo, these works have in common a 'radical nominahsm’ which is 
manifest in their concem with particular works of art. He writes,
Hegel’s programmatic idea - that knowing is giving oneself over to a 
phenomena rather than thinking about it from above - has become feasible in 
aesthetics with this tum to nominahsm...
Moreover,
Benjamin embraces the view that insights into the traditional problems of 
aesthetics, notably those of a metaphysical kind, can no longer be expected 
from a discussion of general principles but have to come from the realm of the 
particular in art, the particular being more than a mere specimen of the 
universal. 27
By invoking Lukacs, Croce and Benjarnin, Adomo is implying that the transformation 
of aesthetics, away from the universal to the paiticular, is bigger than his own particular 
philosophical motivations. It is part of a wider dissatisfaction with the modes of procedure 
practised by Ideahst aesthetics. This leads on to an important modification of his critique of 
Idealist aesthetics. While expressing reseiwations about the capacity of traditional aesthetics 
to deal with individual works of art, he does not denounce it out of hand. Rather, it is the 
changes that have taken place in art itself since Kant and Hegel formulated then* theories 
wliich have damaged them, limiting then usefulness. Adomo historicizes their position, 
claiming that the specific conditions which define the art he is concemed with are different 
from those confronted by Kant and Hegel. He thereby puts certain art beyond the giasp of 
their aesthetics: “Getting back to the question of why aesthetics has abated, I would argue 
that, while some of this lack of concem stems from problems inherent in aesthetics as a
Aesthetic Theory, p. 457. !
Aesthetic Theoiy, p. 457. |
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discipline, the greater part is due to changes in its object, i.e. art.”^^  The result of changes in 
ait mean that.
Putting it bluntly, we can say that Hegel and Kant were the last philosophers 
who could afford to write systematically on aesthetics without knowing 
anything about art. This was possible as long as art took its bearings from 
comprehensive norms which were accepted unquestioningly by the creative 
artist. Granted, there may never have been a single important work in which 
those norms were not in some way mediated or modified; somehow they 
proved to be larger than the individual works shaped after them. To the extent 
that gieat aesthetic thought conceptualized what was manifestly universal in 
ait, it tended to be in harmony with it.^ ^
Rejecting the idea that philosophical aesthetics is about the analysis and description of 
aesthetic experience in general, the issue for Aesthetic Theory is not to “solve” this problem, 
but to re-align it. This realignment must ensure that the difference between philosophical 
reflection and ait is not predetermined in the way philosophical aesthetics understands that 
relation. The preceding argument is an example of this process Adomo has invoked a number 
of different reasons for the necessary transformation of Aesthetics. Certainly there are things 
congenitally wiong with the aesthetics of Kant and Hegel with which Adomo as a 
philosopher is preoccupied. Aditionally, however, he claims art has changed beyond the 
parameters their theories can compensate for. Other theorists have made similar moves to 
aesthetic nominalism. In responding to this variety of mediating factors, Adomo defines 
Aesthetic Theory as sometlftng which is no longer simply embedded in a tradition of 
philosophical arguments about art, but as something which is transfoimmg itself into a 
different order of relation to art.
Aesthetic Theoiy, p. 464. 
Aesthetic Theoiy, p. 458.
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Mutual Dependence of Aesthetics and Art
Albrecht Wellmer has discussed the respective mimetic capacities of art and
philosophy in Adorno’s thought. As a starting point, he takes Adorno’s assertion in Negative
Dialectics that philosophy must strive to use concepts to get beyond the limitations of the
concept. He continues,
hi Negative Dialectics Adomo has tried to characterise this self-conquest of 
the concept as the incorporation of a “mimetic” moment into conceptual 
thought. Rationality and mimesis must come together to deliver rationality 
from its irrationality. Mimesis is the name for those modes of behaviour wliich 
are receptive, expressive, and communicative in a sensuous fashion.
hi other words, philosophy is conceptual and, as such, it is hmited m its capacity to represent
experience. It must stiive to get beyond this limitation, however, not by transforming itself
into another medium, but by mobilizing the “mimetic” moment in its own conceptual
resomces. Wellmer now defines art as the opposite of philosophy. He says that art is
“intellectualized mimesis, i.e., mimesis which has been both transformed and objectified by
rationality”, hi other words, Wellmer claims that philosophy is rational, but has a mimetic
moment, where art is mimetic with a rational moment. This begins to look as thougli art and
philosophy are effectively collapsed into each other. Wellmer goes on to argue, however, that
despite this “mtertwimng’’ of mimesis and reason as defining art and philosophy, they are
distinct because the intertwining occurs fiom “opposite poles”. What Wellmer is saying here
can be clarified with reference to an aspect of Adorno’s critique of Heidegger discussed
earlier. Adomo remarks that “The substance of concepts is to them both immanent, as far as
mild is concemed, and transcendent, as far as being is c o n c e m e d . W e  will recall that
Adomo says Heidegger is wrong to identify concepts as wholly rational; to do so is to imply
Negative Dialectics, p. 15.
Albrecht Wellmer, Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation: Adorno's Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity', p.
92.
Negative Dialectics, p. 12.
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mind and being as separable by reading concepts as pure mind. Given the inseparability of 
mind and being, it follows that concepts have both immanent and transcendent content. That 
is, concepts make specific rational truth claims that must be judged by mind. At the same 
time, the content of concepts is transcendent for being, because they leave a remnant in the 
object. It is because of this non-conceptual remnant in the object that philosophy has to 
deploy its mimetic moment. This, as we have seen, is the discursive form it takes as it evolves 
from the positing of stringent judgements. Now Wellmer’s argument shows that this whole 
dynamic of philosophical mimesis takes on a new identity when it confronts art. What 
happens is that the dynamic of philosophical mimesis comes to be seen as mind, by 
comparison with art’s being. In other words, the dynamic between the rational and sensuous 
modes within philosophy are externalized with the confrontation of philosophy with art. Thus 
far we have not discussed the mimetic capacity of ait. To do so, we need to understand that 
ait appears to philosophy in the light of its difference from philosophy, i.e. ait as being, in
contrast to philosophy as mind. Against this, ait is hke philosophy, because it is both mind j
1and being. This is the reason for Wellmer’s claim that art is mimesis that has been j
rationalized, where philosophy is reason with a mimetic moment. Now, the inseparabihty of j
reason and mimesis in philosophy and ait, is translated to their contrasting identities in then*
relation to each other. That is to say, philosophy appears as mind in the Ught of its contrast
with art, which in the hght of philosophical reflection, appears as being. It is with an
emphasis on the difference between philosophy as mind and art as being that Wellmer bases
his argument. Thus he writes
then relation to each other, a relation to two fragments of a non-reified sphit, 
is itself a relation between intuition and concept; a relationship to be sine 
which cannot be stabilized by the articulated unity of cognitive judgement.
The presence of reconcihng spirit in an unreconciled world can only be 
th o u ^ t of aporetically.^^
Albrecht Wellmer, ‘Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation: Adorno's Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity’, p.
92.
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Having just described art and philosophy as virtually identical in so far as they both “contain”
mimetic and rational moments, Wellmer noiv describes them as “aporetic” in their relation to
each other. In explaining this, Wellmer invokes the distinction between “discursive” and
“non-discursive” knowledge: “both deshe knowledge; hi its entirety but the very fact of
knowledge being spht into non-discm*sive and discursive knowledge means that they can each
only grasp complimentary fragmented foims of truth”. So that
hi the work of ait tmth makes it’s appearance as an object of the senses; this 
accounts for its superiority over discursive knowledge. But precisely because 
tmth appears by means of the senses in the work of art, tmth remams 
inaccessible to aesthetic experience; since the work of art cannot express the 
tmth which it makes manifest, aesthetic experience does not know what it
3 4expeiiences.
Wellmer continues to expound what this dilemma implies for Adomo.
Should one try to grasp what cannot be giasped through an inteipretative 
penetration of the work of ait, then it disappears like a rainbow to which one 
has come too close {AT. pl78). However, h  the tmth content of works of art 
were locked into the moment of aesthetic experience, it would be lost and the 
aesthetic experience would itself be in vain. For this reason, works of art are 
dependent on “interpretative reason” {AT. p. 186) on the production of their 
tmth content through interpretation, which points beyond the fleetkg moment 
of aesthetic experience. For Adomo, interpretation means philosophical 
inteipretation; the need for inteipretation which is inherent in the work of ait 
is the need which aesthetic experience has for illumination. “Genuine aesthetic 
experience must become philosophy or it fails to exist at all.” {AT. p. 190) 
Philosophy , however, whose utopia it is “to open up the non-conceptual by 
means of concepts, without making it equivalent to these concepts.” {ND. 
p. 10) remains tied to the medium of conceptual language, in which the 
immediacy of tmth as it appears in the aesthetic experience cannot be 
restored.
Now, in an important sense, Wellmer diagnoses here is the familiar contradiction latent in all 
philosophical aesthetics - that what it sets out to do is literally impossible. The distinction 
between the means of philosophical aesthetics as discmsive thought and its object, non-
Albrecht Wellmer, Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation; Adorno's Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity', p. 
92-93.
Albrecht Wellmer, Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation; Adorno's Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity’, p.
93.
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discursive thought, are incompatible. The impossibility of aesthetics is an overt theme in
Aesthetic Theory and is related to Adorno’s pessimism. At the same time, Wellmer highlights
the fact that in Adorno’s thought this incompatibihty is not just a problem for philosophical
aesthetics, it is constitutive of philosophical aesthetics. As such, it is not just a contradiction
that needs to be overcome. Its imphcations need to be explored and explained. Ait and
philosophy both have differently configured rational and mimetic aspects, neither of which
can properly grasp the truth. There is the implication that together, as reunited fragments,
they might be more truthful than in then isolation. The arena where they are brought together
is philosophical aesthetics, fir this sense, philosophical aesthetics is not simply a somewhat
idiosyncratic branch of philosophy, dedicated to the analysis of art and aesthetic experience.
Rather, it is where discursive and nondiscuisive thought are held together. Discursive
thought qua mind tries to represent art qua being. Discursive thought qua being attempts to
be mimetic of art in the rational critique of its own concepts. Thus characterized, Rudiger
Bubner has emphasized the defining importance of aesthetics for Adorno:
The pessimism vis-à-vis any historical progress of rationality combined with a 
Marxist distrust of all pure theory worked together to make philosophy as a 
whole appear unreliable. Adorno’s way out of radical skepticism is aesthetics.
Theory of art is not only one philosophical discipline among others, it tends 
increasingly to coincide with philosophy. That theory which camiot simply 
“state” the truth, because its understanding is absorbed in aesthetic 
experience, offers the best chance to truth.
This characterization of the strategic significance of aesthetics as the exemplary site for the
bringing together mind and being relates to Lukacs’ configuration of his relation to the
proletariat. For Lukacs, it was the job of philosophical reflection qua mind to represent the
reification of experience to the proletariat. The proletariat alone had the power to transform
the reification of consciousness at the site of its production. At the same time, the proletariat
Rudiger Bubner, “Hegel’s Aesthetics - Yesterday and Today”, in Steinkraus & Schmitz, (eds.). Art and 
Philosophy in Hegel's Philosophy, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), pp. 26-27. •
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did not understand either their revolutionary significance, or their own potentially non-reified
consciousness. Ironically, it is Lukacs’ romanticization of the proletariat as potentially pure
being that does not allow him to consider his own being, and hence the rmnd of the
proletariat. The ubiquity of reification in Adomo is a fimction of his configuration of the
inseparability of mind and being at this level, which in tum has a causal relation to the
significance he gives aesthetics. Of course, Adomo and Lukacs were perpetually disagieeing
on this constellation of mutually sustaining assumptions in each others’ thought. It is behind
Lukacs’ attack on Adomo in the 1962 preface of The Theory o f the Novel:
A considerable part of the leading German intelligentsia, including Adomo, 
have taken up residence in the ‘Grand Hotel Abyss’ which I described in 
connection with my critique of Schopenhauer as ‘a beautifiil hotel equipped 
with every comfort, on the edge of an abyss, of nothingness, of absurdity. And 
the daily contemplation of the abyss between excellent meals and artistic 
entertainments, can only heighten the enjoyment offered.
The earlier critique of Schopenhauer to which Lukacs is re-invoking, appears in his book The
Destruction o f Reason (1962). The sophistication of Lukacs’ insult is not just what it says
about Adomo, but that in re-using the same insult against Adomo, Lukacs is likening Adomo
to the original anti-Hegelian. He is thereby alluding to the fact that their disagieement is
ultimately about who is the better reader and developer of Hegel. Adomo described The
Destruction o f Reason as actually signaling the destmction of Lukacs’ own reason.
Adomo’s emphasis on the strategic significance of aesthetics as the mutual
dependence of art and philosophy contrasts with Heidegger’s account of their relation. Paul
Crowther has argued that, for Heidegger, the rise of aesthetics is a symptom of the decline of
great art:
He [Heidegger] asserts that at the period of the Greeks’ great art, their 
‘lummous state of knowing’ meant that they had ‘no need’ of an aesthetics. 
Aesthetics, indeed, begins only when Greek art ‘goes into decline. ’ Why does 
it go into decline? Heidegger does not answer this question explicitly but the
Georg Lukacs,77?e Theory o f the Novel: A historico-philosophical essay on the forms o f great epic 
literature, trans. A. Bostock, (London: Merlin, 1978), p. 11.
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direction of his thinking is manifestly clear. Greek culture (certainly at the time 
of the pre-Socratics) dwelt in a close and authentic proximity to Being, and 
brought it to an unconcealment in an appropriate way. However, the rise of 
Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy introduced more dissembled modes of 
thinking which came to pervade other aspects of culture and to tum them 
away from the authentic unconcealment of Being. Art, therefore, now comes 
to be understood fundamentally as a means to the production of feeling, i.e., 
in terms of its effect on the human subject. Again, in the Modem period, we 
find that the rise of the aesthetic attitude once more coincides with the decline 
of great art. Under the impact of Cartesian philosophy, man continues his 
dissembling of Being and understands himself fundamentally from the 
viewpoint of his own subjectivity. Art accordingly re-orientates itself towai ds 
the more personal dimension of expression and feeling. It is this tendency 
which the aesthetic attitude attempts to legitimise,
This is extremely usefid for teasing out some of the differences between Heidegger 
and Adomo as they have been described thus far, in terms of their ramifications for 
aesthetics. Heidegger makes a distinction between the “gr eat ait” of the pre-Socratic Greeks 
and ait of the modem period, which needs aesthetics. This move, for Heidegger, is a decline. 
Adomo makes the same distinction, though it is not as much between the ait of the Gi eeks 
and the Modem as between the Modem and eveiything else. At the same time, Adomo 
reverses Heidegger’s prognosis of decline while accepting the basis of Heidegger’s 
distinction between Greek ait and Modem art. Thus, it is precisely when, it is thought that ait 
can be experienced without resoit to philosophical unpacking by aesthetics that it is 
irrelevant. This is a function of both the ait object and of the deteitnination of experience in 
history. Thus pre-Modem art can appear unproblematic because it does not manifest the 
tensions within it, and reification simplifies the experience of art to the extent that its tmth 
value is understood as equivalent to its physical existence, hi other words, under the present 
reification of consciousness, the only art which has potential value is that art which is not 
susceptible to the kmd of ‘luminous knowing” Heidegger ascribes to the Greeks. On the
Paul Crowther,“Heidegger and the Question of Aesthetics,” Journal o f  the British Society for 
Phenomenology 19 (January 1988), p. 53.
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contrary, it is the very resistance of some modem art works to such assimilation which 
creates one half of the necessity for the mutual dependence of art and philosophy.
One of the oddest things about the reception of Adomo’s aesthetics is that his 
rejection of pre-modem ait as a whole has gone almost completely uncommented on. Instead 
his hostility to “mass culture” has been explained as a symptom of his cultural conseivatism 
There is ceitainly an aspect of Adomo which is conservative, hi the light of his wholesale 
rejection of pre-Modem art manifest in explicit discussions of its current irrelevance and in 
statements such as “One reason why the well educated close themselves off from radically 
modem art is their angry displeasme at having to witness the decomposition of traditional 
artistic values brought on by the murderous historical force of modernity”/^ however, his 
cultural conseivatism, if it is that, needs to be rethought.
Adorno’s critique of Hegel or Philosophical Mimesis as “delay”
If Wellmer has diagnosed the mutual dependence of aesthetics and art, he does not
explain the form it takes. In the fiist part of this chapter, philosophical mimesis was
considered as the “movement of the concept” qua the movement of aesthetics towards art.
The movement, thus described, represents the capacity of philosophy to do something about
the inadequacy of its conceptual medium The other side of the coin is that philosophy,
despite its best efforts to move towards art, cannot jfinally do so. Thus, as Wellmer writes.
Philosophy , however, whose utopia it is “to open up the non-conceptual by 
means of concepts, without making it equivalent to these concepts.” {Negative 
Dialectics, p. 10) remains tied to the medium of conceptual language, in which 
the immediacy of truth as it appears in the aesthetic experience cannot be 
restored.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 50.
Albrecht Wellmer, ‘Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation: Adorno's Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity’, p.
93.
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This means that the “movement of the concept” cannot be construed as a simple movement 
towards its object. It is, to return to somethmg like what is implied by Gadamer’s 
equivocation, also about maintaining a distance between philosophy and its object. The best 
way to explain the dilemma Adomo faces here is to reconsider his position relative to Hegel’s 
teleology.
As we saw in Marx’ critique of Hegel, Marx emphasises Hegel’s greatest contribution
to philosophy as his systematic development of the idea of tmth as process - “historical
becoming”. As I have already suggested, Adorno’s equivocal relationship with Hegel’s
thought is a reflection of the central importance of the idea to his own philosophy, combined
with a rejection of that element of Hegel’s Idealism which emphasises the possibility of
attaining Absolute Knowledge. Adorno’s ambivalence towards Hegel on this issues is by no
means without precedent. Both within Hegel’s own thought, and in its subsequent
inteipretation and development by others, an obvious tension exists between the Idealist
aspiiation for Absolute Knowledge and the emphasis on tmth as inseparable fi*om “historical
becoming” and its consequent dynamism Take the following quotation from the Preface to
Hegel’s Phenomenology:
the real issue is not exhausted by stating it as an aim, but by carrying it out, nor is 
the result the acmal whole, but rather the result together with the process through 
which it came about. The aim itself is a lifeless universal, just as the guiding 
tendency is a mere drive that as yet lacks an actual existence; and the bare result is 
a corpse which has left the guiding tendency behind it."^ ^
This putative unity of “process” and “result” is notoriously awkward to grasp. As we 
have seen, one cannot simply be adopted without the other. We cannot simply reject Hegel’s 
claim for Absolute Knowledge. He can reply that we are criticising his claim for the unity of 
“process” and “result” m isolation fi*om the essential activity of dialectical argument, which
G.W.F.Hegel, Phenomenology o f  Spirit, trans A.V.Miller, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 2.
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arrives at such a conclusion. Hegel’s dialectical argument is itself based on the form of 
contradiction. According to him, it is only so far as contradictions are perceived to exist, and 
we are able to identify them, that experience is possible. We develop more sophisticated 
understandings of our place in the world through establishing contradictions in our 
conception of the status quo, resolving them, but in the process estabhshing new 
contradictions. For Hegel “contradiction is the root of aU movement and vitahty; it is only in 
so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity.
The strength of Hegel’s argument lies in the idea that it is not only philosophy which 
deals in contradictions and then resolution, but experience has the same basis. Hegel can 
claim, therefore, that in the process of his philosophical argument he is able to combine the 
action of the processes of thought with a criticism of it. Any contradiction we identify in 
Hegel’s position is necessarily derived by principles he has already described, and can 
therefore be accounted for and resolved on Hegel’s terms. Of this irrfuriatmg aspect of 
Hegel’s thought Adorno writes “Tike other closed systems of thought, Hegel’s philosophy 
avails itself of the dubious advantage of not having to allow any criticism whatsoever.
Hegel himself  ^ however, sometimes gives the impression of havhig been unable to 
resolve the contradiction between “Process” and “Result” - most notoriously hr what some 
have seen as the notion that the process of history ends with the process of his thought in the 
Prussian State of 1827. There are cogent reasons for dismissing this simple view of Hegel’s 
failure, the most obvious is that the Prussian State of 1827 should not be read as a frozen 
moment m history, but as “the present” hr the sense that it was Hegel’s ‘present”, and is 
hence thoroughly dynamic.
G.W.F.Hegei, Science o f Logic, trans A.V. Miller, (New York: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 439. 
T.W. Adorno, ‘Aspects of Hegel's Pliilosophy' in Hegel: Three Studies, trans. Shieity Weber Nicholson, 
(Cambridge, Mass: MTT, 1993), p. 2.
In defending Hegel against one of liis lesser disciples, Lukacs in notes the awkward tension between the 
dynamism of Hegel's philosopliical method and its conclusion:
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Nonetheless, where there is tension between “process” and ‘Yesult” within his work, 
the history of the reception of Hegel has tended to reproduce it. Hegelians have spht on the 
issue of whether he achieved Absolute Knowledge, or whether his position implies truth can 
only be possible as the product of ‘historical becoming”, hi other words, the tension between 
“process” and “result”, which Hegel announces as both necessary and overcome in his 
philosophy, is not resolved simply at the level of reading. If this were the case, the 
sympathetic commentator will find Hegel to have overcome the contradiction, and the 
unsympathetic will see it as unresolved. On the contrary, sympathetic readings of Hegel 
divide on this question.
To summarise, therefore, we can say that there appear to be two kinds of 
contradiction between “process” and “result” in Hegel. There is one which is emphasised as 
necessary for the possibfiity of thought, and one which emerges out of a genuine imcertahity 
as to the nature of his achievement and his own understanding of it.
Adorno’s critique of Hegel rests on disciiminating between these two categories of 
contradiction. For Adomo, the distinction surfaces most obviously at moments of crisis in 
Hegel’s philosophy where one of the contradiction between “process” and “result” threatens 
to exclude the other. For example, Hegel notoriously has real problems both in beginning and 
ending his argument. The Preface to The Phenomenology begins with an apology that it 
should be necessary at all
...ill stopping at the present, at what he calls the self-attainment of the spirit, Hegel's system 
is reactionary both in substance and in its intentions and consequences. Looked at from the 
methodological standpoint, however, refusal to go any furtlier reveals Hegel's magnificent 
realism, liis rejection of all utopias, his concern to conceive philosophy as the conceptual 
expression o f history itself 2eid not as philosophy about liistory... only in consequence of his 
reactionary hypostatizing of the present did it change from a dynamic principle impelling 
reality forwards into a static one designed to fix the stage presently attained as an absolute.
see Georg Lukacs, ‘Moses Hess and the Problems of Idealist Dialectics,' in Rodney Livingstone, (ed.), Georg 
Lukacs: Political Writings 1919-1929. The Question o f Parlimentarianism and Other Essays, (London: New 
Left Books, 1968), p. 188.
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It is customary to preface a work with an explanation of the author’s aim... In the 
case of a philosophical work, however, such an explanation seems not only 
supeifluous but, in view of the nature of the subject-matter, even inappropriate and 
misleading.
Hegel has similar difBculty in trying to bring his philosophy to a conclusion, to
reconcile the “movement through contradiction” which defines his argument and with its
“End” in the form of Absolute Knowledge. Adomo complains of Hegel’s dilemma, “if
something is conceived to be possible only as an emergent phenomenon, it makes httle sense
to claim simultaneously that it is integral and ‘complete’. A n d ,  more specifically, in
Negative Dialectics he writes of Hegel’s position,
There is contradiction as well as kinship between this concept of the system - a 
concept that concludes, and thus brings to a standstill - and the concept of 
dynamism, of pure, autarkic, subjective generation, which constitutes all 
philosophical systematics. Hegel could adjust the tension between statics and 
dynamics only by construing his Unitarian principle, the spirit as a simultaneous 
being-for-itself and pure becoming...the implausibihty of this construction - in 
which subjective generation and ontology, noroinalism and realism, are syncopated 
at the archhnedean point - will prevent the resolution of that tension is also 
immanent in the system
The main co-ordinates of Adorno’s relation to Hegel’s philosophy, then, are part of a 
long tradition of ambivalence towards Hegel’s philosophical legacy. In the quotation above, 
however, Adomo signals a refining of the basic contradiction between “process” and “result” 
as has been described thus far. The issue here is not of “which Hegel” to follow, as is 
reflected in the spht between the Young and Old Hegehans. Rather, Adomo emphasises 
contradiction at a different level - the issue concerns precisely the kind of “process” Hegel’s 
philosophy imphes.
As it was with Demda, the focus of Adomo’s attention here is Hegel’s idea of “the 
system”. The problem, he suggests, is that if “process” or “historical becoming” is always
G.W.F.Hegei, Phenomenology o f Spirit, p.l. 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 39.47 Negative Dialectics, p. 25.
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conceived of as taking place systematically, it is a fimdamentally different kind of “process” 
from that which takes place without such a framework. Moreover, for Adomo, the difference 
is highly significant m terms of diagnosing what, for him, is wrong with Hegel’s philosophy. 
Despite Hegel’s emphasis on the notion of “tmth as historical becoming”, its necessary 
containment within the framework of Ideahst aspirations always predetermines the way a 
particular question is answered. This prevents Hegel from fidly reahsing the ambition of 
allowing objects to “speak” on their own terms, without the imposition of extraneous 
categories of judgement. For Hegel, the aspiration had been, as Adomo says “fr eedom 
toward the object”. Hegel aspired to describe the world as it is in itself, without imposing on 
it any subjective bias. By conceiving of experience as systematic, however, Hegel’s version of 
“historical becoming” is modified through its orientation to an end, namely, the idea that the 
world is finally meaningful. To put this sfightly differently, the potential ‘fr eedom towards the 
object”, signalled by the idea of tmth as “historical becoming”, is hi fact already “unfree” 
since it is defined by Hegel’s aspiration for the “Tmth” which “Stands”. As Adomo writes hr 
Negative Dialectics,
The philosophical call for immersion hr detaÜ, a demand not to be steered by any 
philosophy fr om above or by any intentions infiltrated into it, was Hegel’s one side 
aheady. Only hi his case the execution caught in tautology: as by prearrangement, 
his kind of immersion in detail brings forth that sphit which from the outset was 
posited as total and absolute.
Seen hi the fight of this criticism of Hegel, Adomo’s rejection of the idea of an “End” 
for philosophy might be conceived of as having removed the aspect of predetermination hr 
the putative freedom of Hegel’s idea of tmth as “historical becoming”, fin place of Hegel’s 
“End” for philosophy, Adomo adopts the principle of “I nf i n i t y . The  task of philosophy is 
never-ending, because reason is never sufficient to describe its object fully. The negative
Negative Dialectics, p. 303.
Negative Dialectics, p. 62.
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capacity of reason operates in philosophy so that, ideally, any claim philosophy makes 
contains within it an intimation of its own inadequacy. As Adomo puts it, “Disenchantment 
of the concept is the antidote of philosophy.” ®^ In other words, philosophy’s persistent 
investigation and inquiry into the validity of its own achievements gives it a uniquely critical 
awareness of the inadequacy of claims to have gr asped Absolute knowledge.
Adomo often seems to contradict himself when describing Hegel. Moreover, such 
contradiction is not simply defined by his advocacy of the idea of “historical becoming”, and 
rejection of “the System”. On the contrary, where Hegel is discussed hr terms of “historical 
becoming” the insidious influence of “the System” is played down.^  ^Where Adomo discusses 
Hegel in Negative Dialectics and the predominant motif is “the System”, he is 
correspondingly far more hostile to Hegel, and the idea of “historical becoming” receives 
scant attention.
Despite the potential for confusion, a concrete manifestation of the different priority 
Hegel and Adomo allow the principle of “historical becoming” is in then contrasting 
deployment of introductory and concluding remarks. Hegel makes extravagant claims to 
Absolute Knowledge, even if that condition is itself conceived of as dynamic. Where he is at 
pains to emphasise that the real issue is “the result together with the process thr ough which it 
came about”, Hegel seems to invite confusion. Adomo for one, is unconvinced by such 
putative unity, speaking of the “implausibihty of this constnrction”. Similarly, although Hegel 
apologises for the presence of a Preface at the beginning of the Phenomenology, he still 
writes one. hr contrast to Hegel, Adomo is notoriously evasive as to the question of 
beginnings, results or conclusions to his project - fact which exposed him to a great deal of 
criticism ftom more orthodox, utopian Marxists, especially Lukacs. His resistance to
Negative Dialectics, p. 13.
See for example, the essay "The Experientai Content of Hegel's Philosophy" in Hegel: Three Studies.
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teleological thought is similarly a major factor in his dispute with Benjamin. It is also a focus
for more recent criticism of Adorno’s position. Jay complains.
Negative Dialectics ends with a weak plea for an uneasy alhance between 
nonabsolutist metaphysics and the negation of identity. The ghost of the Kantian 
Antinomies remained unexorcised.
Just as Adorno’s problem with the ‘Tdea” of a beginning for philosophical thought is
reflected in the difficulty he has m engaging with traditional philosophical argument, so his
refusal to countenance the idea of an “End” to philosophy leaves him open to the criticism
that he does not bring his arguments to satisfactory conclusions. On the few occasions where
Adomo addresses the idea of an “End”, it is always self-consciously paradoxical, as for
example in Negative Dialectics where he remarks.
What makes philosophy risk the strain of its own infinity is the unwananted 
expectation that each individual and particular puzzle it solves will be like 
Leibniz’s monad, the ever-illusive entnety in itself - although, of course, in hue 
with a pre-established disharmony rather than a pre-estabhshed harmony.
hi Hegel, ambiguity as to his own aspirations creates a contradiction between the 
claim for simultaneous “process” and “result”. Adomo on the other hand takes a far less 
equivocal attitude to the problem Whilst, indeed, he almost admits an aspiration to 
“entirety”, and therefore to conclusion, such “entirety” is characterised as both “ever- 
illusory” and (in obvious opposition to Hegel) as a “pre-estabhshed dishaimony”.
We can say then that Adomo modifies Hegel’s idea of “tmth as historical becoming” 
by removing the possibhity of its “End”. This, in tum, changes the way dialectical thought 
engages with detail. Instead of predetermining particular phenomena as amenable to 
exhaustive description, he predetermines as partially knowable. This incomplete knowledge, 
comprehended as such, does not however represent failure for philosophy. Rather, it
Martin Jay, ‘The Concept of totality in Lukacs and Adorno' in S. Avineri (ed). Varieties o f Marxism, (The 
Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 163.
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replicates the “non-identical” world as it really is in itself. This is the other dimension of 
philosophical mimesis in Aesthetic Theory.
Adorno’s invocation of Hegel’s idea of the “movement of the concept” is most 
significant, not least because it reintroduces into our argument Gadamer’s idea of the truth of 
philosophy as deriving from its character as discursive thought, hi so doing, it begins to 
resolve the tension inherent in the idea of philosophical mimesis as “self-conquest of the 
concept”, because that self-conquest can also be understood as processural, rather than 
somehow isolated in a single truth claim.
Like Hegel, Adomo understands his project to be historically confined. At the same 
time, he allows for accumulation in the increasingly adequate experience of artworks. 
Indeed, he exemplifies it hi Aesthetic Theory, but this is not a teleological process, as it is in 
Hegel. This does not mean he abandons reason; his deployment of reason is different fr om 
Hegel’s because it is always stmgghng against its definitive insufficiency, hence the idea of 
the concept striving to get beyond the concept, hi Hegel, because of the idea of sublation, 
what was said before is out dated by what is said afi;er. hi Adomo this “outdathig” cannot 
take place in the same way because he is not a teleological thinker. In Hegel, the mimetic 
impulse of his philosophy, the ^^movement of the concept”, is guaranteed because there is 
always going to be a rational explanation for the failme of a particular rational representation. 
The same goes for Adomo. He remains completely committed to the critical power of 
rational thought, but Adomo is not a teleological thinker. Or is he? hi Aesthetic Theory, a 
concept is not necessarily preceded by a less perfect version. Rather different concepts are 
constantly up against each other. Definitions are incomplete and sometimes appear 
unsustainable. Hegel’s methodical procedure is not simply inverted into complete anarchy in 
Aesthetic Theory.
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It might be objected that this position reflects a vestige of dogmatic 
confidence in the Hegelian system, that a notion like ‘movement of the 
concept’ has no validity outside that system, and that to grasp a thing as the 
life of the concept presupposes the coincidence of objective totahty with
sphit. This is not so. My argument is that the general characteristics of art
are more than just responses to the need for conceptual reflection: they also 
testify to the piinciple that the need for individuation has its limits and that 
neither it nor its opposite should be ontologized. '^^
The opening pages of Aesthetic Theory are difficult, not just because of the controversial
nature of some of its claims, but because Adomo presents them in a dogmatic, even
polemical manner. Without seeking to excuse Adomo for this tendency, his apparent
dogmatism is a function of his critical method. Recall that in the Draft Introduction Adomo
identifies different, but coimected, motivations for his argument. These include the
inadequacies of traditional aesthetics, the move towards nominalism in contemporary
aesthetics, and changes in ait. As I argued at the end of Chapter 1, any claim Adomo makes
will be justifiable with reference to one or more of the mediating ideas that motivate his
thinking. More important, all these mediations have to work simultaneously in driving the
arguments of Aesthetic Theory. It is because Adomo is so acutely aware of the dangers of
allowing his argument to become over-determined by a single perspective that tmth claims
win not necessaiily generate justification or explanation hi the immediate context of then
articulation. Rather, the implications of a tmth claim for a related argument will be
compensated for, sometimes a few lines later, sometimes pages later, sometimes m a
completely different part of Aesthetic Theory. This compensation expresses itself hi the way
aesthetics modifies itself in response to a particular idea of art, but also with regaid to the
other mediating ideas which define Aesthetic Theory’, the idea of reification, the tradition of
philosophical aesthetics, Hegel’s aspiration for philosophy, etc. The justification for the
claims he makes only begins to emerge as an indirect interaction between claims about art
Aesthetic Theory, p. 259.
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and claims about the practice of aesthetics, reification, and so on. These are claims which, m 
the process of reading, gradually emerge as mutually supportive by the hnphcations they 
carry for each other.
hi Negative Dialectics, Adomo explains what he is trying to do by using this method 
of “argument”, and why he does it. He emphasises coherent aims, despite their opaque 
articulation.
The unifying moment survives...because there is no step-by-step progression 
fiom the concepts to a more general cover concept. Instead, the concepts 
enter into a constellation...The model for this is the conduct of language. 
Language ofifers no system of signs for cognitive functions. Where it appears 
essentially as a language, where it becomes a form of representation it wül not 
define its concepts. It lends objectivity to them by the relation into which it 
puts the concepts...
This notion of Aesthetic Theory as an accumulation of different arguments, rather than a 
single developing argument, is central to its definition. It also explains more clearly how we 
might think of its speculative structure as a fimction of the stiingent deployment of 
philosophical judgement. This is obviously not the linear progress of traditional philosophical 
argument, but a constant breaking off of that argument. Concepts are left undefined in the 
immediate context of then articulation. Asides are made; the word “incidentally” appears 
frequently; diversions are entered into. These are all expressions of the terminal inadequacy 
of the philosophical concept in an abstract sense. At the same time, they are also a filling in 
of the gaps left by concepts. These nonconceptual gaps are the hnphcations for the 
representation of art of reification, history, and the pecuharities of a particular work itself
Another aspect of this tendency to stray from the point is reflected in the assertion 
that “It is through its dynamic laws, not through some invariable principle, that art can be 
understood. It is defined by its relation to what is different from art.” ®^ An enormous amount
Negative Dialectics, p. 162.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 4.
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o f Aesthetic Theory is devoted to explaining what art is not. One of the things art is
not is philosophy, and it is clear that the discursive quahty of philosophy, as it contrasts with 
and compliments the immediacy of the art work, is central to its trutli value. Thus, “Pure 
immediacy is not enough to generate aesthetic perception. Besides spontaneity, will and 
mental concentration are needed as well - a contradiction that cannot be liquidated by 
decree. Philosophical reflection takes time, the “movement of the concept” takes time, and 
it is the temporal assimilation of itself to a work of art which is a necessary definition of 
Aesthetic Theory.
Identifying this idea of various diversions from “the point” as an explicit strategy of 
Aesthetic Theory is a problem. I have argued that it is a function of the stiingent deployment 
of philosophical argument. At the same time, ideas of what philosophy is and the conventions 
of philosophical reading, are just not equipped to read it that way. Straying from ‘the point’ 
is de facto bad philosophy. It is with the idea that such a philosophical response to reading 
Aesthetic Theory will not pay attention to the various potential levels and significances of 
digiession in Aesthetic Theory that a veiy limited recomse to a related insight from literary 
criticism can be usefiiUy deployed. This is not to saying Aesthetic Theory is hterary, but in its 
resistance to teleology, it relates to various anti-narrative devices in hterature.
Patricia Parker has discussed at length the structure and significance of the rhetorical 
trope of dialtio or amplificatio in Renaissance hterature. It is her discussion of this trope 
which is relevant to understanding the structure of Aesthetic Theory, with one important 
proviso. Parker notes that, as a rhetorical device, dilatio is something which would have been 
learned and consciously deployed to create a desired eflfect.^  ^ I am not claiming that Adomo
Aesthetic Theory, p. 103.
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did anything hke this. On the contrary, it is precisely the problem of writing philosophically
about art m the way he does that spontaneously generates effects which the conscious literaiy
deployment of dilatio seeks to achieve directly. Parker explains that
“To dilate,” in Renaissance EngHsh, meant not only to expand, disperse or 
spread abroad but also to put off, postpone, prolong, or play for time - 
meanings which still linger in the modem English “dilatory”. It is this 
combination of temporal deferral and spatial tension which informs its 
significance in several different contexts. The specifically rhetorical meaning 
of “dilate” - the amplifying and prolonging of discourse - involves both an 
expansion and an opening up, the creation of more copious speech through 
expHcation, or unfolding, of a brief or closed, hermetic “sentence”, widening 
the space between its beginning and ending and generating much out of little, 
many words (or things) where there had been few.^^
Now, there are various ways this discussion can be seen to be directly related to what
happens in Aesthetic Theory. I have already suggested that one such is the postponement or
prolonging of the deployment of the philosophical concept hi the face of its acknowledged
inadequacy. Equally, since the meaning of every concept posited in Aesthetic Theory is
mediated, its meaning(s) shift and change within the work, and what it means firom one
perspective can be different fiom what it means fiom another. It is here that Parker’s
description of ‘Thetoiical” dilation as the “explication, or unfolding of a brief or closed
hermetic sentence” is particularly useful. Adomo is well known for his use of the aphoristic
form through Minima Moralia. One way to read some of the chapters of Aesthetic Theory is
to understand each as the partial unfolding of a hermetic sentence with which it begins. For
example, Chapter 1 begins “Today it goes without saying that nothing goes without saying,
much less without thinking”,®® Chapter 7 with “The experience of art is vahd only when it is
hve.”®^ Now, not aH the chapters can be read this way, because some are directly contiguous
Parker, P. “Dilation and Delay: Renaissance Matrices,” Poetics Today 5 (1984) p. 520. 
Aesthetic Theory, p. I.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 252.
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with the previous one. The means by which this unfolding takes place is again usefuUy
delineated- by Parker. In this case, Erasmus serves as an example.
Erasmus describes the principal means of dilating a discourse - dividing a 
short sentence into its component parts through what was known classically 
as divisio and partitio (The first method of enriching what one has to say on 
any subject is to take something that can be expressed in brief and general 
terms, and expand it and separate it into its constituent parts”). The figure for 
this dilation through partition in Erasmus comes fiom the lexicon of natural or 
commercial abundance: “This is just like displaying some object for sale first 
of all through a lattice or inside a wrapping, and then rmwrapping and opening 
it out and displaying it more fully to the gaze.”®^
This is a very useful definition of what happens at various moments in Aesthetic Theory). The 
direct quotation form Erasmus at the end of the above quotation gives a whole new meaning 
to Adorno’s well -known assertion that “No theory escapes the market p l a c e . N o t  
withstanding this hony, a suggestive but incomprehensible idea is fiequently presented in 
Aesthetic Theory with polemical directness. Its implications are then developed in various 
ways which go so far, break off and are taken up hr a new way. This in turn is again broken 
off^  and started again fiom a different angle. This strategy can be related back to the notion 
of the inseparabihty of “mhid” and “being” discussed earher.
Adorno posits an opaque or, at least, indeterminate idea or concept. Mind, in its 
responsibility to deploy concepts hi a stringent manner, begins to explain what that idea or 
concept means. This proceeds for a while, then Being takes over and reveals the one­
sidedness of the forgoing discussion. This discussion then reorientates itself with regard to 
the original problem. This is philosophical stringency in its fullest sense. Stringency is 
deployed, both in the use of philosophical judgement in its representation of an object, and hr 
the withdrawal of philosophical judgement in the light of a continued non-conceptual 
remainder. Now, in Hegel, this process moves forward and, as we have seen, is teleological.
^ Parker, P. “Dilation and Delay: Renaissance Matrices,” p. 521. 
Negative Dialectics, p. 4.
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hi Aesthetic Theory, progress is possible to the extent that an argument is developed under 
the auspices of mind, but when this is disrupted by being, mhid can only return to the original 
problem for a parallel development fiom a different perspective. Thus Aesthetic Theory is an 
argument which is constantly diagnosing and filling gaps, as is Hegel’s Phenomenology. The 
difference is that these gaps in representation are always bridgeable for Hegel, while for 
Adomo they only are temporarily, in the instance when mhid operates in isolation fiom being.
Earlier hi this chapter, a variation of this strategy of argument was presented in 
Adorno’s discussion of the various different reasons why traditional philosophical aesthetics 
had become obsolete. The “movement of the concept” imphcit in Adorno’s metacritique of 
aesthetics and the reorientation of his own aesthetics in relation to art is philosophical 
mimesis writ large in Aesthetic Theory). The same broad pattern repeats itself throughout 
Aesthetic Theory at different “magnifications.” Chapters 1 and 2 of Aesthetic Theory are 
some of the most difficult to read, because of a range and variety of thoughts about art and 
the aesthetic are raised simultaneously. The remaiodng chapters can be thought of as 
developing some of the particular themes raised hr Chapters 1 and 2. Each chapter “shows” 
and “says” a particular configuration of art and philosophy, concentrating on a particular 
aspect of their definition. Within this pattern, however, chapters 3 to 6 can be read as a 
particularly important progression. I will consider these chapters hi then sequence. Before 
doing so, in the next chapter I will concentrate on a section of Chapter 10 of Aesthetic 
Theory.
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Chapter V 
AESTHETIC THEORY’. CHAPTER 10
Adomo describes the chapters o f Aesthetic Theory as a series of “partial complexes”. 
Partial, because each is the discussion of an issue fiom the perspective of an aggregation of 
only a few of the possible mediating themes, hi this sense, the chapters of Aesthetic Theory 
can be thought of as the breaking down of the constellation of arguments which constitute 
Aesthetic Theory, necessary fiom an organisational point of view. This is not to facilitate the 
development of a line of argument. The organisation of chapters, or arguments within 
chapters, is not necessarily linear so the order in which they are read is not specially 
important. Instead, the strategy of breaking down the work chapter by chapter enables 
Adomo to place some kind of limitation on the parameters of his discussion. The necessity 
for doing this is as an organisational antidote to the philosophical imperative to strive for the 
most adequate possible conceptual representation of the concrete particular. One of the 
things this generates is simple quantity of argument. Concepts need constant adjustment and 
reformulation. This takes in the different contexts of their deployment, but the contexts 
themselves are not definitively separable. Such complexity generates writing, and the demand 
of the material itself is to keep the moves of the argument as seamless as possible. The 
negative impact of arguing Aesthetic Theory into chapters is that everything Adomo says in 
a chapter needs to be taken on its own merits. It also needs to be thought of as a part of a 
more extensive argument, is thus incomplete. In chapter 10 o f Aesthetic Theory the aspect of 
art that he concentrates on is its “artefactuality”. hi the section discussed below he moves 
fiom a consideration of the general significance of the artefactual quahty of art, to the 
consideration of a particular object, hr this case Picasso’s use of fight. While the narrowing of
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focus from the general to the particular is being described, another movement takes place.
Adomo is thus ‘showing’ what happens when philosophy attempts to describe the
artefactuahty of art and the inevitability of a remainder.
This chapter considers what Adomo means by his first statement, “The experience of
art is adequate only when it is five.” In beginning to unfold its meaning he refiects.
This statement predicates something over and above a certain relationship 
between viewer and viewed, or that psychological cathexis is the condition of 
aesthetic perception. More fundamentally, asserts that aesthetic experience is 
five in terms of its object, namely at the moment when art works themselves 
are brought to life under the gaze of aesthetic experience.^
The suggestion of aesthetic experience as an act of “bringing to life” or resuscitation 
is relevant. Just as it is impossible to resuscitate a stone, so not every object has the potential 
to generate aesthetic experience. Equally, an unconscious person is different from a 
vegetable, but to reahse that difference fully, the person actively needs to be brought back to 
fife. So it is with the function of aesthetic experience, qua the process of revealing and 
engaging with the contradictory nature of art works. Equally, some art may be beyond 
resuscitation.
The metaphor of resuscitation breaks down, however, when Adomo seems to suggest 
that the enlivening of a work of art works both ways. He uses the word “five” when 
describing both the aesthetic experience and the work of art. That is, their potential Hveliness 
is mutually dependent. Explaining the possibility of this mutual Hveliness Adomo remarks, 
“The unity of meaning...is not static but processural. It is the enactment of antagonisms 
inherent in every work”.^
 ^ Aesthetic Theory, p. 254.
^Aesthetic Theory, p. 252.
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We can say that to have the potential to he resuscitated, i.e., experienced 
aesthetically, a work of art must “contain” antagonisms. The act of resuscitation is the 
“enactment” of those antagonisms and is processural.
Some of the questions Adorno is posing for himself now become clearer. He needs to 
explain how artworks “contain antagonisms” and why this is important. He has to explain 
what kind of experience “enacts the antagonisms” of art works, and why this is important. If, 
as he imphes in the fir st sentence, art and the experience of it can take place in an inadequate 
way, he has to include an indication of how he distinguishes between art which is potentially 
‘live” and art which is not. Lastly, having signalled the processural nature of the integration 
art and the experience of it, he has to explain what he means by this.
Chapter 10 is preoccupied with refining and redefining these ideas. A starting point 
can be taken as the following series of claims concentrating on defining the artwork, rather 
than the aesthetic experience. It is important to acknowledge that Adomo is breakhrg his own 
rules here. He has stated that the analysis of art is inadequate if it decomposes its object into 
basic units. Having emphasised the importance of grasping art and the exjrerience of it 
simultaneously, to talk about the artwork hr isolation is to break his own rules. Tire other side 
of this coin is that Adomo is committed to being critical hr a rational sense. Art and rational 
analysis do not mesh together and, for the moment, Adomo is prepared to give rational 
argument the upper hand. With this hr mhrd, we whl take the following as a point of 
departme.
The manner wherein art constitutes its existence is as a dynamic mode of 
behaviom, an orientation towards objectivity which does three things: it steps 
back fiom objectivity; it takes up a stance towards it; and in so doing 
preserves some version of it. Art works synthesise diverse, incompatible 
moments.^
^Aesthetic Theory, p. 253.
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These claims can be taken as his definition of ait and its significance in the most 
general teims. Fhst, ait can remove itself fiom objectivity. Second, this capacity for removal 
fi om objectivity is not simply a distancing, but a critique of that objectivity. Third, ait is not 
completely distinct fiom the objectivity it criticises. These three themes can be summarised by 
saying that in relation to objectivity, art is simultaneously “autonomous”, “critical”, and 
“mediated”. Adorno acknowledges these are “incompatible moments”. They can only be 
understood in then simultaneity when art itself is understood as “a dynamic mode of 
behaviour”.
Adorno gives some indication of what it might mean to understand tliis withhi the
apparently restricted context of considering the behavioural dynamic of art qua “artefact”.
lire dynamic quality of art works is grounded m the fact that they are man- 
made artefacts: as such they belong by definition to the ‘native realm of the 
sphit’, but in order to be identical with themselves they need the presence of 
the heterogeneous, the non-identical, the amorphous. The resistance of 
otherness in then midst prompts them to articulate themselves in the language 
of form, leaving absolutely no blank spots, no areas are not touched by form."^
Just because art works are a special subset of all man-made objects, this does not
make then man-made quality less important to them as art than those characteristics which
make them different fiom man-made objects. Adorno here is simply interested in man-made
objects in general; what he says about them is extrapolated to art. He says that what defines
man-made objects as such is then difference fiom “the heterogeneous, the non-identical, the
amorphous”. The man-made is differentiated fiom this state by vhtue of having been
“formed”. I take Adorno to be using the word “form” here to imply any level of conceptual
or physical synthesis of “the heterogeneous, the non-identical, the amorphous”. He is not
using “form” here to imply a special kind of “aesthetic” ordering. Having been thus formed,
‘^ Aesthetic Theory, p. 253.
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the man-made belongs to the ‘'native realm of the spirit” which, in the broadest sense, is 
simply the opposite to “the heterogeneous, the non-identical, the amorphous”/
Having made this argument, Adorno then emphasises the obvious, namely that all 
man-made objects are the remains of the substance of that which is not man-made. This 
estabhshes a dialectical tension in all man-made objects: “Dynamic therefore is reciprocity, a 
restless antithetical process which never comes to a halt in static being. Works of art only 
ever exist in actu\ their tensions never resolve themselves into pure identity with one or the 
other extreme.”® Adorno is not simply stating that an artefact is, say, both wood and a chan. 
He is saying that a work of art qua artefact is form and matter. The tension of then 
simultaneous presence is a constituent of art qua art. hr thus emphasising the artefactual in 
his argument, Adorno specifically aims to destabilise the idea of art as finally achieving 
“symbolic reconciliation” with the world. Such reconcihation, aesthetic or conceptual, is an 
impossibility. The significance of art, for Adorno, lies in its capacity to exjrress the 
contradictions which the idea of “symbolic reconciliation” claims to resolve.
Havhrg described the dual nature of man-made objects hr general, Adorno now 
begins to differentiate within that class of object. He makes the general point that the 
simultaneous ‘Torm” and the “amorphous” quahties of the artefact create a dynamic tension: 
“Dynamic therefore is reciprocity, a restless antithetical process which never comes to a halt 
hr static being. Works of art only exist in actu\ their tensions never resolve themselves into 
pure identity with one or other extreme.”  ^He then imphes that this may be an ideal state, but 
it cannot be taken for granted as taking place in all artefacts, “they can act as a dynamic field
 ^The temptation is to give a harder definition to this contrast using familiar oppositions such as ‘culture’ v. 
‘nature’ or, ‘human’ v. ‘non-human’ but these are already loaded with the history of their usage that are 
extraneous to the matter at hand. For the moment it is better to contain the ambiguity implicit in the phrases 
“native realm of the spirit” and “the heterogeneous, the non-identical, the amorphous” and give these ideas 
more substance using Adorno’s own argument.
^Aesthetic Theory, p. 253.
^Aesthetic Theory, p. 253.
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of internal antagonisms only if and when they are finished, congealed objects”/  “Finish” is 
the key word here. It is the conclusion of the process of differentiating the man-made object 
fiom the amorphous, rather than ideas associated with “finish” as a quahty like “pohsh” or 
smoothness. This is important because “finish” is the state of being a “result”. On this basis a 
finished man-made object expresses a more exaggerated contrast with the heterogeneous 
than an unfinished one, which would express the same tension in a less extreme way. hr other 
words, the distinction between a finished and unfinished artefact is the degree to which they 
distance themselves firom the heterogeneous. For example, we can imagine an unfinished 
novel where we are especially aware of the blank page beyond the place where the writing 
stops. This might seem to be a situation where the contrast between “form” and “mere 
existence” are thr own into the kind of stark contrast in which Adorno is interested. On the 
contrary, if an artefact is unfirrished, “...the pent-up forces in them would simply run parallel 
to or away fiom each other without ever intersecting.”®
The idea o f ‘conclusion’ is certainly part of what is imphcit in Adorno’s emphasis on 
the significance of the finished work. Over and above this, the finished artefact also differs in 
kind fi om the unfirrished in its relation to the heterogeneous. It is the tension between result 
qua finish and the heterogeneous qua process. hi other words, the dynamic processural 
tension of the finished artefact is constituted in the contrast between “form” and the 
“amorphous”, and between “finish” qua anested matter and the unformed changing matter of 
the heterogeneous.
It is especially the second sense of “finish” that we need to keep in mind when 
reading, “The paradoxical phenomenon of an equihbrium of forces negates itself. Then
Aesthetic Theory, p. 253,
^Aesthetic Theory, p. 253.
This particular tension is made explicit later in chapter 10; “In terms of the concept of artefact, dialectics is 
a recurring relation between existing man-made products and their opposite, i.e. pxocQSsT Aesthetic Theory, 
p. 265.
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motion must come to a halt and yet remain visible qua motion in this standstill”^/ hi a hteral
sense, the finished artefact brings process to a halt, but it is that literal stasis which has the
potential to animate the various dynamic tensions Adomo is interested in. It is the task of
philosophical reflection on the work of art to unfold the halted motion of the tensions in the
ait work which appear to be at a standstill.
Having thus described the dialectic embodied in works of ait qua finished man-made
object, Adomo now goes on to explain what this characteristic of.ait imphes for our
experience of it. Or, to use the language employed above, he describes this characteristic of
art in a way that makes the experience of it “live”. Adomo sets out to answer what the
understanding of the work of ait qua artefact means, why this gives ait value. Thus,
the inherently processmal nature of works of ait, independent of any 
consideration of taking sides, comes out in the action they bring against what 
is extemal to them, i.e. mere existence. Ah works of art, including aflSmiative 
ones, are ipso facto polemical ones. The very notion of a conseivative work 
or ait is somehow absuid.^^
Fhst, against traditional aesthetics, he argues that it is the processural natme of art 
works that differentiates them fiom “mere existence”. As objects, however, that process is at 
a standstill; it needs philosophical reflection to unfold it and biing forth its processmal nature. 
We have seen Adomo argue that aesthetics since Kant has valued ait because the ait object 
“contains” an aesthetic essence which differentiates it fiom aU other objects. Adomo says 
that, on the contrary, the value of the art work derives firom the way it, like aU artefacts, 
embodies the tensions. In this case, these tensions reside in its state of being man-made while 
being constituted of the matter of mere existence.
To give this premise a philosophical context, we can recall Kant’s distinction between 
the determinant judgement and the aesthetic judgement. Deteiminant judgements involve the
11 Aesthetic Theory, p. 253.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 253.
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straight-fomard labelling of a phenomenon by applying a concept to it. The aesthetic
judgement, by contrast, involves the free play of the imagination and the understanding in
representmg a phenomenon to consciousness. Kant is making a firm distinction between two
different kinds of judgement on the basis of their different internal stractures. For Kant, it is
in the way that it is distinct fr om the deteiminant judgement that the significance of the
aesthetic judgement resides. Adomo, by contrast, is drawing attention to the act of synthesis
itself, qua a distancing or separation from the manifold, hrespective of whether it is a
deteiminant judgement aesthetic judgement. For Adomo, what seems to be significant, at this
stage, is the degiee to which this process of differentiation expresses itself as such. This is a
function, both of the object’s “finish” and its reception through philosophical unfolding.
Adomo now goes on to explain the value of this process of differentiation as it is
expressed hi art. He says that it makes all ait works, qua artefacts, ^"ipso facto polemical”:
“By emphatically seveihig aU ties with the empirical world, art in an unconscious way
expresses its deshe to change that world.” To iUustrate his argument, Adomo uses the
example of Mozart’s music. The choice of Mozart is deUberate because he is a “seemingly
unpolemicai artist...whom a conventional perspective would place squarely in the realm of
puie sphit”. That is to say, Mozart’s work is traditionally thought of as being pure form in
the sense that, unlike modem works, it draws very httle attention to the material out of which
it is constituted. Even so, Adomo argues,
his music tacitly distances itself fr om the triviality and falsehood surrounding 
it. For Mozart the strength of form is determinate negation...The more 
resolute the act of distancing is, the more concrete whl be the criticism of 
reaUty.^ ^
It would be difficult to confuse Mozart with the artists of modernism, such as say, 
Schoenbiug with whom Aesthetic Theory is more overtly preoccupied. Adorno’s use of
Aesthetic Theory, p. 254.
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Mozart thereby serves to emphasise the global teims of his discussion at this stage. In other 
words, he is using Mozart to exemplify the general dynamic which gives art, qua artefact, its 
significance. Although Adomo uses Mozart to illustrate a general principle, in so doing, he 
produces a particularly tendentious reading of Mozart’s broad significance. This is partly a 
fimction of the claim that all art, qua artefact, is polemical. Equally, his argument can be read 
as itself a demonstration of his premise that, to be five, the art object must have the latent 
capacity to have its contradictory nature expressed. Here Adomo is making exirUcit what he 
sees as the particularly heightened form of Mozart’s music. He is suggesting, in a refinement 
of his discussion of the significance of “finish”, that this heightened form serves to 
differentiate Mozart’s music in a particularly extreme, and therefore critical, way from reahty. 
At the end of the paragraph Adomo adds, “This may be an aspect of aU serious varieties of 
classicism: they are interventioirist rather than merely self-referential”. In other words, having 
described “strength of form as determmate negation” in Mozart, Adomo is extending the 
same principle to classicism in the arts hr general.
The idea that either Mozart, or classicism in general, are involved in “determinate 
negation” of anything sounds implausible, but we need to consider two things. Fkst, this 
discussion is taking place within an account of the value of artefactuahty in general. Second, 
Adomo’s use of Mozart and classicism is exemplary of the khid of philosophical resuscitation 
necessary for the “five” experience of art. That this looks like a somewhat implausible 
account of the value of form in Mozart and classicism may imply that they are beyond critical 
resuscitation.
This reading of Adorno’s use of Mozart is made more plausible where, for the first 
time in this chapter, Adomo begins to delineate what might constitute a “five” work of art. 
Thus far, Adomo has moved fi om a general discussion of the difference of art qua artefact
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from its suiTomidings. Then, using the dehberately uncontroversial example of Mozart, he
describes the significance of this difference. Having posited this general argument, he now
begins to differentiate between art works in terms of the extent to which this tension can be,
and is, made palpable. This is a move a move away fiom a critical animation of the
experience of a work, vis, his argument about Mozart, to a claim about a category of object
which might more exphcitiy reveal such contradiction beyond its “finish”.
We WÜ1 recall fi om the brief discussion of his difference fi om Kant, that art and the
experience of it do not imply a different kind of experience fi om the experience of everyday
reahty. Rather, it is a question of the degree to which the contradictory natme of experience
is made palpable in the process.
When art works crackle, so to speak, it is because there is friction between the 
antagonistic moments they try to hold together. Then processural quahty is 
encoded in objectifications hke linguistic symbols or written language hr 
general, hr short, the processmal nature of art is its temporal core.^ "*
In the second sentence of this quotation he hkens the processural quahty of art to that of
“written language in general”. Fhst, he speaks specificaUy of “written language”. The word
“apple” is a physical pattern of ink on a page, as well as being language. Later in the chapter
he expands this observation: “Viewed firom the outside, the written word and the written note
are hksome to the eye because, paradoxicahy, they constitute an existent the meaning of
which is in flux.” ®^ Adorno is committed to the idea of the histabihty meaning; indeed it is the
instabihty of meairing which contrasts so forcibly with the relative stabihty of art work qua
form. We have seen that an aspect of the value of art resides hi the contradiction between its
material stability, or finish, and the amorphous heterogeneity out of which it is made. Now,
additionally, and this is a new argument, there is also value in the contradiction between its
Aesthetic Theory, p. 254.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 263.
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material stability and unstable meaning. It is worth noting that this contrast is quite ahen to 
poststructuraUst thought which emphasises the latter as a universal condition.
Having emphasised the importance of this new contradiction, Adomo continues to 
expand his argument, again emphasising that this tension can only be exjieiienced through 
time. That is to say, it is only with the passage of time that we can experience the relatively 
unchanging physical object, in contrast to the changing meanings ascribed to it. Hence 
Adorno’s assertion that “the processural nature of art is its temporal core”. Adorno spends 
the next two pages in an extended discussion of this claim.
Before going on to consider this argument, it is worth briefly rehearsing what has 
been said so far and anticipating a problem. Adorno is talking about the value of art hr 
general as being generated out of its contradictory state. He is very aware of the potential 
worthlessness of this claim because, as we have seen, contradiction needs to be exjrerienced 
as such, rather than simply broken up for abstract analysis of its constituent parts. Thus far, 
the contradictions he has dr awn out reside in the contrasts resulting fiom a consideration of 
the work of art as a man-made object. These contradictions are as follows: a) form v. the 
amorphous, b) finish v. the process of heterogeneity, and c) static object v changing meaning. 
At the risk of making an empty generalisation, despite then differences, all these 
contradictions are generated in particular constmals of the opposition between stasis and the 
passage of time. Furthermore, Adomo has argued that art works can orrly be ex^rerienced as 
“five” if they are experienced as processmal. It would seem that this assertion, encapsulated 
in the statement “the processural natm e of art is its temporal core”, impHes the subordination 
of the work of art, qua object, to the experience of it. For example, we cauirot grasp 
instantaneously how a work articulates itself in terms of the particular relation between form 
and the heterogeneous. The particular work may or may not make explicit this contradiction.
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but it needs to be “unpacked” as such, and this Hterally takes time. This leads to the 
impression that the temporal “unfolding” of the work, in being experienced takes precedence 
over the concrete existence of the object. Given that Wehmer defines the discursive nature of 
philosophy in contrast to the non-discursive nature of art, it would seem that the experience 
of the work of art as ‘live” is its ‘translation’ fi om the non-discursive into the discur sive. In 
Hegel, the imagination of art goes thr ough a similar translation into the reason of pliilosophy. 
It is this translation of art to the terms of philosophy that constitutes the absorption of art 
into philosophy in Hegel. Is not Adomo doing the same thing?
Paradoxically, the object reasserts itself agahist the all-important temporal experience 
of it with Adorno’s refinement of what he means by “temporality”. He does this by 
introducing the ideas of the art work’s “duration”, and ultimately, “mortahty”. Two factors 
are important to bear in mind. Fhst, Adomo is committed to distinguishing between the 
adequate, or “live” experience of art, and the inadequate experience of it. This clearly 
separates his project fiom traditional aesthetics which, as we have seen, tends to understand 
aesthetic experience as given. Second, he is equally committed to a similarly discriminatory 
attitude towards art works. That is, unlike traditional aesthetics, he does not take the sum 
total of art works as a group, for which he must derive normative characteristics. Rather, his 
project centres on discriminating between art works which are susceptible to being 
experienced as “five” and those which are not. Now, in this scenario, what limits the 
potentially infinite power of reception to resuscitate all artworks is its own historical 
situatedness and the “mortality” of art works. Art works, through time, loose their 
susceptibility to behrg experienced as “five”. This is the moment where the power of the art 
work qua non discursive knowledge ovenides the power of its successful unpacking by 
discursive knowledge.
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Adorno’s assertion of the “mortahty” of art works definitively separates him fiom 
reception theorists. The defining characteristic of reception theory is the extent to which it 
sees the critical act as having piimaiy responsibility for generating meaning, and not the work 
of art. The work of art is thus chaiacterised as having potentially infinite meanings, hi this 
sense, reception theory is different fiom traditional aesthetics because in shifthig 
responsibility for meaning onto the critical act, it undertnines the status of the art object. Like 
traditional aesthetics, however, theories of reception are non-discriminatoiy, even anti- 
disciiininatoiy, in teims of then theorised capacity to make judgements about the relative 
value of different objects. This is to say that although traditional aesthetics and reception 
theoiy have radically opposing views about the significance of art, neither is much 
preoccupied with disciiminating between ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Both inevitably act in 
disciiminating ways, but remain untheoiized and umefiected upon. Reception theoiy fails 
because it places so httle emphasis on the value of art as a categoiy, while traditional 
aesthetics tends to be far more concerned with differentiating between art and non-art, or 
aesthetic experience and other types of experience, than with disciiminating the good fiom 
the bad. Against both these traditions, Adorno’s idea of the “mortahty” of art works signals 
his overt concern with actively and consciously disciimmating between categories of work, 
rather than with making claims for the global significance of all art. It also seems a fimction 
of his emphasis on the art object as having a deteimining impact on the possibility of its 
reception as “live”
At an abstract level, we aheady have a conception of Adorno’s idea of what defines 
the mortality of an art work. A “hve” art work is a work that is susceptible to havmg its 
contradictoiy natme made expHcit in aesthetic experience. When a work looses this 
susceptibility, it reveals its mortahty and dies. Withhi the fi amework of the argument so far.
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however, the contradictions Adorno has concentrated on would seem to be universal to all
artefacts. The two refinements he has signalled are the importance of “finish” and the
“strength of foim” of Mozart’s music. Instead of developing additional specific physical
refinements in his definition of the art work, Adorno now proceeds to discuss the art work in
terns of its “duration”; Hterally, how long it lasts in a condition which is susceptible to live
reception. This might seem an odd departure, but it is in tune with the original proposition
that what constitutes the value of art resides neither wholly in the object nor in the experience
of it. From the way he discusses “duration”, it is clear that he is interested in how art objects
configure the relation between themselves as objects and the passage of time, initially he is
concerned with an example of a kind of art that has consciously aimed at dm ation, namely
classicism. It is clear, however, that this kind of work serves as a counter-example to what he
rmderstands as dmation, because when dmation becomes ‘too intentional”, as it does in
classicism, then it actually shortens rather than prolongs the life of the work:
if it exorcises what it deems ephemeral by resorting to pm e impregnable forms 
or even such intangibles as universal human values, then it works against 
itself...Duration thus conceived falsely emulates conceptuahty, which is a 
constant circumference or shell for diverse contents, aspiring to achieve 
something like static atemporahty. All this is incompatible with the tensional 
properties of art works. This is why they perish more quickly, the more 
dir ectly they aim at dmation.
The same quahty, “strength of form”, which hr the earher discussiorr of Mozart and 
classicism had taken on positive value, fiom the perspective of the idea of duration now 
appears in a negative hght. This change in the value of “strength of form” is important to 
recognise. Until now, it has been described as an artefactual quahty of art works, and as such, 
seemed both defining and de facto  valuable. Now, fiom the different perspective of 
“duration” and the way “strength of form” is engaged by classicism, the same quahty
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becomes a negative. As with reading Hegel, the process of reading Adorno’s argument is an 
education in a way of thinking. When he says everything is “mediated”, this is an example of 
that principle being practised in his own argument. “Strength of form”, “classicism”, 
“artefactuality” are all fluid concepts. None can be given definitive values and meanings. 
Then meaning and value only crystallise in specifically dhected arguments. These arguments 
concentrate on particular qualities of a work, or group of works, in the light of a given 
perspective.
The problem with the “strength of form” of classicism, then, is that it consciously
aims at duration as a kind of “static atemporahty’. Using “pure impregnable forms” and
appealing to “universal human values” this ait engages in an overt attempt to evade the
passage of time. The classical work is like the unfinished artefact, whose formed and material
quahties do not intersect but run paraUel. In its use of unchanging forms, it isolates these
forms fiom temporahty, instead of bringing the two together in contradiction, which is the
basis for trne duration, hi Adorno’s argument, classicism can be said to exemplify a kind of
hyper-artefactuahty. Its strength of form certainly diflPerentiates it fiom mere existence, but
only to the extent that it becomes apparently detached and simply paraUels mere existence.
With this critique of classicism, Adorno moves his discussion of art beyond its quahty
qua artefact. It is something over and above form, qua difference fiom mere existence, that
gives art works dur ation.
Dmation is imphed by the concept of form but is not essential to it. Works 
that go out on a hmb, seeming to rnsh headlong into perdition, have a better 
chance of smviving than the ones that bracket out temporahty for the sake of 
secmity. It is the curse of classicism to keep generating a kind of art that is 
hohow and, because of that, faUs victim to time.
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At this point, having used classicism to indicate what he does not mean by the
dmation of art, Adorno’s relation to his own argument changes in a subtle way. He describes
the “duration” of classicism as “too intentional”, but when he starts to define what he might
mean by “unintentional duration”, his argument ceases to be a theoretical discussion using
examples and begins to sound prescriptive. That is to say, it is by no means clear that the kind
of art work he is describing actually exists. The quotation above gives some hint of tliis when
he talks about ait works “lushing headlong into perdition”. There may be a number of
different reasons for the change in the character of the argument.
The fii'st reason is that Aesthetic Theory is becoming polemical in its demands for a
new ait. The second, reason is that aesthetics operates with concept but the nonconceptual
work of ait will never achieve what the concepts of aesthetics prescribe for it. Adorno is
sanguine about discussing aspects of ait in isolation, or failed ait, but when he starts getting
near the real thing, the medium in which he is working begins to break down. Thirdly, the
khid of art Adorno is tiying to define simply cannot exist, because its temporal limits are so
severe. Its “duration” or “life” is literally the process of disappeaitng. The next paragiaph
begins with the imphcation that what he is talking about does not exist:
What is at present conceivable, hideed necessaiy, are works that immolate 
themselves, through then temporal core, saciificing then own hves, to the 
instant when then tiuth appears. For them perishing does not m the least 
diminish then importance. This new kind of nobility befits art in an age where 
nobility has degenerated into ideology. The idea of duration is patterned after 
property in bomgeois society; hence it is transient.
Besides indicating the speculative nature of its claims, this section of argument does a 
number of things. It reasserts the importance of what is meant by the “temporal core” of art 
works, hi so far as it deals with the problem of dm ation, it talks about an “instant”. This is a 
temporal categoiy, but seems the antithesis of dmation. It appears that works of art are only
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“hve” hi the process of revealing themselves; once they are revealed they perish. That is to 
say, although works of ait qua objects must be made hve through philosophical reflection, 
once they have been thus reflected on, then defining instantaneity is compromised and they 
die.
Having presented these controversial themes, Adorno puts them into a specific 
context, emphasising the idea of “duration” as not simply an aesthetic category, but as 
mediated by the idea of property. Aside fi om any theoretical argument, works of art are so 
thoroughly defined by their value as property that the idea they might only exist in a “hve” 
state for an instant is very difficult to accept. At the same time, this idea of the art work as 
property is a fimction of bourgeois society, which Adorno considers to be transient. This last 
point selves as another condition for the apparent present impossibihty of “hve” art works.
With this refinement of what he means by duration, Adorno then apparently forestaUs 
developing and explaining his argument for a whüe with a number of digressions. Before 
considering these digressions, and their fimction in his argument, it is worth briefly reiterating 
the sahent points of his argument in order to reconstmct what he might mean by 
“unintentional duration”.
Alt which is “hve” is in this state because of its ‘temporal core”. The ‘temporal 
core” is its latent state of contradiction in the process of being made exjihcit by philosophical 
reflection. This process engages the idea of duration, both because it takes time and because 
it takes place at a particular historical moment. FinaUy, art works only exist as “hve” in the 
process of being revealed, which is understood as an instant. Part of the problem here is that 
we seem to be dealing with the intersection of different categories of time between which 
Adorno has not differentiated. There is “critical time”, which might be construed as the time 
it takes to experience an art work as hve and there is what we might understand by the idea
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of “historical time”, hi this sense, “critical time” could be constmed as “instantaneous”. All
the same, “critical time” is not simply a fragment of “historical time”, because the way they
intersect changes. Thus, “The idea of dmation is patterned after the concept of property in
bomgeois society; hence it is transient”.
Adorno now diiectly develops this last point, using two examples. Fhst, he remarks,
“There is many a period in art histoiy and many an individual work that eschews duration”.
He gives no concrete examples, but quotes two people who, in terms' of the way he uses
them, might have expressed ideas similar to what he means here
Upon finishing the ‘Apassionata’, Beethoven is said to have ex^iressed the 
behef that he felt confident that this sonata of his would still be played ten 
years later! Most intriguing in this connection is K.H. Stockhausen’s idea that 
electronic works - to the extent that they are non-notational and diiectly 
realised in the material - might exphe at the moment when they are played. 
Stochhausen’s is a conception of art that retains the emphatic claim to being 
art while at the same time being ready to throw itself away.^®
What is so odd about these examples is they seem to be the exact inversion of 
Adorno’s use of classicism. The problem with classicism, we will recall, is that it attempted 
duration “too intentionally”. Surely these examples are too intentional in then pursuit of “the 
instant”. That is to say, part of the distance between Adorno’s account of classicism’s 
“intentional dmation” and the preliminaiy indications of what constitutes proper 
“unintentional duration” in art, is the way the latter emerges as a complex and mediating 
series of relations between object and duration. The problem with classicism was that its 
dmation was too static and atemporal in its internal dynamic. The same must surely be tme of 
his Beethoven and Stockhausen examples; their “instantaniety” is apparently qua object, 
rather than the tensional dynamic of art and experience he has hitherto imphed. The last
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sentence of the paragraph of his critique of classicism goes so far as to state, “Adding 
something ephemeral in the hope of achieving dmation is no solution to the problem.
As I have aheady indicated, one way to explain what Adomo is doing here is to 
understand these examples as specifically responding to his critique of the idea of propeity in 
bourgeois society, fiom which they immediately follow. The point is that Adomo has claimed 
bourgeois society places emphasis on defining ait as propeity. Here are two suggestions of 
ait works which might evade being property while remaining ait. In isolation, this is rather a 
weak justification, and in the context of his critique of classicism a few lines above, does not 
really hold. At the same time, it is part of Adorno’s argument as a means into a mode of 
thinking. The context where a theory might appear relevant changes, making a theory 
iiTelevant. So wlule he might hold to his critique of classicism, works which aim at 
ephemerahty as an effect are not necessaiily outlawed, because they so obviously undeimine 
the prevailing idea of art as property. If art were not so thoroughly identified as propeity as it 
is now, then Stockhausen’s example might simply be trivial.
This suggestion is amplified by the first sentence of the next paragraph: “Like other 
traditional constituents of art, the temporal core has been tuined outside, thus exploding the 
concept of art.”^^  This indeed complicates the issue. Having emphasised the apparently 
constitutive significance of the “temporal core” of art, Adomo now seems to be contradicting 
himself. How can the “temporal core” be “tumed outside”? Does he really mean that this 
hnphes abandoning his critique of the intentional duration of classicism to produce work 
which is “intentionally instantaneous”? There is plenty of scope for this argument. There are 
numerous contemporary examples of art works that deliberately seek to avoid physical 
peimanence. hi a different but related argument in chapter 5, Adomo says “The phenomenon
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of fireworks can be viewed as a prototype o f art [my emphasis]”/^ Although it is clearly veiy 
important for him to take account of the idea of the material ephemerahty of art works in his 
argument, he never endorses the idea whole sale in the sense that physical ephemerahty does 
not necessaiily constitute definitively “hve” works.
If this is not what Adomo is getting at, then what is he saying? Instea d of reading tliis 
part of Adomo’s argument in a linear way, we need to consider some of the themes which 
are emerging simultaneously. We have understood something of the potential significance of 
“unintentional duration” in art and its difference fi om the model of classicism. Adomo has, in 
what seems like a diversion, emphasised that the classical idea of duration is itself defined by 
the bourgeois idea of property. In espective of the status of tliis hypothesis as a truth claim, it 
injects into Adorno’s argument a different order of duration. That is to say, until tliis 
moment, Adomo has been defining in absolute teims the parameters which define a “live” art 
work. On the conditions of his own argument, such a theoiy is hivahd because it is itself 
hterally historically located. Instead of thinking of Aesthetic Theory in teims of the way it 
has been discussed so far in this chapter, let us consider it in the light of the following 
statement of the editors: “On 4 May 1961, Adomo began dictating a first version of 
Aesthetic Theory which consisted of relatively short paragraphs’’.^ "^
If Adomo is to deal with the idea of “duration” properly, on his own terms, then he 
must consider it in all its significant mediations. What earher looked like a deviation fiom the 
matter at hand, when he speaks of the idea of “duration as patterned after the concept of 
property in bourgeois society”, actuahy represents a stage in the progressively nariowing 
focus of Adorno’s definition of “duration”. Equahy, it is also a reorientation of Adorno’s 
position towards his argument. Adorno characterises his own argument as subject to
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duration, and therefore as historical. Lastly there is a transfoimation of the form and
parameters of the argument, but also of the problem itself, because what the idea of ait’s
“duration” means changes through histoiy. When Adomo says: “the temporal core has been
tumed outside”, he is making a historical claim about “dmation”. This in an argument where
it had ceased to be meaningful to discuss “dmation” in abstract terms. This abstract approach
worked for the critique of dmation in classicism, but is not adequate to the conditions of art’s
duration at the present historical moment. What we could say about this, in conclusion, is
that Aesthetic Theory is not a classical text. Its strength of form is not distinct fiom duration,
but thoroughly mediated by it. I am not saying that Aesthetic Theory is an art work, but in
terms of the rigorously conceptual and logical dynamic of its ex%)loration of “dm ation” and
art, its stmctme mdicates something of what we should be looking for in art.
hi beginnhig to elaborate on his critique of the idea of duration, Adomo discusses the
impact of a particularly modem phenomenon on the idea of dmation in art, namely fashion:
The facile indictment of fashion as something transient and hence nmgatory is 
usually alhed with the ideology of inwardness or hiteriority, which has long 
smce been exposed as an inability to extemalise something and as a narxow 
minded concern with the thussness of the individual. Fashion does more than 
just exjiloit works of art; it permeates them to their very core, far beyond all 
commercial manipulation.^^
As with his detached relation to the earher examples, Adorno’s invocation of fashion 
here is tied quite specificahy to the critique of its transience. This is another aspect of his 
attack on classicism, and here he ties that critique to associated ideas of universal subjectivity 
and what he calls “the ideology of inwardness”. If the individual’s subjectivity is conceived as 
an absolute, then fashion wUl necessarily be understood as external ephemera. The same 
principle can be extended dir ectly to art. If what defines art qua art is presmned to reside in 
“pme impregnable forms” or “universal human values”, then changes will either be construed
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as eiToneous departures fi om an absolute (classical) standard, or, as of secondary significance
by comparison with normative characteristics of all works. Adorno’s use of fashion here is
not, however, restricted to its metaphorical suggestiveness in highlighting the importance of
valuing art as transient. The impact of fashion is direct in a material sense, both because it
exploits art for commercial ends and, more importantly, ‘permeates works of art to their very
core”. Part of this transformation occurs because “Fashion is one of the ways in which
historical change affects the sensory apparatus, and thus, indirectly, works of art.”^^  He
pr ecedes this claim with the following example.
Inventions like Picasso’s peculiar handling of hght, in respect of their 
experimental quahty, resemble fashion shows. They are like dresses sewn with 
a few stitches that hold the material together for a night. They can hardly be 
said to be properly crafted.
Here he is beginning to come round to firse his theoretical demand for art which “immolates”
itself with a historical account of what has actuahy happened as a consequence of the impact
of fashion on art. At the same time, it is important not to over-emphasise the significance of
fashion in the argument. In the present context its significance is more exemplary than
explanatory. It is an example of a new, and historicaUy specific impact on the way we need to
understand “duration,” and how it is engaged by art. In concluding his discussion of fashion,
Adomo says that its impact on art is shght; “Typicahy, its impact is small in degree and
discernible only in recondite features of art.”^^
With tliis we can retmn to the problem of explaining what Adomo means by the
various important claims that have been left hanging, namely, the “unintentional duration” of
art and the claim that the “processural core” of art has been ‘turned outside”. Fhst, to try to
derive ‘‘universal forms” and “universal experiences”, either when making art or doing
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aesthetics, is to attempt to separate art and the experience of it fiom then historical matrix. 
To locate the value of art or the experience of it in their ahistorical constituents is wrong, 
because it sets up static and atemporal contradictions as defining the production and 
reception of art. What has to be aimed at is “unintentional duration”, where art and the 
experience directly engage each other through then own particular historical circumstances. 
This does not mean that they become definitively historical, nor does it mean they under stand 
the specific constituents of then historical constitution; this would be impossible. Rather, 
then “processmal core” is animated by actual contradictions, not abstractions. Lastly, this 
actual dynamic is located at the time of writing Aesthetic Theory, and this means (and here it 
is unclear whether Adomo thinks he is being descriptive or prescriptive) that art works have 
become definitively ephemeral in terms of the way they relate to their constitutive ideas. The 
“[rrocessural core” being “tumed outside” means this, that it is no longer possible to talk 
about art by explaining the dynamic relation of certain categories such as “artefactuahty” and 
“dmation”, because these themselves are changing. Newly significant categories emerge, 
such as ‘Tashion”, but more important, art’s relation to all its traditionally stable categories 
along with the new ones, has become fundamentally imstable. This means that the process of 
art’s contradictory dynamic is “outside” as well as “inside”. So, to grasp the impact of 
fashion on art, we cannot deal with as a constant, like “artefactuality”. Rather, the kind of 
impact fashion is variable and cannot be predicted. This has a knock on effect for the 
category of artefactuahty, which, as a result, cannot be given an unequivocal function.
After concluding his discussion of fasliion Adomo produces something of a summary 
of the wider imphcations his “position” as it has developed. The focus is now on 
understanding imphcations for the way we can now think of meaning and method m general, 
in the hght of the fragmentation of his argument. These problems have become acute because
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they arise directly out trying to describe art in terms of the parameters Adorno has
established as defining it. We have seen that Adorno has emphasised the significance of
understanding art in terms of its temporal core, and gone some way to describing what this
means. He has demonstrated that this defiirition itself needs to be understood as subject to
historical transformation. Art manifests its temporahty differently in each of the examples he
gives. Each example imphes a different idea of the structure of the relation betweerr art and
duration. Classicism imphes one kind of relation, Stockhausen’s another, fashion another,
Picasso’s use of hght another. In ah the emphasis on specificity, is there any room for theory
and method? Or has the dynamic of the problem absorbed the argument into a state of radical
irrstabihty? The fohowhig passage can be construed as a kind of “standing back” on Adorno’s
part, to answer some of these questions. It ther efore has a different function fiom what
immediately precedes it.
Above ah, the work of art is processural in so far as it is a relation between a 
whole and its parts. In other words, this relation itself is a process of 
becoming. The work is not a totahty in the sense of a structure integrating the 
parts; once objectified, the work keeps on producing itself hi response to 
tendencies at work within it. By the same token the works are.not data but 
centres of gravity straining towards totality, even though they may be subject 
to preformation by the whole. '
If, taking the fir st sentence, we think of the work of art as a relation between whole 
and parts, then we need to understand this relation as subject to constant change. This is an 
incredibly abstract claim. Adomo deliberately does not indicate whether we should think of 
the whole as the work constituted o f different parts, or whether we should think of the work 
as a part o f  the whole. We need to do both simultaneously. This means that we must gr asp 
the practical implications for aesthetic experience for the idea that, which ever way we 
construe the idea of “whole” and “part” hi a particular circumstance, they are always 
mediated by the other. Consider the Picasso example: we can think of his use of light as part
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of a whole pictiue. hi so far as Adomo characterises Picasso’s use of light as exjieiTmeiital,
rather than properly crafted, he suggests it might be read as a symptom of the way fashion
has “affected the sensory apparatus” and transformed the way we think of transience in
general, and therefore of art. On these terms, Picasso’s art is a part of art in general, which is
part of a larger whole. At the same time, Adomo concludes, “Tyiiically, [fashions] impact is
small in degree and discernible only in recondite features of art.”^^  We are back to the idea
that we cannot understand one of Picasso’s works in terms of the impact of fashion. Fashion
becomes a part of what we need to understand a whole work,
Withhi all these different constructions of the way what is “whole” and what is “part”
interchange and over-lap, the relation between whole and part is also different. That is to say,
the way a whole relates to its parts may be fundamentally different accordhig to which whole
you are talking about. For example, it is obvious that the stmctme and mechanisms of the
way hght operates in a painting will be different fiom the way fashion operates in that
painting. Equally, the order and stmcture of the impact fashion wUl have on art will change,
as will hght, as wih the relation between hght and fashion.
In a sense ah this is rather obvious. We could take a work by Picasso and discuss it m
terms of hght and fashion. Even if we start with these restricted categories, if we do what
Adomo shows us we should do when he writes “Aesthetic experience, properly miderstood,
is the complete smTender of the self to the work”,^ ° we become absorbed into a process that
is not just infinite, but needs to be sustahied as such
FinaUy what becomes engulfed by this dialectical turbulence is the notion of 
meaning. Since a negative judgement must be passed on history, the unity of 
process and result is unattainable. Increasingly, the individual moments reftise 
to accommodate themselves within a preconceived totahty, opening a 
cleavage that destroys meaning. Works of art are not fixed once and for ah, 
but are in flux. This inherent temporahty also affects the relation of the whole
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and parts, a relation which changes over time and is potentially subject to 
being discontinued enthely.^^
This brings us back to the idea of meaning as potentially infinite, but restricted by the
mortahty of the art work. Having posited the very general idea that art is “processural in so
far as it is a relation between a whole and its parts”, and having absorbed the imphcations of
putting this idea into practice, Adomo now reopens the problem of “duration” as it affects
the life of individual works. He begins to restrict the khid of critical intervention within this
infinite field of possibihties to that which might be hve.
If works of art have a historical existence owing to their processural quahty, 
they must also be able to perish. As far as the figures are concemed that are 
engraved on stone, painted on canvas, or drawn on paper, they may weh be 
imprescriptable. But the most important thing, their sphit is not 
imprescriptible. It can be lost because it is a fluid entity.
What, then are the factors which define the mortahty of a work of art qua object? We 
are back to where we were after his critique of classicism, and before he talks about the idea 
of dur ation as defined by the bour geois idea of property. It is not that what has gone on since 
is an melevance; rather that every thing he now says about “duration” needs, at the very 
least, to be understood as mediated by dmation.
At one level, Adomo says, rather obviously, that works of art change with the 
historicahy changing attitudes of people. But he is not particularly happy with this argument, 
and concludes,
these kinds of changes are extraneous when compared with those that occm in 
art works themselves, specifically the unpredictable falling away of layers one 
by one; the determination of this kind of change by the law of form as it 
manifests and separates itself more clearly; the petrification of works gr own
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transparent; then aging and falling silent, hi the final instance, the unfolding of 
ait works is the same as then decomposition.^^
' Aesthetic Theoiy, p. 256.
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Chapter VI
AESTHETIC THEORY CHAPTERS 4, 5, & 6
N ature and Illusion
Chapter Six of Aesthetic Theory looks at the idea of “illusion” and specilically, Ihe
“crisis of illusion” in modern art. Adorno organises the argument in the first part of (he
chapter around the contrast between “illusion” and “materiality”, in the second pait around
the contrast between “illusion” and “ex|nession”. In reading the detail of what Adorno is
saying, we need to bring to it an understanding of other arguments in Aesthetic Theory. 1 or
example, at the beginning of chapter 1, Adomo articulates the broad crisis of modern ar( as
its having “come to corrode the veiy same categories which were its own reason for being”,
and “illusion” is one such category. Thomas Huhn has claimed that for Adorno, “Illusion is
the defining character of ait works. An art work is an artwork just so tar as it pretends to he
something which it is not”.’ He is quite right to stress the necessity of “illusion” for art, hut
he errs when he implies that the crisis of “illusion” is sufficient explanation for the crisis of
modern art. In a footnote Huhn questions Richard WoliiTs different r eading oC Aesthetic
Theory. “Wolin seems off the mark,...when he describes the cr isis of the avant-gar de as the
crisis of identity, rather than, as f have it, a crisis of illusion”.^  Huhn ’s claim is inter esting in
his emphasis on the constitutive significance of “illusion” for art as derived from a close
reading of aspects of chapter 6 oï Aesthetic Theory. Wolin\s ar gument, hy contr ast, is mor e
o floosely based, referring to a wide variety^Adonio’s writings. His emphasis on the “crisis of 
identity” expresses itself through the idea of “de-aestheticization” which “signifies a llnai
' Thomas Huhn, ‘Adorno’s Aesthetics of Illusion’, The,tournai of Aesthetics anti Art Criticism 44 (Winter 
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dissolution of the essential aesthetic qualities which have up until this century been 
inseparable from the concept of art itself’.^  For Wolin “illusion” is one of those “essential 
aesthetic qualities” rather than the sole, or main, grounds for that crisis as Huhn argues.
The criticism of Huhn’s-over emphasis on “illusion” would be unfair were it not that 
he invites the comparison with Wolin, because they do different things. Huhn extrapolates 
claims about Adorno through the close analysis of a specific text. What comes across in his 
paper is a strong feeling of what the experience of reading Aesthetic Theory might he like. At 
the same time, the claims he makes are detached from a consideration of the place of that 
particular argument within Aesthetic Theory. In fact, situating the specificity of what Adorno 
says in any one place is not best thought of as relating the particular to the general. It is more 
a question of the relation of one particular to another.
1 he dilemma which the difference between Huhn and Wolin presents is the manner in 
which the specific claims are made accountable: Huhn inflates the significance of a particular 
argument, while Wolin explains Adorno’s theoiy of art through an accumulation of dispersed 
details. Against both critical models the principle of mediation implies that detail is modified 
or transformed through its relation to other detail, which means understanding context as (he 
relations between different concepts, rather than either their meanings in isolation, or their 
accountability to generalities. This chapter will consider the problem with which Adorno 
opens chapter 6, which is his diagnosis and exjilanation of the crisis facing modern art in 
terms of the crisis of “illusion”. First, Adorno’s argument will be set out. Chapters 4 and 5 
are an extended exploration of “illusion” in nature, ait, and philosophy. Chapters 4 and 3 are 
some of the most exiilicitly theoretical in Aesthetic Theory. Adorno repeatedly deals with the 
history of how ait and nature have been represented by philosophy and society, and he
’ Richard Wolin, The De-Aestheticization of Art: On Adorno’s/I fts7/7t'//.vc7?e Theorie'. Te/os4\ (Fall 197^ )),
p. 111.
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develops his position as a negotiation betwepn the two. In chapter 6, however, the tlieorelieai 
conclusions of the previous two chapters are confionted witli an account of how various 
examples of art since 1910 have failed to achieve the theoretically defined ideals developed in 
the previous two chapters. Thus the crisis of “illusion” presented in chapter 6 has I wo 
identities. It is a series of truth claims about the potential failure of modern art and a 
demonstration of the failure of X\\q Aesthetic Theory qua theory to match its concepts to art.
IModerii Art anti the crisis of “illusion” at the beginning of chapter 6
Chapter 6 opens with the statement, “ fhe emancipation from harmony turns out to be
a revolt against illusion...”'’ We will recall that one of the ways Adorno has described the
crisis of modern art is as its “freedom from external purposes”. “I larmony” can be
understood as one of those external purposes. Another example are “genres and styles”,
whose absence, and the ensuing implications for modem art, Adorno discusses in chapter 12.
An illusion, to use Huhn’s definition, is “something which pretends to be something
which it is not”.^  On what basis does Adomo make such an explicit link between “harmony”
and “illusion”? In what sense does harmonious art pretend to be something which it is not?
Adorno’s indirect answer is that a harmonious work of art is “the fiction of a totality”. One
way to explain Adorno’s thinking is to consider that the definition of the Word “harmony” has
specifically musical connotations and a more general suggestiveness.
1; tuneful sound : melody 2a: the combination of simultaneous musical notes 
in a choid 2b: the structure of music with respect to the composition of 
chords 2c: the science of the structure, relation, and piogression of chords.
also:
' Aesthetic Theoiy, p. 148.
 ^Thomas Huhn, ‘Adorno’s Aesthetics of Illusion’, p. 181,
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3a: pleasing or congruent arrangement of parts 3b: correspondence, accord 
3c: internal calm: tranquillity 4a: an interweaving of diflerent accounts into a 
single nanative../’
A harmonious ait work, therefore, is one which has an internal order, and that order
can be understood as the fiction of a greater totality which, by definition, is similarly
ordered. In other words, a harmonious art work is the illusion of a harmonious world
Adorno makes the musical suggestion in his argument explicit when he goes on to explain
how the crisis of illusion in modem ait extends even to music:
To appreciate the depth of crisis of illusion, one must take into account, that it 
has repercussions even for music, which on the face of it seems to have no use 
for illusion to begin with. In music fictitious elements die off even in their 
sublimated form; i.e., not only elements like the expression of non-existent 
feelings, but also structural aspects like the fiction of a totality, which has been 
exposed as unrealisable.^
This raises two distinct questions about the reasons for the crisis of “illusion”, f'irsl, is
the fiction of a totality unrealisable because the structural principle of harmony has become
formally impossible in a strictly musical sense? Or, second, is it the totality of which harmony
is a fiction that “has been exposed as unrealisable”? That is, is harmony made spurious qua an
illusion of something which does not exist? In the previous chapter Adomo gives an
indication of what is implied here:
Once perceived as a transparent untruth, this illusion undermines (he 
possibility of art itself. An asinine army joke in Wilhelmian Germany captured 
the gist of this dynamic. In it an officers aide gets marching orders to go to Ihe 
zoo on his day off. When he reports back he is all excited: Sir, he says, these 
animals don’t exist.’’
To give priority to one or other of these explanations for the crisis of illusion would 
be to misrepresent the problem by oversimplifying it. 1 his would locate a “solution” to the 
crisis of art as either formal or social. Tliat it is both, explains the radical nature of the crisis.
Webster’s Dictionary.
’ Aesiheiic Theory, p. 149. 
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It is a crisis which is not soluble either fornially or socially, in (hat neither the perfect art 
work nor the perfect society can salvage harmony. This recognition of'the insolubility ol’the 
crisis of illusion, coupled with its apparent necessity, becomes all the more important where 
Adomo goes on to identify the parameters within which the crisis of “illusion” has its impact 
on art.
Let us employ a definition of “Itarmony” from those listed above as: “the science of 
the structure, relation, and progression of chords”. Harmony is then the structuring principle 
through which parts of an art work are arranged within it. What happens to ai l if there are no 
such principles by which its material might be internally ordered? Adorno pursues the 
implications of this question in terms of the way it impacts on the “material” dimension of art 
within the processes o ï Ûxq production and reception of art. In the second half of the chapter, 
he discusses the impact of the crisis of harmony for the idea of art as expression.
The arguments of chapter 6 are interesting in themselves, but as 1 have already 
suggested, the way chapter 6 is read is also determined by what is going on around it. In 
particular, I wish to examine Adorno’s analysis of “illusion” in chapters 4 and 3, before 
coining back to consider chapter 6.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 opens with Adorno’s discussion of the relation between beauty in ar( and 
beauty in nature, specifically the way this has been dealt with by philosophical aeslhedcs. 
First, Adorno obseives that since Schelling’s major work on aesthetics “which he called 
Philosophy o f Art, aesthetics has shown an almost exclusive concern with works of ar(, 
discontinuing any systematic investigation of The beautiful in nature’”.'^  Adorno suggesis dial
Aes'lhelic Theoiy, p.91.
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philosophical aesthetics repressed the idea of natural beauty for two associated reasons. I'irsf, 
because the so called ‘religion of art’’" understands nature as the object syinbolically 
reconciled to inan by art. In this scenario, the beauty of natuie becomes something oddly 
spurious; it is passive, having no function but to be reconciled to man. Second, Adorno 
argues that the continued presence of nature in aesthetics “would have touched a sore spoL 
conjuring up associations of acts of violence perpetrated by every work of art, as pure 
artefact, against the natural. Wholly man-made the work of art is radically opposed to nature, 
which appears not to be so made”. ’ ’ In other words, the artifactuality of art is revealed by the 
contrast with the beauty of nature, and this artifactuality qua an “act of violence against the 
natural” does not mesh with the idea of art as containing the means for “symbolic 
reconciliation” with nature.
What Adorno is doing here, then, is using the critique of an aspect of the history of 
philosophical aesthetics to define his own position. Adorno is saying that, in as much as an 
art work is made of the material of nature, it is nature, while being different from nature, by 
virtue of its being man-made. Later in the chapter, Adorno explicitly distances himself from 
Hegel on precisely this point. For Hegel, Adorno complains, “the beautiful in nature comes 
into its own only by being eclipsed, whereupon its deficiency becomes the raison d'etre of 
the beauty in art...”, and “for Hegel natural beauty disappears without leaving a recognisable 
trace in artistic beauty”.’^
It is the suppression of the consideration of natural beauty in aesthetics aller Kant that 
has “blocked out any reflection upon a dimension of art which lies beyond aesthetic 
immanence while still being its premise”.” In other words, the neglect of nature by
'"Adorno notes that this is: “a term coined by Hegel, denoting the satisfaction at having achieved symbolic 
reconciliation in works of art”, Aesthetic Theory, p. 91.
" Aesthetic Theory, p. 91.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 112.
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philosophical aesthetics, ostensibly to concentrate on art, is actually to neglect a significant
aspect of what art is. Against Hegel, Adorno says, and this is important, “the detei tiiinacy of
art is greater than that of nature, but the prototyi)e for ex|)ression in art is still nature rather
than human spirit”.'"’ In other words, Adorno’s discussion of the beautiful in nature is as
integrated into his theory of beauty in art, as is idea of the artwork as of'the stuff of nature.
despite its man-made status.
Adorno ends his discussion of the suppression of the natural in art by post-Kantian
aesthetics with a quotation fiom Kant’s Critique o f Judgement. Kant compares Ihe
appreciation of beauty in ait with the appreciation of beauty in nature, favouring the latter.
Adorno claims that this demonstrates Kant’s “.belief in the fallibility of making”'^  which was
lost to “Hegel and his generation”.
Immediately upon concluding this discussion Adorno remarks, “The concept of
natural beauty has been subject to historical change”.”’ He then proceeds to use this premise
as a different perspective fiom which to re-emphasise what he has just been arguing.
“Nature” has actually become thoroughly man-made. First, this is because “naliiie” is a
thoroughly “man-made” idea and experience:
In every perception of nature there is actually present the whole of' society.
The latter not only provides the patterns of perception in general, but also 
defines nature o priori in relation to itself. Thus the perception of nature is a 
product of the faculty of determinate negation. As technology and, more 
important the principle of commodity exchange go on expanding, natural 
beauty increasingly takes on a merely contrasting function, in which it is easily 
subject to co-optation by the reified world it opposes.”
Thus,
Integrated into the commercial world (as Tourist industry’, for example) and 
devoid o f  its critical sting, the immediate appreciation o f  nature has become 
neutralised. A s nature becom es m ore synonymous with national parks and
Aesthetic Theoiy, p. 112. 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 94. 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 94. 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 101.
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wildlife preserves, its beauty is purely tokenistic. Natural beauty is an 
ideological notion because it offers mediatedness in the guise of iiuuiediacy.
With a new paragraph Adorno has changed the terms of his engagement with the idea
of “nature”. Hitherto he has discussed “nature” as a concept of philosophical aesthetics.
“Nature” is not sufficiently defined by aesthetics, because the concept is also mediated by its
social formation. To engage “nature” as a social phenomenon Adorno has to remove himself'
fi om aesthetics to become a cultural theorist.
Adorno’s pessimistic prognosis of the impossibility of any “real” experience of nature
in capitalist society has resonances in French cultural theory since Foucault. 1 hat capitalist
society “offers mediatedness in the guise of immediacy” could be said to be one of the
guiding principles of that tradition. This has le d Lyotard, for example, to claim that to
protest about the existing conditions of capitalism is reactionary because it implies some
capacity to escape the transformation of any experience, even ostensibly critical experience.
by capitalism. It is usefid to keep in mind the radical pessimism exemplified by Lyotard,
because its extreme implications are very different from the way Adorno develops his
position. The first indication of this difference emerges as what appears as Adorno’s radical
indecision as to the legitimacy of holding to the possibility of any immediate experience in
capitalist society. The sceptical claims of the quotations above are interspersed with less
sceptical suggestions. Adorno is genuinely and openly contradictory in his analysis of the
social mediation of the experience, suggesting that there may still be some kind of residue of
“immediacy”. Adomo chooses as the object of his analysis the “culturescape” which is an
“aesthetic twilight zone”” which is neither pure “nature” or pure “culture ”.
The prevailing urban society co-opts culturescapes as an ideological 
complement of itself Culturescapes can play this role, because while 
acqiiescing in the hegemony of urban life, they do not visibly bare the stigmata 
of market society. This is why the joy of seeing an old stone wall, or cluster of
AesHmiic Theory, p. 101
'‘Cle.sihelic Theory, p. 95.
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medieval houses is spoiled by a guilty conscience. Even so, that joy has 
sinvived the objection which tries to make it suspect. As long as the face of' 
the earth keeps being ravished by utilitarian psuedo-piogress, it will turn out 
to be impossible to disabuse the human intelligence of the notion that despite 
all the evidence to the contraiy, the pre-modem world was better and more 
humane, its backwardness notwithstanding.^"
Adorno is committed to the ideology critique of the urban capitalist belief in the
immediate experience of the historical past and natural beauty. At the same time, there is the
suggestion that its potential legitimacy might reside as the “memory” of something different.
Likewise, he is explicitly critical of arguments which imply the complete artificiality of
experience. “Nowadays even fairly sophisticated thoughts - like the one about how trashy
paintings actually disfigure the beauty of real sunsets - become insubstantial through
monotonous repetition”.^ '
On what basis, then does Adomo amplify these suggestions? Adorno’s aigumcnt
develops into his theory of “natural beauty” and it begins with a crucial claim. I he
appreciation of natural beauty
focuses exclusively on nature as appearance, never on nature as the stuff of 
work and the material reproduction of life, let alone as a substratum of 
science... Nature is perceived as appearance of the beautiful and not as an 
object to be acted upon.^^
In other words, first, the appreciation o f natural beauty is distinct from any other 
instrumental attitude towards nature. Second, every appreciation of natural beauty will 
always have its basis in the perception of nature as it appears to consciousness. In the 
appreciation of natural beauty “What emerges as nature’s appearance is no more co-cxtensi\ e 
with empirical reality than Kant’s thing in itself is with the world o f ‘phenomena’ or with the 
constitution of objects by the categories’’.^  ^Or, put less philosophically; “natural beaut y as an
^^Clesfhelic Theory, p. 95. 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 107. 
Aesthetic 'theory, p. 97. 
Aesthetic 'Theory, p, 98.
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appearing quality is itself an image”/ ’ In other words, whether our experience is l eilicd oi 
not, the appreciation of natural beauty is always just an image of nature. Tor the appreciation 
of natural beauty at a different time in history, nature appeared differently.^^ In other wo ids, 
“the concept of nature continues to be what it always was: an idyllic, provincial, insular 
notion”.W h a t  gives the appearance of natural beauty its quality as an image is its historical 
mutability.
What this means is that the appearance of natural beauty can only be understood as an
image, rather than as an immediate experience, if it is understood historically. I his historical
understanding takes two shapes. It is only m so far as we understand that nature has been
appreciated differently through history that we can understand our own appreciation of it as
historical, and therefore as an image. Second, and more subtly, the appearance of beauty
itself is the manifestation of a historical consciousness. What does this mean?
While it is true that nowadays an aesthetic relationship to the past is liable to 
be poisoned by an alliance with reactionary tendencies, the opposite 
standpoint of an ahistorical aesthetic consciousness that brushes the dimension 
of the past into the gutter as so much rubbish is even worse. I here is no 
beauty without historical remembrance. In a state of freedom - particularly 
freedom from nationalism - mankind would be able innocently to appropriate 
culturescapes along with the historical past as a whole.^^
The idea that “the pre-modem world was better and more humane” is just an image, 
and a dubious one at that, as is the idea of primordial nature. What these images suggest is 
the possibility of an altemative to the status quo. It is the “liistorical remembrance” implicit in 
the appreciation of natural beauty that “lepresents the recollection of a historical condition
Aesthetic Theory, p. 99. 
For example:
As long as nature had not yet been repressed, its seeming indomitability was a source of fear This explains 
the prediliction once apon a time for symmmetrical arrangement of nature, a prediliction which later gave 
way to the sentimental mode of appreciating nature with its preference for irregularity and randomness 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 96.
A esthetic 'Theory, p. 100.
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that may never have existed"/^ It is precisely this image of an alternative which gives the 
appearance of natural beauty its validity: “Natural beauty is myth transposed into imagination 
and thus possibly redeemed”.
fo recapitulate Adonio’s argument thus far, the appreciation of beauty in nature is 
the appreciation of images of nature. As such, these images are detached from empirical 
reality and, philosophically speaking, have no demonstrable truth content, fhese images are 
historically mediated, in so far as they change and are utopian projections onto pre-modern 
histoiy and nature.
From this Adorno makes the claim that through the history of diverse appeal ing 
images of nature, there is a consistency which enables him to make a normative claim about 
“beauty in nature”
If there is one characteristic that is peculiar to the beautiful in nature, it has to 
be the extent to which something non-artefactual has the capacity to speak; 
this characteristic is expression. The beautiful in nature is that which appears 
greater when seen fiom a distance, both temporally and spatially. True this 
objective expression needs a subjective receptacle, but it does not become 
identical with it. What the beautiful in nature does is testify to the precedence 
of the object in subjective experience. Natural beauty is perceived alike as 
authoritatively valid and as incomprehensible (as a problem asking for 
solution).
1 his last sentence is where Adorno makes his objective claim about natural beauty. 
Whatever character its appreciation takes through history, “Natural beauty is perceived alike 
as “authoritatively valid” and “incomprehensible”. While we are familiar with the fust point, 
the second has not yet been properly discussed. In what sense is natural beauty perceived as 
“incomprehensible (as a problem asking for solution)”? Earlier in the above (piotation 
Adorno speaks of nature as “non-artifactual [butj has the capacity to speak; this 
characteristic is expression”. The problem of nature’s incomprehensibility is that it is
^^Aeslhafic 'I'heory, p. 98.
‘^\4e.sihefic I'heoty, p. 98.
''''\\esthetic Theory, p. !05.
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precisely at the moment that we attempt to realise the promise of image of nature, qua an
alternative to the status quo, that that promise disintegrates:
through remembrance appreciation of nature dissolves again into an 
amorphous quality which devoid of genius, cannot conceive the idea of 
fieedom, let alone realise it. The presumed anamnesis of freedom in natural 
beauty is false, for where it seeks fieedom there is only archaic 
unfreedom...The song of birds is judged beautiful by nearly everybody. No 
sensitive person of European background, for example, fails to be moved by 
the song of a robin after a shower of rain. All the same there is something 
frightening lurking in the song of birds, which is not really a song bu( a 
response to natural necessity. The same frightful threat emanates from (locks 
of migratory birds; even today their formations bespeak the old practice of 
divination, forever presaging ill fortune.^’
Having admitted the illusory quality of the suggestion of something different implicit 
in the experience of natural beauty, as soon as we try to capture or realise that illusion, nature 
collapses into the image of the “archaic unfreedom”, of natural necessity, flic futility of 
trying to realise “the promise of nature” as offering something different and better than 
capitalist society leads Adorno to argue that this is not just because nature does not live up to 
its promise. Rather, the attempt to realise that promise misconstrues the "appearing (piality ' 
of nature: “objectifying the appearing quality... tends to wipe out that quality” '^ . For 
example, “going out of one’s way to visit famous beauty spots and such, like drawing cards 
of the beautiful in natuie, is almost always the occasion for disappointment”.'  ^ It is only as an 
“appearing quality” that natural beauty has value. The attempt to grasp that beauty is to 
destroy it: “Unconscious apperception knows nature’s beauty better than does the ever-ready 
verbal ecstasy. It is the continuity of unconscious apperception that makes these, at times 
sudden, glimpses into nature possible”.^’ This sets up the dilemma for any appreciation of 
natuial beauty, including art and aesthetics, in their attempts to represent natuial beauty.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 98. 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 99. 
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Here things become complicated. Adorno’s explanation of the “incomprcliensibility” 
of natural beauty and the emerging construction of the relation of art and aesllielics relation 
to natural beauty cannot usefully be distinguished. Although the discussion of “the beauty of 
art" is obviously different from the discussion of “beauty in nature", art and aesthetics are 
themselves particularly important attempts to grasp the “incomprehensibility” of natural
beauty. Indeed, Adorno’s discussion of their attempts to do this are constitutive of his
!
emerging explanation of the “incomprehensibility” of natural beauty, llus is not a crisis in 
Adorno’s argument, but a crisis in the way it has been unpacked here. 1 he discussion so far. 
especially in its later stages, has extracted Adorno’s “theory of natural beauty” (font how art 
and aesthetics can engage the appearance of natural beauty. In their presentation in chapter I. 
these arguments are not easily separable.
Art and the appearance of natural beauty as explaining the “incomprehensibility” of 
the appearance of natural beauty.
Adorno develops a tightly defined theory of how art might engage the appeai ance of 
natural beauty, and explains various conditions of its attempts to do so by looking at 
historical examples of ail.
1 o grasp the theory, we need to recall that at the beginning of chapter 4. Adorno 
argued that^he experience of nature persists in art qua the “dimension of art which lies 
beyond aesthetic immanence while still being its premise”. I t  follows that art has a double, 
contradictory, relationship to nature. On the one hand, as material, art is ol'nature. On the 
other hand, nature is also appreciated as “appearance” and not the “stulf of work”, flic 
condition of the “appearance” of natural beauty is not just the contrast with the "material” of 
the work of art, but is the “image quality” as described above. Now Adorno writes.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 91,
Aesthetic Theory Chapters 4, 5, and 6 244
Alt is infiuenced by the fact that nature is not yet what it appears to be; and 
this condition will last as long as nature is exclusively defined in terms of its 
opposition to society. Art accomplishes what nature strives for in vain, it 
opens its eyes. Nature in its appearance - that is nature in so far as it is not an 
object to be worfced upon - in tuni provides the expression of melancholia, 
peace or what have you. Art stands for nature by abolishing the latter in 
effigy. Naturalistic art, on the other hand, attains only specious affinity with ' 
nature because, like industrial production, it reduces nature to raw material. ' '
This is dense and is anticipating a great deal. For the moment, however, what is
important to understand is that the way Adorno defines the significance of art is (hat it
attempts to do what nature cannot do, namely to, bring into realisation its promise of an
alternative to the status quo. Simply to replicate, as does “naturalistic art”, an image of nature
is to produce a copy of a copy. This argument is obviously reminiscent of Plato s critique of
mimesis in his Theory of Forms. Plato’s case against mimesis derives from his argument that
the object which an artist apprehends is itself but a copy of an ideal object to which the artist
has no access. That the product of the mimetic act will be an unreliable picture of reality, a
copy of a copy, is a result of the artist’s inability to apprehend the truth of his object. Now,
for Adorno, the “naturalistic artist” commits a similar order of error: “natural beauty as an
appearing quality is itself an image. Hence to tiy to replicate it is like committing a
tautology”. This is not because, as Plato argued, such an artist has no access to some “ideal
nature”. Rather, the naturalistic artist reduces the appearance of nature which “...provides the
expression of melancholia, peace or what have you”^^  to a raw material. I his is precisely to
deny the possibility of the appreciation of natural beauty because, we will recall, the
appreciation of beauty in nature “focuses exclusively on nature as appearance, never on
nature as the stuff of work and the material reproduction of life, let alone as a substratum of
science... Nature is perceived as appearance of the beautiful and not as an object to be acted
Aesihelic 'theory, p. 97.
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upon”/^ Moreover, the naturalistic artist also fails because “by objectifying tiie appearing
quality, replication tends to wipe out that quality”/'"
Now, the theoretical impetus for Adorno’s critique of naturalistic art derives from its
inadequacies m the light of his theory of the appearance of beauty in nature. What is less easy
to anticipate is how art might represent nature without: a) “committing a tautology”, b)
treating nature “as an object to be acted upon” or c)”objectifying an appearing quality”.
Now, these questions do not begin to be treated in detail here in chapter 4. Rather, as 1 have
already suggested, the answers Adorno gives in this context are more concerned with
illuminating the problem of natures “incomprehensibility”. This begins to re-emerge out of his
critique of naturalistic ait and, curiously, a more apt way of dealing with nature’s
“incomprehensibility” hinges on the choice of subject matter:
Even unsophisticated people brand painted Matterhorns and flashy sunsets on 
canvas, to mention only the most glaring examples of this type, as kitsch.
What we have here is an intuitive understanding of the irreplicibility of natural 
beauty as such. The discontent with naturalistic portrayals of natural beauty 
articulates itself in reference to extreme cases like the ones mentioned above, 
the idea being that tliis strategy will implicitly protect the sanctity of the zone 
of the ‘tasteful’ imitations of nature. This will not do. The green forest of the 
German impressionists have no greater aesthetic value than the Konigssee 
painted by a third rate painter who supplies hotel chains with his out pul."
file German Impressionists are probably a soft target, but Adorno defends 1 Tench
Impressionism on the basis of a significant difference from the Germans. 1 he French did not
choose for their subjects ‘jiure nature”, but “either artificial themes like ballet dancers or
racing jockeys or dead nature, as in Allied Sisley’s images of winter, or landscapes
pockmarked with emblems of civilisation of a kind that would lend constructive support to
form, as in the paintings of Pissarro”. '^  In other words, these are examples of naturalistic art
Aesfhetic Theory, p. 97. 
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which do not represent nature as “pure”, but in images which testify to the beauty of nature 
as appearance by implicitly referring to the latent historicity of what is being represented. 
“The beautiful in nature is histoiy standing still and refusing to unfold. Those works of art 
which are justly known for their sensitivity to nature tend to incorpoiate this notion”. fhc 
images of nature represented by these artists are of artificial subjects; they represent nature as 
“dead” or as being encroached on by civilisation. This theme is expanded a few lines later 
where he writes,
At all times the pictorial representation of nature seems to have been authentic 
only when it was nature inorte: when it had the ability to interpret nature as an 
encoded historical message, if not as a message of death itself "
In other words, still life painting does not seek to depict nature naturistically as appearing
image, but naturalistically as something which is already historical, already dying. Nature
appears decaying or, in a state of impending decay. He continues:
In this context, the Old Testament prohibition of graven images can be said to 
have an aesthetic aspect besides the overt theological one. The interdiction 
against forming an image - of something - in eflect implies the proposition that 
such an image is impossible to form. Through duplication in art, the appearing 
quality in nature looses its being-in-itself on which appreciation in nature 
feeds. Art remains loyal to natures appearing quality only when it conjouies 
up natural seen a ries in the artistic expression of their negativity."
Now, this argument has taken place around the discussion of the inadequacy of naturalistic
art and Adorno’s explanation of how some exceptional examples of it apparently avoid the
general criticism. The major theme which needs to be highlighted here is the impossibility and
inadequacy of any direct attempt by art to represent the appearance of natural beauty. In a
AdoiT AOsection Aesthetic Theory quoted above, remarks “Art stands for nature by abolishing theA
latter in effigy”. The “effigy” is precisely the image of the appearance of natural beauty which 
cannot be directly realised. Naturalistic art, which, as in the examples above, represents
Aesthetic Theory, p. 105.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 100.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 100.
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nature as compromised, seem to suggest a potential alternative. I’he manner o! Il>al 
suggestion is in Adonio’s terms, to approach the problem presented by the appearance of 
natural beauty indirectly. A veiy important suggestion of what this might imply is the 
statement: “art is imitation of the beautitlil in nature, rather than imitation of nature”, Now, 
of course, the naturalistic artists Adonio has described as having a measure of success in (his 
task did not do so at Adorno’s behest, nor are the claims about their work at all obvious. 
Rather, what his analysis of these works is doing is revealing “the allegorical intention of art 
which manifests the beautiful in nature without decoding it. It grows in relation to the giowth 
of non-objectifying meanings and non-denotative languages”.'*^ 1 his is because “Art imitates 
neither nature or individual natural beauty. What it does imitate is natural beauty as such”.
Making a normative claim for “natural beauty” as distinct from
“the appearance of natural beauty”, Adorno has said, “Natural beauty is perceived alike as
authoritatively valid and as incomprehensible (as a problem asking for solution). 1 his is
what art imitates and
I his puts the finger on the paradox of aesthetics as a whole, which is 
intimately tied up with the paradox of natural beauty. The subject matter of 
aesthetics too is defined negatively by its undefineability. 1 hat is why art 
needs philosophy to interpret it. Philosophy says what art cannot say, although 
it is art alone which is able to say it: by not saying it.^ "
Now, the structure of this paradoxical relation between aesthetics and art clearly 
echoes the same extreme problematic Adorno has diagnosed as defining the relation between 
ait and the appearance of natural beauty. Just as the appearance of natural beauty cannot 
“speak”, and needs art to “teach it to speak”, so ait needs philosophy to interpret it. What 
needs to be remembered however, is that within their similarly patterned problematic, art and
Aesthetic Theory, p. 105. 
‘'^Aesthetic I ’heory, p. 105. 
''^Aesthetic Theory, p. 107.
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philosophy are différent mediums. For example, earlier in chapter 4 Adorno associated (he 
appearance of beauty in nature with art in contrast to philosophy. I ’he contrast centres on the 
“instant” of the appearance of beauty in nature and art with the duration of philosophical 
argument:
The objectification that careful contemplation causes is detriiiiental to the 
dimension of nature that speaks meaningfully. Incidentally, the same may be 
true of works of art; perhaps they are only perceptible in temps chireé, the 
term Bergson seems to have derived fiom artistic experience... Besides 
spontaneity, will and mental concentration are needed as well - a contradiction 
that cannot be liquidated by decree... analytical reflection restores the temps 
chireé through the medium of its antithesis. Analysis terminates in beauty. 
Analysis subjectively retraces the trajectory described objectively by the work.
Thus adequate knowledge of aesthetic matters is the spontaneous 
recapitulation of objective processes taking place in the work owing to (he 
tensions therein.^'
What then emerges out of chapter 4? The appearance of natural beauty sets the agenda for
art, while the appearance of natural beauty promises something it cannot deliver. Adorno
says it is the purpose of art to deliver what nature merely promises. I here is the strong
suggestion that this will be impossible. Chapter 4 ends.
While nature’s language is mute, art tries to make this muteness speak. In so 
doing art is constantly exposed to the danger of failure because of the 
insurmountable contradiction between teaching nature to speak - a Herculean 
effort " and the fact that such a result cannot be willed or intended.
Within this extreme difficulty art needs aesthetics to achieve what it sets out to do. In 1 Icgcl
natural beauty is made obsolete by art and art is made obsolete by philosophy. In Adorno,
nature, art and philosophy all have significant functions. What pertains to all of them is that
their truth value cannot be “willed or intended”. The problem for art is to “imitate (he
appearance of natural beauty”, but this will necessarily be incomplete without philosophical
reflection. This, likewise, must be a “spontaneous recapitulation of object ive ))rocesses taking
place in the work owing to the tensions therein”.
Aeslhetic Theory, p. 102-103
Aesthetic Theory, p. 115.
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Chapter 5: Art and Illusion
Chapter 5 begins:
Nature’s beauty consists in appearing to say more than she is. Now the idea 
behind ait is to wiest this ‘plus’ fiom its contingent setting in nature, 
appropriating nature’s appearance and making it determinate, which means 
among other things negating its unreality.
Works of art are man-made, but this difierence from nature does not guarantee their 
achieving the appropriation of nature’s appearance. As we saw with the critique of (ierman 
Impressionism, even for something to be de facto art guarantees nothing with respect to 
Adorno’s demands for art’s appropriation of nature’s appearance. On the contrary, Adorno 
says that ‘Works of art become works of art, only when they produce that surplus which is 
their transcendent quality. They are not an arena where transcendence occurs, which is why 
they are also separated from their transcendence”,^ '* Or, making the same point negatively, he 
writes, “Art falls below its standards and becomes entkimstet, desubstantialized, when it fails 
to attain transcendence. The same betrayal occurs when art seeks transcendence as an 
effect”'^
As a precondition for making sense of this argument, we need to become accustomed 
to the idea that those objects which we are used to calling “art” are not actually “art” in the 
sense of Adonio’s definition of the term. Aside fiom the claim itself, Adorno’s mode of 
expression is odd because he personifies works of art, implying they have the capacity to act. 
He says things like “in works of art b e c o m e .or, “works of art must do such and such...” 
One way to explain this apparent eccentricity is to refer to the first sentence of chapter 10.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 116.
 ^' Aesthetic Theory, p. 116.
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Here Adorno claims “The experience of art is adequate only when it is live”. '" As he goes on 
to explain what he means by this, it is clear that what constitutes the experience of an art 
work as “live” is contingent on both an object and the experience of it. In other words, not 
just any object can be experienced as a “live” work of art, but neither can a work of ai t be 
considered to be “live”, without an appropriate experience of it. By personifying the “work of 
art”, Adorno is talking about it qua a mediated constellation of moments whose vitality is 
contingent on both a particular kind of object and a particular kind of experience. More to 
the point, the “live” experience of a work of art cannot be taken for granted it does not 
present itself as such. On the contrail, this status must be achieved, striven for; woi ks of art 
have to “become” works of art. This process of becoming, Adorno calls the work of art 's 
“transcendence”.
To attain “transcendence”, works of art must try to make themselves into something
more than their difference from nature qua artefacts, but they cannot achieve this
“transcendence” of their material state if they aim directly foi- it. In order to achieve
“transcendence”, they must do more.
Arts man-made plus does not by itself guarantee to art any metaphysical 
content. If we assume the latter to be nurgatoiy, this does not imply that 
works of art cannot posit a plus of appearance, fhe true arena of 
transcendence in works of art is the integration of their moments. By straining 
towards unity while at the same time adapting to unity, the moments of the 
work of art go beyond their appearance.^^
To understand what Adonio means by the work of art’s “transcendence”, wc need to 
grasp the different senses in which the word “appearance” is being used. On the one hand, we 
have seen that nature’s beauty derives fiom its appearing quality. On the other hand, by 
virtue of being man-made, works of art “appear” to be more than nature, but Adorno is 
explicit that this does not constitute their quality as art works. On the contrary, “ fhe true
Aesthedc Theory, p. 252.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 116.
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arena of transcendence in works of art is the integration of their moments”. ^ ’* It is this which 
allows ait works to “go beyond their appearance”. In the present context Adorno is 
characterising the “appearance” of works of art as their difference from nature by virtue of 
their being man-made. This appearance of being more than nature needs to be transcended 
because it is “nurgatoiy”.^ "^ in beginning to define art’s transcendent quality, Adorno says,
“ fhe element most akin to transcendence is expression...”,"" and “The instant of expression ^ inI
works of art is not their reduction to the level of material qua immediate reality but a 
complex phenomenon of mediation”.
faking art’s transcendent, beyond material, quality as nothing more specific than a 
“complex phenomenon of mediation”, what is beginning to emerge is a paradoxical idea of 
the work of art as man-made artefact which appears to be more than it is, and the work of 
art as a transcendent quality. In the context of the claim of the previous chapter that “art is 
imitation of the beautiful in nature, rather than imitation of natur e”,"' this should not come as 
a surprise. If art is to be an imitation of the beautiful in nature, it must be the imitation of an 
appearance. What stands in the way of its achieving this? I ’iiere are two, quite distinct, 
reasons for art to fail. If art is simply tied to its difference fiom nature by its artilactual
■ I
quality, it fails. If art attempts to imitate the appearance of nature directly, it also (ails 
because “I ’hrough duplication in art, the appearing quality in nature looses its being-in-itscif 
on which appreciation in nature feeds’’."^  Thus “Art falls below its standards and becomes 
entkunstet, when it fails to attain transcendence. The same betrayal occurs when art seeks 
tr anscendence as an effect”."^
Aesthetic 'Theory, p. 116. 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 116. 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 117. 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 105.
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N ow , in the previous chapter w e saw  that the latter problem  w as apparently  bypassed 
in the exam ples o f  successful naturalistic art. T hese m anaged to  represen t the appearance o f  
natural beauty. W hat A dorno  is now  saying, how ever, is différent and new. He is saying that 
if  a it is to  imitate, ra ther than represent, it m ust in som e w ay im itate na tu re  qua appearance; 
a it m ust itse lf be an appearance o f an appearance.
fo  begin to com e to  term s with w hat this m ight imply, w e need to  return to A d o rn o 's  
claim for the w ork  o f  a it as m an-m ade artefact, appearing to  be m ore than it is, and the work 
o f  art as a transcendent quality. In expanding the im plications o f  this claim, A dorno relates 
his argum ent to the psychological idea o f  the Gestait. This states that the w hole is m ore than 
the sum o f  its parts. W hile suggestive, the Gestalt is insufficient because “ fhe artistic 
m om ents in their to ta l contex t intim ate w hat falls outside this co n tex t” ."' Or, to put this 
slightly less ciyjitically, the idea o f  the Gestait allow s for the idea that the parts o f  an object 
are m ediated by their p lace in the w hole, but that w hole is not understood as furthcj 
mediated.
A d o rn o ’s rejection o f  the adequacy o f  the idea o f  the Gestalt w ould imply that what 
he m eans by the “m om ents o f  a w o rk  o f  a rt” are better understood  as the configuration o f 
m ediating factors defining the w ay a w o rk  o f  art appears at a particu lar time. I his idea is 
em phasised when A dorno  now  proceeds to  liken w hat he is arguing to  B enjam in 's idea o f  
“aura” . Benjam in’s argum ent is extrem ely im portant, both in establishing a dynam ic which is 
central to  A d o rn o ’s theory , and in A d o rn o ’s various departures from  Benjamin claims.
In “The W ork  o f  A rt in the  A ge o f  M echanical R eproduction”, Benjamin defines the 
“au ra” o f  a w ork  o f  art as all those aspects which im pinge on the experience o f  a w ork o /'a il 
which cannot be reproduced. This broad  contex t is, as Benjamin puts it: •
Aesthetic Theory, p. 117.
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thoroughly  alive and extrem ely changeable. An ancient sta tue  o f  V enus, lor 
exam ple, s tood  in a different traditional contex t w ith the  G reeks, w ho m ade it 
an object o f  veneration, than w ith the clerics o f  the  M iddle A ges, w ho viewed 
it as an om inous idol. B oth  o f  them , how ever, w ere ecjually confronted with 
its uniqueness, that is, its a u ra ."
Benjamin has diagnosed a fundam ental contradiction here: the G ieeks and (he 
M edieval clerics had experiences o f  the  sam e m aterial art object, but in com pletely dilfercnl 
ways. A t the sam e tim e the “au ra” o f  the m aterial p resence o f  the w ork  o f  ai t endorses and 
underw rites the idea th a t these, actually historically contingent experiences, are taken to be 
uniquely valid and certain. From  the perspective o f  A d o rn o ’s argum ent, the statue o f  Venus 
is “appearance”, in the  sense that natural beauty  is appearance. Ideas o f  art change through 
history, ju s t as do ideas o f  nature , so that natu re and art will seem  different at din'ercnt times. 
No historical idea o f  a it can claim absolute authenticity, so they are all appearances. Second, 
qua artefact, the w ork  o f  art confi onts us w ith its uniqueness and the  absolute authenticity o f  
ou r im m ediate experience o f  it, but this is itse lf ju s t appearance. N ow , the norm ative in the 
experience o f  the appearance o f  natural beauty  w as that it w as experienced as having both 
“absolute validity” and as “inexplicable” . I 'h e  experience o f  the  art object is also experienced 
as having “absolute validity” , but it is n o t necessarily as “inexplicable” .
F or Benjamin, in com plete contrast to  the experience o f  the original, (he mechanical 
reproduction o f  the w ork  o f  a it is w ithou t “aura” and fails to  radiate a .feeling o f  “ absolute 
validity” to  its viewer. The relationship betw een the v iew er and the  w ork  o f  art becom es 
unstable, m aking the v iew er aw are o f  the contingency o f  the relation betw een them. 1 hus, 
according to  Benjam in, the separation o f  art fiom  “aura” m eans that, “for the first lime in 
w orld history, m echanical reproduction em ancipates the w ork  from its parasitical dependence 
on ritual” .""
Waiter Benjamin ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”? 
“  Walter Benjamin, [IJianinalions, p. 226.
Aesihelic Theoiy Chapters 4, 5, and 6 254
N otw ithstanding B enjam in’s hostility to  “aura” and his optim ism  in the liberating
pow er o f  technology, it is im portant to  rem em ber that A dorno  has alluded to  Benjam in’s idea
o f  “aura” w hen he rem arks, the  “true  arena o f  transcendence in w orks o f  art is the integration
o f  their m om ents...”"  A dorno  now  needs to  answ er, on his own term s, w hat this implies and
it hinges on how  the “appearance” o f  “absolute validity” o f  the d irect experience o f  the w ork
o f  art is understood:
A ppearances in the tru e  sense are appearances o f  an other. N ow , w orks o f  art 
becom e appearances in this sense when they  pu t the accent on the unreality o f  
their real being."**
This is saying tw o things: an appearance is both “o f  ano ther” and “unreal ”. W e have seen that 
successful naturalistic represen ta tions o f  natu re  had that success by virtue o f  (heir pi esenting 
the appearance o f  natural beauty  so that its appearing quality could be identified as such. 
N ature w as variously represented  as tenuous. A don io  is now  saying that, in ordei for w orks 
o f  art to  becom e appearances, then art w orks m ust likewise em phasise the “unreality o f  their 
real being” which is their “appearance o f  absolute validity” and present them selves as 
tenuous. H ow  m ight this be achieved? W e have already been to ld  that the moment o f  
expression is a “com plex phenom enon o f  m ediation”, and this is w hat w e need to be prepared 
for.
A dorno says “w orks o f  art are after-im ages o f  pre-hislorical shudders in an age o f  
reification, bringing back the te rro r o f  the  prim al w orld against a background o f  reified 
ob jects” ."** W e need to  rem em ber that the  “live” experience o f  the w ork  o f  art is cont ingent 
on both object and experience. T he experience o f  art is, like the experience o f  everything 
else, reified. Reification is the historical condition o f  experience that creates the ubiipiitous 
appearance o f  im mediacy, including the appearance o f  im m ediacy in o u r relation to art w orks
Aesihelic Theory, p. 116. 
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qua objects. It is no t ju s t the m ateriality o f  art w orks as objects wiiich presen ts us with their
im mediacy, it is also reification. So, countering the expectation o f  im m ediate experience
generated  by the  presence o f  the object and the reification o f  exjierience, A dorno  wi ites.
T he m ore p ronounced  the  h iatus betw een the discrete, con tou red  individual 
objects on the one hand and the  paling essence on the othei , the  m ore em pty 
the gaze the w orks o f  a it - the only rem iniscence o f  the fact that there has to 
be som ething besides this hiatus.^"
It is precisely the inadequacy o f  the  im m ediate experience o f  the art w ork which
constitu tes its value. W here Benjamin had celebrated the d isappearance o f  “aura” as the
d isappearance o f  the feeling o f  “absolute validity” before the w ork  o f  art, A dorno defends the
persistence o f  “au ra” as the presum ption o f  the  “absolute validity” o f  the experience o f  art,
generated  by reification. It is the  failure o f  the experience o f  art to  live up to  this expectation
w hich gives art its value.
Having arrived at th is point, A d o rn o ’s argum ent needs to  be located in term s o f  (he
claims he has m ade for the  relationship betw een art and the appearance o f  beauty in nature.
In chapter 4, im m ediately after stating that “a it is the im itation o f  the beautiful in nature.
ra ther than the im itation o f  na tu re” , A dorno  rem arks,
Ih is  com ponent g row s to g e th er w ith the allegorical intention o f  art which 
m anifests the beautifiil in natu re  w ithout decoding. It g ro w s in relation to the 
grow th  o f  non-objectilying m eanings and non denotative languages, fhc  
preconditions for them  are historical through and through.^'
He has also said that this “cannot be w illed or in tended” ,’  ^ and that “adequate  know ledge o f
aesthetic m atters is the  spon taneous recapitulation o f  objective p rocesses taking place in (he
w ork  ow ing to  the  tensions therein” . A l l  th is needs to  be kept in mind when considering
w hat A dorno has ju s t said about the  experience o f  art. The value o f  the appearance o f  natural
^"Aesihelic I'heory, p. 118. 
Aesihelic Theory, p. 105. 
Aesihelic Theory, p. 115. 
Aesihelic Theory, p. 102-103
Aesthetic Theoiy Chapters 4, 5, and 6 236
beauty derives fi om  its prom ise o f  a different kind o f  experience from  the status ()uo, as a
m em ory o f  som ething w hich m ay never have existed. The appearance o f  natural beauty is
taken as having absolute validity while at the  sam e tim e being inexplicable. A similar
m ovem ent is taking place here. On the one hand w e have the art object and reified experience
which generate  the  idea o f  the “authoritative validity” o f  the w ork  o f  art. On the o ther hand
w e have its inexplicability, its ‘Jjaling essence”. It is the “liiatus” betw een them  that says
“there has to  be som ething besides h iatus” . A don io  goes on to explain w hat art is achieving
here in term s o f  its relation to  philosophy,
Throw n back  upon itself, enlightenm ent m oves farther and farther aw ay fiom 
its goal, which is som e kind o f  objective certainty. H ence under the strain o f  
its ideal o f  tru th , enlightem nent is forced to  retain w hat it tends to  discard in 
the nam e o f  truth.
This is a definition o f  A d o rn o ’s philosophical position. The recognition o f  the impossibility o f
objective certainty implies the necessity  for philosophy to  m aintain doubt, which is at the
sam e time a negation o f  its self-definition. This is by no m eans A d o rn o ’s unique observation.
V arious philosophers have taken the inadequacy o f  philosophy and pro jected  its solution onto
art and aesthetic experience. On the  coiitraiy , fo r A dorno , there  is no such hierarchical
difference betw een art and philosophy o f  this, o r H egel’s kind. R ather art, as A dorno  has just
described it, is both inseparable fiom  its unfolding by philosophy, and from in its relation to
the dynam ic o f  enlightenm ent ju s t described.
A rt as initemosyiie [aid to  the m em ory] is this kind o f  retaining operation.
The instance o f  appearance o f  w o rk s o f  art is the  paradoxical union o r balance 
betw een a vanishing and preserving tendency, for art w o rk s are static and 
dynam ic at the sam e tim e.’'*
Now, w here for Benjamin “au ra” w as the obstacle to  the leal experience o f  art, w c see (hat
for A dorno, aura persists. A t the sam e time, the crucial “h iatus” hctw cen expectation and
‘^Giesfhelic Theory, p. 118.
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experience wliich he has identified as giving art its value is far from  guaranteed. W e have
seen that the “transcendence” o f  w orks o f  art is n o t guaranteed  by their difference from
natu re  as m an-m ade, n o r is it i f  a d irect a ttem pt is m ade at transcendence. 1 liese constrain! s
on art w ork  as object and its p roduction  are m irrored by w hat happens to art under
reification. The value o f  art, as A donio  has ju s t described it, is far from  guaranteed because
the expectations for art generated  by reification are predicated on rem oving (he hiatus jus!
described as so im portant.
l l i e  tw o extrem e form s o f  Entkimstiing o f  ait, therefore, are reification - art 
view ed as a thing am ong things - and psycliologism  - art view ed as a vehicle 
for the psychology o f  the view er. Tfie reified w orks o f  art which have ceased 
to  speak, are m ade to  say the  things the  v iew er w ants them  to  say and which 
are the stereotyjied  echo o f  h im self
For A dorno , Benjam in w as quite w io n g  in his pred ic tions o f  the destruction o f
“au ra”. T he opposite  has com e true. T he universal availability o f  quality reproductions o f  art,
far from  liberating the  experience o f  art, has b rought hom e a r t’s innate obscurity, and so feed
the desire for the  “authentic”. All that is left o f  w orks o f  art now , in term s o f  Benjamin 's
argum ent, is the “aura” o f  the original w orks; their physical presence. 1 hus.
T he grow ing  independence[fi om B enjam in’s definition o f  “au ra”] o f  w orks o f  
art, their objectification by m an, m akes it appear as if  their shudder wer e 
com pletely unm itigated and unheard  o f  T he act o f  alienation that is pai l o f  
that objectification is a corrective in all art. W orks o f  art are neutralised and 
qualitatively changed epiphanies.^"
It is precisely “aura”, qua the idea that there  is m ore to  a w ork  o f  art than its physical
existence as an object that Benjamin does no t allow, and is increasingly becom ing the case. If
there is no “aura” to  an art w ork , then there is no suggestion that an artw ork  can be more
than its physicality; it cannot thus be the appearance o f  som ething else. W ith this ar gument
against Benjam in, A don io  in troduces a new  w ord  to  describe w hat he w an ts to  defend as the
Aesihelic Theory, p. 25.
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appearing quality o f  art, nam ely its “apparitional” quality as su ch /^  He says, “W orks o f  ai l 
collude w ith apparition, especially in the  w ay an apparition rises above people beyond tlic 
reach o f  their intention, beyond the reach also o f  the w orld  o f  th ings” /** I his ephem eral 
quality o f  art arises not, as Benjamin argues, because it is free to  m ean anything once released 
from  “au ra ,” and to  generate  “shock” in its suiprising and d isorientating relation to other 
images. R ather, fo r A don io  the  apparitional quality o f  the art w o rk  derives first from the 
em phasis that w hat it is is n o t equivalent to its m ateriality: “ In every w ork  o f  art som ething 
appears that does n o t exist” .’** W hat does not exist is the possibility o f  an experience o f  the 
w orld which is no t reified. T hat which thus appears in art cannot do so overtly; it can only 
appear as “ciphers” : “art w o rk s do n o t place these ciphers before o u r eyes as though they 
really existed, which is w hat fantasies d o ” .^ ** H ere A dorno  starts to  locate the apparitional 
quality o f  art “betw een” the “appearance o f  the beautifiil in n a tu re” and “denotative 
thinking” . The apparitional quality o f  art is m ore determ ined than the form er in term s o f  its 
form s, and the  extent to  which those  form s appear. I h i s  m akes it like denotative thinking, but 
not the sam e as it.
So the apparitional quality o f  art is thus different from the appearance o f  natural 
beauty, but this apparitional quality o f  art “does not exist” for reified consciousness. I his is 
because the non-existen t in art is the possibility o f  transcending reification. A rt p resents the 
possibility that the transcendence o f  reification could be m ade substantial, that is definitively 
achieved - but reification cannot thus be achieved by art. Both Idealist aesthetics and 
rom anticism  believed erroneously  in th is possibility. A gainst them , w hat is im portant about 
art w o rk s is that “they call forth philosophical reflection on the  question o f  how  and why they
” Aesthetic Theoiy, p. 119.
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- as figures o f  the existent and yet unable to  im part life to the non-existent - can becom e 
im ages that oveiw lielm  being, and how  it is that the non-existent is not sufficient unto itself 
but requires a it” / '
I 'h is  philosophical reflection on art which is w hat is enacted in Aesihelic Theory, 
leads to  the following series o f  claims. It is as apparitions, i.e. suggestions o f  som ething 
which does n o t exist, which m akes w orks o f  art “im ages” . 1 heir im age quality does not 
derive fiom  being “copies” . W hat are a it w orks im ages of? fh ey  are im ages o f  society. 
“W hat appears in art is no  longer the  ideal o f  harm ony o r o f  anything else, foday  a r t 's  
em ancipatory quality seem s to  lie in dissonance and contrad iction” .**^  But it is precisely this 
dissonance and contradiction which does no t exist for reified consciousness. Now, as 
“im ages” , w orks o f  art represent duration. T hat is to  say, their im age quality derives fiom  
their claim to  posit som ething which does n o t exist, i.e. d issonance and contradiction. 
A gainst this, as appearances, which is how  they are know n by philosophical reflection on 
them , they represent transience. In the discussion o f  the  m utual dependence o f  philosophy 
and a it, w e saw  th a t art can exist fo r m ind and being. H ere, w hat A dorno  is saying is that for 
being, w orks o f  a it appear to  represent som ething which does no t exist under reification, i.e. 
dissonance and contradiction; as such they seem  to  have duration. For mind, how ever, w orks 
o f  art do n o t have such duration. It is only as a function o f  philosophical reflection that they 
can exist as the  appearance o f  something, but as such they represen t transience. “Art w orks 
qua im ages represent duration , w hereas qua appearances they represent transience '.*'' But 
ano ther way, as im ages o f  som ething which does no t exist, a rtw orks exist as som ething 
definite and tangible through their duration as such. To be any thing m ore than apparitional.
Aeslheiic Theory, p. 123. 
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to  be the  appearance o f  someihing o ther than reification, they can only exist in a state oi
extrem e transience, like, fo r example, firew orks.
It is as the appearance o ï something X\v\i w orks o f  art are “spirit” , which defines them
as ail. “ I f  spirit does no t appear, w orks o f  art do no t exist any m ore than does spirit” .** ' 1 his
is w hat defines a “live” w ork  o f  art as such, and it is w hat gives w o rk s o f  art their truth value.
A t the sam e time, how ever, A dorno is clear that spirit is but one m om ent o f  a w ork o f  art.
C ritique in terprets the  spirit o f  w o rk s o f  art on the basis o f  the configurations 
in them , confionting  the  m om ents with each o ther and with the spirit as it 
appears to  them . In so doing critique passes over into a truth beyond the 
realm  o f  aesthetic configurations. T hat is w hy criticism  is an essential and 
necessary  com plem ent o f  art w orks. C riticism  recognises the truth content o f  
w orks in their spirit, o r alternatively denies that they have any tru th  content
because they have no spirit. The only place w here art and philosophy
converge is in the  act o f  criticism  - which is a far cry from  philosophy
dictating to  art w hat its spirit ough t to  b e ."
This m ight be taken as an account o f  the foregoing discussion o f  the possibility o f  the truth of’
ait. A dorno the philosopher considers the w ay w orks o f  art are configured in relation lo
reification. “In every w o rk  o f  art, th e  m om ent o f  spirit is in the p rocess o f  becom ing and
form ation; it is never at re s t” . "  This is because the appearance o f  spirit is a function o f  the
relationship betw een art w ork , h istory  and its philosophical critique within that matrix.
W hat th is m eans has already been suggested  in the discussion o f  various exam ples o f
naturalistic art in chap ter 4. In that case, philosophical critique d iagnosed the significance o f
the idea o f  the appearance o f  n a tu re  as transitory. It then explained how  various w orks
testified to  the transito ry  nature o f  the appearance o f  natural beauty. C hapter 5, which we
have ju s t discussed does no t how ever engage such concrete  exam ples o f  m ore m odern art.
R ather it has attem pted  to  develop a series o f  principles on which art m ight be engaged by
philosophical critique. A s w e have seen, in the contex t o f  reification the crucial tension within
^''Aesthetic Theory, p. 130.
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the a it w ork  is the relation it can be dem onstrated  as m aintaining betw een itself as a durable 
im age o f  som ething which does n o t exist, and as transitory  appearance, revealed in (he 
process o f  its unfolding by philosophical critique.
1 his w hole form ula com es into crisis in chapter 6 fiom  tw o  different angles.
Chapter 6
A t the beginning o f  this chapter there  w as a prelim inary discussion o f  the opening 
statem ent o ï Aesthetic Theory chapter 6. This is the statem ent “T he em ancipation from (he 
concept o f  harm ony tu rns ou t to  be a revolt against illusion” . From  the perspectives o f  having 
read chapters 4 and 5, this statem ent takes on a particular significance. W e have seen (hat (he 
truth o f  an art w ork  is a frinction o f  a num ber o f  m ediating them es. N otable is its relation (o 
philosophical critique. W e have also seen that this relationship is em bedded in a condasi 
betw een art revealing itse lf as duration as the im age o f  som ething impossible, and its 
transience in its philosophical unfolding to  reveal its truth, fh e  latter, its m om entary taking 
on the appearance o ï something, is com pletely contingent on its appearing to  posit som ething 
that does n o t exist. N ow , to  posit som ething which does not exist for reification, is to posit 
d issonance and contradiction. The problem  chapter 6, confronts this with is that, to 
rein troduce G om brich, representation is contingent on resem blance and it m atters that there 
should be resem blance.
N ow , the first p art o f  chapter 6 describes how  m odern art has rejected the idea o f  
harm ony, and with it the possibility o f  art as an illusion o f  a totality . 1 hat is to say what 
appears to  be in its duration is no t som e “w holeness” beyond reification. In any case this is 
precisely w hat the reified experience o f  art seeks. It either equates a r t’s truth with the object, 
o r sees the art w ork  as the vehicle fo r psychological expression. A gainst this, under
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m odernism , the revolt against liarm ony has becom e the revolt against the organisation o f  
m aterial per se. C onsider that one definition o f ‘liarm ony” is as “the structu re  of’nui.sic with 
respect to the com position o f  chords” . "  then the rejection o f  harm ony is then not just the 
rejection o f  a w hole, bu t a rejection o f  th e  idea that an artw ork  should be structured  at all. 
A dorno  identifies tw o responses to  this crisis as it im pinges on the m aking o f  art. One is the 
rush by m odern artists to  look  for new  principles o f  construction (th is will be discussed m ore 
f'ully in the penultim ate chapter when 1 look at chapter I eiï Aesthetic Theory), fhe other, 
which p reoccupies A don io  in the first h a lf o f  chapter 6, is the introduction o f  
“phantasm agoric” elem ents into ait. In the  sense which A dorno  is using the w ord here, it 
m eans the presentation o f  art in such a w ay as to em phasise the different sim ultaneous 
relationships o f  its m aterial to  the view er. The m ost obvious exam ple here is the double status 
o f  a p iece o f  new spaper in a cubist collage. It is both a p iece o f  the real w orld which the 
painting represents, and has a formal or structural function within the painting which it shares 
with the paint itself. Interestingly, this idea o f  art holds to g e th er tw o  traditionally viewed 
attitudes to  m aking a it as virtually identical. The extrem e realism  o f  the end o f  the 
n ineteenth-century  is seen as essentially continuous with the new spaper in cubist w orks 
because both are “asham ed o f  everything that tended to disclose the m ediations o f  its 
pretended im m ediacy” . "  Thus, “Artificiality w as effaced, d isappearing in the autonom ous 
fram ew ork o f  the  product. T he only thing the act o f  positing left behind w as au ra ...”*''
Parallel with the  crisis m odern art generates for the theoretical argum ents o f  chapters 
4 and 5 is the related dissolving im pact philosophical analysis has on art. W hile philosophical 
critique is necessary for the revelation o f  the truth o f  art, such reflection also coi rodcs its 
structure. I  hus,
see footnote
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The m ost objectified w orks o f  art dissolve into a teem ing m ass o f  com ponents 
- e.g. tex ts  dissolve into w ords - as soon as they are view ed at very close 
range, the m ore one is sure o f  holding in ones hands the  details o f  a w ork o f  
art, the m ore inevitably does this sense o f  possession disintegrate into 
am orphous indeterm inacy. This show s ju s t how  m ediated w orks o f  art are. It 
also show s how  aesthetic illusion m anifests itself in the s tru c tu re  o f  art . "
N ow , contrary  to  B urger’s reading o f  him, A dorno states that ‘T he validity o f  the revolt
against illusion and its invalidity - nam ely th e  false hope that aesthetic illusion might be able
to pull itse lf ou t o f  the m orass by its own boo tstraps - are inseparable from each o ther” .
B ürger has argued th a t A dorno  is de facto  hostile to  art which sim ply “posits” ralhci than
makes. From  one perspective, he is, but equally A donio  understands its validity and
inevitability. M oreover, w here B ürger sees A d o rn o ’s problem  as a narrow ness tow ards
recent art, A d o n io ’s position is m ore com plex and integrated than B ürger gives him credit
for. A d o rn o ’s position is perm eated  by its own failure. The crisis o f  m odem  art is also a crisis
in the capacity  to  theorise  about art, and the possibility for art to be true  at all. I.ike I Icg cfs
A esthetics, Aesthetic Theoiy has an internal strength which m akes B iirger’s kind o f  criticism
som e w hat dubious.
The problem  w ith art which seeks to  evade its artifactuality  is that, despite itse lf it is 
“alw ays a replica o r reality” , even while seeking to  be reality itse lf ' It is this which 
in troduces the next part o f  A d o rn o ’s argum ent, w here he seeks to  describe an art which 
m ight som ehow  transcend the crisis o f  illusion. The problem  he addresses is “w hether art is 
able to  outlive illusion” .**^
esthetic Theory, p. 149.
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Expression, Mimesis and Autonomy
W ith th is w e can re tiin i to  the  problem s o f  the second h a lf o f  chapter 6. I lie situation
here is obviously related to  the crisis o f  philosophy after Hegel. W here the idea o f  the 
sufficiency o f  reason posits an ideal relationship betw een concept and object, it also generates 
a speculative integrity. T he concept o f  the harm ony o f  the w o rk  o f  art plays a similar role. 
1 hus, the crisis Aeslheiic Theory as philosophical form  in the absence o f  sufficient reason 
parallels the crisis o f  art in the absence o f  harmony.
T he w ay artw orks confion t the problem  is through “expression” and “expression in 
art is m im etic” .**'' Expression, thus defined is no panacea because “M im esis is the ideal o f  art. 
not som e practical m ethod o r subjective attitude aimed at expressive values” ;'*' mimesis 
cannot be achieved directly. Equally problem atic, under the  critique o f  philosophy every 
w ork  o f  art, even the  one that tries to  hide its artifactuality as sim ple m atter, is “always a 
replica o f  reality” . This is because “the m im etic m ode o f  behaviour in art has been 
progressively infiltrated by illusion - the organ o f  m imesis since the archaic taboo on mimesis 
- virtually becom ing the  vehicle o f  illusion...”"  H ow ever unintended o r unw orked, a work 
o f  art qua man-made.object will never achieve absolute immediacy. It alw ays replicates reality 
by virtue o f  being m ade by man. T he question is, can art achieve this replicatoiy  relation to 
reality in an active way? A s w e have seen, it cannot be effected directly and “expression” 
therefore, has nothing to  do with the projection o f  subjective feelings: “ If expression w ere 
merely a duplicate o f  subjective feelings, it would not am ount to  anything” . * ' Instead he says 
“a b e tte r m odel for understanding expression is to  think o f  it, no t in term s o f  subjective
Aesihelic Theory, p. 162. 
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feelings, but in term s o f  ordinary things and situations in w hich historical processes and
function have been sedem ented, endow ing them  with the potential to  speak .
In explaining w hat he means, A dorno uses language as an example. A dorno
associates a r t’s mimetic capacity  with one aspect o f  the “dual natu re o f  language”. One side
o f  language is the com m unicative aspect, which, A dorno defines here as its “ linguistic
construc tion” . T he o ther side is “m im etic language” . For D errida, language is distinguished
betw een its signifying capacity and its discursive structure. A dorno  does not m ake that
distinction here; fo r him the  com m unicative capacity o f  language derives from its discursive
structure which is contrasted  witli “m im etic language”. Thus,
The efforts o f  m odern p rose  w riters such as Joyce, w ho set discursive 
language aside or, to  say the least, subordinated it to  the  idea o f  form to the 
point w here the linguistic construction  becom es indecipherable, m ight be 
explained as attem pts to  m ove fiom  com m unicative to  m im etic language. *
Having m ade this distinction betw een “discursive” and “m im etic” m om ents in art,
A dorno  now  considers art by com parison with philosophy. fro m  this perspective,
philosophy is “discursive, w here a it is “m im etic” . This leads A dorno  to say that “the ttuc
language o f  art is speechless” . "  H ere he indicates that painting and sculpture are the most
“speechless” arts, and thus “A rt’s speechless m om ent has priority  over the significative one
o f  poetry  (which is found to  som e extent even in m usic)” . ' "  l h a t  is, in term s o f  its modern
m anifestation, art, as opposed to  p o e tiy  and music, is the least significative and therefore the
m ost different from  philosophy. It is consequently  the m ost susceptible to  philo.sophical
critique qua the unfolding o f  its m om ents. D espite him self and his own musical background.
A dorno is allowing his philosophical identity  to  determ ine his a ttitude to art. It is the
“speechlessness” o f  a w o rk  o f  art w hich he m ost obviously equates w ith the “h iatus” between
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the im m ediate experience o f  the art object and the inadequacy o f  the experience o f  it as ai l. 
In o ther w ords, the m im etic potential o f  art, which is the potential to  represent the world 
indirectly, is a r t’s speechlessness, i f  “exi)ression is the gaze o f  an a rtw o rk ” '" ',  that gaze can 
only be m ade to  “speak” by philosophy.
1 his discussion has considered art as it p resents itse lf to  philosophy. N ow  he talks 
about art from the perspective o f  its p roduction  and his attention is directed Iowa ids the 
relation betw een w ork  o f  art and w orld. From  this perspective, he says “expression is a 
llinction o f  both m ethod  and m im esis” . H ere the crisis o f  art becom es virtually identical to 
the crisis o f  Aesthetic Theory, l  o see this w e need to  recall A d o rn o ’s em phasis on stringeiicy 
in the deploym ent o f  philosophical concepts. The mimetic aspect o f  art em erges out ol ils 
production , but through the history  o f  its developm ent tow ards m odernism , art has becom e 
detached fiom  its “ru les” o f  production. To see this w e need to consider the idea of 
“autonom y” and A d o rn o ’s developm ent o f  it in chapter 12.
Chapter 12
The idea o f  “autonom y” can be tied quite specifically to the category  o f  society. 1 his 
is because when A dorno  speaks o f  art as “autonom ous”, he is talking about its autonom y 
from society. A d o n io  begins by looking at the vexed question o f  how  art can be conceived as 
a social category. A s w e have com e to  ex|)ect, the categories and term s used in the analysis 
o f  the art o f  the past need to be m odified. A don io  claims that by com parison with previous 
art, there  is heightening aw areness o f  social content in advanced art. l ie  acknow ledges this is 
a paradoxical claim to  m ake, since one o f  the definitions o f  au tonom y he gives as “art ’s 
g row ing independence fiom  society”.'"^ Indeed, he suggests that until its em ancipation in the
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bourgeois era, there  had been a great deal o f  direct social control ovei art which was 
extended particularly  through a control o f  genres and styles. T hese d irect social inlhienccs arc 
no t the focus o f  A d o rn o ’s in terest in the discussion o f  advanced art because they have 
becom e relatively insubstantial: artists no  longer orientate them selves w ith reference to  (his 
kind o f  convention.
The waning significance o f  styles and genres does not signal a reduction in (he impaci 
o f  society on art, but a transform ation o f  the structu res through which society expresses itsell 
therein. Em ancipation fiom  genres and styles m eans paradoxically, that “there is a sense in 
which bourgeo is society can be said to  have in tegrated  art m ore com pletely than any previous 
society” .'"'*fo explain h im self A dorno  con trasts the novel with the chivalric epic. In an 
obvious sense the  stylistic rules which govern the formal organisation o f  the chivalric epic are 
far m ore rigidly defined by convention than are those  for the novel, which is characterised by 
its form lessness. It m ight seem obvious that the level o f  social inteivention in (he chivalric 
epic is m ore powerfiil than in the novel. In fact, the opposite is tru e  because in (he chivalric 
epic, experience had to  be forced into a given genre. In the novel, by contrast, art is faced 
with an influx o f  experiences which are no longer m ade to com ply w ith the r ules o f  a genre. 
Instead o f  being prescribed, form has to  be created  out o f  these experiences “ fiom  below, as 
it w ere” . A s a consequence, “N o longer sublim ated by the principle o f  stylisation, the relation 
o f  conten t to  the society fi om  w hich it springs is thus rendered much m ore d irect” '"^
A w ay to  clarify and broaden the perspective on this argum ent is to recall (lom bricli’s 
idea that an individual representation is alw ays m ediated by a tradition o f  previous 
representation. A d o rn o ’s argum ent endorses this schem e up to  a jioint but part o f  what 
defines m odern a r t’s “autonom y” is its em ancipation fiom  precisely this kind o f  traditional
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influence. A rtists are no longer tied either to  the tradition o f  representation, o r to  m ore
specific styles and genres. It is not that G o mb rich is w rong, but that his argum ent cannot be
applied to  the developm ent o f  au tonom ous ar t.
The problem , indeed the crisis, o f  rnodeni art is that it has no t only the absence ol
genr es and styles, but that it has no t properly  engaged the im plications o f  this em ancipation.
R ather, “artists everyw here w ere quick to  look  for som e new  prcsirm ed foundation (or what
they w ere doing” .*"'’ One o f  A d o n ro ’s central principles is to  represent this tendency to look
for explanations as a continuing crisis.
T he iiominalistic w o rk  o f  art is supposed to  organise itse lf from  below  r ather 
than subm it to  ready-m ade pr inciples o f  organisat ion foisted on it from above.
B ut this is im possible. No w o rk  that is left to  its own devices has.the power o f  
self-organisation and self-lim itation...'"^
H ere w e are returned to  the  situation o f  A d o rn o ’s earlier critique o f  ar t which attem pts to
evade its “artifactuality” . In the  past the experiential “con ten t” o f  art w as forced into a given
genre o r style and given form  in the process. In the pr esent, w ithout the impact o f  genr es and
styles, there is no such form  giving fiarnew ork. It becom es im possible to raise art beyond
artifactuality.
A t the begirrning o f  this chapter there w as a prelim inary discussion o f  the opening 
statem ent o f  chapter 6 o f  A esthetic Theory: “ fire em ancipation from the concept of harrnorry 
tu rns out to be a revolt against illusion.” Fr om  the perspective o f  having consider ed chapter s 
4, 5, and 12, this statem ent takes on a particu lar significance within the fram ew ork of
Aesthetic Theory. W e have seen that the m im etic poterrtial o f  a w ork  o f  art is a firnction o f  a
num ber o f  m ediating them es. N otable are its r elation to  philosophical cr itique, the at tem pt to 
replicate reality in an active w ay, and the im possibility o f  trying to  do so w ithout styles and 
genres. These stipulations define the (im )possibility o f  m imesis in art and can be related to
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A d o rn o ’s main theoretical explanation o f  the relation betw een art and the appearance o f  
natural beauty.
T hrough philosophical unfolding, art reveals itse lf as the im age o f  som ething which is 
im possible. Its m om entary  taking orr th e  appearance o f  som ething that does not exist is 
com pletely corrtingent on its appearing to  posit som ething which does not exist, l o posit 
som ething which does not exist is not an absolute problem ; it takes place within reilied 
experience. W ithin reification it is im possible to  posit dissonance and contradiction. 
D issonance and contradiction appears as the  ‘liia tu s” betw een the wor k o f  ar t as object and 
the experience o f  it. F or th is ‘Iria tus” to  be taken to  repr esent som ething beyond r eification, it 
has to  “m atter”  that it should. M odern art, in its attem pts to express the w orld as som ething 
other than a harm onious w hole, re jects the very thing on which the dissonant experience o f  
“hiatus” depends. T hat is to  say, for ‘Iria tus” to  appear thus, there has to  be the possibility o f  
the adequate experience o f  harmony. This is w hat m odern art rejects in its prodrretiorr: 
m odern ar t rejects harm ony as a principle o f  construction. T he sam e dissolution o f  harm ony 
takes place in the philosophical unfolding o f  the “speechless” w ork  which dissolves into 
“am orphous im m ediacy” in being thus scrutinised.
W hat em erges at the  end o f  chapter 6 is a situation w here the present irrrpossibility o f  
mimesis in art is represen ted  in such a w ay that, there is a m utually supporting constellation 
o f  theor etical, philosophical, historical factors which all po int in the sam e dir ection. Aesthetic 
Theory, qua philosophical aesthetics collapses, as philosophical aesthetics becairse o f  the 
definitive irradequacy o f  conceptual represerrtatiorr o f  the nonidentical. It also collapses as 
mimesis, because the object it im itates is in collapse. I f  w e take A d o rn o ’s ‘conclusions' irr 
isolation, therr he is no t significantly different fiom  poststructuralism . Postslnrctr alisrir wor ks.
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or attem pts to  w ork , within the con tex t o f  A d o rn o ’s conclusion. Lyotard does not see this
when he reads A d o n io  as follow s
T he ca tegory  o f  the subject rem ains un criticized. It is the  c n o t only o f  the 
in terpretation  o f  society as alienation and o f  art as mar tyr ed  w itness, but o f  all 
theory  o f  expression. T hat the subject, and consequently  its so-called 
expr ession, m ay itse lf be a p roduct, and n o t a pr oducer , Ador no w ould have 
been able to  doubt only by doubting representation . T he critique o f  
representation w ould have lead him to  the critique o f  politics ( even “Mai xisl” 
politics), and o f  dialectics. To r aise doubts about r epr esentation is to  rnanifesl 
the theatrical (in music, in paintings, in politics, in the theatre , in literatm e, in 
film)... W e have the  advantage over A dorno  o f  living in a capitalism  that is 
m ore energetic, m ore cynical, less tragic. It places ever y th irr g inside 
r epresentation , r epr esentation doubles itself (as irr B recht), ther efor e pr eserrts 
itself
Part o f  w hat Lyotard is saying here, particularly  in his represerrtatiorr o f  A dortro 's 
com m itm ent to  “expression,” is simply w rong. A s w e have seerr, Adortro rejects the 
possibility o f  subjective “expr ession” . The secorrd part o f  the quotatiorr, however , is t evealirrg 
because Lyotard m obilises the fam iliar criticism  o f  A donro that ca])italism is sinrply rrrotc 
sophisticated  than Ador no allowed. Capitalism  “places ever ythirrg inside r epr esent at iorr. 
representation doubles itse lf (as irr B recht), therefo re  presents i ts e lf ’.'"" A donro accepts that 
capitalism  “places everythirrg inside represen ta tion”, but at tim es rejects ly o ta r d ’s pessimistic 
developm errt o f  this argum ent and, in his critique o f  the “pharrtasnragorical” irr art and 
particularly  o f  the cubist use o f  collage, A donro  rejects L yo tard ’s assertiorr that art has to 
becom e “theatr ical” in the absence o f  its capacity  to  r epresent directly. I'lrese sinrilarities airti 
differences betw een A don io  and L yotard  are  significant in distinguishing A donro fioirr 
poststructuralism , arrd in explaining the apparent scepticism  to w ard s art as it is developed iir 
chapter 6 of Aesthetic Iheory. fo  clarify these issues w e need to look m ore catefully at the 
com parison o f  L yotard and A dorno, particularly L yo tard ’s influerrtial defrrritioir ol 
“postm odern ism ” .
Jeaii-François Lyotard, ‘Adorno as the Devif, trans. Robert Hurley, Teios 19 (Spring, 1974). p. 12% 
Jean-François Lyotard, ‘Adorno as the Devif, p. 128.
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Lyotard and Adorno
Lyotard gives the following account o f  the  “m odern” in the Introduction to his book
The Postmodern Condition:
to the extent that science does no t restric t itse lf to  stating useful regularities and 
seeks the tru th , it is obliged to  legitimate the rules o f  its ow n game. It then 
produces a discourse o f  legitim ation with respect to its own status, a discourse 
called philosophy. I will use the term  modern to  designate any science that 
legitim ates itse lf with reference to  a m etadiscourse o f  this kind m aking an explicit 
appeal to  som e grand n arra tiv e ...""
“M odernism ” is defined as scepticism  tow ards dogm atic assum ptions about the 
“tru th ” o f  our know ledge o f  the w orld , while retaining the m isplaced self-confidence of 
dogm a. “M odernism ” is engaged in positing  tru th  claims, w hose status as such, it 
acknow ledges cannot be taken for g ranted and m ust be legitim ated by refeicnce to some 
higher authority. Seen in the  light o f  its deconstruction by “|)ostm odern ism ” and despite its 
radical rejection o f  dogm a, the “m odem ” enteiprise partakes in its own misguided 
m etanarrative. It is the assum ption o f  the  possibility o f  som e higher authority  o f  “tru th” and 
“m eaning” to  underw iite  its ow n claims. N ow , as w e have seen, this is nothing like A dorno’s 
position. I f  w e recall his critique o f  H eidegger, w e will rem em ber that “m ind”, which m akes 
truth claim s which are taken to  rep iesen t the w orld, is coexistent with “being”, which sees 
the inevitable inadequacy o f  those truth claims, in o ther w ords, w hat for Lyotard are the 
definitively difièrent “M odernism ” and “Postm odernism ”, in A dorno  are the sim ultaneous 
com ponents o f  experience.
L yotard says that the  positive implication o f  “P ostm odernism ” is that it is a context
w here there  is com plete to lerance for the “incom m ensurable” .
W here after the m etanarratives can legitim acy reside? T he opei ativity criterion is 
technological; it has no relevance fo r judg ing  w hat is tru e  or ju st...P o stm o d ein
Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmoclern condition: A Report on Knowledfre, trans. Bennington & 
Massunii, Manchester University Press, 1986. p.xxiii.
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know ledge is n o t simply a tool o f  the authorities; it refines o u r sensitiviiy to 
differences and reinforces o u r ability to  to lera te  the incom m ensurable. ' ' '
From  A d o rn o ’s position, all this is doing is allowing the “incom m ensurable” because
judgem ent is impossible. The “incom m ensurable” is not so, because it has nothing to  be
“incom m ensurable” fiom . In L y o tard ’s scenario, to lerance for the “incom m ensurable” is
simply the  inability to  m ake judgem en ts abou t anything.
fh e  question o f  judgem ent is raised pow erfully in one o f  the m ost telling contrasts
betw een A dorno  and Lyotard. This is in their different attitudes to  the  radical student politics
o f  the late 1960's. M artin Jay quo tes H aberm as as describing A dorno  adopting a “strategy o f
hibernation” which, in Jay's w ords, seem ed “woefully inadequate” to  the N ew  Lell in
G erm any o f  the late 1960's. H e goes on to  relate an episode which seem ed to crystallize these
feelings:
In April 1969, th ree m em bers o f  a m ilitant action group  rushed onto the 
podium  during one o f  his lectures, bared their breasts and 'a ttacked ' him witii 
flow ers and ero tic caresses. A dorno unnerved left the lectine hall with 
students m ockingly proclaim ing that 'as an institution A dorno  is dead'."**
M eanw hile, L yotard  w as at the heart o f  precisely the constituency which so despised A dorno.
L yotard  w as for a long tim e a m ilitant o f  the far-left group Socialism on Barbaric which,
P eter D ew s argues:
anticipated and m ay even have directly influenced, m any o f  the key them es ol 
the M ay S tudent uprising. H aving left S ou B in 1963, L yotard  at that time a 
philosophy teacher at N ant erre, and therefore the epicentre o f  the revolt, 
becam e active in the Mouvement du 22 Mars, the spontaneist ant- 
authoritarian w ing o f  the M ay m ovem ent. “The m ovem ent o f '68 '“ Lyotard 
w io te  in the introduction to  his first anthology o f  essays, “seem ed to us lo do 
and say on a grand scale w hat w e sketched ou t in w ords and actions in 
m iniature and by anticipation..."**
Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern condition, pp. xxiv-xxv. 
Martin Say, Adorno, (London: Fontana, 1984), p. 55.
Peter Dews I ,o}fics o f Disintigration, (London: Verso, 1987), p. III.
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The contrast betw een A don io  and Lyotard could not be much starker. Very quickly.
how ever, the position represen ted  by Lyotard at this tim e cam e to  be seen by himsell and
others on the French radical left to  be com pletely com prom ised. Indeed the signilicance o f
M ay 1968 for subsequent French th eo iy  as a w hole, and L yotard  in particular, is now  seen
precisely in its underm ining o f  the  idea o f  any possibility o f  a revolutionary  political action.
A s D ouglas K ellner suggests in his book  on Baudrillard, by the early 1970's in France
fh e  reaction against M arx and F reud ...w as also conditioned by the failure o f  
the M ay 1968 revolts to p ro d u ce  m ore dram atic and lasting changes. 
D isillusionm ent and 'left melancholy' set in, and thinkers like Baudrillard began 
to abandon their revolutionary  hopes and p re tensions."  *
In Economie Libidinale (1974) L yotard  begins to  com e to  term s w ith the im plications o f  the
failure o f  the M ay m ovem ent for his own position. H e developed a kind o f  extrem e nihilism
which V incent D escom bes sees as pessim istically implying that: “Lyotard considers it
reactionary  o r reactive to  p ro test against the state  o f  the w orld, against 'capitalism ', if we
like.” "^ This idea has a familiar echo. W here have w e com e across a similar rcliisal to
endorse political activism  before? W ell A dorno o f  1969 does for a s tart, but in fact the whole
o f  A dorno 's theoretical career since the early 1930's is m otivated  by the kind o f  problem atic
which L yotard  and Baudrillard w ere ju s t beginning to deal with by the early 1970's.
A s w as described in chapter 2, A dorno 's agenda w as hugely influenced by Luka es'
History and Class Consciousness and the essay 'Reification and the C onsciousness o f  the
Proletariat' in particular. The circum stances against which this w o rk  w as w ritten are worth
briefly recapitulating because they parallel closely the extrem e change in direction o f
Lyotard 's career. Five years before History and Class Consciousness Lukacs had w ritten The
Theory o f The Hovel. In a n ew  Preface for the 1962 edition he describes the book as “written
" ' Douglas Kellner, .ycfl/7 Bomlnllarcl: I'rom Marxism to Poslmoclernism and Beyond, (Cambridge Polity 
Press, 1989), p. 122.
Vincent Descombes, Modern Prench Philosophy, trans. L. Scott-Pox and J.M. Harding, (Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 181.
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in a m ood o f  perm anent despair over the state  o f  the w orld. It w as not until 1917 that 1 found 
an answ er to  the problem s, which “until then, had seem ed to  m e insoluble.” ""  It is clear that 
his despair w as both directed externally tow ards w orld events and internally tow ards his own 
inability to theorize rationally a valid alternative. In the A utum n o f  1918 Lukacs gave up 
lecturing in aesthetics at H eidelburg U niversity and jo ined  the H ungarian com m unist party. 
D uring the Hungarian C om m une o f  1919 he w as Com m issar o f  C ulture, and aller its collapse 
he escaped to  Vienna w here he w as arrested  and im prisoned in the S te inhof Lunatic Asylum. 
It w as here that he w ro te  much o f  History and Class Consciousness. It is a w ork written by a 
failed com m unist party  otBHcial, com ing to  term s w ith that failure.
I f  there are obvious parallels betw een L ukacs’ and L yotard 's experience o f  the failure 
o f  political action, it is equally im portant to understand that their reactions to  the abject 
failuie o f  their political as])irations w ere very  different. A s D escom bes puts it, for Lyotard: 
“I f  M arxism  is not true, this is no t because it is false, but because nothing is true” '" .  Lukacs' 
response, how ever, is as w e have seen m ore com plex and Involved for him a com plete 
rethinking o f  the aspirations o f  O rthodox  M arxism. A s w e have also seen, the thrust o f  
Lukacs' strategy w as to  reinvigorate the latent Hegelian character o f  M arxism. A dorno 
continues this them e and for him the possibility o f  som e kind o f  resistance to capitalism , 
how ever negligible, rem ains a possibility. For Lyotard and Baudrillard this kind o f  
prelapsarian faith in the persistence o f  subjectivity is m isplaced met aphysics.
The problem  w ith L yotard  is that he understands subjectivity as vulnerable to his 
particular brand o f  scepticism . For A dorno , it is not. F or A dorno , the ultim ate significance o f  
subjectivity is far from  guaran teed , but its potential exists in the  dialectical s tructure o f  
experience. For the Hegelian tradition o f  which A donio  is a part, this is fundamental. In a
Georg Lukacs, The ThenrI of The Novel: A historicalphilosophical essay on Ihe forms o f f  real epic 
lUerahire, trans A.Bostock, {London: Merlin, 1978), p. 12.117 Vincent Descombes Modern h'rench Philosophy, p. 181.
Aesthetic Theory Chapters 4, 5, and 6 275
recent discussion o f  one o f  Hegel's early essays on skepticism , it has been pointed out dial (he
kind o f  skepticism  L yotard 's position represen ts is o f  questionable value. Hegel's argumeni
has been sum m arized as follows:
Hegel's story  o f  the decline o f  ancient skepticism  into its anem ic m odern 
coun terpart goes som ething like this: the initial phase o f  skepticism  w as a negative 
ascesis tow ard  experience and the w orld  that has its positive side only in m atters 
o f  conduct. Since the w orld is an illusion, w e should seek to suspend judgem ent 
about it, and no t attem pt to  give an account o f  it o r seek to  explain this illusion. 
C onsistent with this negation o f  the w orld, Pyrro w ro te  no books. Second, 
skepticism  becam e a philosophical school, attacking its opponen ts and defending 
its own view s with argum ents and dem onstrations. B ut when skepticism  becam e a 
philosophical school, it had to  be expressed in w ritings that involved formulai ion 
and com m unication o f  doctrines. T hus the “developm ent o f  skepticism ” am ounts 
to  a decline fiom  the noble ascetic p ractice o f  the epoché}^^
The m ost im portan t implication o f  this diflerentiation betw een 'ancient' and 'm odern' 
skepticism  is that to  say anything philosophically interesting about m eaning and skepticism  
one m ust com pensate for the fact that even in the act o f  articulation one is already implicitly 
engaging 'm eaning' and 'truth'. U nderstood  this way, 'm eaning' and 'truth ' are actually 
incredibly resilient, unavoidable even. W hat I mean by this is, as Hegel's discussion o f 
skepticism  show s, and as A dorno  em phasizes, it is im possible not to  p roduce 'm eaning' and 
m ake claims to  'truth '. Philosophy does no t therefore have to defend them  because they are 
literally im possible to  avoid. The only w ay to  be consistently skeptical is to say nothing, like 
Pyrro. L yotard  can diagnose the absence o f  any guaran to r for the relation betw een a 'speech 
act' and the w orld it pu rp o rts  to  describe, but he m akes no com pensation for this idea as it 
pertains to  its own reception. People understand his argum ent, and judg ing  by its impact, 
believe him. W here L yotard  theorises the end o f  subjectivity, his identity as subject anil 
au thor of The Postmodern Condition persists in his practice, w here “m eaning” is p iesciibed 
and incom m ensurable and exists in the  v e iy  denial o f  its own possibility. As Steven C onnor
Robert Williams, 'Hegel and Scepticism', The Owl o f Minerva: BiannnalJoiirnal of Ihe Ihgel Soriely of 
America 24 (Fall 1992), p. 72.
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has cogently  pointed out, denouncing the possibility o f  truth and value is one (lung, lo
operate w ithout them  is another. C onnor cites Haberm as' critique o f  D errida as having its
basis in w hat H aberm as identifies as 'perform ative contradiction'. In C onnor's w ords:
For H aberm as, to  en ter into critical d iscourse at all is to accede to  the 
orientation tow ards consensus implicit in all rational exchange. I o attem pt to 
underm ine these norm s and values within one's own d iscourse, as thinkers 
such as Foucault and D errida do in H aberm as' view , is to  place oneself in a 
condition o f  intolerable and enfeebling self-refu ta tion .""
D errida's self-refutation lies in his denunciation o f  the possibility o f  truth and value
while even in this denunciation, be  is m aking a claim to truth, l l i e  big difference between
A dorno and D errida is that w here D errida is perpetually  seeking to get beyond the problem .
A don io  acknow ledges its inevitalnlity, and seeks to  internalise it within the practice o f  his
theory. So, although A d o rn o ’s p ro jec t parallels the deconstructive m om entum  o f  D eirida.
that a ttitude in isolation is perceived by A dorno  to  be one-sided and contradicto iy . filings
ju st do no t w o rk  out that way. V alue, tru th  claims, and sulijectivity all persist in the
behaviour o f  deconstructive theorists and the historical m atrix o f  the production and
reception o f  their w ork. F o r A dorno , the sym ptom s o f  "identity thinking" (the tendency to
posit an unproblem atic phenom enological relation between language and referent, concept
and object) are them selves no t am enable to  exhaustive rational critique because, no m atter
Kow hard you tiy , they will inevitably resurface in the effort to  surpass them. A ccording to
H aberm as, w hat separates A dorno  and D errida is that the form er
does no t slip out o f  the  paradoxes o f  self-referential critique o f  reason: he 
m akes the perform ative contradiction w ithin which this line o f  thought has 
m oved since N ietzsche, and w hich he acknow ledges to  be unavoidable, into 
the organized form  o f  indirect com m unication. Identity thinking t urned against 
itse lf becom es pressed  into continual self-denial and allow s the w ounds it 
inflicts on itse lf and its objects to  be seen. This exercise quite rightly l^it s the 
nam e o f  negative dialectics because A dorno  p ractices determ inate negation 
unrem ittingly...This fastening on critical p rocedure that can no longer be sure
119 Steven Connor, Theory and ('nllnral (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 1.5.
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o f  its foundations is explained by the fact that A dorno (in contrast to 
H eidegger) b j r  s no elitist contem pt for discursive th o u g h t." "
A s w e have seen, for A dorno it is H egel w ho first gives system atic expression to the idea that
w hat a philosopher says and does m ust be in tegrated  and m utually sustaining. W e have seen
that H eidegger, D errida and Lyotard can all be characterised as having tw o distinct aspects o f
their philosophical identity. All th ree  o f  them  behave very rationally at tim es; I leideggei in his
critique o f  W estern philosophy and science, Derrida in his critique o f  Saussure and Lyotard in
his critique o f  O rthodox  M arxism . All o f  them  arrive through rational argum ent at a position
which denies the possibility o f  critical reason. This sets up a second phase in their
philosophical identities, which defends the “irrational” per sc. All A dorno does is to
em phasise that the irrational is already present in the apparently  rational ‘first phase’ o f  each
o f  these philosophers. J ’he rational is equally present in the supposedly  “ irrational” .second
phase. This m eans that Aesthetic Theory should not be read as either “m odem ”, or
“postm odern” on L yo tard ’s definition. It is the movement betw een the two. 1 will lea \e
A dorno to  answ er Lyotard with a quo te from  Aspects o f  Hegel's Philosophy.
Hegel's critique strikes at the em pty cen tre o f  the static analysis o f  know ledge 
into subject and object that the currently  accepted logic o f  science takes for 
granted, the residual th eo iy  o f  tru th  according to  which the object ive is what 
is left after the so-called subjective factors have been elim inated, and the blow 
he strikes is so deadly because he does no t set up an irrational unity o f  subject 
and object in opposition to  that analysis but instead presei*ves the distinct 
moments o f  the subjective and the  objective while grasping them  as mediated 
by one another.'^*
Jürgen Habermas, "On Leveling the Genre Distinction between. Philosophy and Literature" in The 
Philos'ophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F.Lawrence, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1987), p. 185
T.W. Adorno, ‘Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy' in T.W. Adorno, Ile^ ’et: Three ,Si ndies, trans. Shicny VVelxu 
Nicholson, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1993), p. 7.
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Chapter VII
AESTHETIC THEORY, A R T  H IST O R Y  A N D  C R IT IC ISM
A lthough it is fundam entally different from  H egel’s Aesthetics, I have argued that 
Aesthetic Theory is similarly consistent w ith itse lf This consistency is constitu ted  o f  various 
“m ovem ents” . Each m ovem ent is the dissolution o f  concept to w ard s som ething else. We 
have seen this as a m ovem ent from  traditional aesthetics to the historical p reoccupations of 
Aesthetic Theory. It is also the digressive nature o f  som e o f  A d o rn o ’s argum ent. In the 
analysis o f  C hap ter 7 o f  Aesthetic Theory it w as the m ovem ent from “artifactuality” in 
general to  the  infinite specificity o f  the  particu lar artifact. T hrough C hap ters 4, 5 and 6, a 
theory  o f  m im esis is developed, but it is revealed as unachievable by art. Each of these 
m ovem ents is a disintegration, but A d o rn o ’s argum ent does no t conclude as the result ol 
these disintegrations. It is, as w e saw  at the end o f  the prev ious chapter, the revelation o f  the 
process^disintegration in its specificity wliich is significant.
In the first h a lf o f  this chap ter I will read G om brich’s Art and Illusion as a kind of 
“inverted” im age o f  Aesthetic Theory, l  hat is to  say, the p resuppositions o f  G om brich’s 
argum ent mesh w ith the  illusionistic art he describes. I ogether they give his w ork an internal 
consistency w hich re la tes to  the internal consistency o f  Aesthetic Theory. 1 he difference 
betw een the tw o  w o rk s is that in Aesthetic Theory all the coord inates o f  G om brieh’s 
argum ent are in a ‘m ovem ent’ to w ard s their dissolution. In the second h a lf o f  the chajiter the 
im plications o f  com paring Aesthetic Theory and Art and Illusion will be e.xploied. 
Specifically, w e will exam ine the w ay this com parison characterizes ‘m odern ism ’ in general 
as the p rocess o f  the collapse o f  the pre-m odern, fh is  reading o f  ‘m odern ism ’ will be
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contrasted  with critical and historical accounts o f  m odern art which have em phasized its 
continuities with the past.
Aesthetic Theory and Art and Uhision
In his D raft In troduction to Aesthetic Theory A dorno m entions L ukacs’ Ihc Theory 
o f The Novel as an influence on his approach to  aesthetics.' E lsew here, he describes it as 
having “established a standard  for philosophical aesthetics that still holds today”.** fhe 
fram ew ork o f  L ukacs’ position is well known. Broadly speaking, he argues that the unity o f  
the epic form  arose fiom  a corresponding  unity defining G reek experience, fh e  novel, by 
contrast, em erges in an age o f  alienation w here existence is experienced as li agm entary and 
w ithout certain meaning.
It has been suggested  that the significance o f  this argum ent for A dorno is tw ol'old.' 
First, Lukacs em phasizes the historicity  o f  aesthetic form s, developing a central insight ol 
\\q%oVs Aesthetics. T hat is to  say, form s like the epic and the novel are identified as particular 
to di fièrent historical m om ents.
fh e  second broadly significant area o f  L ukacs’ argum ent for A dorno lies in one ol its 
conclusions. T hat is to  say. The Theory o f the Novel can be read as presenting a pow erful and 
original strategy  for defending the legitim acy o f  the fiagm entary , non-organie lorm  o f  the 
novel and, by extension, o f  “advanced a rt” in general.
For A dorno therefore. The Theory o f the Novel is im portant as a defense of 
“advanced a rt”, described w ithin the con tex t o f  a particu lar theory  o f  m odern experience. If
'Aesthetic 'Theory, p. 457.
 ^T.W. Adorno, ‘Extorted Reconciliation: On Georg Lukacs Realism in Our Time' in Notes to Ltteratiire I ol 
I, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991 ), p. 217.
 ^Peter Hohendahl, “Artwork and Modernity: The Legacy of Georg Lukacs”, New (ierman Critique 42 (Fall 
1987), p. 38.
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w e think o f  Aesthetic Theory in these term s, then its subject ex tends beyond the usual 
param eters o f  a w ork  o f  philosophical aesthetics, like \-\q%qVs Aesthetics: it is a theory o f  
style. A t this level Aesthetic Theory engages a w ide ranging debate which has traditionally 
p reoccupied  art historians. L ike the basic prem ises of The Theory o f The Novel and Aesthetic 
Theory, the big m ethodological d isputes in the history o f  art history  can be traced to 
assum ptions about the natu re o f  experience and w hether and how  experience is held to 
impinge on the developm ent o f  art. M oreover, consciously or unconsciously the term s o f  the 
debate have largely been defined by H egel’s legacy.
From  an art historical perspective, Gom brich, fo r one, has repeatedly  drawn attention 
to  the dependence o f  a it h isto iy  on H egel’s argum ents. H e has stated: “ It is my belicl that 
Hegel IS the father o f  the history o f  a rt” . A t the sam e time, he argues that while I Icgel's 
im pact on art h isto iy  is enorm ous, it is also unwelcom e: “I still believe that fhe history of art 
should free itse lf o f  H egel’s authority , but I am convinced that this will only be possible once 
it has learned to  understand H egel’s oveiivhelm ing influence.” ' G om brich’s antipathy fo 
Hegel focuses on w hat he sees as the erroneous em phasis on the idea that experience 
changes through history and that art is subject to  those changes.
Seen from  the perspective o f  A d o rn o ’s philosophy, G om brich’s critiipie of Hegel, 
together w ith his broadly Kantian alternative, defines his m ethodology, his w orking definition 
o f  art, the art he discusses, and the structure , form, and conten t o f  his argum ent . Seen in this 
light, G om brich’s w ork  em erges as a significant foil against which to  understand Aesthetic 
Theory, which, as has been suggested, can be described as a system atic attem pt to counter 
the kind o f  position  G om brich’s argum ent exemplifies at every level.
’ Ernst Gombricli, “Hegel and Art Histoiy” in Porphyries, D. (ed.) “On the Meliiodology of Arclulccturni 
Histoiy”, Archiiectiirol Design ( 1981), 3.
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A way to expand on the terms o f  this approach to reading Aesthetic Theory and Art 
and Illusion is to  consider a b rie f  excerpt f iom  the Introduction to  Art and Illusion. In the 
passage concerned, Gombrich is keen to distance himself fi om a model o f  perception which 
“critics, artists and historians have hitherto used with confidence” . 1 his is the assumption that 
when w e perceive the world, w e first gather “sense impressions” which are subsequently 
elaborated, distorted, o r  generalized. In countering it Gombrich enlists Popper;
K.R. Popper has dubbed these assumptions the ‘bucket theory o f  the in in d \  
the picture that is, o f  a mind in which ‘sense d a ta ’ arc deposited and 
processed. He has sliown the unreality o f  this basic assumption in the field o f  
scientific method and the theory o f  knowledge, where he insists on what he 
calls the ‘search-light theory’, emphasizing the activity o f  the living organism 
that never ceases probing and testing its environment,
fh e  immediate significance o f  P o p p er’s model o f  perception for Gombrich is that it 
“shifts from the stimulus to  the organism ’s response” . Instead o f  images being a product o f  
simple impressions which are “received” and subsequently elaborated upon, images aie a 
product o f  our action o f  “jirobing and testing” the environment. Gombrich repeats two 
m etaphors used by P opper to distinguish between the diffèrent theories o f  perception: the 
“bucket theory” and the “searchlight theory” , l i ie i r  juxtaposition crystallizes the essential 
difference between an understanding o f  perception as either passive and receptive, or as 
either active or responsive. In the context o f  this contrast there is no question that the 
“searchlight theory” is m ore plausible and it does not need lo be contested here. Instead, 1 
want to  consider som e o f  the ramifications o f  the “searchlight” m etaphor from a diflèrent 
perspective.
By comparison with the bucket which simply receives, a searchlight actively responds 
to stimuli and can be directed and focused on different phenomena, but it always remains 
detached and distant from its object. I 'hat is to say, while a searchlight can actively reveal
Ernst Gombricli,/I/7 and Illusion, (London: Phaidon, 1959), p. 23.
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din'ereiices and changes in the object o f  its focus, those changes never com e to threaten its 
own aloof, objective stains. To put this claim foi perception into a w ider context, Gombrich 
admits that the theoretical model for his argument “ultimately goes  back to Kant”/ ’ At the 
beginning o f  the Introduction to  The Pheiiomenolog)’ Hegel criticizes a key aspect ol this 
part o f  K an t’s argument with an uncannily resonant metaphor:
fo  be specific, it takes  for granted certain ideas about cognition as an instrumenf as inedhmi, and assumes that there is a différence helween ourselves and this cogtiifion. Above all, it p resupposes that the Absolute 
stands on one side and cognition on the other, independent and separated 
from it.^
Hegel’s critique o f  Kant has already been discussed. In a negative sense Hegel’s argument 
creates a radical instability for Kantian philosophy which, fused with its object, has the 
ground for any claim to objectivity removed. In the term s o f  our discussion o f  Gombricli, 
change no longer takes place within the limits that sustain the “searchlight” metaphor. I hc 
m etaphor collapses because perception cannot be taken to be anchored in the idea ol 
detached obseiwation, since the act o f  perception is itself conceived o f  as trans(brmati\ e ol 
the subject.
While this critique o f  the Kantian subject is relatively simple to comprehend, what is 
less easily grasped are the range o f  its implications for G om brich’s argument. In the pas.sage 
from The Phenomenolog}’ quoted  above, Hegel is simultaneously criticizing K ant’s 
theoretical model o f  perception and\\\s self-understanding o f  his own role as a philosopher in 
relation to his object. I f  w e  extend the form o f  this critique to G om brich’s argument, then his 
“searchlight theory” is revealed as m ore than a m etaphor for perception as it defines art - the 
most obvious function o f  G om brich’s theory  o f  perception. It also defines his own lelation to
Ernst Gombricli, Art and Illusion, p. 24.
 ^ G.W.F.Hegel, Phenoinenologv o f  Spirit, trans. A. V.tVtiller, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 47
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art as an art historian and, in turn, aflects his definition o f  art. In o ther w ords, the “searcidight 
theo iy” o f  perception permeates G om brich’s program  systematically.
To flesh out this claim and its implications, it is im portant to consider specific 
examples o f  G om brich’s critique o f  Hegel and Hegelianism in art history.
Gombrich on llegel and Art History
' f o  help us see the w ay H egel’s ideas have defined art history, Gombrich identifies Ids 
influence in three broad areas. First, is w hat he describes as Hegel’s “firm belief in the divine 
dignity o f  ar t” . Second, is the idea o f  ‘Idstorical collectivism” and third is “historical 
determinism” .** All these ideas, according to Gombrich, have been used erioncoiisly by art 
historians to explain stylistic change.
Taking issue with the  first claim, it is clear that for Gombrich, art is not justified by 
the metaphysical assumption o f  the existence o f  a divine presence to which it gives 
expression. Rather, implicit in his own argument is the idea o f  the human dignity ol art I hc 
derivation for this idea is most obviously K ant’s broad project o f  attempting to demonstrate 
the moral significance o f  the individual’s judgem ent in the absence o f  any metaphysical 
guarantee o f  truth.
In his emphasis on the moral resjionsibility o f  the judging individual, Gombrich
believes that Kant, no t Hegel, suggests the correct paradigm o f  behavior. Not only does Kant
suggest a human rather than divine justification for art, but his example suggests the proper
art historical method:
It w as Immanuel Kant w ho insisted on the stern and frightening doctrine that 
nobody and nothing can relieve us o f  the burden o f  moral responsibility (or 
ou r  judgem ent: no t even a theophany, such as Hegel saw  in history. 'For' - he 
w iites  - 7// whatever way a Being wight he described as Divine...and indeed appear so ’, this cannot absolve anyone the duty 'to judge for himself whether he is etrtitled to regard such a Being as a God and to worship it as such '. It
Ernst Gombrich, “Hegel and Art Histoiy”, p. 3.
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may well be that Kant dem ands here more than is humanly possible, and yet
much would be achieved if  the insight that Kant w as right gained ground in
the world o f  art."
The way Gombrich is using Kant against Hegel here obviously goes beyond a critique 
o f  their different justifications for art. He contrasts K ant’s demand lor individual 
responsibility in judgem ent with the Hegelian art historian who, in deferring to some extra- 
artistic guaran tor o f  value, implicitly abdicates responsibility for his own judgement in a 
methodological and professional sense. Hegel, according to  Gombrich, not only provides a 
questionable justification for the broad significance o f  ait, he also represents a paradigm (or 
bad, or at the very least, lazy art history, fhe  same theme is extended when we consider 
G om brich’s second and third criticisms o f  H egel’s latent presence in accounts o f  the In story 
o f  style: “historical collectivism” and “Idstorical determinism”. In speaking o f  “historical 
collectivism” Gombrich means the way art historians have ascribed changes in style to 
groups, nations, ages, etc. Likewise, the idea o f  “Idstorical determinism” wrongly implies an 
inevitability in the development o f  style tow ards a predetermined goal. Questioning these
ideas, G om brich’s critical strategy follows a familiar pattern, and he is uncompromising. It is
not simply a question o f  good or bad art historical method, it is simultaneously a question ol 
morality.
I have discussed elsewhere why this reliance o f  art history on mythological 
explanations seems so dangerous to me. By inculcating the habit o f  talking in 
terms o f  collectives, o f ‘mankind’, ‘races’, or ‘ages’, it w eakens resistance to 
totalitarian habits o f  mind.'"
While w e might have som e sympathy with G om brich’s critique o f  these aspects ol 
Hegelianism in art history, it is equally obvious that his alternative has its philosophical 
justification in his confidence in the judgem ent o f  the ‘au to n o m o u s’ individual. 1 he same 
paradigm extends to G om brich’s idea o f  the artist.
Ernst Gombrich, “Hegel and Art History”, p. 9. 
Ernst Gombrich, /I;V and Illusion, p. 17.
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As we might expect, the direction o f  his argument com es fiom his Iheoiy of 
perception and ranges itself against the implications o f  the “bucket theory” . Gombrich argues 
that the artist does not perceive the world directly: “contrary to the hopeful belief o f  many 
artists, the ‘innocent eye’ which should see the world afresh would not see it at all. It would 
smart under the chaotic medley o f  forms and colours.” "  In the production o f  art. the 
organizational principles necessary to form rejiresentations are never passively icproduccd by 
the artist. For Gombrich, therefore, a i t  never immediately or naturally represents (he world, 
but is always mediated by fmevioiis representation:
All art is “ image-making” and all image making is rooted  in the creation of 
substitutes. Even the artist o f  an ‘illusionist’ persuasion must make the man 
made, the ‘conceptual’ image o f  convention his starting point. Strange as it 
may seem he cannot simply ‘imitate an objects external fo rm ’ without having 
first learned ho w  to  construct a fo rm .’^
Style, on this analysis, becom es the product o f  a skillful p iocess  o f  “making and
matching” within the context o f  a tradition o f  representational art. While the tcchniipics for
making representational images have to  be learned, this tradition carries expectations which
need to be fused with the peculiar dem ands o f  matching a specific representational image to a
particular object. The representational artist’s skill is defined as manipulating (his tension
between ‘creation’ and ‘imitation’ and it is through skill that the artist resolves it. It is (his
process o f  making and matching which accounts  for stylistic transformation, not the Hegelian
art historian’s appeal to extra-artistic force:
As long as w e have no better  hypothesis to offer, the existence o f  uniform 
m odes o f  representing the world must invite facile explanation that such a 
unity m ust be due to  som e supraindividual spirit, the ‘spirit o f  the ag e ’, or the 
‘spirit o f  the race ’... but I w ould  assert that what is their [Hegelian art 
historians] greatest pride is in fact their greatest flaw: by throw ing out the idea 
o f  skill they have not only sun  endered vital evidence, they made it impossible 
to realize their ambition, a valid psychology o f  stylistic change.'*
" Ernst Gombrich, “Meditations on a Hobby Horse”, in Ernst Gombrich. Maclilations on a llo h ly  Horse mut 
Other Essays on The Theory o f  Art, (London: Phaidon, 1963), p. 9.
Ernst Gombricli, “Meditations on a Hobby Horse”, p. 9. 
Ernst Gombrich, /(/V and Illusion, p. 17.
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Considering this theory  o f  the production o f  art in the way w e looked a! Goinhrich ’s 
Popperian model o f  perception and his critique o f  Hegel, a familiar them e emerges. At the 
centre w e find the artist actively engaged with a tradition o f  representation, from which he 
must literally learn h o w  to represent. Obviously the images the artist produces will be 
informed by the peculiarities o f  that tradition. At the same time, these peculiarities are always 
seen to  be different solutions to a comtont problem o f  reconciling conventions with the 
demands o f  a single representation. The artis t’s task will vary, but the param eters ol Ihe 
problem remain defined by the representational paradigm.
Art and Illusion^ r e p re s e n ta t io n a l  a r t ,  a n d  Positiv ism
At its centre, G om brich’s program  is a powerful and plausible account o f  stylistic 
transformation. His argument centres around some basic assum ptions about cpistemology, 
the nature o f  art, its history, and the m ethodology o f  the discipline o f  art history. While 
different aspects o f  this argument can be questioned, they form a cohesive whole which, seen 
as such, is remarkably resistant to metacritique. Put another way, w e get a sense from reading 
Gombrich that his methodological and epistemological assumptions function beyond their 
immediate roles in ways which are som ehow  sympathetic to the objects they describe. We 
might go so far as to say that there appears a kind o f  symbiosis between the various 
coordinates o f  his program.
This hypothesis can be refined by considering G om brich’s position in a widei context 
and bringing it back to a confrontation with Adorno. This can . be affected if the 
methodological characteristics o f  G om brich’s program are bracketed within a broad
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11definition o f  Positivism, which, it has been argued, defines itself around three basic tends ,  
f irs t  there is methodological monism, which is the idea o f  the unity o f  scientific 
methodology amidst the diversity o f  subject m atter under investigation. Second, is that the 
exact natural sciences set an ideal for all o ther sciences. Third, there is the idea o f  causal 
scientific explanation which consists in the subsumption o f  individual cases under 
hypothetically assumed general laws o f  nature.
I hese three parts o f  the definition o f  Positivism apply respectively lo methodology, 
the aspirations o f  that m ethodology, and the nature o f  the object. Gombrich develops a 
m ethodology that can be applied to all examples o f  representational ai t. 1 he universality o f  
this method derives from the scientific claim that the physiological ground o f  perception is 
unchanging, and all representational art develops out o f  a constant tension between a 
tradition o f  “m aking” art and “matching” it to a specific object.
M ost important, however, the same tripartite scheme extends to representational art if 
it is understood as method, ra ther than just  as the “object” for art history. For example, the 
Positivist model which w e have applied to describing Gombrich can ecjually be applied to the 
parameters defining representational art. On Gom brich’s terms, rejuesentational art is taken 
to be a universally valid m ethod o f  depicting the world in all its diversity. Représentât ionai art 
is defined by the aspiration for an accurate “m atch” between itself and its object. Particular 
objects are accurately pictured when the laws o f  representation are brought to bear on their 
particularity.
The suggestion o f  a common “positivism” in G om brich’s program  and 
representational art is no t to suggest that art and art history are essentially the same kind o f  
activity. Rather, both are engaged in representation and, as such, both can be thought o f  as
see Frisby, D. “Introduction” to T.W.Adorno, et al. The Positivist Dispute in (ierman Socio/oyw  trans. 
Glyn Adey and David Frisby, (London; Heineniann, 1976), p. xii. Frisby takes this breakdown of Positivism 
from G.H. von Wright lixplanotion and Understanding, (London: 1961), p. 4.
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related enterprises. A t the same time, there is something specific about the correlation 
between G om brich’s theory and the objects he describes. That is to say, G om brich’s 
conception o f  his own relation to  representational art is replicated in his account o f  how 
representational art relates to the world it pictures. The m etaphor o f  the “searchlight” extends 
to the representational artist’s conception o f  his relation to the object he depicts, and the 
process o f  representation reinforces and aflirms the same idea in the artist and the viewer. 
While there might be  serious philosophical and methodological arguments to undermine 
Kantian epistem ology and the Positivist m ethodology it often seem s to spawn, the relevance 
o f  these strategies is underpinned by their apparent replication in the object ol their 
description.
1 have already argued that a similar o rder o f  unity is absolutely central to Aesthetic 
Theory. A dorno, invoking Hegel, calls it “ freedom tow ards the object” . Parts o f  A dorno 's  
argument, like G om brich’s, are mutually supporting by implication. Dieter Peetz has delined 
Gom brich’s theory o f  representation as “Realist” on the g rounds that “there is at least partial 
subversion o f  belief by the spec ta tor that s/he is see ing ."  This does  not need to be read as 
suggesting that: in G om brich’s theory a representation is ever mistaken for what it represents. 
Rather, G om brich’s “searchlight” always illuminates yet never understands itself as an act o f  
illumination. A d o rn o ’s m ethod and the art he is interested in are systematically committed lo 
revealing the act o f  illumination as such.
An idea o f  the complexities involved in this kind o f  systematic noncompatibility 
between the different intellectual p rogram s o f  Gombrich and A dorno  is signaled in the 
“Positivist” dispute between A dorno  and Popper, which began at the German Sociological 
Conference in 1 961 ."  Gombrich identifies very closely with Popper; in the Introduction to
Dieter Peetz, ‘Some Current Philosophica! Theories of Pictorial Representation', The lirifish Jotinuil i>l 
Ae.sthelics 21 (Summer 1987), p. 228.
" T.W. Adorno, et al. The Positivist Dispute in (ierman Sociology.
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Art ami Illusion lie writes, “ I sliouid be pi oud if  Professor P o p p er’s influence w ere lo be Ibll 
every where in this bo o k ”. In o ther words, the dispute between Adorno  and Popper is o f  
m ore than thematic relevance to reading Gombricli.
A  defining characteristic o f  the “Positivist”  dispute emerged as a disagreemenl so 
profound and systematic that there w as very  little possibility for fruitful discussion, lei alone 
agreement. In this respect A d o rn o ’s and P o p p er’s dispute echoes aspects o f  G om brich’s 
confrontation with Hegel and Hegelianism in art history. David Frisby has wiillen o f  ihc 
dispute, that
A discussion o f  m ethodology usually presupposes that w e know  and agree on 
the object to which the m ethodology is related or at least that there exists 
some measure o f  agreement as to where this object lies. In the present dispute 
this is no t the case. Some pro tagonists  do not recognize as a genuine object 
what others regard  as the real object o f  social research. I’hat the 
methodological s tandpoints and their interpretations are divergent, suggests 
that m ethodology may not be taken in isolation from its object nor from Ihe 
critical reflection upon its own activ ity ."
W hat needs to be emphasized is that in neither instance can the disagreemenl be distilled to 
one particular issue. As Frisby puts  it: “1 he diversity o f  issues which arc contained in the 
positivist dispute... suggests that there is not merely one but several disputes taking place ” 
This idea is particularly relevant here because it mirrors the range o f  scenarios in which Ihe 
“searchlight” m etaphor em beds i tse lf ."  Frisby notes that one critic o f  the positivist dispute 
has argued that, from a methodological standpoint, the controversy  manifests itself at three 
levels:
Firstly, w hether the role o f  sociology is the replication o r reproduction o f  
existing social reality or ra ther w hether it is to be concerned with the 
transformation o f  that reality; secondly, whether sociology engages in its 
empirical w orld historically or unhistorically; finally, whether theories 
generated possess a globalizing or individualizing tendency.'"
David Frisby, “Introduction” to Adorno, T.W. et al. The Positivisf Dispute in (ierman Sociolay.y, p. xxvili.
David Frisby, “Introduction” to Adorno, T.W. et al, I'he Positivist Dispute in (ierman Sociology, p. xxx
David Frisby, “Introduction” to Adorno, T.W. et al. The Positivist Dispute in (ierman Sociology, p. xxx.
Aesthetic Theory, Art History and Criticism 2^0
I f  w e substitute “Sociology” for “art theory” here then w e can begin to develop a 
more subtle understanding o f  the differences between Art and Illusion and Aeslhelic Theory, 
beyond the obvious idea that the former is based on a realist paradigm  and the latter anti- 
realist, Taking the first question, are Gombrich and A dorno  concerned with the replication or 
reproduction o f  ail, or with its transformation? This is straight-forward, Gombrich: aspires 
tow ards the former, A dorno  the latter. In Aesiheiic Theory art is m ade lo “speak” by its 
critical unfolding through philosophical discoiuse; art and philosophy are mutually 
inseparable and philosophical aesthetics is not, for A donio , a m atter o f  thinking about general 
rules which must be seen to apply in every instance. Second, do their theories engage art 
historically or unhistorically? Again the difference is clear. A dorno  seeks to define his own 
position as thoroughly  historical, while Gombrich understands his own position to be 
objective and ahistorical. GombriclTs approach is unhistorical, in the sense that he does not 
find it necessaiy  to  build into his methodological relationship with his object an 
acknowledgm ent o f  his own historical existence. Third, where Gombrich isolates principles 
that ostensibly hold for art from the Egyptians to  the Impressionists, his theory is globalizing. 
A dorno, by contrast, restricts his observations to a comparatively minute aspect o f  the history 
o f  art.
This last contrast is worth considering at som e length because one o f  the most 
important arguments in Aesiheiic Theory emphasizes the discontinuity o f  avant-garde art 
from the past.
A Hegelian critique of Art and Illusion
On G om brich’s terms, the antithesis between his own and H egel 's  position ostensibly 
revolves around an argument about the causes o f  stylistic transformation in art. Gombrich
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sees Hegelianism as placing emphasis on external causes for this transformation: (lomhrich 
argues change is fundamentally internal, deriving from the activity o f  representing ilsclf. In 
theoretical writings such as “Meditations on a Hobby H orse” '^’, the Introduction to Art and 
JllusiotP'  ^ and “Hegel and A rt H is to iy”^^ Gombrich is uncompromising in excluding the 
possible impact o f  external influences on stylistic transformation, but he tends to be less 
uncompromising in less theoretically self-conscious writing. It has been suggested this is 
because he softens his position on the relevance o f  context. As David Summers has pointed 
out, the second chapter o f  Art and Illusion ends with the sentence “ fhe  form o f  a 
representation cannot be divorced fiom its purpose  and the requireirienls o f  the society in 
which the given visual language gains currency'”. F o r  Summ ers it is ecpially true that 
Gombrich does not develop the implications o f  this statement. Whilst acknowledging the 
distinction between G om brich 's  theoretical writing and his confrontation with specific works 
o f  art, the critique o f  his theory is still relevant to his practice because, as I have argued, the 
attitude suggested by the metajdior o f  the “searchlight” extends beyond its theoretical origins 
and into his practice.
fhe difterence between Gombrich and Hegel, then, is not a rigid polarity between 
internal and external explanations for stylistic change; both allow for both. Rather, it is a 
question o f  emphasis. F or Gombrich, stylistic transformation always takes place within 
certain limits derived from his definition o f  perception in general and art in particular. Since 
for Gombrich art is a form o f  perception, and perception itself has an unchanging dynamic, 
any changes in art take place within already defined limitations. For Hegel, by contrast, 
experience in iota is subject to  transformation. This implies the possibility o f  far more radical
Ernst Gombrich, “Meditations on a Hobby Horse”, pp. I-I I. 
Ernst Gombricli,/!;’/ and Illusion, pp. 3-25.
Ernst Gombrich, “Hegel and Art History”, pp. 3-9.
2^ David Summers, “Conditions and Conventions: on the disanalogy of art and la n g u a g e in  Kcnial and 
Gaskell, (eds.) The Language o f  Art History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1901 ), p. 202
Aesihelic 'J'heory, Art History and Criticism . 202
change in art than Gonibrich allows for. It is here that the “searchlight” m etaphor comes 
under renewed pressure from a different quarter.
For G om brich 's  skill-based explanation for stylistic transformation to w oik , he not 
only has to  prove its plausibility, but he has to  discount the relative significance o f  other 
pressures that might account for stylistic change. Having dismissed Hegelian arguments. 
Gombrich considers it necessary to emphasize the stability o f  the psychological make-up o f  
the individual, at least that part o f  it which is involved in the production o f  images;
There are few historians today, and even fewer anthropologists, w ho believe 
that mankind has undergone any marked biological change within historical 
periods. B ut even those who might admit the possibility o f  some slight 
ossilation in the genetic make-up o f  mankind would never accept the idea that 
man has changed as much within the last three thousand years, a mere 
hundred generations, as have his art and his style.^’
This argument jux taposes  a claim for a consistent physiological basis for perception 
with the manifest changes in style in the history o f  ait. Since the mechanics o f  perception do 
not change, bu t style does, changes in perception are discounted as a possible impact on 
style. The putative stability o f  perception therefore functions in a two-(bid manner for 
Gombrich. It counters  the legitimacy o f  Hegelian claims that changes in perception might 
affect art, and selves as a precondition for the methodological success o f  his own argument. 
That is to  say skill can only have the determining impact it does on style if o ther influences 
are given a secondaiy  role, if  they are not completely excluded. fVIore subtly, by invoking (he 
idea o f  physiological constancy as a guarantor for the unchanging nature o f  perception, 
Gombrich characterizes perception itself as physiologically determined.
Wlien this argument is confronted with the Hegelian principle o f  mediation, two 
things happen. First, the notion o f  presenting physiological evidence as a defense for (he 
constancy o f  perception appears spurious. For Hegel, we transform and constitute ourseKes 
in the process  o f  perception which, qua the process o f  mutual modification o f  mind and
Ernst Gonibricli, Art anti Illusion, p. 18.
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world, cannot be reduced to its physiological constituents. Second, since perception is 
constitutive o f  our subjectivity, it is in essence transformative, fh e  idea that it might provide 
some objective base for judgem ent is erroneous. Gombrich in fact recognizes a symj)tom o f  
this argument in the m ethodology o f  Hegelian art historians. In the introduction to Art and 
Illusion Gombrich criticizes Hegelians for^circularily o f  their arguments:
I f  w e really want to treat styles as symptoms o f  something else (which may on 
occasion be veiy  interesting), w e  cannot do w ithout som e theory o f  
alternatives. I f  every change is inevitable and total, there is nothing lefl to 
compare, no situation to reconstruct, no symptom or expression to be 
investigated. Change becom es a symptom o f  change as such, and to hide this 
tautology, som e grand scheme o f  evolution has to be called in...^^
W ithout questioning the pertinence o f  this kind o f  criticism o f  Hegelianism, it should
be obvious by now  that the clarity o f  G om brich 's  insight into the inade(]uacies o f  I Icgclianism
are, at least to a degree, mediated by the systematic and methodological incompatibility o f  his
own argument with Hegelianism. W here Gombrich sees “Change as a symptom o f  change as
such” it is as valid to argue that in Gom brich 's  argument the opposite is true. I he rigid
delineation o f  the param eters wherein change can be conceived as taking place become
evidence for continuity.
I ’he methodological tendency to diagnose continuity is especially evident in
Gombrich s account o f  the production o f  art. His argument is contingent on ai tist s being
seen to behave in a particular way. This is to say, for Gombrich, the history o f  ait is about
finding solutions to a fundamentally unchanging problem associated with representation. II
artists stop producing representational w o rk  and so remove themselves from the crucial
tension between “m aking” and “matching”, it is difficult to  see w here Gombrich s system can
go. By comparison with the extraordinary richness o f  G om brich 's  engagement with
representational art, he has very little to  say o f  any substance about non-rc))i cscntalional art.
Ernst Goinbricti, Art and illusion, p. 18.
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Specifically, there seems to em erge a radical incompatibility between (he cohesion of 
G om brich’s whole system and art which does not conform to the representational paradigm. 
This is \y\xQVQ Aeslhetic Theory can be read as taking over. Just as G om brich 's  theoretical and 
methodological predispositions match very well with the representational art he is describing, 
the same holds for Aesihelic Theory in its relation to non-representational art. Just as the 
systematic integrity oi'Art and Illusion based on the “searchlight” model o f  perception, gives 
the w ork  an extreme closeness to  its object, so Aesthetic Theory has a similarly close relation 
to its object in identifying and exemplifying the multiple implications o f  the “searchlight” 
m etaphor in the process o f  its disintegration.
T o characterise/Ic,s'//j!c(7c Theory as taking over w here Gombrich leaves o f f  is a useful 
w ay o f  situating Aesthetic Theory within the debate about the definition and significance o f  
modern ait. There are tw o  obvious reasons why Aesthetic Theory occupies an odd position 
within this debate. I'irst, since the inception o f  modern art, one o f  the ways it has been 
defined is as anti-mimetic. Second, it is precisely because mimetic theories o f  art were so 
manifestly unable to  understand m odern art that they came to be seen as obsolete. If  Adorno 
was interested in mimesis and pre-m odern art, o r  anti-mimesis and modern art, then we could 
understand the logic o f  his position in terms o f  a certain parity between a concept and the 
objects it is being used to describe. By bringing together “mimesis” and “modern ar t”, one o f  
the things A dorno  is doing is reinvoking the crisis modern art provoked  for (he theory of art 
qua a theory o f  artels imitation. This can be put another way by arguing'that the crisis o f  (he 
idea o f  art as mimesis was not ju s t  that mimetic theories were not inclusive enough to allow
l’çiv»for, say Post- Impressioii, but that mimesis seems to have been a suj'jicient definition for ait. 
In this sense, the crisis o f  mimesis in art is the crisis o f  the theory o f  art. Danto has described 
this scenario as follows:
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In lernis o f  the prevailing artistic theory (Imitation I 'heory), it was impossible 
to accept these [post-impressionist paintings] as art unless inept art: othei wise 
they could be discounted as hoaxes, self-advertisements o r  the visual 
counterparts  o f  m adm en’s ravings. So to get them accepted as art, on a 
footing with the Transfiguration (not to  speak o f  the L andseer stag), rerpiired 
not so much a revolution in taste as a theoretical revision o f  rather 
considerable p ro p o s io n s ,  involving not only the artistic enfranchisements o f  
these objects, but an emphasis upon newly significant features o f  accepted 
artworks, so that quite different accounts o f  their status as ar tw orks would 
have to be given.
A d o rn o ’s idea o f  the mimetic potential o f  modern art flies in the face o f  (he (he 
process Danto describes. A d o rn o ’s idea o f  mimesis is radically dilferent fiom the “ Imitation 
Theory” Danto alludes to as marking the distinction between, say a work o f  Post- 
Impressionism and a w o rk  o f  the Renaissance. At the same time, the levels o f  crisis, and 
particularly the theoretical implications Danto diagnoses, are relevant to understanding the 
trajectory o ï Aesthetic Theory in its confiontation with modern art. In this sense, although 
Aesthetic Theory w as wiitten in the I9 6 0 ’s, it might be thought o f  as being concerned with 
that mom ent o f  theoretical crisis Danto describes. Like other theories o f  art that emerged out 
o f  the crisis o f  the “Imitation Theory” D an to ’s engaged in “a theoretical revision o f  rather 
considerable proportions... an emphasis upon newly significant features o f  accepted artworks, 
so that quite different accounts o f  their status as artw orks would have to be given” . I f  at the 
time, the enfranchisement o f  the Post-Impressionists was a major motivation for theoretical 
contortions, by the ümQ Aesthetic Theory was wnitten, enfranchisment is not a problem: 
indeed it had been succeeded by absolute cultural assimilation. A dorno  is not simply, or even 
primarily, concerned with the collapse o f  the old “ Imitation I h e o r y ”, but with countering the 
various revisions and alternatives which have emerged out o f  it, including the kind o f  position 
Danto goes on to articulate and defend. W e could say here that Adorno  is interested in 
reanimating the crisis precipitated by the demise o f  the old “ Imitation I heory” by 
undermining the various theoretical responses to it.
Danto, A. ‘The kxtwoAd", Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol 61, 1964, pp. 573.
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(ii holding together “mimesis'” and “m odem  art” , one of the things that certainly 
happens is a reconfiguration o f  the concept o f  mimesis while maintaining its judgemental 
character. Under the old “ Imitation T heory”, theoiy  had a critical edge: if it is not an 
imitation it is not art. A lle r  the “Imitation Theory” , the question for theory becomes in pail 
ho w  it can accom m odate  the new  art. In o ther words, the value o f  the new  art is accepted as 
given by theory; it is just a question o f  adapting the theory to allow it to articulate this. What 
A dorno is unrelentingly hostile to  are the assimilatory tendencies o f  theories o f  art which 
succeeded the “ Imitation Theory” . This is no t to argue that A dorno  yearns for the good old 
days when judgem ents  w ere  critically secure in the know ledge that Art ' imitation, fhe 
“ Imitation Theory” itself is critically incomplete, even for the kind o f  art it includes. If we 
think o f  one o f  the problems motivating Aesihelic Theory as the attempt to derive a critically 
sustainable basis tor judging ait, then this is both a very old problem which has never been 
resolved, but it is also new  because the crisis o f  the “ Illusion I heory” is really the collapse o f  
those factors which allowed it to  be sustainable, despite its deficiencies.
The prevailing response to  the collapse o f  the “Illusion Ih eo ry” has been to open the 
critical floodgates. Certainly a lot gets through and new  kinds o f  w ork  com e to be accepted 
as art. W hat stops everything from being accepted as art, Danto argues, are institutional 
controls. Since some kind o f  discriminatoiy activity is taking place, judgement appears intact. 
By comparison with the clarity and finality o f  the “illusion theory”, however, in the new 
situation the criteria o f  judgem ent becom e diffuse and its g rounds difficult to evaluate. In this 
scenario A dorno  seeks to maintain and define the possibility o f  the critical judgem ent o f  
modern art and it is his commitment to discriminating between l i v e ’ and dead art works 
which \mkQS Aesihelic Theoiy different from traditional aesthetics and art history.
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riic Scope of Aesthetic Theory
Chapter 1 o f  Aesihelic Theory begins with a series o f  truth claims about art and
extrapolates their implications for the practice o f  aesthetics, i'luis described, the opening o f
Aesthetic Theory seems relatively straight-forward. At the same time, this is a work whose
presentation does not necessarily mirror the way its apparently distinct claims about art and
aesthetics w ere generated. It would be misleading to identify separate  origins for A d o rn o ’s
claims about art and aesthetics, because these claims are mutually dependent.
In the Draft Introduction A dorno  signals the im portance o f  acknowledging this
mutual dependence where he makes a familiar criticism o f  traditional aesthetics, l ie  suggests
that traditional aesthetics makes normative claims for art and aesthetic experience, while
extrapolating them  from the experience o f  a relatively narrow  range o f  art. Arthur Danto has
expressed a virtually identical opinion o f  philosophical aesthetics, saying
the irrelevance o f  esthetic theory is due to the fact that it has often been a 
response to a particular body o f  art and o f  limited application to another 
order. Plato, Aiistotle, H um e and Kant, powerful and sympathetic thinkers all 
were giving universal validity to  thoughts  suited to  a very local art, so that in 
large measure, esthetic theory is a body o f  criticism concealed as such by the 
unacknowledged provincialisms o f  its authors.^’
For Danto, the unacknowledged provincialism o f  aesthetics signals its demise and clears the
way for his institutional theory o f  art. For Adorno, as we have seen, this implies the need for
the reorientation o f  philosophical aesthetics in the way it understands its relationship to art.
A dorno makes explicit claims about the specificity o f  the art with which he is concerned, and
juxtaposes these with claims about the appropriate response by aesthetics. In so doing, one
aim is to m ake the provincialism o f  his position visible, another to re-em pasi/e  the
inseparability o f  his theory o f  aesthetics fiom his consciously provincial idea o f  art. I his
m ode o f  procedure  does  no t have to be construed as a simple softening o f  traditional
Arthur Danto, State o f  The Art, p. 4.
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aesthetics; it is also the necessary response to an understanding o( the tlioroiigiily iiisloiical
nature o f  the idea o f  art. In o ther w ords, Adorno may be critical o f  the provincialism o(
aesthetics, but this is no t ju s t  a negative criticism. There is the suggestion that these
provincialism’s are far from debilitating; on the contrary, they are the basis for the possibility
o f  aesthetics in the first place.
A lt,  w e  said, is different fi om  empirical reality. N ow  this difference itself does 
not stay the same; it changes because art changes. History, for example has 
transformed certain cult objects into art long after they w ere  first produced.
Or, to give another example, at a certain m om ent in time certain art objecis 
have ceased to be viewed as art. In this context the abstractly posed (pieslion 
o f  w hether a phenomenon like the film is art o r  something else is instructive, 
although it leads nowhere. A s w e  saw, art has changing scope and it may be 
jus t  as well not to  try to  define sharply w h a t’s inside and w h a t 's  outside o f  
it.^^
In other w ords, A d o rn o ’s emphasis on the historical dimension o f  art, and therefore 
ofaesthetics, does not reduce art to  a purely historical o r  social phenomenon. It is a 
recognition of, and emphasis on, his assertion that the idea o f  art changes through history. 
Considering this claim, A dorno  understands philosophical aesthetics to be historically located 
within its own tradition, its society, but also within its relationship to whatever is the 
prevailing operative idea o f  art.
1 he obvious strategy in response to this notion o f  art would appear to be consciously 
to develop an idea o f  the limits o f  o n e ’s project by, for example, defining a historical time 
frame and operating within it. A d o n io ’s constellation o f  “reification ”, “modern ar t”, and his 
modifications to  philosophical aesthetics, are all symptoms o f  something like this. At the 
same time, such a narrow ing o f  focus does not guarantee the adequacy o f  any claims he 
makes. The difference between not recognising o n e ’s provincialisms and attempting to 
acknowledge them may be something, but it hardly represents a break through in aesthetics. 
A way to reconsider w hat A dorno  is doing is to  look at how  he reframes the criticism already
Aesthetic Theory, p. 3.
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made o f  traditional aesthetics: “Philosophers arc used to distinguishing conceptually between 
tw o types o f  origin, one belonging to metaphysics, the o ther to primal history. Upholding this 
distinction too  rigidly leads how ever to  a distortion o f  the literal meaniiig o f  the concept o f  
o r i g i n . I n  other w ords, the metaphysical and historical origins o f  representation are 
inseparable. W hat is necessary is an attem pt to  understand the specificity o f  artw orks, not just 
from philosophy, but through their place in the history o f  art. I hus “ fh e  definition o f  art does 
indeed depend on w hat art once was, but it must also take account o f  what art has become 
and what might possibly becom e o f  it in the future.” So, although it is w rong to take one art 
and extrapolate universals fiom  it, it is equally w rong to engage one art in isolation from its 
place in the history o f  ait. This implies that “What are called questions o f  aesthetic 
constitution are demarcated by the tension between the motive force o f  art and art as past 
history. It is through its dynamic laws, not through some invariable principle that art can be 
understood .”^'
With this w e can begin to  realign the w ay we think o f  Aesthetic Theory. Although 
preoccupied with m odern ait, a large part o f  A d o rn o ’s argument is concerned with analysing 
the diflerences between it and the art o f  the past, and a concern with what m odem  art implies 
for the future o f  art. Directly attributable to this are arguments in Aesthetic Theory which 
make historical claims about pre-m odern art, descriptive claims about existing examples o f  
modern art, and prescriptive claims about what modern art implies for the future. I laving 
established the principle that aesthetics and its object are partially determined by (heir own 
respective histories, w e  can examine the w ay A dorno configures this particular relation as it 
pertains to Aesthetic Theory.
Aesthetic Theory, p. 3.
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A dorno is writing at a particular moment in history, and lie makes a quite explicit 
claim about this moment: “Everything about art has become problematic: its inner life, its 
relation to  society, even its right to exist.” W e can legitimately understand this overt and 
specific invocation o f  the historical moment to apply to the time when Aesthetic Theory was 
wi itten, which is the 1960’s. Equally, this claim is a diagnosis o f  the failure o f  revolut ionary 
modern art o f  the early years o f  the century. It is in the light o f  his prognosis o f  the failure o f  
the avant-garde that A d o rn o ’s argument describes what art ought to be aiming for, not its 
existing condition. At the same time, his prescriptions are often expressed in the present, 
rather than in the future tense. An effect is to give the impression that he is describing the 
existing condition o f  art.^' M ore  contentiously, descriptive and prescriptive statements 
fiequently have a polemical edge which gives his argument: a combative lone. Sometimes the 
language and argument o ï Aesthetic Theory echoes early avant-garde manifestos, sometimes 
modernist criticism, sometimes history, sometimes philosophical aesthetics, sometimes 
Marxism. This deliberate confusion o f  presentational strategies, serve in Aesthetic iheory to 
undermine any distinction between philosophy, history and criticism.
A blurring between the descriptive and prescriptive is nothing new, especially within 
the tradition o f  critical accounts  o f  twentieth-century art. C ontroversy  over how  and why this 
art is significant is inseparable fiom its development, but the w ay different arguments have 
been presented has varied enormously, as have their aspirations. From the first arguments 
over the significance o f  Cubism, through Greenberg, to analysis o f  the current condition o f  
art, one o f  the more familiar critical strategies has been to frame established achievements o f  
the past in a w ay that justifies a particular approach to present practice. I his is rightly
” Ziiidervaart uses the terms "retrospective" and "prospective" to distinguish Adorno’s difTcrcnt trcntmcni of 
premodern and modern art, but he also notes that within the discussion of modern art Adorno engages botli in 
defining an aestlietic for existing works, and for a future art. It is this, second contrast, within his discussion 
of modern art, with which I am concerned here, see Zuidervaart, L. Adorno’s  Aesthetic iheory: The 
Redemption o f  Illusion, (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT, 1991), pp. 56-7
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condemned when writing history, but less commented on in m anilestos and criticism which 
tend, by definition, to  be more overtly partisan, and are accepted as such.
At the same time, the contrast between historical and critical writing is tenuous, 
because at best, it signals little more^an au tho r’s intent. As a result, controversies which 
surround the reception o f  theories o f  m odem  art have sometimes manifested themselves, not 
as disputes about content, but as debates about the status o f  claims a particular theory may. 
o r  may not, be making. This confusion has been especially typical o f  the reception o f  
G reenberg’s theory. For example, one o f  the m ore naive objections to aspects o f  his criticism 
has questioned the dogm atic and prescriptive presentation o f  som e o f  his descriptions o f  the 
history o f  m odern painting. This misreads him by dissociating his theory fiom the context in 
which it was first articulated ; whether his history o f  modern painting w as right or w rong is o f  
secondaiy interest to  its function in defining a context to undeiw iite  the practice o f  early 
Abstract Expressionist painters.
As w e have seen, A dorno does not conceive his discussion as relating directly and 
unproblematically to  its object; its combative tone signals an engagem ent with the on-going 
dispute about the meaning and significance o f  modern art. Obviously the same goes for 
Greenberg, but a part o f  the problem with G reenberg’s theory w as its success in surviving the 
historical and critical m oment o f  its origin to become, for a while, the dominant account o f  
the history o f  twentieth-century art. The transition from criticism to history, from prescription 
to  description, derives fiom  the way his writing moves seemlessly between polemic and 
argument, concealing their difierences. A s an author, A dorno is committed to attempting to 
pre-empt the kind o f  unthinking reception which was the fate o f  G reenberg 's  theory, a 
reception which was arguably a function o f  the au thor’s, and som e o f  his subseipient 
readers’, need to look for some presumed foundation fiom which to understand modern art.
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Aesihelic Theory's combative tone, then, derives in part fiom the explicitness with which the
author invokes and heightens our awareness o f  its disputatious critical context. Adorno
achieves this by defining aspects o f  his argument against o ther theories, serving to claril'y his
position, and keeping us in mind o f  competing claims. He mixes prescription and description
and, unlike Greenberg, does so in a manner which attem pts to  m ake us aware o f  their
confusion and its implications.
Unlike G reenberg’s theory, A d o rn o ’s did not develop out o f  a rapport with an
emerging category o f  art. By the mid 1960s, when he w as working on Aesihelic Theory, the
kind o f  high modernism which the  w o rk  is sometimes described as defending was far fiom
new. This is no t to claim A d o rn o ’s theory o f  modernism is any less partisan than
G reenberg’s, but A d o rn o ’s relation to  the art he is defending is neither as materially or as
historically proximate - an irrelevant observation if its purpose is to argue the validity or
otherwise o f  either theory. W hat it does is signal the potential for their having radically
different motivations. G reenberg’s theory o f  modernism is essentially an attempt to
assimilate an emerging form into the tradition o f  the avant-garde. A dorno  is clear that (his
function o f  the critic is actually counter-productive:
1 his integration is not, as the progressivist cliche would have it. some 
posthum ous benediction that says this or that artistic phenomenon was meet 
and p roper after all. Reception tends to dull the critical edge o f  art... Once ait 
w orks  are buried in the pantheon o f  cultural exhibits, theii truth content 
deteriorates.^^
W hat is at s take in Aesthetic Theory then is not the attem pt to make modern art acceptable, 
but the opposite. One facet o f  the crisis o f  modern art A dorno  is confronting in Aesthetic 
Theory is precisely that it has become accessible. W hat A dorno  is attempting to achieve 
through his argument is to re-invoke the atm ospheie o f  artistic and cultural crisis which can
Aesihelic 'theory, p. 325.
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accompany m odem  art. Crisis is invoked both in the arguments he presents in defence o f
modern art, but also in their presentation. So it is that he writes,
Tlie great expanse o f  the unforeseen which revolutionary artistic movements 
began to  explore around 1910 did not live up to the prom ise o f  happiness and 
adventure it had held out. W hat has happened instead is that the process 
begun at that time came to corrode the very same categories which were its 
own reason for being.
“Modernism” as Cultural Crisis
The w ay A dorno  re-gen era tes the crisis o f  the early avant-garde in Aesthetic Theory 
has a distinct pattern which can usefully be compared with the w ay he begins Negative 
Dialectics. A t the beginning o f  Aesthetic Theoiy, Adorno  identifies a significant moment in 
the history o f  art, and describes it fiom the perspective o f  the present as having failed in as 
much as it is characterised as no t  having fully realised its potential. In the Introduction to 
Negative Dialectics he defines his philosophical project as dealing with the implications Ibi 
philosophy in the light o f  H egel’s failure: “ I f  Hegel’s dialectics constituted the unsuccessful 
attem pt to use philosophical concepts for coping with all that is heterogeneous to those 
concepts, the relationship to  dialectics is due for an accounting in so fat as his attempt 
failed.” ’^ As w e have seen, A dorno  is completely committed to H egel’s aspiration that 
philosophy should aim “to use philosophical concepts for coping with all that is 
heterogeneous to  those  concepts” . A s is also obvious to  A dorno, Hegel failed to do (his 
properly, and this means revisiting Hegel’s characterisation o f  the task o f  philosophy and the 
way he went about fulfilling it. Tlie stakes in doing so, however, are not just a matter o f  
philosophical interest. Rather, the “task w ould be to impiire w hether and how  there can still 
be a philosophy at all, no w  that H egel’s has fallen, just as Kant incpiired into the possibility o f
A e.S’lhetic Theory, p. 1.
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metaphysics after the critique o f  rationalism.”^^  So although H egel’s aspiration for philosophy
remains intact, the fact that he failed, and that the nature o f  his failure is far from obvious,
puts  philosophy itself in jeopardy. This means that A d o rn o ’s configuration o f  his own
position as a philosopher is both absolutely immersed in the history o f  philosophy, specifically
H egel’s critique o f  Kant and, at the same time, it is potentially extremely anti-philosophical,
in so far as he expresses a doubt about the possibility o f  doing philosophy a I all. Nogalive
Dialectics begins with one o f  the m ore  familiar sound-bites by which Adorno  is known, and
this expresses his paradoxical position;
Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to 
realise it was missed. The summary judgem ent that it had ijjjerely interpreted 
the world, that resignation in the face o f  reality had crippled^in itself, becomes 
a defeatism o f  reason after the  attempt to change the world miscarried . ' ’
The simultaneous emphasis on the necessity o f  philosophy and his skepticism tow ards
it manifests itself in A d o rn o ’s hostility to  the various empiricist and positivist inheritors o f  the
neo-Kantianism o f  the late nineteenth-century, but also the anti-rational claims o f  Orthodox
Marxism and Heidegger. In o ther words, Hegel’s aspirations remain relevant, because they
were unrealised, but this cannot be allowed to slip into a “defeatism o f  l eason”, either o f  the
Marxist or Heideggarian variety.
fhe  problem for A dorno  in Aesthetic Theoiy is more complicated because he is
characterising tw o different traditions as having failed, while remaining relevant because o f
their failures. In the Draft Introduction he has presented us with his diagnosis of' the demise
o f  traditional aesthetics, and on the first page o f  chapter I he describes what he sees as the
failure o f  early avant-garde art. W e have already considered at some length Adorno 's account
o f  the failure o f  traditional aesthetics and the implications for the future o f  aesthetics. His
d ia g n o s i s  o f  t h e  fa i lu r e  o f  t h e  e a r ly  a v a n t - g a r d e  t a k e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s h a p e :
Negative Dialectics, p. 4.
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Wliat at first looked like an expansion o f  art turned out to be its 
contraction. The great expanse o f  the unforeseen which revolutionary artistic 
movements began to explore around 1910 did not live up to  the promise ol 
happiness and adventure it had held out. W hat has happened instead is that tJie 
process  begun at the  time came to  corrode the very same categories which 
w ere its own reason for being. An ever-increasing num ber o f  things artistic 
were drawn into an eddy o f  new  taboos, and ra ther than enjoy theii newly 
won fi'eedom, artists eveiyw here w ere quick to look for some piesumed 
foundation for what they w ere doing. This flight into a new  older, however 
flimsy, is a reflection o f  the fact that absolute freedom in art - which is 
particular - contradicts the abiding unfreedom o f  the social whole.
3 0 5
Returning to the earlier discussion o f  how  Adorno reconstitutes the way aesthetics 
must confront its object historically, in the sense that it is understood  as shaped by its relation 
to the past and to  the promise for the fiiture, w e have here a series ol important truth claims 
which seem to  hover between the historical, descriptive and prescriptive. Adorno gives us 
some clear indications o f  precisely h o w  he is going to confront art in Aesthetic Theoi \ . Ihe 
crisis o f  the early avant-garde springs from its emerging “autonom y , which in this eonte.xt 
means a “freedom from external purposes” . It is this which diflcrentiatcs the art with which 
Aesthetic Theory is preoccupied fiom the art o f  the past and gives modern art its “radical 
specificity” . It is the uniqueness o f  the problems o f  m odern art which is the basis I'or 
A d o rn o ’s claim that the m ethods o faesthetics ,  which may have been relevant to Ihe art o f  the 
past, are inappropriate for the analysis and description ol modern art. At the same time, 
although “autonom y” gives m odern art its identity, it is precisely the inability o f  modern art 
to live up to  the implications o f  its autonom y that constitutes its crisis. For Adorno this 
implies the necessity o f  revisiting the problem o f  a r t’s autonom y and seking a more useful
way o f  confi onting it.
A dorno gives the following reasons for the crisis in art which all derive from its 
“au tonom ous” state: 1) the em ergence o f  a r t ’s autonomy began to “to corrode the very same 
categories which w ere  its own reason for being”, 2) “rather than enjoy their newly won
Aesthetic Theoiy, p. 1.
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freedom, artists everywhere w ere quick to look for some presumed Ibuudatioii for vvlial they 
were doing”, and 3) “absolute freedom in art - which is particular - contradicts the abiding 
unfieedom  o f  the  social w hole .”
Now, keeping in mind the comparison o f  the beginning oT Aesthetic Theory with (he 
beginning of Negative Dialectics, w e see a similar series o f  paradoxical implications begin to 
emerge. On the one hand, a r t’s “freedom form external purposes” suggests a utopian 
potential which resonates and radicalises K an t’s famous phrase “puipossiveness without 
p urpose” . Kant always maintains the  necessary link between art and its tradition, where 
A d o rn o ’s principle o f  “au tonom y” means the separation o f  avant-garde art (iom tradition. 
A cknowleding the im portance o f  a defining tradition, autonom y also implies the potential 
impossibility o f  art as a consequence o f  the corrosion o f  the categories which gave it its 
raison d'être. This leads A d o n io  to question the possibility o f  art: “as Ifegel realised, art can 
no longer afford to be  naive art. N ow adays artistic sophistication amalgamates itself with a 
naïveté o f  a different and stronger kind, which is an uncertainty about the purpose o f  art and 
the conditions for its continued e x i s t e n c e , A g a i n ,  as with A d o rn o ’s ambivalent attitude 
regarding the possibility o f  philosophy, with art w e are presented with a similar paradox. On 
the one hand, Adorno  expresses w hat still looks like an extremely controversial “uneeitainly 
about the continued existence o f  ar t” while also rejecting theorisations o f  radically anti-art 
positions. For example, he exj)licitly distances himself from M arcuse’s The Affirmative 
Character o f Culture, saying “A  rabid critique o f  cultuie is not the same as a ladical critique 
o f  culture. A s culture is not completely w iong  just because it failed, so affirmation in art is 
not completely w rong e i t h e r . F l o w  does this tension between the collapse and necessity ol 
culture play out in Aesthetic Theoiy in term s o f  the tradition o f  the reception o f  modern art?
A e.'ithetic 'Theory, p. 2.
^'C\e.sthetic 'theory, p. 357.
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Aesthetic Theory and the crisis of modern criticism
I h e  proposition that the definition o f  painting can stretch to include hoth 
lepresentational and non-representational w orks  is the most radical claim in the history o f  art 
criticism. A t the same time, the g rounds on which such continuity is diagnosed vary and 
c a n y  consequently varied implications for the way w e think o f  painting aller the critical 
assimilation o f  abstraction. Aesthetic Theory engages this debate, but intervenes from what 
seems to be an unfamiliar and even old-fashioned position. As w e have seen, it does not 
attempt to alleviate the crisis resulting f iom  the rejection o f  mimesis critically, but to re­
emphasise the crisis as continuing. That this kind o f  argument should appear unfamiliar or 
possibly tendentious is, in part, a tribute to the success o f  modernist criticism that has aimed 
to underw iite  the legitimacy o f  abstract painting by emphasising its continuities with the past. 
Indeed, it is as a polemic against the supposedly successful critical assimilation o f  abstract 
painting, with the associated implication that it has ceased to be problematic, that we must 
read the second sentence o f  Aesthetic Theory: “Everything about ait has become 
problematic: its inner life, its relation to  society, even its right to exist”. Again, this is not a 
lament for the past, but the rejection o f  the grounds on which abstract painting has been 
justified by modern criticism and the effects o f  this justification on the way we think o f  
painting.
Having said this, it is not sufficient to think of Aesthetic Theoiy as an alternative 
solution to the problem  o f  abstract painting as that problem is defined by modern criticism. 
On the contrary, Aesthetic Theory does not accept the premises on which modernist criticism 
diagnoses mimesis and abstraction to  be in conflict. This is not to say that A dorno  necessarily 
argues that mimesis and abstraction are not contradictory categories, but that modern 
criticism over simplifies their relation, failing to understand the range o f  implications arising
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out o f  the rejection o f  mimesis by modern art. To  see how  Aesthetic Theoiy docs frame (his 
relation it is important to understand that, at least in part, it is a reaction against modern 
criticism and the  assumptions upon which it diagnosed the apparent incompatibility between 
mimesis and abstraction.
That in painting mimesis and abstraction have com e to be accepted as mutually 
corrosive categories is because abstract tendencies are identified as impeding the conditions 
necessary for mimesis to work. A  traditional w ay o f  historicizing this idea has been to argue 
that modernist painting progressively undermined the mimetic relation between art work and 
the w orld  by emphasising the material quality o f  the painted surface. I his thesis has been j 
criticised on a variety o f  grounds, but it remains intrinsic to the general understanding o f  a 
broadly based tension which animated late nineteenth and early twentieth-century painting. 
Indeed, an emphasis on the conflict between the idea o f  painting as representation and 
painting as object has becom e so much a part o f  our grasp o f  the development o f  modernism 
in painting that it is not obvious how  the relation between mimesis and abstraction might 
further be usefidly explored. In considering some o f  these arguments, however, the emphasis 
will not focus so much on their claims, w hose strengths and weaknesses have already been 
explored and debated extensively. Rather, w e will examine their possible motivations and the 
needs they fulfil in our historical and critical understanding o f  the development o f  modern 
painting.
1 raditionally, criticism has concentrated on the problem o f  establishing the grounds 
on which non-mimetic w orks  might be considered art. In o ther words, its self-appointed task 
has been to legitimate non-mimetic ait per se. One strategy for doing this has described the 
transition aw ay fiom representation as evolutionary, i.e. gradual and inevitable. Obviously 
G reenberg’s w o rk  is the classic example o f  this approach, although it is not unique. Alli ed
Aesthetic Theory, Art History and Criticism 3()‘)
B arr’s famous diagram on the frontispiece o f  Cubism and Abstract Art operates in a similar 
w a y /"  as does  Gleizes’ and M etzinger’s Du Cubisme, the first section o f  which opens: “ I o 
estimate the significance o f  Cubism w e must go back to  C ourbet.” *' Du Cubisme 
proceeds to w o rk  its w ay through M anet and Cézanne explaining ho w  their w ork predicts, 
but falls short o f  Cubism, fliis kind o f  argument tends to  attribute value to individual works 
by virtue o f  their place in an evolutionary chain that links them convincingly to earlier 
representational w orks o f  undisputed worth.
A nother influential critical response to  the rejection o f  mimesis by art has been to 
argue that it had always been a spurious compliment to the formal qualities of a |)ainting. 
Probably the best known argument along these lines is Clive Bell’s Art where the author 
famously declares.
Let no one imagine that representation is bad in itself; a realistic form may be 
as significant, in its place as part o f  the design, as an abstiact. But if 
representational form has value, it is as form, not as representation. I he 
representational element in a w ork  o f  art may o r may not be harmful; always it 
is irrelevant.'*^
l l i e  strategy o f  Bell’s argument is not to abandon systematic aspirations, but to isolate (he 
universal ‘a r t ’ character o f  all art works. In the early years o f  the century this kind o f  
argument was associated with an empiricist bent in formalist art history whicli emphasised (he 
importance o f  the art object held in isolation fiom auxiliary and oil en circumstantial, 
biographical, historical and sociological information. Woljfflin’s hugely influential stylistic 
history o f  art tended to  have a similar emphasis on stylistic autonomy and a conseipieiit 
separation o f  form and content. The latter w as often considered as “as a ‘mere prete.xL for 
the exercise and display o f  significant constructs” .'*^  As Gerd Wolandt has suggested these
Francis Frasciiis, Pollock and After: The Critical Debate, (London: Harper and Row, 1985).
H.B. Cliipp, Theories o f  Modern Art, p. 207.
Clive Bell, Art, (London: Chatto and Windns, 1949), p. 25.
Miciiael Ann Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations o f  Art History, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). 
p. 25.
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tendencies towards formalism, empiricism and the idea of a universal essence of art actually
“made it easier for the history of art to comprehend the early phase of modern art ”., .i.i
Philosophical Aesthetics and Art History
Adorno’s approach to the emergence of modern art is antithetical to arguments which 
emphasise its continuities with the art of the past and is inseparable from his commitment to 
judging ait. His emphasis on the necessary historicity of aesthetic ipiestions not only 
transforms aesthetics, but has important implications for the pract ice of art histoi y. Acsilwtiv 
Theory implies the relevance of problems of judgement for art history.
Formalist art history relies implicitly on aesthetics for its grounding, at least to the 
extent that the art historian’s concern with form is underwritten by the acsthetician’s 
argument that it is this self-evident and constant aspect of art which defines it as sucli. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that the development of art histoiy as a discipline with scientific 
pretensions was made possible by the preceding emergence of aesthetics as a legitimate and 
independent philosophical entejprise.'*  ^ Paradoxically however, the potential for this limited, 
but important, partnership between aesthetics and art historical formalism depends on 
sustaining a distance between them. Just as history is irrelevant to aesthetics, so for the 
formalist art historian the suggestion that a work of art needs any kind of philosophical 
justification is an impertinence. ITiis is, and must be, taken for granted. Without the certain 
knowledge that the object of the fonnalists attention is art, and that it is defined as such by its 
formal qualities, formal analysis is presented with the possibility of its own irrelevance. 
Formalist art history depends on taking for granted the value and meaning of art to the extent
Gerd Wolandt, "Philosophical Aesthetics and Empirical Research in Germany", Briiish Journal of 
Aeslhefics 18 (1978), p. 79
Gerd Wolandt, "Philosophical Aesthetics and Empirical Research in Germany", pp. 72-80.
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that the issue becomes transparent and invisible, literally disappearing from the field of issues 
that the art historian needs to address. So, although philosophical aesthetics and formalist art 
history would seem to be two sides of the same coin, the stability of their relation is 
paradoxically dependent on holding them apart. The universal aspirations of aesthetics risk 
being tainted by history; the empirical ‘facts’ of formalist art history are undermined hy 
questions about the value and meaning raised by aesthetics. Although superficially dilferent, 
an art history which takes for granted the value of its objects as art, and a culluial criticism 
which reads ait works as symptom of wider tendencies, are similar. I heir similarity resides in 
the exclusion of the question of what it is that gives an object value from the description of 
that object.
It has already been suggested that the possibility of a “scientific”, and therelbic 
academically legitimate ait history, depended on some guarantee of objectivity that aesthetics 
seemed to be in a position to fulfil. The potential problems within this relation were to some 
extent avoided by the increasing insularity of academic philosophers in the early twentieth- 
century and a parallel tendency of scholars in all fields to bequeath “the problem of 
knowledge” to these professional philosojihers.'*" To this extent the separation between 
empirical research and questions of value and meaning in art history was part of a wider 
tendency and is obviously not exclusive to art history.
In Panofsky’s critique of WdlJfiin a significantly different attitude to the necessity of 
describing an object in terms of an explicit engagement with the judgement of what gives it 
value emerges, fhis was not an overt challenge to the relation between art history and 
aesthetics; rather it was an issue generated out of art history. 1 he issue at stake concerns the 
justification for practising formalist art history a justification which should be supplied by
Larry Laiidan, Progress and Us Problems: 'Towards a 'Theory ofScienlific (irowth, (Berkeley: University of" 
California Press, 1977).
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philosophical aesthetics. It is in this sense of recognising the necessity for justifying the 
practice of art history, rather than an overt interest in aesthetics, that Panolsky signals the 
possible assimilation of aesthetic problems into the practice of art history. Indeed, Panofsky’s 
critique of Wôlfïlin is one episode in a German tradition of ait histoiy which Michael Podro 
has argued “aimed to explore particular works in the light of our conception of art - of those 
principles which governed art as a wh o l e . Gi v e n  this aim, the tradition which Podro 
identifies clearly impinges on questions of art’s definition which is properly idenlilied as (he 
territory of philosophical aesthetics. With regard to this, Panofsky in paKicular was 
concerned to ensure that the basic assumption of the difference of art fiom other historical 
objects be incoiporated into the way art historians describe it. A key motivation for his 
project was that he regarded Wolffiin as an example of an art historian’s failure to guarantee 
the adequacy of this relation. In The Principles o f Art History Wolffiin famously compares 
Renaissance and Baroque styles on the basis of five pairs of opposite “categories of 
beholding”.
Panofsky’s accusation is that while Wolffiin’s concepts are invaluable in describing
works of art, they do not do so in a way that is self-evidently pertinent to these objects’
status as art and, according to Podro,
Panofsky challenged, inter alia, Wolffiin’s concepts in the Principles, not 
because he doubted their descriptive aptness, but because he queried (heir 
critical relevance - or, at least, held that this needed to be shown. Wolffiin’s 
concepts were dependent upon empirical obseivation of individual works and 
lacked any guarantee that such critical obseivations were pertinent.
The significant implication of this criticism is that it signals the potential for a dilferent
relation between philosophical aesthetics and art histoiy. It implies that tjie art historian must
be clear about why an object is a work of art, and integrate that explanation into its hist orical
Michael Podro, The (T iiical f lis io n a n so /A rt, (Newhaven: Yale University Press. 1982) p. xv. 
Michael Podro, The (Tiiical Ilislorians o f  Art, p. 179,
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description. As a background to Panofsky’s argument, Michael Ann Molly has noted that 
when art history was developing in the nineteenth-century, its approach to art was to a great 
extent determined by the organisation of museums. '" It was felt that works of art could and 
should stand by themselves, needing no explanation beyond the bare minimum of (acts. 
WoHTlin’s activity as an art historian derives its justification from this institutional framework 
of values, and in this sense his formalist method might be said to be based on a deferred 
judgement that the objects which he scrutinises are art. Precisely because formal (pialities 
were taken for granted as the “art” in art works, it was not necessary for Wollllin .self­
consciously to attempt to explain why he isolated certain of their formal characteristics (or 
description.
Vasari and Winckelmann, each a candidate for the title of being the first art historian, 
both operated under the assumption that the cpiestion of judgement and history are 
inseparable. Both were unequivocal in identifying antique beauty as the standard against 
which all subsequent art could be judged, both adhered to a cyclical view of history to explain 
why this standard was not constantly upheld. Equally important, Vasari’s The Lives o f (he 
Artists (1568) and Winckelmann’s Histoiy o f Ancient Art (1764) are, at least to some degree, 
polemical works, fhis is not simply a function of their author’s commitment to Ihe standard 
of antique beauty. Rather, both books were written at times when their authors perceived the 
necessity of defending the classical ideal of beauty. Vasari wrote afiei the death of 
Michaelangelo, who, in Vasari’s judgement, achieved the pinnacle of perfection, surpassing 
even classical standards. According to the logic of his own argument, the pinnacle he has 
identified inevitably implies the cycle of art histoiy to be in immanent danger of decline. So 
when he famously wrote.
Miciiael Ann Holly, Panofslcy anci ihe lunmclalions o f  Art Hisiory, ([(haca; Cornell‘University Press. 1 )^84). 
p. 25.
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I have endeavoured to distiuguisli between the good, the better and the best...! 
have tried as well as I know how to help people who cannot find ont for 
themselves how to understand the sources and origins of styles/"
He was not only simply recording histoiy. Rather “He wrote, above all, for his fellow artists,
and his purpose was to establish and maintain artistic standards” '^. Similarly, Winckelmann
saw his Hisiory o f  Ancient Art, not simply as a histoiy and explanation of the progress and
decline of Greek ait, but as a ‘theoretical treatise, aiming to demonstrate, through the
example of Greek ait, what beauty was.”^^  The very fact that this was perceived to be
necessary suggests the standard of antique ait to be in question.
Now, this discussion is not necessarily aiming to locate Aesthetic Theory with a
tradition of ait history which makes the question of value explicit. Rather, it seeks to bring a
wider perspective to the charges of Adonio’s elitism. For example, for Zuideivaai t a major
difficulty in accepting Aesthetic Theory is the problem of why Adorno limits his argument to
the defence of such a narrow range of art. Zuidervaart asks if the dismissal of hclcronamous
art can be countered without doing undue violence to Adorno’s position. Zuider\aar(
identifies a problem in Aesthetic Theory through his characterisation of the work in the
following manner:
Theodor W. Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory carries the tradition of Marxist 
aesthetics to a new level of sophistication. The book develops a complex 
model of the social mediation of ait, and it provides a sustained mediation on 
the social significance of autonomous ait.^^
Zuideivaait’s argument is not simply an act o f  exegesis, it is also performative; if locales Ihe
problem of ait’s autonomy within a quite specific and well defined hisiory of Marxist
aesthetics, and the criticisms Zuidervart makes of it are defined by the préoccupai ions of lhal
Georg Bull ‘Introduction’ to Giorgio Vasari Lives o f the Artists, (London: Penguin), p. 14.
Georg Bull ‘Introduction’ to Giorgio Vasari IAves of ihe Artists, p. 14.
Gombrich, "Hegel and Art Histoiy", p. 3.
”  Lambert Zuidervaart ‘T he Social significance of Autonomous Art: Adorno and Bürger’7/u' Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art ('riticism 48 (Winter 1990), p. 61.
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tradition. Specifically Ziiideivaait focuses his attention on what has been one of the most
abiding criticisms of Aesthetic Theory, namely Adonio’s reluctance/inability to deal wilh
“lieteronomous” art. He wiites,
By ‘lieteronomous ait” I mean art that has not become relatively independent 
fiom other institutions of bourgeois society and whose products are produced 
and received to accomplish purposes that are directly served by other 
institutions of bourgeois society and whose products are produced and 
received to accomplish purposes that are directly seived by other institulions.
The term covers both traditional folk art and contemporary popular art 
Examples of heteronomous art would cover everything from liturgical dance to 
tribal masks, fiom advertising jingles to commercial movies. If such arl lacks 
autonomy, a crucial precondition for truth in art, then one begins to wonder 
about the legitimacy of measuring it according to the criterion of truth. '
A broadly similar criticism of the narrowness of Adorno’s aesthetics is Andreas 
Huyssen’s claim that “both Greenberg and Adorno are often taken to be the last ditch 
defenders of the purity of the modernist aesthetic, and they have become known since Ihe lale 
1930's as uncompromising enemies of mass c u l t u r e . 1 homas Crow says.
The implicit contention of modernist theory - and the name of 1 .W. Adorno for modern music can be joined to that of Greenberg for the visual ails - was that the contradiction between an oppositional art and a public wilh appelile for no other kind of opposition could be bracketed off, if not transcended, in 
the rigor of austere, autonomous practice. '^*
A related criticism is voiced by Peter Bürger when he claims that
Lukacs and Adorno argue within the historical institution that is art, and arc unable to criticize it as an institution for that very reason. For (hem, ihe autonomy doctrine is the horizon within which they think. In the approach which I propose, by contrast, that doctrine as the normative instrumenlalhy of an institution in bourgeois society becomes the object of an investigation.^
Lambert Zuideivaart, “fhe Social significance of Autonomous Art: Adorno and Burger’, 
The Journal o f Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48 (Winter 1990), p. 69.
Andreas Huyssen,/(//cv* the (heat Divide: Modernism, Mass ('idfure, Postmodernism, (Bloomington 
Indiana University Press, 1986).
Crow, Thomas. “Modernism and Mass Culture in the Visual Arts”, in Frasdna, F. Pollock and. Ifier The 
Critical Debate, (London: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 239.
Bürger, P. Theory ofthe Avant-Ctarde, trans. Michael Shaw, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), p. hi.
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These critics are all making slightly different points, but the continuing theine is the 
narrowness of Adorno’s argument and his inability to say anything positive about 
‘heleronomous’ art. At one level this criticism derives from the traditional philosophical that 
the value and usefulness of a truth claim is proportional to its scope, Adorno’s critics assumes 
that a truth claim about ah works of art wih be more useful and interesting than a truth claim 
about a limited range of modem works. Second, none of these critics of Adorno begin to 
address is the strategic sigitieance of Adorno’s judgements within the disintegrating 
hamework of his theory. The claims Adorno makes about modem art are not only significant 
in themselves but for their embeddedne^ in an argument which ruthlessly works out then* 
infinitely complex ramifications. The process of doing so not only undermines these claims  ^
but Adorno’s argument itself begins to disintegrate under the weight of the attempt to give a 
complete explanation for the historically specific phenomenon.
Contrary to the accepted perception a îAesthetic Theory, Eke Hegel’s Aesthetics and 
Art and Illusion it is consistent with itself to an extraordinary deg-ee. For Adorno, however, 
“The ground o f modernism is both the absence of a ground and the expEcit normative 
rejection by modernism of a ground, even if there were one.”^^  The nub is that fiom this 
perspective the order of consistency Gombrich and Hegel exemplify is unsustainable. What 
Adorno demonstrates is possible, liowevei*, is fire inevitability of making ultimately 
unsustainable assumptions and their process of dissolution. The uniqueness of Aesthetic 
Theory is that it reveals this dynamic as taking place in unforeseen and unthou^t of ways in 
the attempt to conceive of the possibility of art in the twentieth-century.
^Aesthetic Theory, p. 34.
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CONCLUSION
Although the loge of a book tmpKes a begmniug and an end, Aesthetic Theory 
does not reach a conclusion. According to Adorno’s paratactical schema each chapter 
relates Co the others Eke nodal points in a matrix. There is therefore no help from Adorno 
on how to conclude writing about die woiL. At one level this is an echo of Ms 
understanding of the incomplete task of philosophy, but to over emphasise thematic 
incompletion would be to neglect the definitiw claims he makes. Aesthetic Theory is not 
an endless play of signifrers on the model of a poststrueturalist text; it is dehberatefy 
anchc^ed to its okjects by the claims it makes for them. Admno makes specific claims 
about art in capitalist society which demand evaluation. Critics however, have faded to 
take account of the way the claims mack for art in Aesihetic Theory ti^e p l^e  within 
modes of argument which systematical undermme them. Adorno is tiiorougMy 
modernist in his. defence of autonomous art but postmodern in Ws demonshatlom of the 
impossibility of art.
Adorno’s project can be situated in relation to Lyotard’s well known definition of 
postmodernism. Lyotard has defined the state of postmodern knowledge as a series o f 
distinct islands, each of which makes different and ofren mutually corrosive claims to 
know the world. % a t  he neglects to say is that for the inhabitants of these islands of 
knowledge Me situation he describes does not exist. For die islander it is Ms or her umque 
access to truth which ^ves self identity; the intention to be inclusive w # alway'S fad to 
dehver complete inclush'eness and wih always exclude. Aesthetic Theory makes no such 
claims to inclusweness, the shrillness of Adorno’s defence of modernism is but one 
register of the way he works out the destruetkm of his own position.
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A way to explain the strategic significance of Aesthetic Theory from a 
postmodern perspective is say that it is model for a mode of communication to exist 
between the islands o f postmodernism. A pessmustic view o f the work would say that the 
process of positing a claim and then showing it collapse simply designates a new register 
of autonomous practice; another island. This is the impEcation Jameson’s reading of 
Adorno which seeks to isolate “structure” or “dialecfic” as the source of Adorno’s 
contemponay significance. In this thcsk I have attempted to demonstiate that this is an 
incorrect reading of Adorno. The ccëapse of phdosoffiiy which is taking place in 
Aesthetic Theory does not come out of Adorno’s abstract urge to develop an itnti- 
phdosophieal method. This is what Denida is trying to do. On the contrary, Adorno seeks 
to g^ low material reaUty to “speak” and so transform pMosophy in its very attempts to be 
better phEosophy. Phdosophy is m a state of dissolufron because its attempt to perfectly 
represent its object leads it to strain against the Emitations of its conceptual mediunr 
Mimesis takes place between the inadequacy of the stringently applied philosophical 
concept and the object it seeks to represent.
In Aesthetic Theory this dramatic tension is played out in the relation between 
philosophy and art. Adorno is unique among post-EnEghtenment philosophers m the way 
he configures that relationship. Since Kant’s Critique o f Judgement philosophers have 
projected onto this relationship an image which contrives philosophy as rational and art as 
sensuous. The failure of philosoplucal reason gave rise to a hadidon which projected onto 
art tire funcEon of an anhdote to Me failure of phdosopliy. Wrtii the crisis of niodenirsm 
however, the failure of art to properiy take over the mantle of truth from philosophy has 
given rise to a variety of skepticisms which have found their clearest support m the 
endemic reluctance to pass judgement on anytlm^, Lyotard cads this “tolerance for the 
incommessuraMe” and defends postmodcrmsm for ite inclusiveness. Adorno’s thought
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does not square with the momentum of this paradigm because he does not accept its 
model of the relation between philosophy and art. The point of his separation from this 
tradition of thinking is his conviction that art is not philosophy’s irrational other, but that 
philosophy contains the irrational. The irrational persists in philosophy in the 
philosopher’s continued deployment of concepts in the knowledge of their inadequacy. 
Doing philosopfiy in the knowledge of its temiinal inadequacy is thorouglily irrahonal. 
Aesthetic Theory is committed to making- fins m^onatit}' visible. It invrxhes making- 
visible the debilitating provincialisms which make it possibhe and these are rev^caled in the 
rrnmctic moment of phfiosophy as it tries to assimilate its concepts to particular objects.
Beyond Adorno’s strategic positkni within the histoty of post-Kantian philosophy, 
his modes of procedure su rest themselves as paradigius for the practice of art history of 
twentieth century art, Adorno may have something to say about the art Wstory of other 
ally but as Î argued in the chapter comparing Aesthetic Theoryr with Art and Illusion, the 
strength of both works derives from a deep seated systematic unity with the art being. 
diaeussed. Indeed^ to attempt to extend the relevance of Aesthetic Theory beyond 
modernism would be to attempt to universalise his thought in a way quite at odds with its 
radical specificity. It would be much better to concur with the momentum of Aesthetic 
Theory’ and agree that pre twentieth century art is a cultural and political inelevance.
Within the discipline of art histoiy there is an established split between theorists 
who have sought to import the implications of poststructuralism tfom literary criticism 
from traditional art historians who remain committed to an empirically driven practice. 
Adorno’s principle of mimesis as it is played out in Aesthetic Theory is a model which 
brings together an extreme theoretically derived self-consciousness about the potential 
worthlessness of what he is doirrg wrtli a eonnnrtrnent to understanding the concrete
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object. In practice, this implies the necessity tor exhaustive attention to the conditions 
which govern the reception of a work and the work’s own configuration. These tasks are 
demonstrated by Adomo as defimfively inseparable. In other words an abstractly 
theoretical approach to art history is just as useless as an approach which thinks it is being 
empirical. In combining boM perspectives Adomo pays attention to three kinds of 
question. How haw I conic to titink die way f am tiiinking*? How has tire ohfeel before 
me come to be the way it is? How does the immediate context of my confrontation with 
the object configurent experience mtd representation of it? In answering these questions 
Adomo does two tlmigs. First, he tlmdcs tliem throu^ kt terms of their knpheations for 
modernist art and re^esents, more theronghfy than anyone, the falling of modernism into 
postmodernism. Second, the power of Adorno’s critical intehigenee exemplifies Ms elahn 
that the irrational is not some realm beyond reason, but that it k  part of critical tMnking, 
and the objects confronted by critical thought. For the art historian this implies the 
necessity for an intensity of reflection on the three orders of mediation described above. 
Aesthetic Theory itself falls short, but its most important tinpficatibn for the art historian is 
the way it frames what art Mstorical ambition should be.
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